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CHAPTER XXIII. 
OF  THE COMPLEX  IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES. 
SECT. 
1. Ideas of substances, how made. 
2.  Our idea of  substance in general. 
3,  6.  Of  the sorts of  substances. 
4.  No clear idea of substance in general. 
5.  As clear an idea of  spirit as body. 
7.  Powers a great part of our complex idea of substances. 
8. And why. 
9.  Three sorts of ideas make our complex ones of substances. 
10. Powers make agreat  part of our cornplex ideas of substances. 
11. The now secondary qualities of  bodies would  disappear, if 
we could discover the primary ones of  their minute parts. 
12.  Our faculties of discovery suited to our state. 
13. Conjecture about spirits. 
14. Complex ideas of  substance. 
15.  Idea of spiritual snbstances as clear as of bodily substances. 
16. No idea of  abstract substance. 
17. The cohesion of solid parts, and impulse, the primary ideas 
of body. 
18. Thinking and motivity the primary ideas of  spirit. 
19-21.  Spirits capable of  motion. 
22. Idea of soul and body compared. 
23-27.  Cohesion of  solid  parts in body, as hard  to be conceived 
as thinking in a soul.  ~ 
28, 29. Communication of motion by impulse, or by thought, equally 
intelligible. 
30.  Ideas of  body and spirit compared. 
31. Thc notion  of  spirit involves  no  more clificulty in it than 
tl~at  of  body. 
a 2 iv  Contents.  Contents. 
32.  We know nothing beyond our simple ideas. 
33-35.  Idea of  God. 
36. No ideas in our complex one of  spirits, but those got from 
sensation or reflection. 
37. Recapitulation. 
CHAPTER XXIV. 
OF  COLLECTIVE IDEAS  OF SUBSTANCES. 
SECT. 
1. One idea. 
2.  Made by the power of  composing in the mind. 




1.  Relation, what. 
2.  Relations, without correlative terms, not easily perceived. 
3.  Some seemingly absolute terms contain relations. 
4. Relation difTerent from the things related. 
5.  Change  of  relation  may  be  without  any  change  in  the 
subject. 
6.  Relation only betwixt two things. 
7.  All things capable of  relation. 
8.  The ideas  of  relation  clearer  often,  than  of  the subjects 
related. 
9.  Relations all terminate in simple ideas. 
10.  Terms leading the mind beyond  the subjects denominated, 
are relative. 
11.  Conclusion. 
CHAPTER  XXVI. 
OF CAUSE AND EFFECT,  AND  OTHER RELATIONS. 
SECT.  -  - 
I. Whence their ideas got. 
2.  Creation, generation,  making alteration. 
3, 4. Relations of time. 
5. Relations of place and extension. 
6.  Absolute terms often stand for,relations. 
CHAPTER XXVII. 
SECT. 
OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY. 
1. Wherein identity consists. 
2.  Identity of  substances. 
Identity of  modes. 
3. Principinm individuationis. 
4. Identity of  vegetables. 
5.  Identity of  animals. 
6.  Identity of  man. 
7.  Identity suited to the idea. 
8. Same man. 
9. Personal identity. 
10.  Consciousness niakes personal identity. 
11.  Personal identity in change of substances. 
12-15.  Whether in the change of  thinking substances. 
16.  Consciousness makes the same person. 
17.  Self depends on consciousness. 
18-20.  Objects of  reward and punishment. 
21, 22. Difference  between identity of  man and person. 
23-25.  Consciousness alone makes self. 
26, 27.  Person a forensic term. 
28.  The difficulty from ill use of names. 
29.  Continued existence makes identity. 
CHAPTER XXVIII. 
OF OTHER  RELATIONS. 
SECT. 
1.  Proportional. 
2.  Natural. 
3. Iustitutctl. 
4.  Moral. 
5. Moral good and evil. 
6. Moral rules. 
7.  Laws. 
8. Divine law, the measurc of  sin and duty. 
9.  Civil law,  the trleasure of  crimes and innocence. 
10,  11.  I'l~ilosopl~ical  law, the mcasure of  virtne and vice. 
12.  Its enforcements, commendation, and discredit. 
13.  These threc laws the rilles of  moral good and evil. 
14, 15. Morality is the relation of  actions to these rules. 
16. The denonlinations of actions often mislead us. 
17. Relations innumerable. 
18. All relations terminate in simple ideas. 
19.  We  have  ordinarily  as clear  (or clearer)  notions  of  the 
relation, as of its foundation. 
20.  The notion  of  the relation  is the same, whether the rule, 
any action is compared to,  be true or false. 
CHAPTER XXIX. 
OF CLEAR AND DISTINCT,  OBSCURE AND CONFUSED  IDEAS. 
SECT. 
1.  Itlciis, somc clear im:l distinct, others obscure and confused. 
2. Clci~r  and obscore,  esplaincd by sight. VI  Con  tents.  Contents.  vii 
3. Causes of  obscurity. 
4.  Distinct and confused, what. 
5.  Objection. 
6. Confusion of ideas, is in reference to their names. 
7. Defaults which  make  confusion.  First,  complex  ideas 
made up of too few simple ones. 
8.  Secondly, or its simple ones jnnibled disorderly together. 
9.  Thirdly, or are mutable or undetermined. 
10.  Confusion, witllot~t  reference to names,  hardly conceivable. 
1  1.  Confusion concerns always two ideas. 
12.  Causes of  confusion. 
13.  Corl~plex  ideas  nay be  distinct in  one part,  and confused 
in another. 
14.  Tl~is,  if not lieccled, causes confusion  in our arguings. 
15.  Instance in eternity. 
16. ---  Divisibility of  mattcr. 
CHAPTER XXX. 
OF REAL AND FANTASTICAL  IDEAS. 
SECT. 
1. Real ideas are conformable to their archetypes.  - - 
2. Simple ideas all real. 
3.  Complex ideas are voluntary combinations. 
4.  Mixed modes,  made of  consistent ideas, are real. 
5. Ideas  of substances  are real,  when  they  agree  with  the 
existence of  things. 
CHAPTER XXXI. 
OF ADEQUATE AND INADEQUATE IDEAS.  .- 
SEC'I'. 
1.  Adequate ideas are such as perfectly represent their arche- 
types. 
2.  Simple ideas all adequate. 
3. Modes are all adequate. 
4, 5.  Modes,  in reference to settled names, rnay he inadequate. 
6,  7.  Ideas  of  substances,  as  referred  to  real  essences,  not 
adequate. 
8-1  1.  Ideas of substances,  as collections of their qualities, are all 
inadequate. 
12.  Simplc ideas b~ueu,  and adequate. 
13. ldeas of substances are &s.vvu,  and inadequate. 
14.  Ideas of  modes  and  relations are archetypes,  and cannot 
but be adequate. 
CHAPTER XXXII. 
OF TRUE AND FALSE IDEAS. 
SECT. 
1. Truth and falsehood properly belongs to propositions. 
2.  Meti~physical  uth contains a tacit proposition. 
3.  No  itlcn, as an appearance in tl~e  ~nind,  true or false. 
4.  Itlei~s  referred to any tl~inr:, may I)e true or fcllse. 
5.  Other men's itleas, reill existenre, iu~tl  s~~pposetl  rcitl esscuccs, 
are what nlen  usually refcr their idcas to. 
6-8.  The cause of  such rcfercnccs. 
9.  Siruple  ideas  may  be  false  in  refcrcnce  to  otlrct.s  of  tlrc 
same name,  but are lcilst li,ible to be  so. 
10. Ideas of  [nixed modes n~ost  liable to be false in this sensc. 
11.  Or at least to bc t!~ougllt  false. 
12.  And why. 
13.  -4s referred  to  real  existences,  none  of  our ideas can  bc 
false,  but those of substances. 
14, 16.  First, simple ideas in this sense not false, ant1 why. 
15.  Thoagh  one man's  idea of  blue  shoultl  be  different  from 
another's. 
17.  Secondly, modes not false. 
18.  Tliirdly, idei~~  of  snhstances,  when false. 
19. Truth or falsehood always supposes affirmation or negation. 
20.  Ideas in themselves neither true nor fill%% 
21.  But  are  false,  first,  when  judged  agreeable  to  another 
man's  idea without being so. 
22.  Secondly,  when  judged  to  agree  to  real  existence,  wheli 
they do not. 
23. Thirdly, when jnclged adequate without being so. 
24. Fourthly, when judged  to represent the reiil essence. 
25.  Ideas, when false. 
26.  More properly to be called right or wroog. 
27.  Conclusion. 
CHAPTER XXXIII. 
OF THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS. 
SECT. 
1. Something unreasonable in most men. 
2.  Not wholly from self-love. 
3.  Nor from education. 
4. A degree of  madness. 
5.  From il wrong connexion of ideas.' 
6.  This connexion how made. 
7, 8. Some antipathies an effect of  it. 
9.  A great cause of errors. 
10-12.  Instances. 
13.  Why time cures some disortlers  in the mind,  which reason 
can11ot. 
14-16.  Farther instances of the effects of  the association of  ideas. 
17. Its influence on intellectual habits. 
18.  Observable in different sects. 
19.  Conclusion. Contents. 
BOOK 111. 
OF WORDS. 
CHAPTER  I. 
OF WORDS OR  LANGUAGE IN  GENERAL. 
SECT. 
1.  Man fitted to form art,iculate sounds. 
2. TO  make them  signs of  ideas. 
3,  4.  To make general signs. 
5.  Words ultimately derived from suc11 as signify sensible ideas. 
6.  Distribution. 
CHAPTER 11. 
OF THE SIGNIFICATION OF WORDS. 
SECT. 
1.  Words are sensible signs neccssary for communication. 
2, 3.  \lrords are the sensible signs of his ideas who uses them. 
4.  Words often  secretly  referred,  first,  to the ideas  in other 
men's minds. 
5.  Secondly, to the reality of things. 
6. Wlords by use readily excite ideas. 
7.  TBords often used without signification. 
8. Their signification  perfectly arbitrary. 
CHAPTER 111. 
OF GENERAL TERDLS. 
SECT. 
1.  The greatest part of  words general. 
2.  For every particular thing to have a name,  is impossible. 
3,  4.  And useless. 
5. What things have proper names. 
G-8.  How general words are made. 
9.  General natures are nothing but abstract ideas. 
10. Why the genus is orclinarily made use of  ir, definitions. 
11.  General and universal are creatures of  the understanding. 
12. Abstract ideas are the essences of  the genera and species. 
13. They are the workmanship of  the nnderstanding, but have 
their foundation in the similitude of  things. 
14. Each distinct abstract idea is a distinct essence. 
15.  Real and nominal  essence. 
16. (:c-nstaot connrs;oo between thc name and nominal essence. 
17.  811pl1osition,  that  species  are tlistinguished  by  their  real 
('sscnccs, 11sc1ess. 
Contents.  ix 
18.  Real  and  nominal  essence  the same in simple ideas and 
modes, different in substances. 
19. Essences ingenerable and incorruptible. 
20.  Recapitulation. 
CHAPTER IV. 
OF THE NAMES OF SIMPLE IDEAS. 
SECT. 
1.  Names of  simple ideas, modes,  and substances, have each 
something 
2.  First, names  of  simple ideas and  substances,  intimate real 
existence. 
3. Secondly, names of simple ideas and modes signify always 
both real and nominal essence. 
4.  Thirdly, names of  simple ideas undefinable. 
5.  If  all were definable,  it would be a process in infinitum. 
6.  What a definition is. 
7.  Simple ideas, why undefinable. 
8,  9.  Instances, motion. 
10. Light. 
11. Simple ideas, why undefinable further explained. 
12, 13. The contrary showed  in  complex  ideas  by  instances  of  a 
statue and rainbow. 
14. The names of complex  ideas wl~en  to be made intelligible 
by  words. 
15.  Fonrthly, names of  simple ideas least doubtfill. 
16.  Fifthly,  simple  ideas  have  few  ascents  in  linea  priedi- 
camen tali. 
17.  Sixthly, names of  simple  ideas  stand for ideas not at all 
arbitrary. 
CHAPTER V 
OF THE NAMES OF MIXED MODES AND RELATIONS. 
SECT. 
1. They stand for abstract ideas as other general names. 
2.  First,  the  ideas  they  stand for  are made  by  the  under- 
standing. 
3.  Secondly, made arbitrarily, and without  patterns. 
4.  How tl~is  is done. 
5. Evidently  arbitrary,  In  that the idea is  often  before  the 
existence. 
6.  Instances,  murder, incest, stabbing. 
7.  But still snbservient to the end of  language. 
8. \llhereof the intranslatable words of  divers languages arc a 
proof. 
9.  This stlows al)ccics to I,e nlode for co~nlr~iir~ic~tio~l. Contents.  xi  x  Contents. 
10, 11.  In mixed  modes,  it is the name that ties  the combination 
together, and makes it a species. 
12.  For the originals of  mixed  modes,  we  look no  farther than 
the mind, which also shows them to be the workmanship 
of  the understanding. 
13.  Their being  made  by  the understanding witl~o~~t  patterns, 
shows the reason why they are so co~npouudrd. 
14. Names of  mixed modes stand always for their real essences. 
15.  Why their names are usually got before their ideas. 
16.  Reason of  my  being so large on this suhject. 
CHAPTER VI. 
OF THE NAMES OF SUBSTAX'CES. 
SECT. 
1. The common names of  substances stand for sorts. 
2. The essence of  each sort is the abstract idea. 
3.  The nominal and real essence different. 
4-6.  Nothing essential to individuals. 
7,  8.  The nominal essence bounds the species. 
9. Not the real essence, which we know not. 
10. Not substantial forms, which we  know less. 
11. That the nominal essence is that whereby we  distinguish 
species, farther evident from spirits. 
12.  Whereof there are probably numberless species. 
13. The nominal essence that of  the species, proved from water 
and ice. 
14-18.  Difficulties against a certain number of  real essences. 
19. Our nominal essences of  substances  not  perfect collections 
of  properties. 
21.  But such a collection as our name stands for. 
22.  Our abstract  ideas  are to us  the measure of  species.  In- 
stances in that of  man. 
23.  Species not distinguished by  generation. 
24.  Not by substantial forms. 
25. The specific essences are made by the mind. 
26, 27. Therefore very various and uncertain. 
28.  But not so arbitrary as mixed modes. 
29. Though very imperfect. 
30.  Which yet serve for common converse. 
31.  But make several essences signified by the same name. 
32.  The more general our ideas  are, the more incomplete and 
partial they are. 
33.  This all acco~nmodated  to the end of  speech. 
34.  Instance in cassuaris. 
35.  Men make the species.  Instance, gold. 
36. Though nature makes the similitude. 
37. And continues it in the races of  things. 
38. Each abstract idea is an essence. 
39.  Genera and species are in order to naming.  Instance, watch. 
40.  Species of artificial things less confused than natural. 
41.  Artificial things of  distinct species. 
42.  Substances alone have proper names. 
43.  Difficulty to treat of  words with words. 
44, 45. Instance of  mixed modes in kineah and nioupl~. 
46,  47.  Instance of  substances in zahab. 
48.  Their ideas imperfect, and therefore various. 
49.  Therefore to fix their species a real essence is supposed. 
50.  Which supposition is of  no use. 




1.  Particles connect parts, or whole sentences together. 
2.  In them consists the art of  well speaking. 
3,  4.  They show what relation the mind gives to its own thoughts. 
5. Instance in But. 
6.  This matter but lightly touched here. 
CHAPTER VIII. 
OF ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE TERMS. 
SECT. 
1.  Abstract terms not predicable one of another, and why. 
2. They sho\v the difference of  our ideas. 
CHAPTER IX. 
OF THE IMPERFECTION OF WORDS. 
SECT. 
1.  Words  are  used  for  recording  and  communicating our 
thoughts. 
2.  Any words will serve for recording. 
3.  Communication by words, civil or philosophical. 
4.  The  imperfection  of  words,  is  the  doubtfulness of  their 
signification. 
5. Causes of  their imperfection. 
6.  The names of  mixed modes doubtful :  first, because the ideas 
they stand for are so complex. 
7.  Secondly, because they have no standards. 
8.  Propriety not a sufficient remedy. 
9. The way of  learning  these names contributes also to their 
doubtfulness. 
10.  Hence unavoidable obscurity in ancient authors. xii  Con tents. 
11.  Names of substances of  doubtful signification. 
12.  Names of  substances  referred,  first,  to real essences, that 
cannot be known. 
13,  14. Secondly,  to  co-existing  qualities,  which  are  known  but 
imperfectly. 
15. With this imperfection  they  mny  serve for civil,  but  not 
well for philosophical use. 
16.  Instance, liquor of  the ncrves. 
17. Instance, gold. 
18. The names of simple ideas the least doubtful. 
19. And, next to them, silnple modes. 
20.  The  111ost doubtful  are  the  names  of  very  compounded 
mixed modes and substances. 
21.  TYhy  tllis imperfection  charged npon words. 
22,  23.  This should teach us moderation in imposing our own sense 
of old authors. 
CHAPTER X. 
OF THE ABUSE OF WORDS. 
SECT. 
1. Abuse of words. 
2,s. First, words without any, or witllout clear ideas. 
4.  Occasioned  by  learning names,  before the ideas  they be- 
long to. 
5. Secondly, a steady application of them. 
6.  Thirdly, affected obscurity, by wrong application, 
7.  Logic and dispute have ~nucll  contributed to this. 
8.  Calling it subtilty. 
9. This learning very little benefits society. 
10.  But  destroys  the  instruments  of  knowledge  and  corn- 
munication. 
11. As useful as to confound  the sound of the letters. 
12. This art has perplexed religion and jnstice. 
13. And oug!~t not to pass for learning. 
14. Fourtllly, taking them for things. 
15.  Instance in matter. 
16. This makes errors lasting. 
17. Fifthly, setting them for what they cannot signify. 
18.  V. g. putting them for the real essences of  substances. 
19.  Hence we  think  every change of  our idea in substances, 
not to change the species. 
20.  The cause of this abuse, a supposition of  nature's  working 
always regularly. 
21.  This abuse contains two false suppositions. 
22.  Sixthly, a supposition  that words  have a certain  and evi- 
dent signification. 
23.  ?'lie  c~nda  of li~~guage  : first, to con\.ey our ideas. 
... 
Contents.  xlll 
24.  Secondly, to do it with quickness. 
25.  Thirdly, therewith to convey the knowledge of  things. 
26-31.  How men's words fail in all these. 
32. How in substances. 
33. How in modes and relations. 
34. Serenthlp, figurative speech also an abuse of language. 
CHAPTER  XI. 
OF THE REMEDIES  OF  THE  FOREGOING  IMPERFECTIONS  AXD 
ABUSES. 
SECT. 
1.  They are worth seeking 
2.  Are not easy. 
3.  But yet necessary to philosophy. 
4. Misuse of  words,  the cause of  great errors. 
5.  Obstinacy. 
6. And wrangling. 
7.  Instance,  bat and bird. 
8. First remedy, to use no word without an idea. 
9.  Secondly, to have distinct ideas annexed to them in modes, 
10. And distinct and conformable in substances. 
11. Thirdly, propriety. 
12. Fourthly, to make known their meaning. 
13. And that three ways. 
14.  First, in simple ideas by synonymous terms,  or showing. 
15.  Secondly,  in mixed modes by definition. 
16.  Morality capable of  demonstration. 
17. Definitions can make moral discourses clear. 
18.  And is the only way. 
19. Thirdly, in substances, by showing and defining. 
20, 21. Ideas of  the leading qualities of  substances are best got by 
showing. 
22. The ideas of  their powers, best by definition. 
23. A reflection on the knowledge of  spirits. 
24.  Ideas also of  substances nlust be conformable to things. 
25.  Not easy to be made so. 
26. Fifthly,  by constancy in their signification. 
27.  When the variation is to be explained. Contents. 
BOOK  IV. 
OF  KNOWLEDGE  AND  OPINION. 
CHAPTER I. 
OF KNOWLEDGE IN  GENERAL. 
SECT. 
I.  Our knowledge conversant about our ideas. 
2.  Knowledge is the perception of  the agreement or disagrea- 
ment of  two ideas. 
3. This agreement fourfold. 
4.  First, of identity, or diversity. 
5.  Secondly, relation. 
6.  Thirdly, of co-existence. 
7.  Fourthly, of  real existence. 
8.  Knowledge actual or habitual. 
9.  Habitual knowledge,  twofold. 
CHAPTER 11. 
OF THE DEGREES OF OUR  KNOWLEDGE. 
SECT. 
1.  Intuitive. 
2.  Demonstrative. 
3.  Depends on proofs. 
4.  But not so easy. 
5.  Not without precedent doubt. 
6.  Not so clear. 
7.  Each step must have intuitive evidence. 
8.  Hence the mistake ex pracognitis et praeconcessis. 
9.  Demonstration not limited to quantity. 
10-13.  Why it has been so thought. 
14.  Sensitive knowledge of particular existence. 
15.  Knowledge not always clear, where the ideas are SO. 
CHAPTER 111. 
OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE. 
SECT. 
1.  First. no farther than we have ideas. 
21  secondly, no farther than we can perceive their agreement 
or disagreement. 
3.  Thirdly,  intuitive knowledge  extends itself  not to all the 
relations of all our ideas. 
4.  Fourtllly, not demonstrative knowledge. 
5. Fiftlily, seiisitivc kriowletlgc narro\rcr than  either. 
fi. sixtl~ly,  our kno\\letlge, tlrerefore,  narrower tlr;ru our idcab. 
7. IIow fiir our knowlcdgc rcacl~es. 
8. First, our knowledge of identity and cliversity, as far as our 
ideas. 
0. Secontlly, of  co-esistcnce, a lery little way. 
10.  l3ecause  the connexion  between  ~iiost  simple ideas  is un- 
known. 
11. Especially of  secondary qualitica. 
12-14.  And farther, because all connexion bet\+een any secondary 
and primary qualities is undiscoverable. 
15. of  repugnancy to co-exist, larger. 
16.  Of  the co-existence of  powers,  a very little way. 
17. Of spirits yet narrower. 
18. Tllirdly,  of  other relations,  it is  not  easy to say 11ow far. 
Morality capable of  demonstration. 
19. Two  things  have  made  moral  ideas  tl~ougllt  incapable  of 
den~oustration. Their complexedness,  and want of  sen- 
sible representations. 
20.  Remedies of  those difficulties. 
21. Fourthly,  of  real  existence;  we  have an  intuitive Itnow- 
ledge  of our own,  demonstrative of  God's,  sensitive of 
some few other things. 
112.  Our ignorance great. 
23.  First, one cause of  it, want of  ideas, either such as wc have 
no conception of, or such as pa~.ticularly  we  have not. 
24. Because of  their remoteness,  or, 
25.  Because of  tlreir minuteness. 
26.  Hence no science of  bodies. 
27. Much less of spirits. 
28.  Secondly, want of a disco\.erable connexion between ideas 
we  hare. 
29. Instances. 
30. Thirdly, waut of  tracing our ideas. 
31. Extent in respect of  universality. 
CHAPTER  lV 
OF THE REALITY OF OUR  KNOWLEDGE. 
SECT. 
1.  Objection,  knowledge  placed  in  ideas,  may  be  all  bare 
vision. 
2,  3. Answer,  not so,  where ideas agree with things. 
4.  As,  first, all simple ideas do. 
5. Secondly, all cornplex ideas, except of  substances. 
6. Hence the reality of  mathematical knowledge. 
7.  And of  moral. 
8. Existence not required  to make it real. xvi  Contents. 
g. Nor will it be less true, or certain, because moral ideas are 
of our own making and nanring. 
10.  Misnaming disturbs not the certainty of  the knowledge. 
11. Ideas of substances have their archetypes without us. 
12. So far as they agree with these,  so far our knowledge con- 
cerning them is real. 
13. In our inquiries about substances, we must consider ideas, 
and not confine our thoughts  to names,  or species sup- 
posed set out by names. 
14,  15.  Objection  against  a  changeli~lg  being  sometlling between 
man and beast answered. 
16.  Monsters. 
17. Words and species. 
16. Recapitulation. 
HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING. 
CHAPTER  XXIII. 
Of  our complex Ideas  cf  Subst~lnces. 
§ 1. TIIE mind  being,  as I  have  de-  Ideas of sub- 
clared, furnished with a great number of  stanceshow 
the simple ideas, conveyed in by the senses,  made. 
as they are found in exterior things, or by reflection 
on its own operations, takes notice also, that a certain 
number of these simple ideas go constantly together ; 
which being presumed  to belong  to one  thing, and 
words  being  suited  to common  apprehensions,  and 
made use for quick despatch, are called, so united in 
one  subject, by one  name;  which,  by  inadvertency, 
we  are apt afterwcrcl to talk of,  and consider as one 
simple idea, which indeed is  a complication of  many 
ideas together ;  because, as I have said, not imagining 
how  these  simple  ideas  can subsist  by  themselves, 
we accustom ourselves  to suppose some  substratum 
wherein they do subsist, and from which they do re- 
sult ; which therefore we call substance (I). 
(1)  This section,  which was intended only to show how the indi- 
viduals of distinct species  of  substances came to be  looked up011  as 
simple ideas, and so  to have  simple  names,  viz.  from the supposed 
substratum or substance, which was looked upon  as the thing itself 
in which inhered, and from which resulted that complication of  ideas, 
by wl~ich  it was represented to us, hath been rnistalien for an account 
of  the idea of  substance in  general;  and as such, hat11 been repre- 
sented in these words ;  but how comes the general idea of  substance 
to be framed in our minds?  Is this by  abstracting and enlarging 
~imple  ideas?  NO :  "Rut  it is by a complication  of  many simplc 
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substance  in  himself concerning his notion of pure sub- 
general.  stance in general, he will find  he  has no 
other idea of  it at all, but only a  supposition of  he 
ideas  togetlier : because, not imagining how these  simple ideas can 
subsist by themselves,  we  accustom  ourselves  to suppose some sub- 
stratum wherein they do subsist, and from whence  they do result; 
which therefore we call substance."  And is this all, indeed, that is 
to be said for the being of  substance, tliat we  accuston~  ourselves to 
suppose a s~lbstratnm  ?  Is  that custom grouiideil upori true reason, 
or not ?  If not, then accidents or modes m~ist  subsist of  tliemselvcs; 
and these simple ideas neccl no tortoise to support then]:  for figures 
and colours, &c. would  do well cnougll of  the~nsclves,  but  for somc 
fancies men have accustomed themselves to. 
To which  objection  of  tlie bishop of  Worcester,  our  author* an- 
swers thus:  Herein  your  lordslril) seems  to charge  me  ~vitli  two 
faults : one, that I make the gcncral ictca of substance to be framed, 
not by abstracting and enlarging simple ideas, but by a complicatioii 
of  many simple ideas together : the other, as if  T had said, the being 
of  substance had no otlier foundation but the fancies of  men. 
As to tlie first of  tlresc, I beg leave to remind your lordship,  that 
I say in more  places than one,  and particularly Book  111.  cliap. 3. 
$ 6. and Book I. cliap. 11.  $ 9. where,  ex projieseo, I treat of  abstrac- 
tion and general  itlcas, tliat  tlicy are all  made  by abstracting, and 
therefore could  not  be  undcrstood to incan, that that of  substance 
was made an  other way;  however my pcn might have slipt, or the 
uegligcnce oJcrpression, where I might  liave  something else  than 
tlie  general  idca  of  substance  in  vicw,  might  make  me  seem  to 
say so. 
That I was not spcaking of  tlie general idca  of substance in  the 
passage your lordship quotes, is manifest from the title of  that clrsp- 
ter,  which  is,  Of the complex ideas  of  substances:  and thc first 
section of  it, which your  lordsliip cites for those words you liave set 
down. 
In which words I do not  observe  any that deny the general idca 
of  substance to be made by abstracting, nor any that say it is made 
by a complication  of  many sirnple ideas togetlier.  But spcaliing in 
that place  of  the ideas  of  distinct  s~tbstances,  such as mall, horse, 
gold,  &c.  I say they are made up of  certain  combinations of  simple 
ideas,  which  combinations are loolied  upon,  each  of  them,  as one 
siniple idea, though they are many;  and we  call  it by one name of 
substance, though made up of  modes, from the custom of  supposiiig 
a substratum,  wherein  that cornbination  docs  subsist.  So  that in 
this paragraph I only give an account of  the idea  of  distinct sub- 
stances,  such as oak,  elephant,  iron, &c. how,  though they are made 
*  In his first letter to the l~isliop  of  Worcester. 
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knows not what  support of  such qualities, which are 
capable of producing simple ideas in us ; which qua- 
lities  are  commonly  called  accidents.  If  any one 
should be asked, what is the subject wherein colour or 
u  of  distinct complications of  modes, yet they are looked on as one 
ilea, called by one name,  as making distinct sorts of substance. 
But that my notion of  substailce in general is quite different from 
these,  and has no such combination  of  simple  ideas in it, is evident 
'from  the immediate following  words,  where I say,  * "  The idea of 
pure substance in general is only a supposition of we know not what 
support of  such qualities as are capable of  producing simple ideas in 
hs."  And these  two I  plainly  distinguish  all  along,  particularly 
where I say, "Whatever  therefore be the secret and abstract nature 
of  substance in general, all the ideas we have of  particular  distinet 
substailces are nothing but several combinations  of simplc  ideas, co- 
existing in such, though unknown cause of  their union, as makes the 
whole subsist of itself." 
The other thing laid  to my charge  is,  as if I took the being of 
substance to be doubtful, or rendercd it so by the imperfect arid ill- 
grounded idea I have given of  it.  To which I beg leave to say, that 
I ground not the being, but the idea of  substance, on  our accustom- 
ing ourselves to suppose some substratum; for it  is of  the idea alonc 
I speak there,  and not of  the being of  substance.  And having every 
where affirmed aid built upon it, that a man is a substance, I cannot 
be supposed to question or doubt of  the being of  substance, till I can 
question or doubt of  my own being.  Farther, I say, 1- "  Sensation 
convinces us,  that there  are solid, extended substances;  and reflec- 
tion,  that tlrcre are thinking ones."  So that, I think, the being of 
substance is not shaken by what I have  said:  and if  the  idea of it 
should be,  yct  (the being of  things depending not on  our ideas) thc 
being of substance would not be  at all shaken by my saying, we had 
but an obsc~ire  imperfect idea of it, and that that idea came from our 
accustomirrg ourselves  to suppose  some substratum ;  or indeed,  if I 
should say, we  had  no  idea of  substance at all.  For a great many 
things may be,  and are granted to have a being, and be  in nature, 
of wliich we liavc no ideas.  For example:  it cannot be doubted but 
there are distinct species of  separate spirits, of  wliich yet we have no 
distinct ideas at all: it cannot be questioned but spirits have ways of 
communicating their thoughts, and yet we have no idea of it at all. 
The being then of  substance being safe and secure, notwithstand- 
ing any thing I have said, let us see whether the idea of  it be not so 
too.  Your lordship asks, with concern,  and is this all, indeed,  that 
is to be said for the being (if your lordship please, let it be the idea) 
of substance, that we accustom ourselves to suppose a substratum ? 
1s that custom grounded upon true reason or no ?  I have said that it 
* B.  11. c. 23. 8 2.  -1 Ib. $ 29. 
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weight inheres, he would  have  nothing  to  say,  but 
the solid extended parts : and if  he were demanded, 
what is it t,hat that solidity and extension adhere in, 
he would not be in a much better  case  than the In- 
dian  before-mentioned,  who,  saying that the world 
was  supported  by a great elephant, was asked what 
the elephant rested on ; to which  his  anwer  was,  a 
great tortoise.  But being  again  pressed  to  know 
what gave support to the broad-backed tortoise, re- 
plied, something, he knew not what.  And thus here, 
as in  all other  cases  where  we  use words  without 
having clear and distinct ideas, we talk like children ; 
who being  questioned  what  such a thing is,  wliich 
they know not, readily give this  satisfactory answer, 
that  it  is  something : wliicll  in  truth signifies  no 
more,  when  so  used  either by children or men, but 
that they know not what;  and that the thing they 
pretend  to know  and  talk of  is what they have no 
distinct  idea  of  nt all,  and so are perfectly ignorant 
of it, and in the dark.  The idea  then  we  have,  to 
which  we  give  the general name  substance,  being 
nothing but tlre supposrd, bnt  unknown  support  of 
those  qualities  me  find  existing,  which  we  imagine 
cannot  subsist, "  sine  7-e subslnntc,"  without  some- 
thing to support thern, we call that support substcrn- 
tia;  which,  according  to  the true  import  of  the 
is  grounded  upon  this,"  That me  cannot  conceive how simple 
ideas  of  sensible  qnditics  should  subsist  alone;  and thcrefore we 
suppose them to exist in, ;~nd  to be  supported by, some common sub- 
ject ;  which support we  denote by the name substance."  Which, 1 
think,  is  ;I  true  reason,  because  it is  the  same  your  lordship 
grounds the supposition of  a substratum on,  in this very page ;  even 
on the repugnancy  to  our  conceptions,  that modes aud  accidents 
should  subsist  by themselves.  So  that I ]lave  the good  luck  to 
agree here with your lordship ;  and  consequcrttly  conc:lude,  I have 
your approbation in this,  that the substratum to modes or accidents, 
which is our idea of subktance in general, is founded in this, "  that 
we cannot conceive how modes or accidents can subsist by themselves." 
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word, is in plain English,  standing under or uphold- 
ing (1). 
$  3. An obscure  and relative  idea of  Of thesorts 
,substance in general being thus made, we  of substance. 
(1  )  From this paragraph, there hath been raised an objection by 
the bishop of  Worcester, as if our author's doctrine here concerning 
ideas had aln~ost  discarded  substance out of  the world : his  words 
in this paragraph, being  brought  to prove,  that  he  is  one  of  the 
pntlemen of  this new way of reasoning,  that have almost discarded 
out of  the reasonable  part of  the world.  To which  our 
author replies : * This,  my lord, is an accusation, wlriclt your lord- 
ship will pardon me,  if I do not readily knav what to plead  to,  be- 
kanse I do not understand what it is almost to discard substance out 
of the reasonable part of the world.  If your  lordship means by it, 
that I deny, or doubt, that tllere is in the world any such thing as 
substance, that your lordship will acquit me of,  when your lordship 
looks again into this a3d chapter of  the second book, which you have 
cited more than once ;  where you will find these words,  $4.  "  When 
we talk or think of  any particular  sort  of  corporeal  substances,  as 
horse, stone, kc. though the idea we have of  either of  them  be but 
the complication or collection of those several simple ideas of sensible 
qualities, which we used  to find  united  in the thing called  horse 
or stone;  yet, because we  cannot conceive how  they should  subsist 
alone, nor one in another,  we  suppose  them existing in, and  sup- 
ported by sotne common  subject,  which  support  we  denote by  the 
name substance; though it  is certain, we have no clear or distinct idea 
of that thing we suppose a support."  And again, $5.  "  The same hap- 
pens concerning the operations of the mind, viz, thinking, reasoning, 
fearing, &c. which we considering not to subsist of  themselves,  nor 
apprehending how they can belong  to body,  or  be  produced by it, 
we are apt to think these the actions of some other substance, which 
we  call  spirit;  whereby  yet it is  evident,  that  having  no  other 
idea, or notion of  matter, but something wherein  those  many sensi- 
ble qualities, which affect our senses, do subsist, by supposing a sub- 
stance, wherein thinking, knowing, doubting, and a power of  moving, 
kc. do  subsist, we  have  as  clear  a  notion  of  the nature or  sub- 
stance of spirit, as we have of  body;  the one being supposed  to be 
(without knowing what it is) the substratum to those  simple  ideas 
we have from without;  and the other supposed  (with  a like igno- 
rance of  what it is) to be  the substratum to those operations, which 
we experiment in ourselves within."  And again,  $  6.  r'  Whatever 
therefore be  the secret nature of substance in general,  all the ideas 
we have of  particular  distinct  substances are nothing  but  several 
combinations of  simple ideas, co-existing in such,  thouglr  unknown 
cause of  their union,  as makes the whole  subsist  of  itself."  And 1 
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corne  to have  the ideas  of  particular  sorts  of  sub- 
stances,  by  collecting such  combinations  of  simple 
ideas,  as are by  experience and observation  of  men's 
senses taken notice of to exist together, and are there- 
farther say in the same  section,  "  that we suppose these combina- 
tions to rest in, and to be adherent to that unknown  common  sub- 
ject,  which inheres  not in any thing else."  And $ 3. "  That our 
complex ideas of substances, besides all those  simple ideas  they are 
made up of, have always the confused  idea  of  something  to which 
they belong,  and in  which  they subsist ;  and therefore,  when we 
speak of  any sort of  substance, we say it is a thing having such and 
such qualities;  as body is a  thing that is  extended,  figured,  and 
capable of motion ;  spirit, a thing capable of  thinking. 
6r These, and the like fashions of  speaking, intimate, that the sub- 
stance is supposed always something besides  the extension,  figure, 
soliditv, motion,  thinking, or other observable idea, though we know 
not what it  is." 
- 
rr Onr idea of  bodv.  I sav.  ++  is an extended, solid substance :  and 
our id2  of  soul. is o?;  stibitance that thinks?  So that as long as 
there is any suih thing as body or spirit in the world,  I have  dvone 
nothing towards the discarding substance out of  the reasonable part 
of  the world.  Nay,  as long as there is any simple idea or sensible 
quality left, according to my way of  arguing,  substance  cannot be 
discarded ;  becausc all simple ideas, all sensible qualities, carry with 
them a supposition of  a  substratum to exist in,  and of  a substance 
wherein they inhere : and of  this that whole chapter is so full,  that 
I challenge any one who reads it to think I have almost, or one jot, 
discarded substance out of the reasonable  part  of  the world.  And 
of this, man, horse,  sun,  water, iron,  diamond,  &c.  which  I  have 
mentioned of  distinct sorts of  substances,  will  be  my witnesses,  as 
long as any such tl~ings  remain in being;  of which I say,  t"  That 
the ideas of  substances are such combinations of  simple ideas as are 
taken to represent  distinct  particular  things  subsisting by them- 
selves, in which the supposed or confused idea of  substance is always 
the first and chief." 
If, by almost discarding substance out of  the reasonable  part of 
the world, your lordship means, that I  have destroyed,  and almost 
discarded the true idea we  have of  it, by calling it a substratum,  $ a 
supposition of we  know not nhat support of  qualities as ,are capable 
of producing simple idcac in us,  an obscure and rclative idea:  4 that 
without knowing what it is, it is that which supports accidents;  so 
that of substance wc  have no idea of what it is, but only a confused 
obscure one of what it does : I must confess, this and the like I have 
said of  our idea of  substance;  and should be  very glad  to  be  con- 
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fore  supposed  to flow from  the  particular  internal 
constitution,  or unknown essence of  that substance. 
Thus we  come to  have the ideas  of  a  man,  horse, 
gold,  water,  &c.  of  which  substances,  whether any 
vinced by your lordship,  or any body else,  that I  have  spoken  too 
meall]y of  it.  He that would show me  a more  clear  and  distinct 
idca of substance, would do me a kindness I should  thank him  for. 
But this is the best I can hitherto find, either in my own thoughts, 
or in  the books of  logicians;  for their account or idea of  it is, that 
it is ens,  or res per se s~tbsistens,  dj. substans accidentibus;  which in 
effept is no more, but that substance is a being or thing; or,  in short, 
something  they know  not  what,  or  of which they have no clearer 
idea,  than that it is sometlling which  supports  accidents,  or  other 
simple ideas or modes, and is not supported itself as a mode,  or an 
accident.  So that I do not see but Burgersdicius,  Sanderson,  and 
the whole tribe of logicians, must be reckoned with  tlie gentlemen 
of this new way of reasoning,  who have almost discarded  substance 
out of the reasonable part of the world. 
But supposing, my lord, that I, or these  gentlemen,  logiciaiis  of 
note in the schools, should own that we  have  a very imperfect,  ob- 
scure, inadequate idea of substance, would it not be a little too hard 
to charge us with discarding substance out of the world ?  For what 
$most  discarding,  and reason;~ble  part of the world, signifies, I must 
confess I do not clearly comprehend ;  but let almost and reasonable 
part signify here wliat they will,  for I dare say your lordship meant 
something  by them;  would  not  your  lordship  think  you  were  a 
little hardly dealt  with,  if,  for  acknow1edg;ng  yourself  to  have a 
very  imperfect  and  inadequate  idea  of  God,  or  of  several  other 
things which in this very treatise  you  confess  our  understandings 
come short in, and caunot comprehend, you should be accused to be 
one of  these  gentlemen  that have  almost discarded  God,  or those 
other mysterious things, whereof you contend we have very imper- 
fect and inadequate ideas, out of the reasonable world?  For I sup- 
pose  our lordship means by almost discarding out of the reasonable  B  worl ,  something  that is  blamable,  for  it seems not to be inserted 
for  a  commendation;  and yet I think he deserves no  blame, who 
owns the having imperfect, inadequate,  obscure ideas, where he has 
no  better;  however,  if  it be  inferred from  thence, that either he 
almost excludes those things out of being, or out of rational discourse, 
if that be meant by the reasonable world;  for the first of  these will 
not  hold, because  the being of  things in tlie world depends not on 
our ideas: the latter indeed is true in some degree, but it is no fault ; 
for it  is certain,  that where we have i,mperfect, inadequate, confused, 
obscure ideas, we cannot discourse and reason about those things so 
well,  fully, and clearly,  as  if  \re  had  perfect,  adequate,  clear,  and 
distinct itleas. 
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one has any other clear idea,  farther  than of  certain 
simple  ideas co-existent  together, I appeal to every 
one's own experience.  It is the ordinary qualities ob- 
servable in iron, or a diamond, put together, that make 
Paragraph by that reverend prelate, viz.  The repetition of the story 
of the Indian  philosopher,  and the talking  like children about sub- 
stance : to which our author replies : 
Your lordship,  I must own,  with great reason,  takes notice,  that 
I paralleled  more than once our idea of  substance with the Indian 
philosopher's  he-knew-not-what,  which supported the tortoise,  &c. 
This repetition is,  I confess, a fault in exact writing:  but I have 
acknowledged and excused it in these words in my preface:  "  I am 
not ignorant how little I herein consult my own reputation, when I 
knowingly let my essay go mith  a fault so  apt to disgust  the most 
judicious,  who  are always the nicest  readers."  And there farther 
add,  That I did not publish  my essay for  such  great masters of 
knowledge as your lordship;  but fitted it to men of my own size, to 
whom repetitions might be sometimes useful."  It  would mot  there- 
fore  have  been  beside your lordship's  generosity (who were not in- 
tended to be  provolted by  this repetition) to have  passed by such a 
fault  as  this,  in  one  who  pretends  not  beyond  the lower  rank  of 
writers.  But I see your lordship would have me exact, and without 
any faults;  and  I wish  I could  be  so,  the better  to deserve  your 
lordship's appro1)ation. 
My saying, "  'rhat when ae  talk of substance, we talk lilte children; 
who being asked  a question about  sometl~ing  which  they know not, 
readily  give this satisfactory answer,  That it is something;"  your 
lordship seems mightily to lay to heart in these words that follow : 
If this be the truth of the case, we must still talli like children, and 
I know not  how it call  be  rcmedied.  For if  we cannot come at a 
rational idea of  substance, we can  have no  principle of  certainty to 
go upon in this debate. 
If your lordship  has any better  and distinctcr  idea of  substance 
than mine is, which I have given an account of, your lordship is not 
at all concerned in what I l~ave  there said.  But those whose idea of 
substance, whether a rational or not rational ides, is like mine,  some- 
thing, they Itnow not wl~at,  must in that, with me, talk like children, 
when they speak of  son~ething,  they lcnow not what.  For a philo- 
sopher  that says,  That ~rhich  supports accide~~ts,  is something,  he 
knows not what;  ancl a conntryman that says, the foundation of  the 
great church at Harlem is stlyported  by something,  Ile Itno\vs not 
what;  and a child that stands in the (lark upon his  mother's muff, 
and says he stands upon  sometlling,  he knows not wl~at,  in this re- 
spect talk  all three alilke.  But if  the countryman Iino~s,  that the 
foundation of  the cl~urclr  of Harlem is supported by a rock,  as the 
houses about Bristol are ;  or by gravel, as the houses about London 
are ;  or by woode~l  piles, as the houscs in Amstcrdaln are ;  it is plain, 
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the true complex  idea of  those  substances,  which  a 
smith or a jeweller  coinmonly knows  better than  a 
philosopher ;  who, whatever substantial forms he may 
talk  of,  has no  other idea of  those substances,  than 
that then having a clear and distinct idea of the thing that supports 
the church, he does not talk of this matter as a child; nor will he of 
-the  support of  accidents, when he has a clearer and more distinct idea 
of it,  than that it is barely something.  But as long as we think like 
children, in cases where our ideas are no clearer nor distincter than 
'theirs,  I agree with  your  lordship,  that I know not how it can be 
remedied,  but that we must talk like them. 
Farther, the bishop asks, Whether there be no difference between 
the bare  being  of a thing,  and its subsistence  by itself? To which 
our author answers,  Yes*.  But what will that do to prove,  that 
upon my principles, we can come to no certainty of  reason, that there 
is any such thing as substance? You seem by this question to con- 
clude, That the idea of  a thing that subsists by itself,  is a clear and 
distinct idea of substance : but I beg leave to ask, Is the idea of the 
manner of subsistence of  a thing, the idea of the thing itself? If it be 
not,  me  may have a clear and distinct idea of  the manner,  and yet 
have none  but a very obscure and confused  one of  the thing.  For 
example;  I tell your lordship, that I know a thing that cannot subsist 
without a support, and I know another thing that does subsist with- 
out a  support, and say no more  of  thein:  c'tn  you,  by having the 
clear and distinct ideas of  having a support,  and not having a sup- 
port, say, that you have a clear and di'stinct idea of  the thing that I 
know which has, and of  the thing that I know which has not a sup- 
port? If your lordship can,  I beseech you to give n~e  the clear and 
distinct ideas of  these, which I only call by the general name, things, 
that have or have not supports : for such there are, and such I shall 
give your lordship clear and distinct ideas of, when you shall please 
to call upon me for them ;  though I think your lordship will scarce 
find them  by the general  and confused  idea of  things,  nor in the 
clearer and more distinct idea of  having or not havin~  a support. 
To show a blind Inan,  that he has no clear  and dlstinct idea of 
scarlet, I tell him,  that his notion of  it, that it is a thing or being, 
does not prove he has any clear  or distinct idea of  it; but barely 
that he takes it to be something,  he knows not what.  He  replics, 
That he knows  more than that,  v,  g.  he knows that it subsists,  or 
inheres  in  anothcr  thing:  and  is there no  difference,  says  he,  in 
your lordship's words,  between  the bare  being of  a thing,  and its 
subsistence  in another? Yes,  say I to him,  a great deal ;  they are 
vel y different ideas.  But for all that, you have no clear and distinct 
idea of  scarlet,  nor such a one as I have,  who see and know  it, and 
hi~ve  another kind of idea of it, bcsidcs that of  inhercncc. 
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what is framed by a collection of  those simple ideas 
which  are to be  found  in them: only we nlust take 
notice, that our complex ideas of  substances, besides 
all those simple ideas they are made up of, have always 
the confused idea of something to which they belong, 
and in which  they subsist.  And therefore  when we 
speak of  any sort of  substance,  we  say it is  a thing 
having such or such qualities ;  as body is a thing that 
is extended, figured, and capable of motion ;  spirit, a 
thing capable of thinking ;  and so hardness, friability, 
and power  to draw iron, we  say,  are qualities to be 
found in a loadstone.  These, and the like fashions of 
speaking,  intimate,  that  the  substance  is  supposed 
always  something besides  the extension,  figure,  so- 
lidity,  motion,  thinking,  or  other  observable  ideas, 
though we know not what it is. 
Noclearidea  $ 4. Hence,  when we  talk or think of 
of substance  any particular sort  of corporeal substances, 
ingeneral.  as horse,  stone,  &c. though the idea we 
have  of  either  of  them be  but the complication  or 
collection  of  those  several  simple  ideas  of  sensible 
qualities,  which we  used to find  united  in the thing 
called horse or stone ;  yet because we cannot conceive 
how they should subsist alone, nor one in another, we 
suppose them existing in and supported by some com- 
mon  subject ;  mhich support we  denote by the name 
Your lordship has the idea of  subsisting  by itself,  and therefore 
you conclude,  you have a  clear and distinct idea of  the thing that 
subsists by itself: which, methinks, is all one, as if your countryman 
should say, lie hath an idea of  a cedar of  Lebanon,  that it is a tree 
of a nature to need no prop to lean on for its support ;  therefore he 
hath a clear and distinct idea of  a cedar of  Lebanon :  mhich clear and 
distinct idea, when he comes to examine,  is  nothing but a general 
one of  a tree,  with which  his indetermined  idea of  a cedar  is con- 
founded.  Just so is the idea  of  substance;  which,  however called 
clear and distinct, is confounded with the general indetermined idea 
of sorncthing.  But suppose that the manner of  subsisting by itself 
oives us a clear and distinct idea of  substance, how does that prove, 
?tiat  upon my principles wc can come to no certainty of reason,  that 
there  is  any such thing as substance  in  the world? Which  is the 
1)ropositiion to bc  proved. 
Ch. 23.  Our Ideas of  Substances.  11 
substance, though it be  certain we have no clear  or 
distinct idea of that thing we suppose a support. 
9 5. The same thing happens concern-  As ,lea,  an 
ing the operations of the mind, viz. think-  idea of  spirit 
ing, reasoning, fearing, &c. which we con-  body. 
eluding not to subsist of  themselves,  nor apprehend- 
ing how they can belong to body,  or be produced by 
it, we  are apt to think these the actions of  some other 
substance, which we call spirit :  whereby yet it is evi- 
dept, that having  no other idea or notion of  matter, 
but something wherein  those many sensible qualities 
which  affect  our  senses  do subsist;  by supposing a 
substance, wherein thinking, knowing, doubting, and 
a power of moving, &c. do subsist, we  have as clear a 
notion of the substance of spirit, as we have of body: 
the one being supposed to be (without knowing what 
it is)  the substratum to those simple ideas we have 
from without; and the other supposed  (with  a like 
ignorance of what it is) to be the substratuni to those 
operations we  experiment in ourselves within.  It is 
plain  then,  that the idea of  corporeal  substance in 
matter is as remote from our conceptions and appre- 
hensions, as that of spiritual substance or spirit : and 
therefore from our not having any notion of  the sub- 
stance of  spirit,  we  call  no  more  conclude  its non- 
existence,  than we can for the same reason deny the 
existence of body ;  it being as rational to affirm there 
is no body, because we have no clear and distinct idea 
of the substance of matter, as to say there is no spirit, 
because we have no clear and distinct idea of the sub- 
stance of a spirit. 
9 6. Whatever therefore be the secret,  ofthe  sorts 
abstract nature of  substance in  general,  of sub- 
all the ideas we have of particular distinct  Stances. 
sorts of  substances are nothing but several combina- 
tions of  simple ideas  co-existing  in such,  though un- 
known, cause of their union, as make the whole subsist 
of itself.  It is by such combinations of simple ideas, 
and nothing else, that wc represent particular sorts of 12  Our Ideas of  SuLstances.  Book 2. 
substances to ourselves ;  such are the ideas we have 
of their several species in our minds ;  and such only 
do we, by their specific names, signifiy to others, v.g. 
man,  horse,  sun,  water,  iron:  upon hearing  which 
words,  every  one  who  understands  the  language, 
frames in  his mind  a  combination  of  those  several 
simple ideas, which he has usually observed, or fancied 
to exist together under that denomination;  all which 
he supposes to rest in,  and be as it were adherent to 
that unknown  common  snbject,  which  inheres  not 
in any thing else.  Though in the mean time it be 
manifest,  and  every  one upon inquiry into his  own 
thoughts will  find, that he has no other idea of  any 
substance, v.  g. let it  be gold, horse, iron, man, vitriol, 
bread, but what he has barely of those sensible quali- 
ties,  which he supposes to inhere, with a supposition 
of  such a  substratum, as gives,  as it were,  a support 
to those  qualities  or simple ideas, which he has ob- 
served to exist united together.  Thus the idea of the 
sun, what is it  but an aggregate of those several simple 
ideas, bright, hot, roundish, having a constant regular 
motion,  at a  certain distance  from us,  and perhaps 
some other? As he who thinks and discourses of the 
sun has been more or less accurate in observing those 
sensible qualities,  ideas,  or  properties,  which are in 
that thing which he calls the sun. 
Power a  $ 7. For he has the perfectest idea of 
great part of  any of the particular sorts of  substances, 
complex  who has gathered and put together most 
ideas of  of  those  simple ideas  which  do exist  in  stances.  it,  among which  are to be reckoned  its 
active powers,  and passive capacities ;  which though 
not simple ideas, yet in this respect, for brevity sake, 
may conveniently enough be reckoned amongst them. 
-  Thus the power of  drawing iron is one of  the ideas 
of  the complex one of  that substance we call a load- 
stone;  and a power to be so drawn is a part of  the 
complex one we call iron : which powers pass for in- 
hcrclit cyualities in those subjects.  Because every sub- 
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stance,  being as apt, by the powers we observe in it, 
to change some sensible qualities in other subjects, as 
it is to produce in us those simple ideas which we re- 
ceive immediately from it, does by those new sensible 
qualities introduced into other subjects, discover to us 
those powers, which  do thereby mediately affect our 
senses, as regularly as its sensible qualities do it im- 
mediately : .u.  g. we  immediately  by  our senses per- 
ceive in fire its heat and colour ; which are, if rightly 
coqsidered, nothing but powers in it to produce those 
ideas in us :  we also by our senses perceive the colour 
and brittleness of  charcoal,  whereby we come by the 
knowledge of  another power  in fire, which it has to 
change the colour and consistency of wood.  By the 
former,  fire immediately,  by the latter it mediately 
discovers to us these several qualities, which therefore 
we look upon to be a part of the qualities of fire, and 
so make them a part of  the complex idea of it.  For  , 
all those powers that we  take cognizance of,  termi- 
nating only in the alteration of some sensible qualities 
in those subjects on which they operate, and so making 
them exhibit to us new sensible ideas ; therefore it is 
that 1 have reckoned these powers amongst the simple 
ideas,  which  make the complex  ones of  the sorts of 
substances ;  though these powers, considered in them- 
selves,  are truly complex  ideas.  And in this looser 
sense I crave  leave to be understood,  when  I  name 
any of  these potentialities  among the  simple ideas, 
which we recollect in our minds, when we think of par- 
ticular substances.  For the powers that are severally 
in them are necessary to be considered, if we will have 
true distinct notions of the several sorts of substaaces, 
$8. Nor are we to wonder, that powers  And 
make a great part of our con~plex  ideas of 
substances ; since their secondary qualities are those, 
which in most of them serve principally to clistinguish 
substances one from another, and corninonly make a 
considerable par.t  of  the complex idea of  the several 
sorts of  them.  For our senses failing us  in the dis- 14  Our Ideas oJ'  Substances.  Book 2. 
covery of the bulk, texture,  and figure of the minute 
parts of bodies, on which their real constitutions and 
differences depend, we are fain to make  use of their 
secondary qualities,  as the characteristical notes and 
marks, whereby to frame ideas of them in our minds, 
and distinguish  them one  from another.  All which 
secondary qualities,  as has been shown, are nothing 
but bare powers.  For the colour and taste of  opium 
are, as well  as its soporific or anodyne virtues, mere 
powers depending on its primary qualities, whereby 
it is fitted to produce different operatio~~s  on different 
parts of our bodies. 
Three sorts  5 9.  The ideas that make our complex 
of ideas  ones of corporeal substances are of  these 
make Our  three sorts.  First, the ideas of the primary  complex 
of  qualities of  things, which  are discovered 
stances.  by our senses, and are in them even when 
we  perceive  them  not;  such  are the bulk,  figure, 
number, situation, and motion of  the parts of bodies, 
which  are really in  them,  whether we take notice of 
them or no.  Secondly, the sensible secondary quali- 
ties, which  depending  on these,  are nothing but the 
powers those substances have to produce several ideas 
in us by our senses ;  which ideas are not in the things 
themselves, otherwise than as any thing is in its cause. 
Thirdly, the aptness we consider in any substance to 
give or receive  such alterations of  primary qualities, 
as that the substance so altered should produce in us 
different  ideas from  what  it did before;  these  are 
called active and passive  powers:  all which  powers, 
as far as we have  any notice  or notion  of  them, ter- 
minate only in sensible simple ideas.  For whatever 
alteration a loadstone has the power to make, in the 
minute particles of iron, we should have no notion of 
any power it had at all to operate on iron, did not its 
sensible motion discover it : and I doubt not but there 
are a thousand changes, that bodies we daily handle 
have a power to cause in one another, which we never 
suspect, because they never appear in sensible effects. 
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9 10. Powers therefore justly  make a 
powersrnaltc  great part of our complex ideas of  sub-  agreat part  stances.  He that will  examine his  corn-  of our corn- 
plex idea  of gold will  find  several of  its  plexideas of 
ideas that make it up to be only powers : 
as the power  of  being  melted,  but of  not  spending 
itself in the fire ; of  being  dissolved in  aqua  ?*via; 
are ideas as  necessary to make up our complex  ~dea 
of gold, as its colour and weight : which, if duly con- 
sidered, are also nothing but different powers.  For 
to speak truly, yellowness is not actually in gold ;  but 
is a power in gold to produce that idea in us by our 
eyes, when placed in a due light : and the heat which 
we  cannot  leave out of  oui. ideas of  the sun,  is  no 
more really in the sun, than the white  colour it in- 
troduces into wax.  These are both equally powers 
in the sun, operating, by the motion and figure of its 
sensible parts, so on a man, as to make him  have the 
idea of heat; and so on wax, as to make it capable to 
produce in a man the idea of white. 
5 11. Had we  senses  acute enough to 
The nor  discern  the  minute  particles  of  bodies,  secondary 
and the real constitution  on which their  qualities of 
sensible  qualities  depend,  I  doubt  not 
disappear, if  but they  would  produce quite  different 
could dis-  ideas in us; and  that which is now  the  coverthepri- 
yellow colour of  gold  would  then disap-  ma~y  oqes of 
pear,  and instead of  it we should  see an  minute 
parts.  admirable texture of  parts of  a  certain 
size and figure.  This microscopes plainly discover to 
us; for  what  to our naked eyes produces  a  certain 
colour,  is,  by thus augmenting the acuteness of  our 
senses, discovered  to be quite a different thing ; and 
the thus altering, as it were, the proportion of the bulk 
of the minute parts of  a coloured object to our usual 
sight, produces different ideas from  what it did be- 
fore.  Thus sand or pounded  glass, which  is  opnke, 
and white  to the naked  eye,  is pellucid in  a micro- 
scope;  and  n  hair  secn  this  way  loses  its  former 16  Our Ideas oj'Szrbstances.  Book 2. 
colour,  and  is in  a  great measure  pellucid,  with  a 
mixture  of  some bright  sparkling  colours,  such  as 
appear  from  the  refraction  of  diamonds,  and  other 
pellucid  bodies.  Blood to the naked eye appears all 
red;  but by  a  good  microscope,  wherein  its lesser 
parts appear,  shows  only some few globules of  red, 
swimming  in  a  pellucid  liquor:  and  how these  red 
globules would appear, if glasses could be found that 
could  yet  magnify them a  thousand or ten thousand 
times more, is uncertain. 
Ourfaculties  $ 19.  The infinitely  wise  contriver  of 
of discovery  us,  and all things  about  us,  hath fitted 
suitedtoour  OUT  senses, faculties,  and organs,  to the 
state.  conveniencies of life, and the business we 
have  to  do  here.  We are  able,  by  our senses,  to 
know and distinguish things : and to examine them 
so far, as to apply them to our uses, and several ways 
to accommodate the exigencies of this life.  We have 
insight enough into their admirable contrivances and 
wonderful effects, to admire and magnify the wisdom, 
,  power, and goodness of  their author.  Such a know- 
ledge as this, which is suited to our present condition, 
we want not faculties to attain.  But it appears not, 
that God  intended we  should have  a  perfect,  clear, 
and  adequate knowledge  of  them:  that perhaps  is 
not in the comprehension of any finite being.  We are 
furnished with  faculties (dull and weak  as  they are) 
to discover enough in the creatures, to lead us to t,he 
knowledge of  the Creator, and the knowledge of  our 
duty; and we  are fitted well enough with abilities to 
provide for the conveniencies of living : these are our 
business in this world.  But were our senses altered, 
and made much  quicker slid  acuter, the appearance 
and outward scheme of  things would  have quite  an- 
other face to us ;  and, I am apt to think, would be in- 
consistent with our  being,  or  at least well-being,  in 
this part of  the universe which we inhabit.  He that 
considers how little our constitution is able to bear a 
remove  into parts  of  this  air, not much  higher than 
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that we commonly breathe in, will  have reason to be 
that in this globe  of  earth allotted for our 
mansion the all-wise Architect  has suited our organs, 
and the bodies that are to affect them, one to another. 
If our sense of  hearing  were but one thousand times 
quicker than it is,  how would  a perpetual  noise dis- 
tract us!  And we should  in the quietest  retirement 
be less able to sleep or meditate,  than in the middle 
of a sea-fight.  Nay,  if that most instructive of  our 
senses, seeing, were in any man a thousand or a hun- 
dred thousand times more acute than it is by the best 
microscope, things several millions of  times less than 
the smallest  object  of  his  sight now  wolild then be 
visible to his naked eyes, and so he would come nearer 
to the discovery of the texture and motion of the rni- 
nute parts of corporeal things ;  and in many of them, 
probably, get ideas of their internal constitutions.  But 
then he would be in a quite different world from other 
people:  nothing would  appear the same to him  and 
others ; the visible ideas of every thing would be dif- 
ferent.  So that I doubt whether he  and the rest of 
men could  discourse concerning the objects of  sight, 
or have  any communication  about colours,  their ap- 
pearances  being  so  wholly  different.  And  perhaps 
such  a  quickness and  tenderness  of  sight could  not 
endure  bright  sunshine,  or  so  much  as  open  day- 
light ;  nor take in but a very small part of any object 
at once,  and that too only at a very  near distance. 
And  if  by  the help of  such microscopical  eyes (if I 
may so call them) a man could penetrate farther than 
ordinary into the secret composition and radical tex- 
ture of bodies, he would not make any great advantage 
by the change, if such an acute sight would not serve 
to conduct him to the market  and exchange;  if  he 
could  not see things he was to avoid at a conrrenient 
distance,  nor  distinguish  things he had  to do with 
by those sensible qualities  others do.  He that was 
sharp-sighted  enough to see tlre configur  s  t'  1011  of  the 
minute  particles  of  the spring of  a  clock,  and  ob- 
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terminate  in  sensible  simple ideas,  all united in one 
common subiect. 
U 
Idea of spi-  § 15. Besides the complex ideas we have 
ritual  of material sensible  substances,  of which 
stances as  I have last spoken, by the simple ideas tve 
clear as of  have  taken &om tlldse  operitions of our 
sub-  own millds which we experiment daily in  stances.  ourselves, 3s thinking, understanding, will- 
ing, knowing, and power of beginning motion, kc. co- 
existing  in  some  substance;  we  are able  to  frame 
the complex idea of  an immaterial spirit.  And thus, 
by putting together the ideas of thinking, perceiving, 
liberty,  and power  of  moving  themselves  and  other 
things,  we  have  as  clear a perception  and notion  of 
immaterial substances  as we have of  material.  For 
putting together the ideas of thinking and willing., or 
the power  of  moving  or quieting  corporeal  motlon, 
joined  to substance, of which we have no distinct idea, 
we have the idea of an immaterial spirit ;  and by put- 
ting together the ideas of  coherent solid parts, and a 
power of being moved, joined with substance, of which 
likewise we have no positive idea, we have the idea of 
matter.  The one is  as clear and  distinct an idea as 
the other : the idea  of  thinking, and moving a body, 
being as clear and distinct ideas as the ideas of  exten- 
sion, solidity,  and being moved :  for  our idea of  sub- 
stance is equally obscure, or none at all in both; it is 
but a  supposed  I know not what,  to  support those 
ideas we call  accidents.  It  is  for want of  reflection 
that we are apt to think that our senses show us no- 
thing  but material things.  Every  act of  sensation, 
when duly considered, gives us an equal view of both 
parts of  nature,  the  corporeal  and  spiritual.  For 
whilst I know, by seeing or hearing, &c. that there is 
some corporeal being  without me,  the object of that 
sensation;  I  do  more  certainly know,  that there is 
some  spiritual being  within me that sees arid hears. 
This,  I  must  be  convinced,  cannot  be the action of 
bare  insensible matter ; nor  ever  could be,  witliout 
immaterial thinking being. 
5 16. By the complex idea of extended,  NO  idea. of 
figured,  coloured,  and all other selisible  abstri~ctaub- 
which is all tliat we know of  it, 
\ye  are as far from the idea of the substance of  body 
as if we knew nothing at  all :  nor after all the acquaint- 
ance  and  familiarity  which  we  im:lgine  we  have 
with matter, and tlie many qualities Inen assure them- 
selves they perceive and  know in bodies,  will it per- 
haps upon  examination be found, that they have any 
more or clearer primary ideas belongip,rr to body, than 
they have belonging to immaterial spirlt. 
S 17. The primary ideas we have pecu- 
liar to body, as contradistinguished to spi-  ::?(?::id 
rit, are the cohesiori  of  solld, aid conse-  md 
cluently separable, parts,  and a power of  impulse tile 
cominniiicating motion by impulse. These,  primary 
I think, ilre the original ideas proper and  g;.Of 
peculiar to body ;  hr  figure is but tlie con- 
seiluerice of  finite extension. 
$ 18. l'lie icl~irs  we  have belonging :md  Tllilll,i,lg 
peculiar to spirit are tliiiiking ant1 nrlll, (IT  illld  IllUtivity 
a powthr of  p~lttiiig  body iilito 111otion by  tlie  primary 
tliought,  antl,  which  is consequent  to it,  of s1)i- 
1il)erty.  For as body caliiiot but coniinu-  rit. 
ilicirte its iliotion by impulse to another body, which it 
meets with at rest ; so the ~nilicl  can  put bodies  into 
niotioii,  or forbear to do so,  as it pleases.  The ideas 
of  existence, duration,  and  mobility,  are corninon to 
thein both. 
11).  There is no reason why it should  SpiritScapa- 
be  thought strange,  tliat  I make mobi-  We of mo- 
lity belong to spirit: for having no other  tion. 
idea  of  inotio~l  but  change  of  distance  with  other 
beings  tliat  are  considered  as at rest,-and  finding 
that spirits, as well as bodies, cannot operate but where 
they arc, ancl that spirits do operate at several times 92  Our Ideas oj*  Substances.  Book  2. 
in several places,-I  cannot but attribute change  of 
place to all finite spirits  (for  of  the infinite  spirit I 
speak not here.)  For my soul being s real being, as 
well  as my body, is certainly as capable of  changing 
distance  with  any  other  body,  or  being,  as  body 
itself;  and  so  is  capable  of  nlotion.  And  if  a 
mathemittician  can  consider  a  certain  distance,  or 
a change of  that  distance  between  two points,  one 
lnay  certaillly  conceive  a  distance,  and  a  change 
of  distance  between  two  spirits : and  so  conceive 
their motion,  their  approach  or  removal,  one  from 
another. 
3 20. Every one finds in himself,  that his  soul call 
think, will, and operate on his body in the place where 
that is ; but cannot operate on a body  or in  a  place 
an hundred miles distant from it.  Nobody can ima- 
gine, that his soul can think or  move  a body at Ox- 
ford, whilst he  is  at Idondon; and cannot but know, 
that, being united to his body,  it constantly changes 
place all the whole journey between Oxford and Lon- 
don, as the coach or horse does that carries him, and 
I think may be said to be truly all that while in motion ; 
or if that will not be allowed to afford us a clear idea, 
enough of  its  motion,  its being  separated  from the 
body in death, I think, will : for to consider it as going 
out of  the body,  or leaving it,  and yet  to have  110 
ides of its motion, seenis to me impossible. 
5 21. If it be said by any one, that it cannot chanve 
place,  because it hat11 none,  for the spirits are not In 
loco, but zdi; I suppose  that way of  talking will not 
now be of much weight to many, in an age that is not 
much disposed  to admire  or suffer themselves  to be 
deceived  by  such  unintelligible  ways  of  speaking. 
But if  any one  thinks  there is  any sense  in that di- 
stinction, and that it is applicable to our present pur- 
pose, I desire him to put it into intelligible English; 
and then from thence draw a reason to show that im- 
material  spirits  are not  capable of  motion.  Indeed 
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motion cannot be attributed to God;  not because he 
is an immaterial, but because he is an infinite spirit. 
9 22.  Let us compare then our complex  raea of  soul 
idea of an immaterial spirit with our com-  and body 
plex idea of body, and see whether there  "m~ared. 
be any more  obscurity in  one than in the other, and 
in  which most.  Our idea  of body,  as I think,  is an 
extended solid  substance,  capable  of  communicating 
motion by impulse : and  our idea  of  soul, as  an im- 
material spirit, is of a substance that thinks, and has 
a  power  of  exciting  motion  in  body,  by  willing or 
thought.  These,  I think,  are our  complex ideas of 
soul  and body,  as  contradistinguished ;  and now  let 
us exanline which has  most obscurity in it, and diffi- 
culty to be apprehended.  I know that people,  whose 
thoughts are immersed  in  matter,  and have so sub- 
jected  their minds  to  their  senses  that they seldom 
reflect  on any thing beyond them, are apt to say, they 
cannot comprehend a  thinking thing!  which perhaps 
is true : but I affirm, when they cons~der  it well, they 
can no more comprehend an extended thing. 
9 23.  If any  one  say,  he  knows  not 
Cohesio~i  of  what  it is  thinks in  him,  he  means,  he 
parts 
knows not what the substance is  of  that  ill body as 
thinking thing : no more, say I, knows he  hard to  be 
what the substance is of  that solid thing.  as 
thinking in  Farther, if  he says he knows not how he 
a sou,.  thinks,  I answer,  neither knows  he how 
he  is  extended;  how  the  solid  parts  of  body  are 
united, or  cohere together  to make  extension.  For 
though the pressure  of  the particles of  air  may ac- 
count for the cohesion of several parts of matter, that 
are grosser than the particles  of  air,  and have pores 
less  than the corpuscles  of  air,-yet  the weight  or 
pressure  of  the air will  not  explain,  nor  can be  a 
cause of  the coherence of  the particles of  air  them- 
selves.  And if the pressure of the rether, or any sub- 
tiler matter than the air, may unite, and hold fast to- 
gether the parts  of a particle of  air, as well as other 24  Our Ideas of Substances.  lIook  3. 
bodies ; yet it cannot make bonds for itself, and hold 
together the parts that make up every the least cor- 
puscle  of  that  mnteria  subtilis.  So that that hypo- 
thesis, how  ingeniously soever explained, by showing 
that the parts of  sensible bodies  are held  together 
by the pressure  of  other  external insensible  bodies, 
reaches not the parts of the aether itself; and by how 
much  the  more  evident  it  proves,  that  the  parts 
of  other  bodies  are  held  together  by  the  external 
pressure  of  the aether,  and can  have  no  other con- 
ceivable  cause  of  their  cohesion  and  union,  by so 
much the more it leaves us in the dark concerning the 
cohesion of  the parts of  the corpuscles  of  the aether 
itself;  which we can neither  conceive without parts, 
they being  bodies,  and divisible,  nor  yet  how  their 
parts  cohere,  they  wanting that cause  of  cohesion, 
which  is  given  of  the  cohesion  of  the parts  of  all 
other bodies. 
$ '24.  But, in  truth,  the pressure  of  any ambient 
fluid, how great soever, can be no intelligible cause of 
the cohesion of the solid parts of matter.  For thougln 
such a pressure may hinder the avulsion of two polished 
superficies,  one from another, in a line perpendicular 
to them, as  in the experiment  of  two polished  mar- 
bles ; yet it can never, in the least, hinder the separa- 
tion by a motion, in a line parallel  to those surfaces ; 
because the ambient fluid, having a full liberty to suc- 
ceed in each point of  space, deserted by a lateral mo- 
tion, resists such a motion of bodies so joined no more 
than it would resist the motion  of  that body, were it 
on a1  sides  environed by that fluid,  and touched no 
other body :  and therefore, if there were no other cause 
of cohesion, all parts of bodies must be easily separable 
by such a lateral sliding motion.  For if the pressure 
of the aether be the adequate cause of cohesion, where- 
ever that cause operates not, there can be no cohesion. 
And since it cannot operate against such a lateral se- 
paration (as has been shown), therefore in every ima- 
ginary plane,  intersecting any mass of matter, there 
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could be no 1~:ore  cohesion  than of two polished  sup- 
faces,  which  will  always,  notwithstanding any ima- 
ginable  pressure  of  a  fluid,  easily  slide  one  from 
another.  So that, perhaps,  how clear an idea soever 
Tye  tliink we have of  the extension  of  body, which is 
llothing but the cohesion of  solid parts, he that shall 
well consider it in his  mind may have reason to con- 
clude, that it is  as easy for him  to  have  a  clear idea 
how the soul thinks, as how  bodv is extended.  For 
since  body  is  no  farther  nor  otherwise  extendecl 
thnh  by  the union  and  cohesion  of  its  solicl  parts, 
we shall very ill comprehend the extension of  body, 
without understanding wherein consists the union and 
cohesion  of  its parts;  which  seems  to me as incom- 
prehensible as the manner of  thinking,  and how it is 
performed. 
25. I allow it is usual for most people to wonder 
how any one should find a difficulty in what they think 
they every clay  observe.  Do we not see, will they be 
ready to say, the parts of bodies stick firmly together ? 
Is there any thing more common ?  And what doubt 
can there be  made  of it?  And  the like,  I say, con- 
cerning thinking and  voluntary motion:  Do  we  not 
every nionlent experiment it in ourselves ; and there- 
fore can it be doubted?  The matter of fact is clear, 
I confess ;  but when we would a little nearer look into 
it, and consider how  it is done,  there I tliink we are 
at a loss,  both  in the one  and the other;  and can as 
little understand how the parts of body cohere as how 
we ourselves perceive, or move.  I would have any one 
intelligibly explain  to me  how  the parts of  gold,  or 
brass (that but  now in fusion were as loose from one 
another  as the particles  of  water,  or  the sands of an 
hour-glass),  come  in a few moments  to be so united, 
and adhere  so strongly one  to another,  that  the ut- 
most  force of  men's  arms chnnot separate  them : a 
considering man will, I suppose,  be here at a loss  to 
satisfy his own, or another man's  understanding. 
S 26. The little bodies  that compose  that fluid we 26  Our Ideas of  Substunccs.  Book 2. 
call water  are so  extremely small, that I have never 
heard of any one, who by a microscope (and yet I have 
heard of  some that have magnified to ten thousand, 
nay,  to much above a hundred  thousand times) pre- 
tended to perceive  their distinct bulk,  figure, or mo- 
tion : and the particles of water are also so perfectly 
loose one from  another,  that the least force sensibly 
separates them.  Nay,  if we consider their perpetual 
motion, w-e  must allow them to have no cohesion one 
with another ;  and yet let but a sharp cold come, they 
unite, they consolidate, these little atoms cohere, and 
are not, without great force, separable.  He  that could 
find the  bonds that t~e  these heaps of loose little bodies 
together so firmly ;  he that could make known the ce- 
ment that makes  them stick so fast  one to another ; 
would discover a great and yet unknown secret :  and 
yet, when that was done, would he be far enough from 
making the extension of body (which is the cohesion 
of its  solidparts) intelligible, tillhe could show wherein 
consisted the union  or consolidation of the parts of 
those bonds, or of  that cement, or of the least particle 
of matter that exists.  Whereby it appears, that this 
primary and supposed obvious quality of body will be 
found, when examined, to be as incomprehensible as 
any thing belonging to our minds, and a solid extended 
substance as hard to be conceived as a thinking im- 
material one,  whatever difficulties some  would  raise 
against it. 
$ 27.  For, to extend our thoughts a little farther, 
that  pressure, which is brought to explain the cohesion 
of bodies,  is  as  unintelligible  as the cohesion itself. 
For if matter be considered, as no doubt it is, finite, 
let any one send his contemplation to the extremities 
of the universe, and there see what conceivable hoops, 
what bond he can imagine to hold this mass  of  mat- 
ter in so close a pressure together ;  from whence steel 
has its firmness, and the parts of a diamond their hard- 
ness and indissolubility.  If matter be finite,  it must 
hiivc its extremes;  and there must be  sonlet,hing to 
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Ilinder  it fro111 scattering asunder.  If,  to avoid this 
difficulty, any  one will  throw himseJ,f  into the sup- 
position  and abyss of infinite matter, let hirn consider 
what light he thereby brings to the cobesion of body, 
and whcther he be ever the nearer  making it intelli- 
gible by resolving  it  into a supposition  the most ab- 
surd and most inconipreliensible of  all other : so  far 
is our extension of  body  (wliich  is  ncathing  but  tlie 
cohesion of  solid part},) froii~  being  clearer,  or  more 
distinct,  when  we  would  inquire  into  the  nature, 
cadse, or manner of it, thm  tlie idea of thinking. 
Q 28.  Another idea we  have  of body is  Communi- 
the power of cornixunication of mdtion bv  cation of mo- 
imfilse ; and of our souls,  the power (;f' tion b~ b- 
pulse,  or by  exciting motion by thought.  These  ideas,  t,lougllt, 
the one  of body,  the other of our minds,  equallv in- 
every  day's  experience clearly furnishes  tdligihle. 
us with;  but  if  here  again  we  inquire  how  this  is 
done, we are equally in the dark.  For  to  the com- 
munication  of  motion  by  impulse, wherein as much 
motion  is lost  to one  body  as  is  got to the other, 
which is the ordinariest case,  we  can have  no  other 
conception, but of the passing of  motion  out of  one 
body into another ; which,  1 think, is as obscure aiicl 
unconceivable, as how our minds  move  or  stop our 
bodies  by  thought;  which  we  every  moment  find 
they  do.  The increase of  motion by impulse, which 
is observed or believed  sometiines  to happen,  is  yet 
harder to be understood.  We  have  by daily experi- 
ence clear evidence of motion  produced  both by im- 
pulse and by thought ; but  the manner how,  hardly 
comes within  our comprehension ; we are equally at 
a loss in both.  So that llowever we consider motion, 
and its communication, either from body or spirit, the 
idea which belongs to spirit is at least as clear as that 
which  belongs  to  body.  And  if  we  consider  the 
active power of moving, or, as I may call it, motivity, 
it is  much  clearer  in  spirit  than  body;  since  two 
hodies,  placed  by  one  anotller  at  rest,  ~zill  never 
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other, but by a borrowed motion ; whereas, the mind, 
every  day,  affords  us  ideas  of  an  active  power  of 
moving of bodies ;  and therefore it is worth our con- 
sideration, whether  active power  be  not the proper 
attribute  of  spirits,  and passive  power  of  matter. 
Hence may be conjectured,  that  created  spirits  are 
not  totally separate from  matter,  because  they  are 
both  active  and passive.  Pure spirit,  viz.  God,  is 
only  active ;  pure  matter  is  only  passive ; those 
beings  that  are  both  active  and  passive,  we  may 
judge to partake of both.  But be  that  as it will,  I 
think, we have as many, and as clear ideas belonging 
to spirit  as  we  have  belonging  to  body,  the  sub-  I 
stance of each being equally unknown to us ;  and the 
idea of  thinking in spirit as  clear  as  of  extension  in 
body ; and the communication of motion by thought, 
which we attribute to spirit, is as evident as that by 
impulse,  which we ascribe to body.  Constant  expe- 
rience  makes  us  sensible  of both these, though our 
narrow understandings can comprehend neither.  For 
when  the  mind  would  look  beyond  those  original 
ideas we have from sensation or reflection, and pene- 
trate into their causes, arid inanllcr of procluctiori, we 
find still it cliscovers nothing bi~t  its own short-sighted- 
ness. 
S q!).  To conclude-sensation  convinces  us  that 
there are  solid  extended  substances,  and  reflection, 
that there are thinking ones ; expcriei~ce  assures  us 
of  the existence  of  such beings,  and  that the  one 
hatli a power to move body by impulse, the other by 
tllought ; this  we  cannot  doubt of.  Experience,  I 
say,  every nloment furnishes us with  the clear ideas 
both of  the onc  and  the other.  But  beyond  these 
ideas, as receivecl from their proper sources,  our  fa- 
culties  will  not  reach.  If we would inquire farther 
into their nature, causes, and manner, we perceive not 
the naturc of extension  clearer than we do  of  think- 
ing.  If w-c would explain them  any farther,  one  is 
ils citsy as thc other ; aiicl  there is 110  more diffietilty 
to conccivc ho\v a s\~l)stance  wc know  not slioultl by 
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thought  set body into motion, than how  a substallce 
we know not should by impulse sct body into motion. 
So that we  are no  more able to discover wherein the 
ideas belonging to body consist than those belonging 
to spirit.  From whence it seems probable to me, that 
the simple  ideas we  receive  from  sensation  and  re- 
flection are the boundaries of  our thoughts ;  beyond 
which the mind, whatever  efforts  it ~vould  make,  is 
not able to advance oilc jot; nor can it make any dis- 
coveries, when it would pry into the iiature and hiclderi 
ca~$ses  of those ideas. 
$ 30.  So that,  in  short,  tllc  idea  we  Idca of boulr 
have of spirit, comparecl with the idea we  and spirit 
have of body, stands thus : the substance  cO1n~).u.ed. 
of  spirit is urikn~own  to us ;  and so is the substance of 
body equally unknown to us.  Two primary qualities 
or  properties  of  body,  viz.  solid  coherent parts  and 
impulse, we  have distinct clear ideas of: so likewise 
we know, and have distinct clear ideas of two primary 
qualities  or properties  of  spirit, viz.  thinking,  and  a 
power of action ;  i. e.  a power of  beginning  or stop- 
ping several thoughts or motions.  We have also the 
ideas of several qualities inherent in bodies, and havc 
the  clear distinct ideas of them;  which  qualities are 
but  the various modifications  of  the extension of co- 
hering solid parts, and their motion.  We have like- 
wise the ideas of  the several  modes  of  thinking, viz. 
believing,  doubting,  intending,  fearing,  hoping ; all 
which are but the  several  modes  of  thinking.  We 
have also the ideas of  willing, and moving  the  body 
consequent to it, and with the body itself too ;  for, as 
has been shown, spirit is capable of motion. 
9 31.  Lastly,  if this  no6on  of  imma-  The notioll 
terial spirit may have perhaps some diffi-  spirit ill- 
culties in it not easv to be ex~lained,  we  volvea no 
have therefore no dore  reasoi  to denv or  (Iifi- 
J  culty in it 
doubt the existence  of  such spirits, than 
than  that of 
we have  to deny or  doubt  the existefice  l,,,,~,. 
-  i  of body;  becaise the notion  of  body  is 30  Our Icleas clf'N~~bstcr?zces.  Book 2. 
cumbered with  some  difficulties very hard, and per- 
haps impossible to be explained or understood by us. 
For I would fain have instanced any thing in our no- 
tion of spirit more perplexed, or nearer a contradiction, 
than the very notion of  body includes in it : the divi- 
sibility in infizikm of  any finite  extension  involving 
us,  whether we grant or deny it, in consequences im- 
possible to be explicated or made in our apprehensions 
consistent ;  consequences that carry greater difficulty, 
and more  apparent  absurdity,  than  any  thing  can 
follow  from the notion  of  an immaterial  knowing 
substance. 
We know  $ 39. Which we are not at all to won- 
nothing be-  der st, since we having but some few su- 
yond Our  perficial ideas of  things, discovcrcd to ns 
siniple ideas.  only  by  the senses from without,  or by 
the mind, reflecting on what it experiments in itself 
within, have no knowledge beyond that, much less of 
the internal constitution and true nature  of  things, 
being destitute of faculties to attain it.  And therefore 
experimenting  and  discovering  in  ourselves  know- 
ledge, and the power of voluntary motion, as certainly 
ns  we  experiment  or discover  in things without us 
the collesion and  separation of  solid parts,  which is 
the extension and motion of bodies ;  we have as much 
reason to be satisfied with  our notion of  immaterial 
spirit, as with our notion  of  body, and the existence 
of the one  as  well  as the  0th.  For  it being  no 
inore  a  contradiction  that  thinkin5  should  exist, 
separate  and independent  from  sohdity,  than it is 
a,  contradiction  that  solidity  should  exist  separate 
and independent from thinking, they being both but 
simple  ideas,  independent  one  from  another,--and 
having as clear and distinct  ideas in 11s  of  thinking 
as of  solidity,--I  know not why we may  not  as well 
allow  a  thinkit~q  thing without  solidity, i. e.  imma- 
terial, to exist, as a solid thing without thinking, i. e. 
matter, to exist ; especially since it is  not harder  to 
conceive how  thinking  should  exist  without matter, 
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than how matter should  think.  For whensoever we 
would  proceed  beyond  these  simple  ideas  we  have 
from sensation  and reflection,  and  dive farther into 
the nature of  things, we fall presently into darkness 
and obscurity, perplesedness and difficulties ; and call 
discover nothing farther but our own blindness ant1 
ignorance.  But whichever of these complex ideas be 
clearest, that of body or immaterial spirit, this is evi- 
dent, that the simple ideas that make them up are no 
other than what we  have  received  from  sensation or 
reflection;  and so is it of  all our other  ideas of  sub- 
stances, even of God himself. 
$ 33. For if  we  examine the idea we  Idea of Gorl.  have  of  the  incomprehensible  Supreme 
Being, we shall find, that we come by it the same way ; 
and that the co~rlplex  ideas we have both of God and 
separate spirits are made up of  the simple ideas we 
receive  from reflection:  v. g. having, from  what we 
experiment  in  ourselves,  got the ideas of  existence 
and duration ; of knowledge and power; of  pleasilre 
and happiness ; and  of  several  other  qualities  and 
powers, which it is better to have than to be without : 
when we  would frame  an idea the most suitable wc 
can to the Supreme Being, we  enlarge every one  of 
these with our idea of  infinity;  and so putting them 
together, make our complex idea of  God.  For that 
the mind has such a power of  enlarging some of  its 
ideas, received from sensatioir and reflection, has been 
already shown. 
$ 34.  If I find that I ]<now some few things, anti 
some of them, or all, perhaps, imperfectly, I can frame 
an idea of knowing twice as many; which I can double 
again, as often as I can add to number; and thus en- 
large my  idea  of  knowledge, by extending its com- 
prehension  to all things  existing or possible.  The 
same also I can do of knowing them more perfectly; 
i.  e.  a11  their  qualities, powers, causes, consequences, 
and relations, kc. till all be perfectly known that is in 
them, or can any way relate to them ;  and thus frame 
the idea  of  infinite  or  boundless  knowledge.  The 32  Our Ideas of  Substances.  Book 2. 
same may also be done of power, till we come to that 
we call infinite ;  and also of the duration of existence, 
without beginning or end ; and so frame the idea of 
an eternal being.  The degrees or extent wherein we 
ascribe existence, power, wisdom,  and all other per- 
fections  (which  we can have  any ideas of)  to that 
sovereign being which we call God, being all bound- 
less and infinite, we frame the best idea of  him our 
minds are capable of:  all which is done, I say, by en- 
larging those  simple  ideas we  have  taken from tlie 
operations of our own minds by reflection,  or by  our 
senses from exterior things, to that vastness to which 
infinity can extend them. 
Idea of  God.  S 35. For it is infinity, which joined to 
our ideas of existence, power, knowledge, 
&c. makes  that complex idea, whereby we represent 
to ourselves,  the best  we  can,  the Supreme Being. 
For though in his own essence (which certainly we do 
not know, not knowing the real essence of a pebble, 
or a fly, or of our own selves)  God be simple and un- 
compounded ;  yet, I think, I may say we have no other 
idea of him but a  complex  one of  existence, know- 
ledge,  power,  happiness,  &c.  infinite  and  eternal; 
which  are all distinct ideas, and some of them, being 
relative,  are again compounded of others ; all which 
being, as has been shown,  originally got from sensa- 
tion and reflection, go to make up the idea or notion 
we have of God. 
No idea in  $ 36.  This farther is  to be  observed, 
our complex  that there is no idea we attribute to God, 
one of  bating infinity, which  is  not  also a  part 
spirits, but 
tho,  got  of our complex idea of other spirits.  Be- 
from sensa-  cause, being  capable  of  no other simple  -  - 
tion or re-  ideas,  belonging to any thing but body, 
flection.  but those which by reflection we  receive 
from the operation of our own kinds, we can attribute 
to spirits no other but what we receive  from thence: 
and all the difference we  can put between  them in 
our contemplation  of spirits is only in the several ex- 
tents and degrees of their knowledge, power, duration, 
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happiness, &c.  For that in  our ideas, as well of spi- 
rits as of  other things, we are restrained to those we 
from sensation and reflection,  is evident from 
hence,  that in our ideas of  spirits, how much  soever 
advanced  in  perfection beyond  those of bodies,  even 
to that of infinite,  we cannot yet have any idea of the 
manner wherein  they discover  their thoughts one to 
another : though we  must necessarily conclude, that 
separate  spirits,  which  are  beings  that  have  per- 
fecter knowledge and greater happiness than we, must 
ne~ds  have  also  a  perfecter  way  of  communicating 
their thoughts than we  have, who  are fain  to make 
use of  corporeal signs and particular sounds ; which  . 
are therefore of most general use, as  being  the best 
and quickest  we  are capable of.  But of  immediate 
communication,  having  no experiment  in  ourselves, 
and consequently  no notion of  it at all,  we  have  no 
idea how spirits, which use not words, can with quick- 
ness, or much  less  how  spirits, that have  no bodies, 
can be masters of their own thoughts,  and communi- 
cate or co1lcea.I them  at pleasure, though we  cannot 
but necessarily suppose they have such a power. 
$ 37. And thus we have seen what kind  Recapitulo- 
of ideas we have of substances of all kinds,  tion. 
wherein  they  consist,  and  how  wc  come  by  them.  . 
From wlience, I think, it is very evident, 
First, That all our ideas of the several sorts of sub- 
stances are nothing but collections  of  simple ideas, 
with a supposition of something to which they belong, 
and in which they subsist ; though of  this supposed 
something we have no clear distinct idea at all. 
Secondly, That all the simple ideas, that thus unitcc! 
in  one  common  substratum  make  up  our  complex 
ideas of  several sorts of  substances, are no other but 
such as we have received from sensation or reflection. 
So that even in those which we think we are most in- 
timately acquainted with, and that come nearest the 
comprehension of our most enlarged conceptio~rs,  we 
cannot go beyond  those simple ideas.  And  cvcn  in 
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those  wl~icli  seem most  remote  from all we  havc to 
do with,  and do infinitely surpass any thing we  can 
perceive  in  ourselves  by  reflection,  or  discover  by 
sensation  in other things, we  can attain  to nothing 
but those simple ideas, which  we originally received 
from sensation or reflection ;  as is evident in the com- 
plex ideas we have of angels, and particularly of God 
himself. 
Thirdly, That most of  the simple ideas that make 
up our complex ideas of substances, when truly con- 
sidered, are only powers, however we are apt to take 
them for positive qualities ;  u. g. the greatest part of 
the ideas that make  our complex  idea  of  gold  arc 
yellowness, great weight, ductility, fusibility, and so- 
lubility in  aqua regia,  &c. all united together in an 
unknown substratum ;  all which ideas are nothing else 
but so many relations to other substances, and are not 
really in the gold, considered barely in itself, though 
they depend on  those real and primary qualities of 
its ~nternal  constitution, whereby it has a fitness dif- 
ferently  to operate, and be  operated on by  several 
other substances. 
CHAPTER  XXIV. 
Of  collective Ideas of  Szlbstanccs. 
One  idea.  $ 1.  BESIDES these  complex  ideas  of 
several single substai~ces,  as of man, horse. 
gold,  violet,  apple,  &;.  tlle mind  hat11 also complex 
collective ideas of substances ;  which I so call, because 
such ideas are made up of many particular substances 
considered together, as united into one idea, and which 
so joined  are looked on as one :  ru. g. the idea of such 
a collection of men as make an army, though consist- 
ing of  a  great number  of  distinct  substances, is  as 
much one idea as tlle  idea of  a man : and the great 
collective idea of  all  bodies whatsoe~~er,  significd by 
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the name world, is  as much  one idea as the idea of 
any the least particle of  matte;  in it ; it sufficing  to 
the unity of any idea, that it be considered as one re- 
presentation or picture,  though made  up of  ever so 
many particulars. 
$ 2. These collective ideas of substances  Made by the 
the mind makes by its power of composi-  power of 
tion, and uniting  severally either  simplc  CO~POS~I~~ 
or coinplex  ideas  into one, as it does by  ~n the mind. 
the same faculty make the complex ideas of particular 
suWstaiices, consisting of an aggregate of Jivers simple 
ideas, united in one  substance : and as the mind, by 
putting together the repeated  ideas of  unity, makes 
the collective mode, or comple::  idea of  any number, 
as  a  score,  or  a  gross,  &c. so  by  putting together 
several particular substances, it makes collective ideas 
of substances, as a troop, an army, a swarm, a city, a 
fleet ; each of  which, every one fincis, that he  repre- 
sents to his own mind by one idea, in  one view ;  and 
so under that notiori considers those several thinp as 
perfectly one, as  onc  ship,  or  one  atom.  Nor  is  it 
harder to conceive, how an army of ten tho~sand  inen 
should make one idea, than how  a  man should make 
one idea : it being  as easy to the mind  to unite into 
one the idea of a great number of men, ai~d  consider it 
as one, as it is to unite into one particular all the di- 
stinct ideas that make up the composition  of a man, 
and consider them all together as one. 
§ 3. Amongst  such kinti  of  collective  ,111 artifici:,~ 
ideas, are to bc counted most part of ar-  tl~ings  are 
tificial things, at least such of them as are  ~Ilecti'e 
made up of  distinct  substances : and,  in  ideas. 
truth, if we  consider all these collective ideas aright, 
as  army,  constellation, universe,  as  they  are united 
into so many single ideas, they are but the artificial 
draughts of the mind ; bringing  things very remote, 
and independent on one  another, into one view, the 
better to contcinplate and  discourse of  them, linitctl 
illto onc conception, and signified by one nanlc.  For 
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there are no things so remote, nor so contrary, which 
the mind  cannot,  by  this  art of  composition, bring 
into one idea;  as  is visible  in that signified by the 
name universe. 
CHAPTER XXV. 
Of  Relation. 
Relatioil  $ 1. BESIDES  the ideas, whether simple 
what.  or complex, that the mind has of things, 
as they  are in themselves,  there  are others it gets 
from  their c0mparisc.n  one with  another.  The un- 
derstanding, in the consideration of  any thing, is not 
confined to that precise object: it can carry any idca 
as it were beyond itself, or at  least look beyond it, to 
see how it stands in conformity to any other.  When 
the mind  so  considers  one  thing, that it does  as it 
were bring it to and set it by another, and carry its 
view from one to the other : this is, as the words im- 
port,  relation  and  respect;  and  the denominations 
given to positive things, intimating that respect, and 
serving  as  marks  tq lead  the thoughts  beyond  the 
subject itself denominated to something distinct from 
it,  are  what  we  call  relatives;  and the  things,  so 
brought together, related.  Thus, when the mind con- 
siders Caius as such a positive being, it takes nothing 
into that  idca but what  really exists in Caius;  v.g. 
when I consider him 3s a man, I have nothing in my 
mind but the complex idca of  thc species,  man.  So 
likewise,  when I  say  Caius is  a  white  man,  I  have 
nothing  but  the bare  consideration  of  a  man  who 
hath that white colour.  But when I give Cnim thc 
name  husband,  I  intimate some  other person;  ant1 
when I give him the name  whiter,  I  intimate  sornc. 
other thing :  in both cases my thought is lccl  to somc- 
thing beyond Caius, and there arc two things bron~ht 
into consideration.  Arid  sincc any itlen, ~~hcthcr  slnl- 
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pie  or complex, may be  the occaaion  why  tlie lnilld 
thus brings two things together, and as it were takes 
a view of thein at once, though still corlsidered as di- 
stinct; therefore any of our ideas may be tlic founda- 
tion of relation.  As in the above-mentio~ietl  instance, 
the  contract arltl  ceremony  of  n~arria~c  with  Senl- 
pronia is the occasion of tlie denomination or relatioil 
of husban(1; and the colour white the occasion why 
is said to be whiter than freestone. 
S 2. Tliesc, and the like relations, ex-  IicIatiolrs 
-irkssetl  by relative terms, that have others  ,,,itlIout 
answering them, with a  reciprocal  inti-  relative 
liiatio~?,  as  father  and  son,  bigger  and  t"r"'S  c,lsiIy per-  'lot 
less, cause and effect, are very obvious to  ccircd, 
every one, and every  body  at first  sight 
perceivcs  tlio  relation.  For father and son, husband 
and wife,  and such  other correlative  terms, seen1 so 
iiearly to belong one to another, and throu~h  custoril 
do so readily chime and answer one another in people's 
memories,  that, upon  the naming of  either of  them, 
the thoughts  are presently carried beyond the thing 
so named ; and nobody overlooks or doubts of a rela- 
tion,  where  it is  so  plainly  intimated.  But where 
languages have failed to give correlative names, there 
the relation is not always  so  easily  taken notice of. 
Concubine is,  no doubt, a  relative  name,  as well as 
wife :  but in languages where this, and the like words, 
liave not a correlative term, there people  are not so 
apt to take thein to be so,  as wanting that  evident 
rnark of relation which is between correlatives, which 
seem  to explain one another, and not to be  able to 
exist but together.  Hence it is,  that many of those 
names which, duly considered, do include evident re- 
lations, have been called external denominations.  But 
all names,  that are more  than empty sounds, must 
signify  some  idea,  which  is  either  in  tlie  thin5 to 
which the name is applied ;-and  then it is positive, 
and is  looked  on  as united to,  and existing in  the 
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arises from the respect the mind finds in it to some- 
thing distinct from it, with which it considers it ;  and 
then it includes a relation. 
Some seem-  $ 3. Another sort of relative terms there 
ingly abso-  is, which are not looked on to be  either 
lute terms  relative,  or  so much as external denomi- 
contain rela-  nations ;  which yet, under the form and 
tions.  appearance of signifying something abso- 
lute in the subject,  do conceal  a  tacit,  though less 
observable relation.  Such are the seemingly positive 
terms  of  old,  great,  imperfect,  kc. whereof  I  shall 
have  occasion to speak more  at large in the follow- 
ing chapters. 
~~l~~i~~  dif-  $ 4. This farther may be observed, that 
ferent from  the ideas of  relation may be the same in 
the tllings  men, who have far different ideas of  the 
related.  things that are related,  or that are thus 
compared ; u. g. those who have far different ideas of 
a man, may yet agree in the notion of a father; which 
is  a  notion  superinduced  to the substance, or man, 
and refers only to an act of  that thing called  man, 
whereby he contributed  to the generation  of  one of 
his own kind, let man be what it will. 
Change of  $ 5. The nature therefore  of  relation 
relatio,,  may  consists  in  the referring  or  comparing 
be without  two things one to another ; from which 
any change  comparison one or both comes to  be deno- 
in  sub  minated.  And  if  either of  those things  ject. 
be removed  or cease to be,  the relation 
ceases, and the denomination consequent to it, though 
the other receive in  itself no alteration at all ; v. g. 
Caius, whom I consider to-day  as a father, ceases to 
be so to-morrow, only by the death of  his  son, with- 
out any alteration made in himself.  Nay, barely by 
the mind's  changing the object to which it compares 
any thing, the same  thing is capable of  having con- 
trary denominations  at the same  time : u. g. Caius, 
colnP 
ared to several persons, may truly be said to be 
olde,  and younger, stronger and weaker, &c. 
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$ 6.  Whatsoever  doth  or call exist, or  Ilel;.tiol, 
bc  considered  as  one thing,  is  positive ;  only betwixt 
and  so  not  only  simple  ideas  and  sub-  two tllings. 
stances, but modes also,  are positive  beings : though 
the parts of which they consist are very often relative 
one to another; but the whole together considered as 
one thing, and producing  in us the complex idea  of 
one thing, which idea is  in our minds as one picture, 
though an aggregate of  divers  parts, and under one 
name, it is a positive or absolute thing or idea.  Thus 
a ttiangle, though the parts thereof compared one to 
another  be  relative,  yet the idea of  the whole  is  a 
positive absolute idea.  The same may be said  of a 
family,  a tune, &c. for  there can be  no relation  but 
betwixt two things considered as two things.  There 
must always be in relation two ideas, or things, either 
in themselves really separate, or considered as distinct, 
and the11 a ground or occasion for their comparison. 
$ 7. Concerning  relation  in  general,  All things 
these things may be considered :  capable of 
First, That there is no one thing, whe- 
tlier simple idea, substance, mode, or relation, or name 
of either of them, which is not capable of  almost an 
infinite number of considerations, in reference to other 
things;  and  therefore  this  makes  no  small part of 
men's thoughts and words : v. g. one single man may 
at once be concerned in, and sustain all these follow- 
ing  relations,  and  many  more,  viz.  father, brother, 
son, grandfather,  grandson, father-in-law, son-in-law, 
husband, friend,enemy, subject, general, judge, patron, 
client, professor, European, Englishman, islander, ser- 
vant, master, possessor, captain, superior, inferior, big- 
ger, less, older, younger, contemporary,like, unlike, &c. 
to an almost infinite number :  he being capable of as 
many relations as there can be occasions of comparing 
him to other things, in any manner of agreement, dis- 
agreement,  or  respect  whatsoever.  For,  as I said, 
relation  is a  way  of  comparing  or  coilsidering  two 
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appellation  from  tliat  comparison ; ailri  sometimes 
giving even the relation itself a name. 
Tile ideas uf  § 8. Secondly, This farther may be con- 
relations  sidered concerning relation, that though it 
clearer often  be not contained in the real existence of 
tllan of the  things, but something extraneous and su- 
subjects re- 
lated.  perinduced ;  yet the ideas which relative 
words stand for,are often clearer and rnore 
distinct than of  those  substances  to which  they do 
belong.  The notion we have of a father, or brother, 
is a great deal clearer and more distinct than that we 
have of  a man ; or,  if  you  will,  paternity is a thing 
w;iereof  it is easier to have  a clear idea than of  hu- 
manity : and I can much easier conceive what n friend 
is,  than what God:  because  the knowledge  of  one 
action, or one simple idea, is oftentimes sufficient to 
give me the notion of a relation ; but to the knowing 
of  any substantial  being,  an accurate  collection  of 
sundry ideas is necessary.  A man, if he con~pares  two 
things together, can hardly be supposed not to know 
what it is,  wherein he compares them : so that when 
he compares any things together, he cannot but have 
a very clear idea of  tliat relation.  The ideas then of 
relations are capable at least of  being  more perfect 
and distinct in  our minds,  than those of  substances. 
Because it is  commonly hard to know all the simple 
ideas which  are really  in any substance, but for the 
most part easy enough to know the simple ideas that 
make up any relation I think on, or have a name for : 
v. g. comparing two men, in reference to one common 
parent, it is very easy to frame the ideas of brothers, 
without having yet the perfect  idea  of a man.  For 
significant relative words,  as well as others,  standing 
only for ideas,  and those being all either simple,  or 
made up of simple ones,  it suffices, for  the knowing 
the precise idea the relative term stands for, to have a 
clear conception of that which is the foundation of the 
relation ;  which may be done without having a perfect 
and clear idea of the thing it is attributed to.  Thus 
llavillg thc iiolioti,  thitt 011e  laid the cgg out of which 
the other was hatched, I have it clear itlea of the rela- 
tion  of  dam ant1 chick, between the two cassiowaries 
ill  St. James's  park; though perhaps  I  have  but  a 
very obscure and imperfect idea of  those birds them- 
selves. 
tj 1).  Thirdly, though there be a great 
number of considerations, wherein things  Itelations all 
tern~inatc  in  .may  be  compared one with another, and  sil,lplci~leas. 
so a multituclc  of  relatioris ; yct they all 
tel"minntc in, and are concerned  about,  those simple 
ideas, either of scilsation or reflection : which I think 
to be the whole materials of  all our knowledge.  To 
clear this, I shall slio\v it  in the most considerable rela- 
tions that we have any notion of, and in some that seem 
to be the most remote from sense or refiection ;  which 
yet will appear to have their ideas from thence, and 
leave it past doubt, that the notions we have of them 
are but certnii~  simple ideas, and so originally derived 
from sense or reflection. 
$ 10. Fourthly, that relation being the 
lead-  roiisideri~~g  of  one  thing  with another,  ing tllo  mind 
which is extrinsical to  it, it  is evident, that  bevond the 
all words that necessarily lead the mind to  subject de- 
nominated,  any other ideas than are supposed really 
are relative.  to exist in that thing, to which the words 
are  applied,  are relative  words : v. g. a  man black, 
merry, thoughtful, thirsty, angry, extended ;  these, and 
the like, are all absolute, because they neither signify 
nor intimate any thing but what does  or is supposed 
really to exist in the man thus denominated : but fa- 
ther, brother, king, husband, blacker, merrier, &c.  are 
words which, together with the thing they denominate, 
imply also  something else  separate and exterior to 
the existence of that thing. 
$ 11. Having laid down these premises 
concerning relation in general, I shall now  Conclusion. 
proceed to show, in some instances, how all the ideas 
we have of  relation  are made up,  as the others are, only of simple ideas ; ancl  that they all,  how refined 
or remote from sense soever they seem,  ternlinate at 
last in simple  ideas.  3  shall  begin  with  the most 
comprehensive relation, wherein a11  things that do or 
can exist are  concerned ; and that is  the relation of 
cause  and  effect.  The  idea  whereof,  how derived 
from  the two  fountains of  all our knowledge,  sen- 
sation  and reflection,  I shall in the  next place con- 
sider. 
CIiAPTER XXVI. 
OlJCazrse  nrzd EJL=ct, and other. Relatio~~,~. 
Wl~ence  5 1. IN  the notice that our senses take 
their ideas  of the constant vicissitude  of  things,  we 
got.  cannot but observe, that several particu- 
lar,both qualities and substances, begin to exist ;  and 
that they receive  this  their  existence  from the due 
application and operation of some other being.  From 
this observation,  we get our ideas of cause and effect. 
That which produces any simple or complex idea we 
denote by the general name cause ;  and that which is 
produced,  effect.  Thus  finding  that  in  that  sub- 
stance which we call wax fluidity,  which is a simple 
idea that was not in it before,  is constantly produced 
by the application of a certain degree of heat ;  we call 
the simple idea of heat, in relation to fluidity in wax, 
the cause of it, and fluidity the effect.  So also finding 
that the substance of wood,  which is a certain collec-  , 
tion of simple ideas,  so called,  by the application of  . 
fire is turned into another substance called ashes, i. e. 
another complex idea,  consisting  of  a  collection  of 
simple  ideas,  quite  different  from  that  complex 
idea which we call wood ; we consider fire, in relation 
to ashes,  as cause,  and the ashes as effect.  So that 
whatever  is considered by us  to conduce or operate 
to the producing  any particular  simple  idea, or col- 
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leetion of  simple ideas,  whether substance or mode, 
wllicli did not before exist, hat11 thereby in our iniiids 
the relation of a cause, and so is denominated by us. 
$ 2. Having thus, from what our senses  creation, 
are able to discover,  in the operations of  generation, 
bodies on one another, got the notion of  lnakingal- 
cause and effect, viz.  that a cause is that  teration. 
which makes any other thing, either simple idea, sub- 
*stance or  mode,  begin  to be ; and an effect  is that 
which had its beginning from some other thing,  the 
mind  finds no  great difficulty  to distinguish the se- 
veral originals of things into two sorts. 
First, when the thing is wholly made new,  so that 
no part thereof did ever exist before ; as when a new 
particle of matter cloth begin to exist, in remm nuturn, 
which had before no being,  and this we call cre  t'  a ion. 
Secondly,  when  a  thing is made up of  particles, 
which did all of them before exist, but that very thing 
so constituted of  pre-existing particles, which, consi- 
dered all together, make up such a collection of sim- 
ple ideas as had not any existence before ;  as this man, 
this egg, rose, or cherry, &c.  And this, when referred 
to a  substance, produced  in the  ordinary course of 
nature, by internal principle, but set on work, and re- 
ceived from some external agent or cause, and work- 
ing by insensible ways, which we perceive not, we call 
generation:  when  the cause  is  extrinsical,  and the 
effect prodilced by a sensible separation, or juxta-po- 
sition  of  discernible  parts,  we  call  it making;  and 
such  are  all  artificial  things.  When  any  simple 
idea  is  produced which was not  in that subject be- 
fore, we call it alteration.  Thus a man is generated, 
a picture made,  and  either  of  them  altered,  when 
any new sensible quality or simple idea is produced 
in  either  of  them,  which  was  not  there  before; 
and the things  thus  made to exist, which were  not 
there before, are effects ; and those things, which ope- 
rated to the existence,  causes.  In  which,  and a11 
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and effect has its rise  from  ideas,  received by sensa- 
tion or reflection ;  and that this relation, how conlpre- 
hensible  soever,  terminates  at last in them.  For to 
have the idea of  cause and effect, it suffices  to con- 
sider any simple idea,  or substa~~ce,  as beginning to 
exist by the operation of  some other,  withovt know- 
ilig the manner of that operation. 
kj  3.  Time and place are also the foun- 
lrelations of  dations  of  very  large relations,  and  all  timc.  finite  beings  at least  are  concerned  in 
them.  But having already shov~l~,  in  another place, 
how  we  get these ideas,  it may suffice here to inti- 
mate, that  most  of the denominations of things,  re- 
ceived from time, are only relations.  Thus when any 
-  one says,  that queen Elizabeth lived sixty-nine,  and 
reigned forty-five  years, these words import only the 
relation of that duration to some other, and mean no 
more than this, that the duration of her existence was 
equal to sixty-nine,  and the duration of her govern- 
ment to forty-five annual revolutions of the sun ; and 
so are all words,  answering,  how long.  Again, Wil- 
liam the Conqueror invaded Engla~ld  abo~~t  the year 
1066,  which  means  this,  that taking  the  duration 
from  our Saviour's  time till now for one entire great 
length of time, it shows at what distance this invasion 
was  from  the  two extremes:  and so do all words 
of time, answering to the question, when,  which show 
only tlle distance  of  any point  of  time from the pe- 
riod  of  a longer  duration, from  which we  measure, 
and to  which we illereby consider it as related 
8 4.  There arc yet,  besides  those,  other words  of 
time, that ordinarily are thought to stand for ~ositive 
ideas, which yet will,  when considered, be  found to 
be relative, such as are young, old, &e. which include 
and intimate the relation  ally thing has  to a certain 
length of duration  whereof  we have  the idea in our 
minds.  Thus having settled in our thoughts the idea 
of tlle ordinary duration of a man to be seventy years, 
when we say a man  ia  young,  we  mean  that his age 
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is yet but a small part of that which usually men at- 
tain to : and when we denominate him old,  we mean 
that his duration is run out almost to the end of that 
which men do not usually exceed.  And so it is  but 
the particular age,  or  duration of  this  or 
that man, to the idea of that duration which we have 
in our minds,  as ordinarily belonging to that sort of 
animals; which  is plain,  in the application  of  these 
names to other things ; for  a man is called young at 
tweniy years,  and very  young at seven  years old : 
but yet a  horse  we  call old  at twenty, and a dog at 
seven  years; because  in each  of  these we  compare 
their  age to different  ideas  of  duration,  which  are 
settled in our minds,  as  belonging  to these several 
sorts of  animals,  in  the ordinary course  of  nature. 
But the  sun  and stars, though they have  outlasted 
several generations of  men,  we call not old, because 
we  do not know  what period God hath set to that 
sort  of  beings.  This  term  belonging  properly  to 
those things, which we  can  observe  in  the ordinary 
course  of  things,  by a natural decay,  to come to an 
end in a certain period  of  time ; and so have  in  our 
minds, as it were,  a standard to which we  can com- 
pare the several parts of  their duration ; and, by the 
relation they bear thereunto, call them young. or old : 
which we cannot therefore do to a ruby or diamond, 
tliinss whose usual neriods we know not. 
8 2.  The relation ilso  that things have 
Rclatio,,s  to one  another in  their  places  and  di-  place  anti 
stances,  is  very  obvious  to observe; as  extension. 
above, below, a mile distant from Charing- 
cross,  in England,  and  in London.  But as in durn- 
tion, so in  extension  and bulk,  there are some ideas 
that are relative, which we signify by names that are 
thought positive;  as  great  and  little  are truly  re- 
lations.  For here also having, by observation, settlcd 
in our minds the ideas of the  bigness of several species 
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nrc  inalte  them  as it were  the standards whereby to 
delloininate the bulk of others.  Thus we call a great 
apple, such a one as is bigger  than tlie ordinary sort 
of  those we  have  been  ixsed  to; and a  little horse, 
such a one as comes not up to the size  of  that idea, 
which we have in  our min(ls,  to belong ordinarily to 
horses : and that will  be  a  great horse to a Welsh- 
inan which is but a little one to a Fleming ; they two 
having,  from  the different breed  of  their  countries, 
taken several sized ideas to which they compare, and 
in relation to which they denominate, their great and 
their little. 
Absolute  $ (i. So likewise  weak  and strong are 
terlns oftell  but relative denominations of power, com- 
stand fol  re-  pared to solne ideas we have at that time 
lations.  of greater or less power.  Thus when we 
say a weak man,  we mean  one that has not so much 
strengtli or power  to move  as usually men have, or 
usually those of  his size have:  which is a comparing 
his strength to the idea we have of the usual strength 
of men, or men of  such  a  size.  The like,  when we 
say the creatures are all weak things ;  weak, there, is 
but n  relative term, signifying tlie disproportion there 
is in  the power of  God  and the creatures.  And so 
abundance of words,  in ordinary speech,  stand only 
for relations  (and  perhaps  the greatest part) which 
at first sight seem to have no such signification :  v. g. 
the ship has necessary stores.  Necessary and stores 
are both  relative  words; one  having  a  relation  to 
the accomplishing the voyage ii~tended,  and the other 
to  future  use.  All  which  relations,  how  they  arc 
confined  to  an(1  terminate  in  ideas  (lerived  from 
scilsntion  or reflection, is too obvious to need any es- 
plic  a  t'  ion. 
CHAPTEIL  XXVII. 
$ 1. ANOTHER  occasion the nlind often  WI,,,,;,, 
takes of  comparing, is the very being of  identity con- 
things ; when  considering  any thing as  sists- 
existing  at any determined  time and place, we  com- 
pare it with itself existing at  aiiotl~er  time,and thereon 
form ,the  ideas  of  identity and diversity.  When we 
see  any thing to be  in  any place  in any instant  of 
time,  we are sure (be it what it will) that it is that 
very thing, and not another, which at that same tiiiie 
exists in  another  place, how like  and undistinguish- 
able soever  it may be  in a11  other  respects:  and  in 
this  consists identity, when  the ideas it is attributed 
to vary not at all froin what they were that moment 
wherein  we  consider  their former existence,  and to 
which we  compare the present.  For we  never  fincl- 
ing nor conceiving it possible, that two things of the 
same kind should exist in the same place at the sainc 
time, we  rightly conclude,  that whatever  exists  any 
where at any time, excludes all of the same kind, and 
is  there  itself  alone.  When therefore  we  demand, 
whether any thing be the same or no, it refers always 
to something that existed such a time in such a place, 
which it was certain at  that instant was the same with 
itself,  and no other.  From whence  it follows,  that 
one thing cannot have two beginnings of  existence, 
nor  two things  one  beginning;  it being impossible 
for two things of  the same kind to be or exist in the 
same instant, in the very same place,  or one and the 
same thing in different places.  That therefore that 
had one beginning, is the same thing ;  and that WII~CII 
had a different beginning in time and place from that. 
is not the same, but diverse.  That which has made 
the difficulty about this  relation,  has been  the littlc 
care aid attention used  in haviiit~  precise  notions of' 
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Identity of  S 2. We have  the ideas but of  three 
substances.  sorts  of  substances : I. God.  2. Finite 
intelligences.  3. Bodies.  First, God is without be- 
ginning,  eternal,  unalterable,  and everywhere ; and 
therefore  concerning  his  identity there  can  be  no 
doubt.  Secondly,  finite  spirits having had each its 
determinate time and place of beginning to exist, the 
relation to that time and place will always determine 
to each  of  them  its  identity,  as  long  as it exists. 
Thirdly, the same will hold of every particle of matter, 
to which  DO addition  or  subtraction of  matter being 
made,  it is the same.  For though these three sorts 
of  substances,  as we  term them,  do not exclude one 
another out of the same place ;  yet we cannot conceive 
but that they must necessarily each of  them exclude 
any of  the same kind out of  the same place : or else 
the notions and names of identity and diversity would 
be in vain,  and there could be no such distinction of 
substances, or any thing else one from another.  For 
example:  could  two bodies  be in the same place at 
the same time, then those two parcels of matter must 
be one and the same, take them great or little ; nay, 
all bodies must be one and the same.  For by the same 
reason  that two particles of  matter may be  in one 
place,  all bodies  may be in one place : which, when 
it can be  supposed,  takes  away  the distinction  of 
identity and  diversity of  one and more,  and renders 
it ridiculous.  But it being  :.a  contradiction, that two 
or more should be one,  identity and diversity are re- 
lations and ways of con~paring  well-founded, and of use 
Identity of  to the  understanding.  All other things 
modes.  being  but modes or  relations ultimately 
terminated in  substances, the identity and dircrsity 
of each particular existence of  them too will  be  by 
the same way determined:  only as to things whose 
existence is in succession, such as are the actions of 
finite  beings,  v.  g. motion  nncl  thought, both which 
consist  in a  continued  train of  succession ; concern- 
ilig thcir divcrsity, there call be 110  question : because 
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perishing  the moment  it begins,  they  cannot 
exist in different times,  or in different placcs, as per- 
manellt beings  can at different times exist in distant 
and  therefore  no  motion  or  thought,  eon- 
sidered  as at different times,  can be the same, eacl~ 
part thereof having a different beginning of existence. 
S 3. From what has been said, it  is easy  I'l.inc.il,ilnn 
to discover what is so ~nuch  inquired after,  irtdiritlr~n- 
the principium individzmlionis;  and that, 
it is plain, is existence itself, which detcrmincs a being 
of any sort to a particular tirnc and place, incommuni- 
cable to two beings of  the same Itind.  This, thougl~ 
it seems  easier  to conceive  in  simple  substances or 
morlcs, yet when  reflected  on is not more clificult ill 
coinpound  ones,  if  care be  t~~lteii  to \lil~:~t  it is  ap- 
plictl : v. g. lct us suppose an :ltom,  i.  e.  ax  contirluctl 
body under one immutable supcrficics,  existing  in a 
tletcrmined  tirnc  and place; it is  evident that,  con- 
sidercd in any instant of its existcncc, it is in t1:at  ill- 
stant the samc with itself.  For hcing at that instnllf 
what it is,  and notliirig  else,  it is  the same, and  hi) 
must continue as long as its existence is continuccl; 
for so long it m-ill be the sitme, ant1 no other.  In Iikp 
manner, if two or more atoms be joinccl  together in:o 
the s::lnc  niass,  aery  one of  those  atoms will  be tllc 
samc,  by  the foregoing  rule : and whilst  tllcy  exist 
united  together,  the  inass,  consisting  of  thc  sn~nc. 
atoms, must bc the same mass,  or the same body, lct 
the parts bc ever so diff'c~.cntly  jlunbletl.  Bnt if one 
of thesc atoins be taken away, or one new one adtlctl, 
it is no longer the same mass,  or the s~t~nc  body.  111 
the  state of  living  creatures, their identity dcpcncls 
not on a mass of the same particles, hut oli so~nctlliil~ 
else.  For in them the variation  of  great parcels  of 
lnatter alters not the identity : an oak growin?  from 
a plant to a  great tree, ancl then lopped, is st111 the 
same oak; and a colt grown up to a hoi~~c,  somctinles 
fat, sometinies lean, is :~11 thc while the same horse ; 
though, in but11  tllcsc cascs, tllcrc m:~y bc a rri:~uifc.st 
VOL.  11.  C changc of thc parts; so that truly they are not either 
of  them tlie  same masses  of  n~attcr,  though they be 
truly one  of  them the samc oak,  ancl  the other the 
same horse.  Thc reason whereof is, that in these two 
cases, a mass of matter, and a living body, idcntity is 
not applied to the snmc thing. 
Identity of  $4'. We  must therefore consider whcrein 
vegetables.  an oak diffcrs from a mass of matter, and 
that seems to me to be in this,  that the one  is only 
the cohesion  of  particles  of matter any how  united, 
the other  such  n  disposition  of  thcm  as  constitutes 
the parts of an oak ;  and such an organization of those 
parts as is  fit to receivc  2nd distribute nourishment, 
so  as  to continuc  and frame the wood,  bark,  and 
leaves, &c. of an oak, in which  consists the vegetable 
life.  That being then one plant which  has such an 
org~nization  of parts in one coherent body partaking 
of onc common life, it continues to be the same plant 
as long as it partakes of  the same life, though that 
life  be  communicated  to  new  particles  of  matter 
vitally united to the living plant,  in a like continued 
organization conformable to that sort of plants.  For 
this organization being at any one instant in any one 
collection of matter, is in that particular concrete di- 
stinguished from all other, and is that individual life 
which existing constantly from that moment both for- 
wards and backwards,  in the same continuity of  in- 
sensibly succeeding parts united to the living body of 
the plant, it has that identity, which makes the same 
plant, and a11 the parts of it, parts of  the same plant, 
during all the time  that they  exist  united  in that 
continued  organization,  which  is  fit  to convey  that 
common life to all the parts so united. 
Identity of  5 5. The case is not so much different 
animals.  in brutes, but that any one may hence see 
what makes  an animal,  and continues  it the same. 
Something we  have  like this in machines,  and may 
serve to illustrate it.  For example, what is a watch? 
It is plain it is nothing but a fit organization, or con- 
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structian of parts, to a certain end, which whcn a suf- 
ficient force is added to it, it is capable to attain.  If 
we would  suppose this machine one continued  body, 
all whose organized parts were repaired, increased, 01- 
diminished, by a constant addition or separation of in- 
sensible parts, with one common life, we should have 
something very  much  like  the body  of  an  animal; 
with this  difference, that in an animal the fitness of 
the'organization,  and the motion wherein life consists, 
begin together, the motion coming from within ; but 
in machines,  the force coining sensibly froin without, 
is  often away when  the organ is in  order,  and well 
fitted to receive it. 
§ 6. This also shows wherein the iden-  Identity of 
tity  of  tlie  same  man  consists ; viz.  in  man. 
nothing  but  a  participation  of  the  same  continued 
life, by constantly fleeting particles of matter, in suc- 
cession  vitally  united  to the same  organized  body. 
He that shall place the idcntity of  marl  in any thing 
else,  but,  like that of  other animals,  in one  fitly or- 
ganized  body,  taken  in  any  one  instant,  and  froln 
thence  continueci  under  one  orgarlizntion  of  life  in 
several successively flceting particles of matter united 
to it, will  find  it hard  to make  an  embryo,  one  of 
years, mad and sober, the same man, by any supposi- 
tion,  that will not make it possible for Seth,  Ismael, 
Socrates, Pilate, St. Austin, and Ca?sar Rorgia, to be 
the same man.  For if. the identity of  soul alone makcs 
the same man,  and there be nothing in the nature of 
matter  why  the same  individual  spirit  may  not be 
united  to  different  bodies,  it will  be  possible  that 
those  men  living  in  distant  ages,  and  of  different 
tempers,  may have been the same man : which way 
of  speaking must be,  from a very strange use of the 
word man, applied to an idea, out of which body and 
shape  are  excluded.  And  that  way  of  speaking 
would  agree  yet  worse  with  the  notions  of  those 
philosophers who  allow of transmigration, arid are of 
opinion  that the souls of  men may,  for their miscar- 
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ringcs, be  dctrndcd  into the bodies  of  beasts,  as fit 
h:tbitations, with organs suited to the satisfactiou of 
their brutal inclinations.  But yet, I think, nobody, 
coulcl  he be sure that the soul of  Heliogabalus were 
in  one  of  his  hogs,  would yet say that hog were  a 
inan or Hcliogabalus. 
Identity  S 7.  It is  not  therefore  unity of  sub- 
suited to  stance  that  comprehends  a11  sorts  of 
tile  idea,  identity,  or  will  deterinine  it in  every 
case : but  to conceive  and judge  of  it aright,  wc 
must consiclcr  what idea  the word  it is  applied  to 
staiids  for ; it being  one thing to be  the same sub 
stance,  another tlie  salvic  man,  and a third thc same 
person, if person, nian, and substance are three names 
standing  for  three  diffcrcnt  ideas;  for  such  as is 
the idea belonging to that name, such must be  the 
identity : which, if it had been a little more carefully 
attended to,  wo~zld  possibly  have prevented  n great 
den1 of  tlint confusion, which often occurs about this 
matter, with no small seemirig difficulties, espccit~lly 
concel.ning personal identity, which therefore we shall 
in thc next place a litClc consider. 
Same man.  $ 8. An  animal  is  a  living  organizecl 
body; and consequently the same aiiimnl, 
as we have observed, is the same continue~l  life con+ 
m~xnicatcci  to d~ffcrcat  pnrticlcs  of  matter,  as  they 
,  linppcn  sl~cccssively  to be  united  to that organized 
living  l~ody. And  wliatever  is. talked  of  other  dc- 
iinithos, ihgcnoous  olrsarvation  puts  it past  doubt, 
that the idea in  onr niinrls,  of which  the sound man 
in  our mouths is  the sign, is nothing else but of  nn 
anirnal of such a  certain form: since  I  think I may 
be confident, that whoever  should  see a  creature of 
his  own  shape  and  makc,  though  it liad  no  more 
reason all its life than a cat or a parrot, would call 
him still a marl;  or whoever  should hear a  cat or a 
parrot discourse, reason and philosophize, would call 
or think it nothing but a  cat or a parrot;  and say, 
the one was  a  (lull irrational man, and  the other a 
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Very intelligent rational parrot.  A relation we have 
in an author of great note is sufficient to countenance 
the  of a rational parrot.  His words are *: 
(c  I had a mind to  know from Prince Maurice's own 
mouth the account of  a common,  but much credited 
story, that I heard so often from many others,  of an 
old  parrot he had in Brasil during his government 
these, that spoke,  and asked,  and answered common 
questions like a reasonable creature :  so that those of 
his train there generally concluded it to be witchery 
or possession;  and one  of  his  chaplains,  who lived 
long  afterwards in Holland,  would never from that 
time endure a parrot, but said, they all had a devil in 
them.  I  had  heard  many particulars  of  this story, 
and assevered by people hard to be discredited, which 
made me ask Prince Maurice what there was of  it. 
He said, with his usual plainness and dryness in talk, 
there was something true,  but a great deal false of 
what liad been reported.  I desired to know of  him 
what there was of  the first? He told me short and 
coldly, that he had heard of such an old parrot when 
he liad been at Brasil;  and though he  believed  no- 
thing of  it, and it was  a good way off, yet he had so 
much curiosity as to send for it : that it was a very 
great and a very old one, and when it came first into 
the room where the prince was,  with  a  great many 
Dutchmen about him, it said presently, What a com- 
pany of  white men are here!  They askecl  it what it 
thought that man was ? pointing to the prince.  It an- 
swered, some general or other;  when they brought it 
close to him,  he asked it,  l.D'ou  venez vous? It an- 
swered, De Marinnan.  The prince, A qui estes vous? 
The parrot, A un Portugais.  Prince, Quc fais tu la? 
" Memoirs of  what  passed  in Christendom from  1672 to  1679, 
p. 
j-  Whence come ye? It answered,  From Marinnan.  The prince, 
TO  whom  do  yoti  belong? The parrot, To a Portuguese.  Prince, 
What tlo yo11 there? I1;lrrot, I look  after the chickens.  The prince 
laughed,  ;tnd  said,  Yorl  look  after  the  chicltcns? Tlic  parrot  an- 
swered, Yes,  I, and 1  Itnow  well enough how to do it. .5 4  Of Identi& and Diversity.  Rook e. 
Parrot,  Je gardez les poulles.  The prince laughed, 
rtnd  sniil, Vous  gardez les  poulles ?  The parrot  an- 
swered, Oui moi,  & je scai bien faire ;  and made the 
cliuck  four or five times that people use to make to 
chickens when they call them.  I set down the words 
of  this  worthy  dialogue in  French, just  as  Prince 
Maurice  said  them  to me.  I  asked  him  in  what 
language the parrot spoke, and he said, in Brasilian ; 
I  asked  whether  he  understood Brasilian;  he said, 
no, but he had taken care to have two interpreters by 
him,  the one a  Dutchman that spoke Brasilian,  and 
the other a Brasilian that spoke Dutch ;  that he asked 
them  separately  and  privately,  and  both  of  them 
agreed in telling  him just  the same thing that the 
parrot had said.  I could not but tell this odd story, 
because  it is so much  out of  the way,  and from the 
first hand, and what nlay pass for a good one ;  for I 
dare say this prince at least believed himself in all he 
told  me,  having  ever  passed  for  a very honest  and 
pious man : I leave it to naturalists to reason,  and to 
other men  to believe,  as  they please  upon it; how- 
ever,  it is not, perhaps,  amiss to relieve or enliven a 
busy scene sometimes with such digressions, whether 
to the purpose or no." 
Same man.  I have taken care that the reader should 
have the story at  large in the author's own 
words, because he seems to me not to have thought it 
incredible ; for it cannot be imagined that so able a 
man as he, who had sufficiency enough to warrant all 
the testimonies  he  gives  of  himself,  should  take so 
much pains in a place where it had nothing to do, to 
pin so close not only on a man whom he mentions as 
his friend, but on a prince in whom he acknowledges 
very great honesty and piety, a story which if he him- 
self  thought incredible,  he could  not  but also think 
ricliculous.  The prince, it is plain, who vouches this 
story, and our author, who relates it from him,  both 
of them call this talker a parrot;  and I ask  any one 
elsc, who thinks such a story fit to be told, whether if 
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this parrot, and all of  its kind, had always talked, as 
we have a prince's  word  for it this one did, whether, 
J say, they would not have passed for a race of rational 
:  but yet whether for all that they would have 
been allowed to be men, and not parrots ?  For I pre- 
sume it is not the idea of a thinking or rational being 
alone that makes the idea of  a man in most people's 
senje, but of  a body,  so and so shaped, joined  to it : 
and if that be the idea of  a man,  the same successive 
body not shifted all at once, must, as well as the same 
immaterial spirit, go to the making of the same man. 
$9.  This being premised, to find wherein  Personal 
personal  identity consists,  we must con-  identity. 
sider  what person  stands  for;  which,  I think,  is  a 
thinking  intelligent  being,  that has reason  and re- 
flection,  and can  consider  itself  as itself,  the same 
thinking thing in different times and places ;  which it 
does only by that consciousness which  is inseparable 
from thinking,  and as it seems to me essential to it: 
it being  impossible  for any one to perceive,  without 
perceiving that he does perceive.  When we see, hear, 
smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know 
that we do so.  Thus it is always as to our present 
sensations  and perceptions : and by this every one is 
to himself that which he calls self; it not being con- 
sidered in  this  case  whether  the same  self  be con- 
tinued in the same or divers substances.  For  since 
consciousness always accompanies  thinking, and it is 
that which makes every one to be what he calls self, 
and thereby distinguishes himself from all other think- 
ing things; in  this  alone consists personal identity, 
i.  e.  the sameness of  a  rational being : and as far as 
this consciousness can be extended backwards to any 
past action  or thought, so far reaches the identity of 
that person ;  it is the same self now it was then ; and 
it is by the same self with this present one that now 
reflects on it, that that action was done. 
5 10. But it  is farther inquired, whether  Conscious- 
it be the same identical substance ?  This  ness makes SG  Of  Identity and I)ivcrsi(y.  Book a. 
personJ  few would think they had reason to doubt 
itlelltit~.  of,  if these perceptions,  with  their  con- 
sciousness,  always  remained  present  in the mind, 
whereby  the same  thinking thing would  be  always 
consciously  prcsent,  and,  as  would  be thought, evi- 
dently the same to itself.  But that which  seems  to 
make  the  difficulty  is  this,  that this  consciousness 
being  interrupted  always  by  forgetfulness,  there 
being no moment of  our lives wherein we have the 
whole train of  all our past actions before our eyes in 
one  view,  but  even  the  best  memories  losing  the 
sight of  one part whilst they are viewing another ;- 
arid we sometimes, and that the greatest part of  our 
lives,  riot reflecting on  our past selves,  being intent 
on  our present thoughts,  and in sound sleep having 
no thoughts  at all,  or  at least  none with  that con- 
sciousness which  remarks  our waking  thoughts;--I 
say, in all these cases,  our consciousness  being inter- 
rupted,  and we  losing the sight of  our past  selves, 
doubts are raised whether we are tlie same thinking 
thing, i. e.  the same substance or no.  Which, how- 
ever  reasonable  or  unreasonable,  concerns  not  per- 
sonal identity at all: the question being, what makes 
tlie  same person,  and  not  whether  it be  the same 
identical substance, which always thinks in the same 
person ; which  in  this  case  matters  not at all: dif- 
ferent substances, by the same consciousness (where - 
they do partake in it), being united  into one person, 
as well as different bodies by the same life are united 
into one  animal, whose  identity is preserved, in that 
change of  substances,  by the unity of  one continued 
lifc.  For it being the same colisciousness that makes 
a man be himself to himsclf, personal identity depends 
on that only,  whether it be annexcd solely to one in- 
(lividual substance, or can be continued in a succession 
of  several substances.  For as far  as  any intelligent 
being can repeat the idea of any past action with the 
same consciousness  it had of  it at first,  and with the 
same  consciousness  it has  of  any  present  action,  so 
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far it is thc same personal self.  For it is by the con- 
sciousness it has of  its present thoughts and actions, 
that it is self  to itself now, and so will be the same 
self, as far as the same consciousness  can  extend  to 
past or to come ;  and would be by distance of 
time, or change of  substance, no  more  two persons, 
than a man be two men by wearing other clothes to- 
day than he did yesterday, with a long or a short sleep 
[befween :  the same consciousness uniting those distant 
actions  into the  same  person,  whatever  substances 
contributed to their production. 
$ 11.  That this  is  so,  we  have  some  personal 
kind  of  evidence in  our very  bodies, dl  identity in 
whose  particles,  whilst  vitally ~~nited  to  change of 
this same thinking conscious self, so that  substances. 
we fie1 when  they are touched,  and are affected  by, 
and conscious of good or harm that happens to them, 
are a part of ourselves ;  i. e. of our thinking conscious 
self.  Thus the limbs of  his body are to every one a 
part of himself:  he sympathizes and is concerned for 
them.  Cut off a hand, and thereby separate it from 
that consciousness he had of  its heat, cold, and other 
affections, and it is then no longer a part of  that which 
is himself, any more than the remotest part of matter. 
Thus we see the substance, whereof personal self con- 
sisted at one time, may be varied at another, without 
the change of persorlal identity ;  there being no ques- 
tion about the same person, though the limbs, which 
but now were a part of  it, be cut off. 
$ 12.  But the question is,  "  Whether if the same 
substance  which  thinks  be  changed,  it can  be  the 
same person ; or, remaining the same, it can be dif- 
ferent persons?' 
~nd^to  this I answer, first, This can be  wl,etser  in 
no  question  at all  to those  who  place  the change 
thought in a purely material animal con-  of thinking 
stituiion, voidof an immaterial substance.  Substances. 
For whether their supposit,ion be true or no, it is plain 
they  conceive  personal  identity  preserved  in  some- 
thing clsc than identity of substance ;  as animal iden- 5s  OJlclentity cr~zd  Diversdy.  Book a. 
tity is  preserved  in identity of  life,  and not of  sub- 
stance.  And therefore those who  place thinking  in 
an immaterial substance  only, before  they can come 
to deal  with  these  men,  must  show  why  personal 
identity  cannot be preserved  in  the change of  im- 
material substances, or variety of particular  immate- 
rial  substances,  as  well  as  animal  identity  is  pre- 
served  in  the  change  of  material  substances,  or 
variety of  particular  bodies :  unless  they will  say, it 
is  olle immaterial spirit that makes the same life in 
brutes, as it is one immaterial spirit that makes the 
same person  in men; which  the Cartesians at least 
will  not admit,  for  fear  of  making brutes thinking 
things too. 
$ 13. But next, as to the first part of the question, 
"  Whether if the same thinking substance (supposing 
immaterial substances  only to think)  be  changed, it 
can be the same person ?"  I answer, that cannot be 
resolved,  but by those who  know what kind of  sub- 
stances they are that do think, and whether the con- 
sciousness of  past actions can be transferred from one 
thinking substance to another.  I grant, were the same 
consciousness the same individual action, it could not : 
but it being a present representation of a past action, 
why it may not be possible, that that may be repre- 
scnted to the mind to have  been,  which really never 
was, will  remain  to be  shown.  And  therefore how 
far the consciousness of past actions is annexed to  any 
individual agent, so that another cannot possibly have 
it, will be hard for us to determine, till we know what 
kind of action it is that cannot be done without a re- 
flex act of perception accompanying it, and how per- 
formed  by  thinking  substances,  who  cannot  think 
without  being  conscious  of  it.  But that which  we 
call the same consciousness,  not being the same in- 
dividual act, why one intellectual substance may not 
have represented to it, as done by itself, what it  never 
did, and was perhaps clone by some other agent ;  why, 
I say, such a representation may not possibly be w~th- 
out reality of matter of fact, as well as sevcral repre- 
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sentations  in dreams are, which yet whilst dreaming 
we take for true, will be difficult to  conclude from the 
nature of things.  And that it never is so,  will by us, 
till we have  clearer views  of  the nature of  thinking 
substances, be best resolved into the goodness of God, 
as far as the happiness or misery of any of  his 
sensible creatures is concerned in it, will not by a fatal 
error of theirs  transfer from one to another that con- 
sci&sne~~  which draws reward or punishment with it. 
How far this may be an argument against those who 
would place thinking in a system of  fleeting animal 
spirits, I leave to be considered.  But yet, to return 
to the question before  us, it must be allowed, that if 
the same consciousness  (which, as has been shown, is 
quite a different thing from the same numerical figure 
or motion in body) can be transferred from one think- 
ing substance to another, it will be possible that two 
thinking substances may make but one person.  For 
the same  consciousness  being  preserved,  whether in 
the same or different substances, the personal identity 
is preserved. 
$ 14. As to the second part of the question, ''  Whe- 
ther the same immaterial  substance remaining, there 
may be two distinct  persons ?"  which question seems 
to me to be built on this, whether the same immaterial 
being, being conscious of  the action of  its past dura- 
tion, may be wholly stripped of  all the consciousness 
of  its past existence, and lose it beyond the power of 
ever  retrieving  again;  and so  as  it were beginning 
a new account from  a new period, have a conscious- 
ness  that cannot reach beyond  this new state.  All 
those  who  hold  pre-existence  are  evidently  of  this 
mind, since they allow the soul to have no remaining 
consciousness of what it did in that pre-existent state, 
either wholly separate from  body,  or informing  any 
other body ; and if they should not, it is plain,  expe- 
rience would be against them.  So that personal iden- 
tity reaching no farther than consciousness reaches, a 
Pre-existent spirit not having continued so many ages Go  WIdentib  and Diversity.  Book 2. 
in a state of  silence, must needs make different per- 
sons.  Suppose a Christian Platonist or Pythagorean 
should,  upon  God's  having  ended all  his  works  of 
creation the seventh day, think his soul hath existed 
ever since ; and would imagine it has revolved in se- 
veral human bodies,  as I once met with one, who was 
persuaded  his  had  been the soul of  Socrates  (how 
reasonably I will not dispute ;  this I know, that in the 
post  he filled, which  was  no inconsiderable  one,  he 
passed  for  a  very rational  man,  and the  press has 
shown that he wanted not parts or learning); would 
any one say, that he being  not  conscious  of  any of 
Socrates's actions or thoughts, could be the same per- 
son with Socrates  ?  Let any one reflect  upon  him- 
self, and conclude that he  has in himself  an imma- 
terial spirit, which is that which thinks in him, and in 
the constant change of his body keeps him the same ; 
and is tliat which 110  calls himself:  let him also sup- 
pose  it to be  the same  soul that was in Nestor  or 
Thersites, at the siege of Troy (for souls being, as far 
as we know any thing of them in their nature, indif- 
ferent to any parcel of niatter, the supposition has no 
apparent absurdity in it) which it may have been, as 
well  as it is now the soul of any other man:  but he 
now  having  no  consciousness  of  any of  tlie  actions 
either of Nestor or Thersites, does or can he conceive 
himself the same person with  either  of  them ?  Can 
lie be concerned in either of  their actions ?  attribute 
tlicin to himself, or think them his own more than the 
actions of any othcr men that ever existed?  So that 
this consciousness not reaching to any of the actions 
of cither  of those men, he is  no rnore  one self with 
either of  them, than if  the soul  or immaterial spirit 
tliat now informs  him had been  created, and began 
to cxist, when it began to inform his  present body; 
though it were ever so true, that the same spirit that 
informed Nestor's  or Thersites's  body, were  numeri- 
cally tlie same that now informs his.  For this would 
iio rliore make him the same person with Nestor, than 
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if  some  of  the particles  of  matter that wcrc once s 
part of Nestor were now a part of this rnnn ;  the smnc 
immaterial substance, without the same consciousncss, 
no more making the same person by being united to 
any body, than the same particle of  matter, without 
consciousiless  united  to any body,  mnkes  the snmo 
person.  But let him once  find  himself  conscious of' 
any of the actions of Nestor, he then finds himself the 
samc person with Nestor. 
9 15.  And thus we may be able, without any diffi- 
culty, to conceive the samc person at  the resurrection, 
thol~gli  i11  a  body  not exactly in make or parts thc 
same which he hacl here, the same consciousiicss going 
along with  the soul  that in11al)its it.  But yet  the 
soul alonc, in the change  of  bodics,  would  scarce to 
any one, but to liiin tliat inakes the soul the man, be 
enough to make the same man.  For should the soul 
of a prince, carrying with it the conseiousncss of  the 
princc's  past life, cntcr and inform the body of a cob- 
blcr, as soon as deserted by his  own soul, every one 
sees he would  be  the same  person  with  the princc, 
accountnblc  only  for  the prince's  actions : but who 
woultl say it was the same man ?  The  body toogocs 
to the inaking the man, and \v,vould, I guess, to every 
body  determine the man  in this  casc;  wherein  the 
soul, with a11  its princely  thoughts about it,  would 
not .make another  man : but he would  bc the samc 
cobbler to every one besides himself.  I know that, in 
the ordinary way of  speaking, the same person,  and 
the saine man, stand for one and the sainc thing.  And 
indeed every one will always have  a  liberty to speak 
as he pleases,  and to apply  what  articulate  sounds 
to what ideas he thinks fit, and change them as often 
as he pleases.  But yet when  we will  inquire wl~nt 
mnkes the saine  spirit, man, or person,  we  n~ust  fix 
the ideas of spirit, man,  or person in our minds ; and 
having resolved with ourselves what we meall by them, 
it will not be hard to determine in either of them, or 
the like, when it is the saille, and when not. 62  Ofl(1erlrtitjy and Diversi~y  .  Rook 2. 
Conscious-  § 16. But though the same immaterial 
ness makes  substance or soul does not alone, wherever 
the same  it be,  and in whatsoever  state, make the 
person.  same man;  yet it is plain consciousness, 
as far as ever it can be extended, should it be to ages 
past,  unites  existences  and  actions, very  remote  in 
time,  into  the same person,  as  well  as  it does  the 
existences and actions of  the immediately preceding 
moment:  so that whatever has the consciousness  of 
present and past actions, is the same person to whom 
they both belong.  Had I the same consciousness that 
I saw the ark and Noah's flood, as that I saw an over- 
flowing of the Thaines last winter, or as that I write 
now ; I could  no  more  doubt  .that I who write  this 
now, that saw the Thames overflowed last winter, and 
that viewed the flood at the general deluge, was  the 
same self, place that self in what substance you please, 
than that I who write this am the same myself now 
whilst I write (whether I consist of  all the same snb- 
stance, material or immaterial, or no) that I was yes- 
terday.  For as to this point  of  being  the same self, 
it  matters not whether this  present self be  made up 
of the same or other substances ;  I being as much con- 
cerned, and as justly accountable for any action that 
was done a thousand years since, appropriated to me 
now by this self-consciousness, as I am for what I did 
the last moment. 
self  depends  $ 17.  Self is  that  conscious  thinking 
on con-  thing  (whatever  substance  made up  of, 
sciousness.  whether  spiritual  or  material, siniple or 
compounded, it matters not) which is sensible, or con- 
scious of pleasure and pain, capable  of  happiness  or 
misery, and so is concerned for itself,  as far as that 
consciousness  extends.  Thus  every one  finds, that 
whilst  comprehended  under  that consciousness,  the 
little finger is  as much  a part of  himself, as what is 
most so.  Upon separation of this little finger, should 
this consciousness go along with the little finger, and 
leave the rest of the body, it is evident  the little fin- 
ger would be the person, the same person ; and  self 
then would  have  nothing  to do with the rcst of  tlie 
body.  As in this case it is the consciousness that goes 
along with the substance, when one part is separatc 
from another, which makes thc same person, and con- 
stitutes this inseparable self;  so it is in  rcfercncc  to 
substances remote in time.  That with which the con- 
scio,usness of  this present thinking thing can join  it- 
self, makes the same person, and is  one  self with it, 
and with nothing else ;  and so attributes to itself, and 
owns all the actions of that thing as its own, as far as 
that consciousness 'reaches, and no farther ; as every 
one who reflects will perceive. 
5 1s. In this personal identity is found-  Objects of 
ed a11  the right and justice of reward and  reward ant1 
punishment ; happiness and misery being 
that for which every one is concerned for himself, and 
not  mattering  what  becomes  of  any  substance not 
joined to, or affected with that consciousness.  For as 
it is  evident in the instance I gave  but now, if  the 
consciousness went along with the little finger when 
it was cut off,  that would be the same self which was 
concerned  for tlie whole  body  yesterday, as making 
part of itself,  whose actions then it cannot but adillit 
as its own now.  Though if the same body should still 
live, and immediately, from the scparation of the little 
finger, have  its own peculiar consciousness,  whereof 
the little finger knew nothing ;  it would not at all be 
concerned for it, as a part of itself, or could own any 
of its actions, or have any of them imputed to him. 
§ 19.  This may show us wherein personal identity 
consists;  not in the identity of  substance, but, as I 
have said, in the identity of  consciousness ; wherein, 
if Socrates and the present mayor  of  Queenborough 
agree, they are the same person :  if the same Socrates 
waking and sleeping do not partake of the same con- 
sciousness, Socrates  waking  and sleeping is not  the 
same  person.  And  to punish  Socrates  waking  for 
what sleeping Socrates thought, and waking Socrates G 4+  Of  Identily  and  Diversity.  Book 8. 
was  nevcr  conscious of,  would  be  no more of  right, 
than to punish one twin for what his brother twin (lid, 
whereof he knew nothing, because their outsides were 
so like that they could not be distinguished ;  for such 
twins have been seen. 
S 20. Rut  yet possibly it will still be objected, sup- 
pose I wholly lose the memory of  some  parts of  my 
life  beyond  a  possibility  of  retrieving them, so tlrnt 
pcrhaps I  shall nevcr  be  conscious  of  them  again ; 
yct am 1 not the same pcrson that (lid  those actions, 
had those thoughts that I once was conscious of,though 
I have now  forgot them?  To which I answer,  that 
we must here takc notice what the word I is applied 
to; which,  in  this  case, is the  inan  only.  And  the 
same  man  being prcsuincd  to be  tlie  saine  person, 
J  is  easily here supposed to stand  also for  the same 
person.  But if  it be possible  for  the  same man to 
have  distinct  incommunicable  consciousness  at dif- 
ferent times, it is past doubt the same man would at 
cliffcrcnt  times make differcnt persons ;  which, wc sec, 
is the sense of  mankind in  the solcinllcst declaration 
of thcir opinions ;  human laws not punishin:$  tlie mad 
man for the sober man's  actions, nor the sobcr man 
for what thc mad man did, thereby making thcm two 
persons :  which is somewhat explnilled by our way of' 
speaking in English, whcn we say such an onc is not 
himself, or  is  bcsidc  himself;  in which  phrases  it is 
insinuated, as if  those who now, or at least first used 
them,  thought that self  was  clianged, the self-same 
person was no longer i11  that man. 
l)iffcrcncc  $ 21.  But yet it is  hard  to conceive 
bet~vecn  that Socrates,  the same indivitlual man, 
identity of  should  be  two  persons.  To help  us  a 
mall and  little  in this,  we  must  consider  what is 
person.  meant by Socrates, or the same individual 
man. 
First, it must be either the same individual, imma- 
terial, thinking substance ;  in short, the same numcri- 
cal soul, and nothing else. 
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Secondly, or the san~e  animal, without any regard 
to an immaterial soul. 
Thirdly, or  the same immaterial spirit  united  to 
the same animal. 
Now take which of  these  suppositions  you please, 
it is impossible  to make personal  identity  to corrsist 
in any thing but consciousness,  or reach any farther 
thap that does. 
For by the first of them, it must be allowed possible 
that a man  born  of  different womcn,  and in  distant 
times,  inay  be  the saine  man.  A  way of  speaking, 
which whoever  admits, must allow it possible for the 
same man to be  two distinct persons as any two that 
have lived in differcnt ages, without the knowledge of 
one another's thoughts. 
By the second and third,  Socrates in this  life, and 
after it, cannot be the same man any way but by the 
same consciousness ;  and so making human identity to 
consist ill the same thing whcrcill we  place personal 
identity, there will be no difficulty to allow tlle  same 
man to be the same person.  But thcn they who place 
human identity in consciousness only, and not in soinc- 
thing else, must consider how they will make the in- 
fant Socrates the same mall  with Socratcs  after tlie 
,  resurrection.  But whatsoever to some men makes at 
man,  and  consequently  the  same  individual  man, 
wherein perhaps few are agreed, personal identity can 
by us be placed in nothing but consciousness  (which 
is that alone which makes what we call self) without 
involving us in great absurdities. 
22. But is not a man drunk nncl  sobcr the same 
person,-why  else is he punished for the fact he com- 
mits when drunt, though he be nevcr afterwards con- 
scious  of  it?  Just  as  much  the  same  person  as 
8  man that walks, and does other things in his sleep, 
is  the same person,  and  is  answerable  for  any mis- 
chief  he shall  do in  it.  Human laws  punish  both, 
with  a justice  suitable  to their way of  knowleclge ; 
because  in  these  cases  they  cannot distinguish  cer- 
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tainly what  is real,  what counterfeit:  and so the ig- 
norance in drunkcnncss  or  sleep is  not admitted as 
a plea.  For though punishment  be annexed  to per- 
sonality,  and  personality  to consciousness,  and  the 
drunkard perhaps be not  conscious  of  what he did ; 
yet human judicatures justly punish him, because the 
fact is proved against him,  but want of consciousness 
cannot  be  proved  for  him.  But in  the great day, 
wherein the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open, it 
may Be  reasonable to think,  no one shall be made to 
answer  for  what  he knows nothing of,  but shall re- 
ceive his doom, his  conscience  accusing  or excusing 
him. 
Conscious-  § 93. Nothing  but consciousness  can 
ness alone  unite remote existences into the same per- 
makes self-  son; the identity of substance will not do it. 
For whatever substance  there is, however framed, with- 
out cor~sciousness  there is no person ;  and a carcass 
may be a person,  as well as any sort of  substance be 
so without consciousness. 
Could  we  suppose  two  distinct  incommunicable 
consciousnesses acting the same  body,  the one  con- 
stantly by day, the other by night ;  and, on the other 
side, the same consciousness  acting by intervals two 
distinct bodies : I ask, in the first case, whether  the 
day and the night man  would not be  two as distinct 
persons  as  Socrates and Plato?  And  whether,  in 
the seconci case, there would not be one person in two 
distinct bodies, as much as one man is the same in two 
distinct clothings?  Nor is it at all material to say, 
that  this same, and this distinct  consciousness,in the  cases 
above-mentioned, is  owing to the  same and distinct 
immaterial substances, bringing it with them to those 
bodies ;  which,  whether  true or no,  alters  not  the 
casc ;  since it is evident the personal identity would 
equally be  determined by the consciousness, whether 
that consciousness were annexed to some individual 
immaterial  substance  or no.  For granting that the 
thinking substance  in man  must  be necessnrily sup- 
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posed immaterial, it is evident that immaterial think- 
ing thing may sometimes part with its past conscious- 
ness, and be restored to it again, as appears in the for- 
getfulness men often have  of  their past actions : and 
the mind  many times recovers the memory of a past 
which it had lost for  twenty ycars to- 
,gether.  Make these intervals of memory and forget- 
fulgess  to take  their  turns  regularly  by  day  and 
night, and you have  two persons  with the same im- 
material  spirit,  as  much  as in  the former  instancc 
two persons with the same body.  So that self is not 
determined  by  identity  or  diversity  of  substance, 
which  it  cannot be  sure of,  but only by identity of 
consciousness. 
$ as. Indeed it may conceive the substance, where- 
of it is now made up, to have existed formerly, united 
in  the  same conscious  being:  but  consciouslless  re- 
moved, that substance is no more itsclf,  or makes no 
more a part of it, than any other substance ; as is evi- 
dent in  the instance we have alreacly given of  a limb 
cut off,of whose heat,or cold,or other affections,having 
no longer any consciouslless, it is no inorc of  a man's 
self than any other matter of  the universe.  In like 
manner it will be in reference to any innriaterial sub- 
stance, which is void of  that consciousness whereby I 
am myself  to myself:  if  there be any part of its ex- 
istence  which  I  cannot upon  recollcctio~~  join  wit11 
that present consciousness, whereby I am now myself, 
it is in that part of its existence no more myself  than 
any other immaterial being.  For whatsoever any sub- 
stance  has thought or  done,  which I  cannot  recol- 
lect, and by my consciousness make my own thought 
and action, it will no more belong  to me, whether a 
part of  me  thought  or  did it,  than  if  it hacl  1)cen 
thought or done by  any other immatcrinl bcing  any 
where existing. 
5 25.  I agree,  the inorc  probable  opinion  is, that 
this consciousiless is  anilcsed to, and the aff'ection of', 
one individual immaterial substance. 
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But let men, according to their diverse hypotheses, 
resolve  of  that as  they please, this every intelligerlt 
being,  sensible  of  happiness  or misery,  must grant, 
that there is something that is himself that he is con- 
cerned for, and would have happy ;  that this self has 
existed i11  a continued duration more than one instant, 
and therefore  it is ~ossible  may exist, as it has clone, 
months and years to come,without  any certain bounds 
to be set to its duration ;  and may be the same self, by 
the same  consciousness  continued on for the future. 
And  thus, by  this consciousness, he finds  himself  to 
be the same self which did such or such an action some 
years since, by which he comes to be happy  or miserable 
now.  In all ~vhich  account of  self,  the same nume- 
rical substance is not considered as making the same 
self; but the same continued consciousness,  in which 
several substances may have been united,  and again 
separated from it; which, whilst  they continued in sl 
vital union with that wherein this consciousness  then 
resided,  made a part  of  that same  self.  Thus  any 
part of our bodies, vitally united to that which is con- 
scious in us, makes a part of  ourselves :  but upon se- 
paration from the vital union, by which that conscious- 
ness  is  comm~~nicated,  thzt which  a inoment  since 
was part of ours~lvcs  is now no more so  than a part 
of another man's  self  is  a part of  me;  and it is not 
impossible  but in  a  little  time  may  become  a real 
part  of  anotllcr person.  And  so  we have the same 
numerical  substance become  a part of  two different 
persons,  and  the  sarile  person  preserved  under  the 
change  of  various  substances.  Could  we  suppose 
any spirit wholly stripped of  all its memory  0.;  con- 
sciousness of past actions, as we find our minds always 
are of  a great part of  ours,  and sometimes of  them 
all,  the union  or separation of  such a spiritual sub- 
stance would make no variation of personal identity, 
any more  than  that of  any particle of  matter does. 
Any substance vitally united  to the present thinking 
being is n part of  that very same  self which ncw is : 
any thing united to it by  a  consciousriess of  former 
actions makes also  n part of  the same self,  which is 
the same both then and now. 
$ 26.  Person, as I take it, is the name 
person  a fo- 
rensic term.  for this self.  Wherever a man finds what 
he calls himself, there I think another may 
say is the same person.  It is a forensic tern] appro- 
priating  actions  and  their  merit ; and  so  belongs 
drily to intelligent agents capable  of  a law, and hap- 
piness  and misery.  This personality  extends itself 
beyond  present  existence  to what  is  past  only  by 
cor~sciousness,  whereby it becomes concerned and ac- 
countable,  owns and imputes to itself  past  actions, 
just upon the same ground and for  the same reason 
that it does the present:  all which  is founded  in a 
concern for happiness, the unavoidable concomitallt of 
consciousiless;  that  which  is  conscious  of  pleasure 
arid  pain  desiring that that  self  that  is  conscious 
should be happy.  And  therefore whatever past  ac- 
tions it cannot reconcile or appropriate to that pre- 
sent  self  by  consci~usness,  it can be no  more  con- 
cerned in than if  they had never been done : and to 
receive pleasure or pain,  i.  e.  reward  or punishment, 
on the account of any such action, is all one as to be 
made happy or miserable  in  its first being,  without 
any demerit at all.  For supposing  a man punished 
now for what he had done in another life, whereof he 
could be made to have no consciousness at all, what 
difference  is  there  between  that punishment,  and 
being created miserable ?  And therefore conformable 
to  this  the apostle  tells us,  that at the great day, 
when  every  one  shall "receive  according to his  do- 
ings,  the  secrets  of  all hearts shall  be  laid  open." 
The sentence shall be justified  by the consciousness 
all persons shall have,  that they themselves, in what 
bodies soever they appear, or what substances see-er 
that consciousness adheres to, are the same that com- 
mitted thosc actions, and deserve that punishment for 
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5 27. I am apt enough to think I have, in treating 
of this subject, made some suppositions that will look 
strange to some readers, and possibly they  are so in 
themselves.  But yet,  1 think,  they are  such  ab are 
pardonable in this ignorance we  are in of  the nature 
of  that thinking thing that is  in us,  and wl~icli  we 
look on as ourselves.  Did we know what it was, or 
how it was tied to a certain system of fleeting animal 
spirits ; or whether it could  or could  not perform its 
operations of thinking and memory out of  a body or- 
ganised as ours is ; and whether it has pleased God 
that no one such spirit shall ever be united to any one 
but such body,  upon  the right  constitution of whose 
organs its memory should depend ;  we might see the 
absurdity of some  of those suppositions I have made. 
But taking,  as  we  ordinarily now  do,  (in  the  dark 
concerning these matters)  the soul of  a man for an 
immaterial substance,  independent  from  matter, and 
indifferent alike to it all, there can from the nature of 
things be no absurdity at all to suppose, that the same 
soul may,  at  different times,  be  united  to different 
bodies,  and  with them make up,  for  that time,  one 
man : as well as we suppose a part of  a sheep's body 
yesterday should be a part of a man's body to-morrow, 
and in that union makc a vital part of Meliboeus him- 
self, as well as it did of his ram. 
The difficul-  $28. To  conclude :  whatever substance 
ty, from ill  begins to exist,  it must,  cluring its exist- 
llseclf  llanles.  ence,  necessarily be the same : whatever 
compositions of  substances begin to exist, during the 
union of  those  substances  the concrete  must be the 
same : whatsoever  mode  begins  to exist, during  its 
existence it is the same : and so if the composition be 
of distinct substances  and  different modes,  the same 
rule holds.  Whereby  it will  appear,  that the diffi- 
culty or obscurity that has been  about  this  matter, 
rather rises from the names ill used,  than from any 
obscurity in things themselves.  For whatever makes 
the specific  idea  to which  the  name  is  applied,  if 
that idea be steadily kept to,  thc distinctioii  of  ally 
thing illto  the  same  and  divers  will  easily  bc con- 
ceived, and there can arise no doubt about it. 
$ 29. For supposing a rational spirit be  C,ntinuetl 
the idea of a man, it is easy to know what  existence 
is tlle  same  man; viz. the  same  spirit,  lnakcs  idell- 
bvllether  separate or in a body, will be the  "'y. 
saw  man.  Supposing a rational spirit vitally united 
to a body of a certain conformation of  parts to make 
a man, whilst that rational spirit, with that vital con- 
formation of parts, though continued in a fleeting suc- 
cessive body, remains,  it will be the same.  But if to 
any one the idea of  a man be but the vital  union of 
parts in  a certain shape,  as long as that vital union 
and  shape  remain,  in  a  concrete  no  otherwise  the 
same, but by a continued succession of  fleeting parti- 
cles, it will be the same.  For whatever  be the com- 
position whereof the complex idea is made, whenever 
existence  makes  it one particular thing under any 
denomination,  the  same  existence,  continued,  pre- 
serves  it the same individual  under  the same dcnci- 
mination *. 
* The doctrine of identity and diversity contained in this chap- 
ter the bishop  of  Worcester  pretends  to  be inconsistent  with 
the doctrines ofthe Christian faith, concerning the resurrection of 
the dead.  His way of  arguing from it is this : he says, tlie rdason 
of believing the resurrection of the same body, upon Mr. Locke's 
grounds, is from the idea of identity.  To which our author f an- 
swers :  Give me leave, my lord, to say,  that  the reason of believ- 
ing any article of the Christian faith (such as your lordship is here 
speaking of) to me,  and upon my grounds,  is its being a part of 
divine revelation :  upon this  gound I believed it? before I either 
writ  that  chapter  of  identity  and diversity,  and before  I  ever 
thought of those propositions  which  your lordship quotes out of 
that chapter ;  and upon the same ground I believe it still ;  and not 
from my idea of identity.  This saying of your lordshi  'a, therefore, 
being a proposition neither self-evident,  nor alloweBby me to be 
true,  remains  to be proved.  So that your foundation  failing, a!l 
your large superstructure built thereon comes to nothing. 
But, my lord, before  we  go any farther, I crave leave l~umbly 
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10  rcprcscnt  to your lordship,  that I thought  yo11  undertook  to 
~iiahe  out that my notion of ideas was inconsistent with tlie articlcs 
of the Christian fiiitli.  But that wliich your lordsliip instances in 
here,  is  not,  that I yet know,  an article of  the Christian faith.- 
Tlic resurrection  of the dead I acknowledge  to be an article of 
tlie Christian Gith :  but tliat the resurrection of the same body, in 
your lordship's sense of the same body, is an article of the Christian 
faith, is what, I confess, I do not yet know. 
In the New Testanlent (wherein,  I think,  are contained all the 
articles of'the Christian faith) I find our Saviour and the apostles 
to l~rcacll  tlic resurrection of the dcad, and the resurrection  from 
tlie  dead,  in  many  places ; but  I  do not remcmber  any place 
where tlie  resurrcction  of  the saine botly  is so  much  as men- 
tioncd.  Nay, which is very remarkable  in  the case,  I do not re- 
member  in any place of  tlie New Testament  (where the general 
rcsurrectlon  at tile last day is spoken of) any such expression as 
tlie resurrection  of the body, much less of the same body. 
I say the gencral resurrection  at the last day: because,  where 
the resurrcction  of  some particular  persons,  presently upon  our 
Saviour's rcsurrectiori,  is  mcntioncd,  the words are, "The graves 
were opened, niicl niany bodies  of saints,  wliicli slept, arose,  and 
came out of thc gravcs  after his rcsurrcction, arid went into the 
Holy City, and appcdred to many : of which peculiar way ot'speak- 
ing of tliis  resurrectioil  thc ~~assagc  itself  gives a rcason in these 
words,  appeared to many,  i.  r,  tlrosc who slept appeared,  so as to 
be known to be risen.  But this could riot be known, unlcss they 
brought  with  them  thc cvidcncc,  tli'lt  they were those who liad 
been dead ; wlicreof thcrc wcrc thebe two proofs, tlicir graves wcrc 
opcncd, and thcir bodies not only gone out of tliem,  hut appcared 
to be the same to thosc who had known thein formerly alive, and 
knew them  to be dcad and buried.  For if  thcy had been thosc 
who liad  been dead so long,  that all who knew them once alive 
ncre now gone,  thosc  to whom they appeared might have known 
them  to be men, hut could not liave known  they were risen from 
the dead, because they never knew they had been dead.  All that 
by their appearing they could have known was,  that thcy were so 
marly living strangcrs,  of whose resurrection  they knew notliing. 
It w,ts necessary, therefore, that they should come in such bodies 
as nliglit in mahe and size, kc. appear to be the same they had be- 
fore,  that they might be known  to  those of  tlicir  accltlaintance 
~honl  they appeared  to.  And  it is  probable  thcy were such as 
were newly dead, whose bodies  wcre not yet dissolved and dissi- 
pated;  and, tliereforc, it is particularly said here (differently from 
what is said  of the gcneral resurrection), that their bodies arose; 
because they were the sanie  that wcrc  then lying in their graves 
the nlonrcnt bcfi~c  they rose, 
But your lordsliip cndcavours to provc it lllust be tlle sanle body. 
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and jet  us grant that your lorclsliip, nay, and others too, think you 
]lave  proved it niust bc thc ;amc body ;  will you theref~re  say,that he 
llolds what is inconsistent with an article of faith, who having never 
see11 this yollr lordship's  interpretation of the scripture, nor your 
reasons fbr tlie same body, in your sense of same body ; or, if lie 
has seen them, yet not understanding them, or not perceiving tlic 
force of them, believes what tlie  scripture proposes  to him, viz. 
that at tlie last day the dead shall be raised, without determining 
whether it shall be with the very same bodies or no? 
I,know your lordsltip pretends  not to erect your particular in- 
kerl)retations of scripture into articles of faith.  And if you do not, 
Ile that believes the dcad shall bc raised  believes that article of 
tilit11  ahich the  scripture proposes;  and callnot  be accused of 
Iiolding  any thing inconsistent with  it,  if  it sliould  hnppcn  that 
\chat Ilc holds is  inconsistent with another proposition, vb. That 
tlie dead shall be raised wit11  the same bodies,  in  your lordsliip's 
sense, wliicli I do not find proposed in Holy Writ as an article of 
faith. 
But your lordship argues, it inust be the same body ;  which, as 
you explain saine body *,  is  not the same individual particles  of 
matter whicli  were united  at the point  of  death,  nor  the samc 
particles of mattcr  that the sinner had at the tirne  of the com- 
iuission of his sins; but that it must be tlie same material substance 
wlricli was vitally united to the soul here; i. e. as I understand it, 
tlic sanic individual particles of matter ~vllich  were, some time or 
otllcr during his life licrc, vitally united to his soul. 
Your first argunient to prove  tliat it must be the same body, irr 
this  sensc of tlie samc body,  is  takcn  from  tlicse  words  of our 
Saviour+, All that arc in tlie gravcs shall hear his voice, and shall 
cornc  forth.  $ From  ~vlience  your  lordship  argues,  that  thcse 
words, all that arc in  their gravcs,  relate  to no other substance 
than what was united to the soul  in life; because a different sub- 
btance  cannot be said  tc be in the graves,  and  to come out of 
tlieei.  Which words  cf your lordship's,  if they provc any thing, 
prove tliat the soul too is lodged in the grave, anti raised out of it 
at the last day.  For your lordsliip says, Can a diff'erent substance 
bc said to be In tlie graves, and come out of tliem?  So that,  ac 
cording to tliis  interpretation of these words of  our Saviour, No 
other substance being raised,  but  what  licars  his voice :  and no 
other substance hearing his voice, but what, bcing called, conies out 
of the grave ;  and no other substance corning out of the grave, but 
wliat mas in tlie grave ;  any one must conclude, that the soul, unless 
it be in the grave, will niakc  no part of the person flint is raised; 
unless,  as  your lordship argues  against  me fj,  you  can n~ahe  it 
out, that a substance w~hicli  never was in tlie gravc may come out 
of it, or that the soul is no substance. 
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But setting aside  tlic substance of  the soul, aiiotlier thing that 
will make any one doubt whether  this your interpretation of our 
Saviour's  words be necessarily to be received as their true sense, 
is,  That it will not be very ezrsily reconciled to your saying*,  you 
do not mean by the same body the same individual particles wh~ch 
were united at the point of death.  And yet,  by this interpreta- 
tion of our Saviour's words,  you can mean no other particles but 
such as were united at the point of death ;  because you niean no 
other substance but what  comes out of the grave; and no sub- 
stance,  no particles  come  out,  you  say,  but what  were in  the 
grave ;  and I  think your  lordship will  not say,  that  the  parti- 
cles that were separate from the  body by perspiration bcfore the 
point of death mere laid up in the grave. 
But your lordship, I find, has an answer to this, viz. t That by 
comparing this with other places, you find that the words [of  our 
Saviour above-quoted]  are to be understood of the substance of 
the body, to which the soul was united, and not to (I  supposc your 
lordship writ, of) these individual particles, i.  e. those individual par- 
ticles that are in the grave at  the resurrection.  For so they must 
be read, to make your lordship's sense entire,  and to the purpose 
of your answer here:  and then,  methinks, this last  sense of our 
Saviour's words given by your lordship wholly overturns the aense 
which we have given of them above, where from those words you 
press the belief of  the resurrection of the  same body, by this strong 
argument, that a substance could not, upon hearing the voice of 
Christ,  come out of the grave,  which  was  never  in the grave. 
There (as far as I can understand your words) your lordship ar- 
gues, that our  Saviour's  words are to be understood of the parti- 
cles in the grave, unless,  as your lordship says, one can make it 
out that a substance which  never was in the grave may come out 
of it.  And here your lordship expressly says, That our Saviour's 
words are to be understood of the substance of that body to which 
the soul was [at any time]  united, and not to those individual par- 
ticles that are in the grave.  Which put together, seems to me to 
say, that our Saviour's  words are to be understood of those parti- 
cles only that are in the grave, and not of those particles only which 
are in the grave, but of  others also, which have at any time been 
vit~lly  united to thc soul, but never were in the grave. 
The next text your lordship brings to make the resurrection of 
the same body, in your sense,  an article of faith, are these words 
of St. Paul : j: For wc must all appear before the  judgment-seat  of 
Christ, that evcry one may receive the things  done in his body, 
according to tliat he hath done, whether it be good or bad.  To 
which your lordship subjoins 5  this question :  Can these words be 
understood of any other material substance but that body in which 
these things were done ?  Answer.  A man may suspend his deter- 
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mining the nicaning of the apostle to be, that a sinner shall sulfer 
for his  sins in  the very same body wherein  he con~~nitted  thenl: 
because St. Paul does not say he shall have  the very same body 
tvhen  he sufers that he had when he sinned.  Tlle apostle says 
indeed, done in his body.  The body he had, and did things in, at 
five or fifteen,  was, no doubt, his body, as much as that which he 
did things  in at fifty was his body,  though his body were not the 
very same body  at those different ages: and  so will  the body 
which he shall have after the resurrection be his body,  though it 
be not~he  very same with that wliich he had at five, or fiftecn, or 
fifty,  He  that at threescore is broke on the wheel, for a murder 
he committed at twenty, is punished  for what he did in his body, 
though  the body he has,  i. e. his  body at tlireescore, be not the 
same, i. e. made up of the same individual particles of matter, that 
that body was which he  had forty years before.  When your lord- 
ship has resolved with yourself what  that same immutabIe he is, 
which  at the last judgment  shall receive  the things done in his 
body, your lordship will easily see that tlie body he had when an 
embryo in the womb, when a  child playing in coats,  when a man 
marrying a wife, and when bed-rid dying of a consumption, and at 
last, which he sliall  have after his resurrection, are each of them 
his body, though neither of them te  the same body, the one with 
the other. 
But farther, to your lordship's  question, Can these words be un- 
derstood of any other material  substance but that body in which 
these things were done  ?  I answcr, These words of St. Paul may 
be understood  of another material substance than  that body in 
which these things were  done, because your lordship teaches me, 
and gives me a strong reason so to understand them.  Your lord- 
ship says, * That you  do not say the same particles  of matter, 
which the sinner had at the very  time  of the commission of his 
sins, shall be raised at the last day.  And your lordship gives this 
rcason  for it :  -f.  For then  a  long sinner  must have a vast body, 
considering the continued spending of particles  by pcrspiration. 
Now,  my lord, if the apostle's  words,  as your lordship would ar- 
gue, cannot be understood  of any other material  substance, but 
that body in which these things a ere done ;  and no  body, upon the 
removal or change of some of the particles that at any time makc 
it up, is tlie same material substance, or the same body;  it will, I 
think,  thence follow, that either tlie sinner must have all the same 
individual particles vitally united to his soul when he is raised that 
he had vitally united to his soul when lie sinned, or else St.  Paul's 
words here cannot be understood to mean the same body in which 
the things were done.  For if there were other particles of matter 
in the body, whcrein the things were done, than in that which is 
raised, that which is raised cannot be the same body in which they 
were done :  unless that alone, which has just all the same individual 
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particles \vhen any action  is  done, being  the same body wherein 
it was done, that also, which has not tlie same individual particles 
wlicrein that action was  done, can be tlie  same body wherein it 
was done ;  which is in effect to make the same body sometimes to 
be tlie same, and sometimes not the same. 
Your lordship thinks  it suffices to make the same body to have 
not all, but no other particles  of  matter, but such as were some 
titile  or other vitally united to the soul before; but such a body, 
made up  of part of tlie particles some time or other vlta!ly  united 
to the soul, is no more  the salnc body wherein the acttons were 
donc in the distant parts of the long sinner's life, than that is the 
same body in which a quarter,  or half,  or  three-quarters of the 
same particles,  that made it up,  are wanting.  For example,  a 
sinnclr has acted here in his  body an hundred years; he is raised 
at the last  day, but witli what  body?  The  same, says your lord- 
ship,  tliat  he acted in;  because  St. Paul says, he must  receive 
the things donc in his body.  What tlicrefore must his body at  the 
resurrection  consist  of?  Must it consist  of  all  the particles  of 
matter  tliat  have  ever been vltally  united  to his soul ?  for  they, 
in sncccssion, have all of them made up his  body wherein lie did 
these things : No, says your lordship,  2 that would make his body 
too vast; it suffices  to make  the same body in which  the things 
uere doiie, that it consists of some of  tlie particles,  and no other, 
but such as wcre,  some lime  during his life, vital!y  united to his 
soul.  But according to this account, his body at the resurrection 
being, as your lordship seems to limit it, near the salnc size it was 
in some part of his lib, it will bc no more the same body in wllich 
the tliings were done in tlie distant parts  of  his  life,  than that is 
the same body in which half, or three-quarters, or more of the in- 
dividual niatter that then made it up, is now wanting.  For exam- 
ple, Ict his body at fifty years old consist of a niillion of parts; five 
hundred  thousand  at least of those parts will  be diffcrent  from 
those which made up his body at ten years, and at an hundred. 
So that to take the nun~erical  particles that made up his body at 
titty, or any other season of  his  life, or  to gather then1 promis- 
cuously out of those  which  at diflerent  times have successively 
been vitally united to his  soul, they will  no more make the same 
body wliich  was his, wherein some of his actions were done, than 
that is tlie same body which has but half the same particles: and 
yet all your  lordship's  argument here for the same body is, be- 
cause St. I'aul  says it must  be his  body  in which  these  things 
wcre  donc; which  it could not be if  any other substance were 
joined to it, i. e. if any other particles of matter made up the body 
wliich  were  not vitally united  to the soul when  the actlon  was 
done. 
Again, your lordship says,  1."  That you  do not say the same 
iridividual particlcs  [shall  make up the body at the resurrection] 
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,,rhicll were united at the point of death, for there must be a great 
alteration in them in a lingering disease, as if a  fat niail fills into 
a consun~ption."  Because,  it is likely,  your lordship thinks these 
particles ofa  decrepit, wasted, withered body would be too few, or 
unfit to make such a  plump, strong, vigorous, well-sized body, as 
it llas pleased your lordship to proportion out in your thouglits to 
men at the resurrection;  and therefore some small portion of the 
prticles formerly  united  vitally  to that man's  soul shall be re- 
assumed, to niake  up  his  body to the bulk your lordship judges 
conveniept ;  but the greatest part of them shall be left out, to avoid 
the making his body more vast  than your lordship  thinks will  be 
fit, as appears by these your lordship's words immediately follow- 
ing, viz. ''( That you do not say tlie same particles the sinner had 
at the very time of comnlission of his sins ;  for then a long sinner 
must have a vast body." 
But then pray, my lord, what must  an embryo do, who dying 
within a few hours after his body was vitally united to his soul, has 
no particles  of  matter,  which  were formerly vitally united  to it, 
to malte up his body of that size and proportion which your lord- 
ship seems to require in bodies at tlie resurrection?  Or must we 
believc he shall remain content with that sniall pittance of niatter, 
and that yet imperfect body to eternity, because it is an article of 
faith to believe the resurrection of the vcry same body,  i. e. made 
up of only sucli particles  as have beer. vitally united to the soul? 
For if it be so, as your lordship says, t "That  life is the result of 
the union  of soul  and body,"  it will  follow, that the body of an 
embryo dying in the womb may be very little, not the thousandth 
part of any ordinary man.  For since from the first conception and 
beginniiig  of  fornlation  it has life,  aid "life is the result of  thc 
union ofthe soul witli thc body,"  an embryo, that sliall die either 
by  the untimely death of the mother, or by any other ~ccidcnt, 
presently after it has life, must, according to your lordship's doc- 
trine, remain a man not an inch long to eternity;  because there 
are not particla of matter, formerly united to his  soul, to make 
hini bigger, and no other  can be  made use of to tliat  purpose: 
though what greater congruity the soul hsth with any particles of 
matter which were once  vitally united to it, but are  now so no longer, 
than it hat11 with particles afmatter which it uras never united to, 
would be hard to determine,  if' that should be demanded. 
1%~  these and not a few other the like consequences, one may 
see what service  they do to religion  and the Christian doctrine, 
who  raise questions and  make articles of faith about the resur- 
rection of the same body, where the scripture says nothing of the 
same body; or if it does, it is with no small reprimand $ to those 
who rriake such an inquiry.  61 But some men will  say,  How are 
the dead raised up  ?  and with what body do they come?  Thou 
fool,  that  wliicll  thou  sowest  is  not  quickened,  except  it  die. 
And that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body that shall 
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be, but barc grain, it may chance of wheat, or of some othcr grain. 
Hut  (;od  givctli  it  n body,  as it liatli  pleased him."  IVords, I 
should think, sufficiellt to deter us from determi~iing  any thing for 
or against the sanx bodies being raised nt the last (lay.  It  suffices, 
that all the dcatl sllall be raised, and cvcry one appear and answer 
for tlie tllinas donc in his life, and receive accord~ng  to the things 
he has done in his body, whether good or bad.  I-le that believes 
this, and has said notlimg inconsistent  herewith, I presume may 
and must be acquitted from being guilty of any thing inconsistent 
with the article of the resurrection of the dead. 
Rut your lordship, to prove the resurrection of the same body to 
be an article of faith, farther asks, ++  "  How could it be said, if any 
other substance be joined  to the soul at the resurrection,  as its 
body, that they were the things done in or by the body?"  hn- 
swer.  Just as it nlay be said of a  man at an hundred years old. 
that hath then  another substance joined  to his soul than he had 
at twenty,  that  the murder or drunkenness he was  guilty  of  at 
twenty were things done in the body:  how ':by  the body"  comes 
in here, I do not see. 
Your lordship adds,  And St. Paul's dispute about the manner 
of raising the  body might soon havc ended, if there were no neces- 
sity of the same body."  Answer.  When 1 understand what ar- 
gument there is in these words  to prove  the resurrection of the 
same body,  without  the n:ixture  of one new atom of matter,  I 
shall know what to say to it.  In the mean time this I understand, 
that St. Paul would have put as short an end to all disputes about 
this matter if he had said, that there was a  necessity of the same 
body, or that it should be the same body. 
The next text of scripture you bring for the same body is, +"If 
there be no resurrection of  the dead, then is not Christ raised." 
From which your lordship  argues,  $  It seems then other bodies 
are to be raised  as his  was."  I grant other dead, as certainly 
raised as Christ was;  for else his resurrection would be of no use 
to mankind.  ljut I rlo not see how it follows, that they shall bc 
raised  with  the same body, as Christ was raised with  the same 
body, as your lorilship infers in these words annexed : 'l  And can 
there be any doubt, whether his  body was the same material sub- 
stance which was united to his soul betbre?"  I answer, None at all ; 
nor that it had just the same distinguishing lineaments and marks, 
yea, and the same wounds that it had at the time of his death.  If 
therefore your  lordship will argue from other bodies being raised 
as liis was,  that they must keep proportion with his in sameness; 
then we must believe that cvery man shall be raised with the  same 
lineaments and other notes of distinction he had at the time of his 
death, even with his wounds yet open, if he had any, because our 
Saviour was so raised;  which  seems to me scarce reconcileablc 
with what your lordship says,  4  of a  fat man falling  into a con- 
sumption, and dying. 
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But whether it will  consist or no with your lordship's  meaning 
in that $ace,  this to me seems a consequence that will need to be 
better proved, viz.  That our bodies must be raised the same, just 
as our Saviour's  was :  because  St.  Paul says,  if there be no re- 
surrection of the dead, then is not Christ risen."  For it nlay be a 
good consequence, Christ is risen,  and therefore there shall be a 
resurrection of the dead; and yet this may not be a good cnnse- 
quence, Christ was raised with the same body he had at his death, 
therefore all men shall be raised with the same body they had at 
their denth,  contrary to what your lordship says concerning a tiit 
man dying of a consumption.  But tlie case I think far different 
betwixt our Saviour and those to be raised at the last day. 
1. His body saw not corruption,  and therefore to give him an- 
other body new moulded,  mixed with other particles,  which were 
not contained in it as it lay in the grave, whole and entire as it was 
laid there, had been to destroy his body to frame him a new one 
without any need.  But why with the remaining particles of a man's 
bqdy  long since dissolved  and mouldered  into dust and atoms, 
(whereof possibly a great part may have  undergone variety  of 
changes, and entered into other concretions, even in the bodies of 
otber men) other new particles of matter mixed with  them, may 
not serve to make his body again, as well as the mixture of new 
and different particles of matter with the old did in the compass of 
his life make his body, I think no rc?ason can be  given. 
This  may serve  to show  why,  though  the materials  of our 
Saviour's  body were not changed at  his resurrection,  yet it does 
not follow,  but that  the body of a  man dead and rotten in his 
grave, or burnt, may at the last day have several new particles in 
it, and that without any inconvenience :  since whntever matter is 
vitally united to his soul is his body, as much as is that which was 
united to it when he was born, or in any other part of his life. 
2.  In  the nest place,  the size, shape, figure, and lineaments of 
our  Saviour's  body,  even  to his  wounds,  into  which  doubting 
Thomas put his fingers and his hand, were to be kept in the raised 
body of our Saviour, the same they were at his death, to be a con- 
viction to his disciples, to whom he showed himself,  and who were 
to  be witnesses  of his  resurrection,  that  their  master,  the very 
same man,  was  crucified,  dead,  and buried,  and  raised  again; 
and therefore he was handled by them, and eat before them after 
he was risen, to give them in all points full satisfaction that it was 
really he, the same, and not another, nor a spectre or apparition 
of him:  though I do not think your  lordship will  thence argue, 
that because others are to be raised as he was,  therefore it is ne- 
cessary to believe, that because he  eat  after his resurrection, others 
at the last day shall eat and drink after they are raised from the 
dead; which  seems to me as good an argument as because his 
undissolved  body was raised out of the grave, just as it there lay 
entire,  without  the mixture  of any new  particles; therefore  the 
corrupted  and consun~ed  bodies of the dead,  at the resurrection, 
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shall be new framed  only out of those scattered particles which 
were once vitally united to their souls, without  the least mixture 
of  any one single atom of new matter.  nut at the last day, when 
all men are raised, there will be no need to be assured of any one 
particular  man's  resurrection.  It is enough that every one shall 
appear before the  judgment-seat of Christ. to receive accordi~lg  to 
what he had done in his former life; but in whnt sort of body Ile 
shall appear,  or of what particles made up,  the scripture having 
said nothing,  but that it shall be a spiritual body raised in incor- 
ruption, it is not for me to determine. 
Your lordsliip asks,  2 "  Were tliey [who  saw our Saviour after 
his resurrection]  witnesses only of some inater~al  substance then 
united to his soul?"  In answer, I beg your lordalii[~  to consider, 
whether you suppose our Saviour was to be known to be the sanlc 
man  (to the witnesses  that were to sce Iiirn,  and testify  his  re- 
surrection) by his soul, that could neither be seen ilor known to be 
the same;  or by his  body,  that could be seen,  and by the dis- 
cernible structure and niarks of  it,  be known  to be the same? 
When your lordship has resolved  that,  all thnt you say in that 
page will  answer  itself.  But because one man cannot know an- 
other to be the same, but by the outward visible  lincanlents  ant1 
rensible marks he has been wont  to be known  and distinguishetl 
by, will  your lordship therefore  argue, that the Great Jndge, at 
the last  day,  who  gives  to each man,  whom  he raises,  his  new 
body,  shall  not be able to know who is who,  unless he give  to 
every one of the111 a  body just of tlie same figure,  size, and Sea- 
tures, and made up of the vpry same ini1;vidual particles he l~atl  in 
his former life?  Whether such  a way of  arguing for  the resur- 
rection  of the came body,  to be an article of  faith, contributes 
much to the strengthening the credibility of tlie article of  tlie re- 
surrection of the dead, I shall leave to the jrtdgmelit  of others. 
Farther,  for the proving  the resurrection of the sanie body  to 
be an article of faith, your lordship says, j-" But the apostlc insist6 
upon the resurrection of Christ, not merely as an argument of the 
possibility of ours,  but of  the certainty of it; :because  lie  rose, 
as the first-fruits;  Christ the first-fruits,  afterwards they that  arc 
Christ's at  his coming."  Answ. No doubt, the resurrection of Christ 
is a proof of t11e certainty of our resurrection.  But is it thcretorc 
a  proof of the resurrection  of the same body,  consisting ol' thc 
same individual particles  which  concurred to the making  up of 
our body here, without the mixture of any one other particle of 
matter? I confess I see no such consequence. 
But your lordbliip goes  on:  5 '' St.  Paul was  aware of the ob- 
jections in men's  minds about the resurrection of the same body; 
and it is of great consequence as to this article, to show upon what 
grounds he proceeds.  6 But some men will say, How are the dend 
raised  up, and with what body do tliey come?'  First, he slro\ts, 
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that the seminal parts of plants arc wonderfully improved  by the 
ordinary  Providence  of  God,  in  the rnanncr  of  their  vegeta- 
tion."  Answer.  I do not perfectly  understand  what it is " for 
the seminal  parts  of  plants  to  be \vonderf'ully  improved  by tlic 
ordinary Providence of God, in the manner of their vegetation :" 
or else, perhaps, I should better see how  this l~cre  tends to tlie 
proofof'tlie resurrection of the saine body, in your lordship's sense. 
It continues,  * "  They soiv  bare grain  of' wheat,  or  of soille 
other grain, but God givetli it a I)ody, as it lint11 pleased him, and 
to evcry~seed  his  own  body.  Ilere," says your lordship, "  is an 
identity of the material substance supposed."  It may be so.  But 
to me a diversity of the material substance, i.  e. of the coniponent 
particles, is here supposed, or ill direct \+oriis  said.  For the words 
of St. Paul,  taken  all  together, run  thus,  + a That wl~icll  thou 
sowest, thou sowest not that body which sliall be, but bare grain;" 
arid so on, as your lordship has set down in the remainder of them. 
Froln which words of  St. Paul, the natural argument seems to me 
to stand tlius: If the body that is put in the earth in sowing is not 
that body which shall be,  then tlie body that is put in the grave 
is not that,  i. e.  the same body that shall be. 
But your lordship proves  it to be the same body by these three 
Greek words of  the text, TO  18iov awpa, ~vliich  your  lordship  in- 
terprets thus, ,t i' That proper body which belongs to it."  Answer. 
Indeed by those Greelc words so idiov awpa, whether our translators 
h.lve rightly rendered them ''  his own botly,"  or your lordship more 
rightly "  that proper body whicll belongs to it," I fornierly under- 
stood no nlore but this, that in the production of wheat, and other 
grain froin  seed,  God continued every st>ecios distinct; so that 
from grains of wheat sown, root,  stalli, blade, car, grains of wheat 
were produced, and not those of barley;  and so ot'tl~e  rest, whicli 
I took to be the meaning of  '6  to cvery secil 111s o\rn body."  No, 
says  your  lordship,  these  words prove,  That to  every  plant  of 
wheat,  and to every grain of wheat procluced  in it,  is  given  the 
proper body that belongs to it, which  is the same body with  the 
grain that was sown.  Answer.  This, I confess, I do not under- 
stand;  because I do not understand how one individual grain can 
bc the same with  twenty,  fifty,  or an hundred individual grains; 
fbr such sometimes is the increase. 
But your lordship proves it.  For, says your lordship,  4  I'  Every 
seed having that body in little, which is  afterwards so lnucli en- 
larged; and in grain the seed is corrupted before its gern:ination; 
but it hat11  its proper  organical parts,  whish make it the same 
body with that which  it grows up to.  For although grain bc not 
divided into lobcs, as other seeds are, yet it hat11 been found, by 
the most accurate observations,  thnt  upon  separating  the mem- 
branes,  these seminal parts are discerned  in them; which  after- 
wards grow up to that body which we call corn."  In wl~ich  words 
I crave leave to observe,  tliat your lordship supposes, tliat a body 
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may be enlarged by the addition of ail hundred or a thousand times 
as mucll in bulk as its own matter, and yet continue the same body; 
which,  I confess, I cannot understand. 
But in the next place, if that could be so ; and that the plant, in 
its full growth at harvest, increasecl  by a thousand  or a million of 
times as much new matter added to it, as it had when it lay in little 
concealed in the grain that was sown, was tlie very same body; yet 
I do not think that your lordsliip will  say, that  cvery minute, in- 
sensible, and inconceivably small grain of the hundred grains, con- 
tained in that little organised seminal plant, is every one of them 
the very same with  that grain which  contains that whole seminal 
plant, and all those invisible grains in it.  For then it will follow. 
that one grain is the same with an hundred, and an hundred di- 
stinct grains the same with one; which I shall be able to assent to, 
when I can conceive that all the wheat in the world is  but one 
grain. 
For I beseech  you, my lord,  consider what it is St. Pnul here 
speaks of:  it is plain he speaks of that which is sown and d~rs,  i.  e. 
the grain tliat the husbandman takes out of his barn to sow in his 
field.  And of this grain  St. Paul says, "that  it i5  not that body 
that shall be."  These two,  viz.  "that  u~liich  is  sown,  and that 
body that shall be,"  are all the bodies that St. I'aul  here speaks 
of, to represent the agreement or direrence of men's  bodies after 
the resurrection, with  those they had before  they died.  Now, I 
crave leave to ask your lordship,  wll~ch  of these two is that little 
invisible seminal plant, which your lordsliip here speaks ot ?  Does 
your lordsliip mean by it the grain  that is  sown ?  But that is not 
what  St. Paul speaks  of; lie  coultl not nlcan  this  embryonated 
little plant, for he could not denote it by these words,  that which 
thou sowest," for that he says must die :  but this little embryonated 
plant,  contained in the seed that is sown, dies not:  or docs your 
lordship mran by it, "the  body that shall be?"  But neither by these 
words, G6 the body that shall be,"  can St. Paul be supposed to denote 
this insensible little embryonated plant; for tliat is nlrcatly in being, 
contained in the seed that is sown, and thereforc could not be spoke 
of under the name of  the body that shall be.  And therefore,  I 
conFess, I cannot see of what use it is to your lordship to introduce 
here this third body, which St. Paul mentions not, and to make that 
the same or not the same  with any other, when those which St. Paul 
speaks of are, as I humbly conceive, these two visible sensible bodies, 
the grain sown, and the corn grown up to car; witli neither of which 
this insensible embryonated plant can be the same body, unless an 
insensible body can be the same body with a sensible body, and a 
little body can be the same body  witli  one ten thousand, or an 
hundred thousand times  as big as itself.  So that yet,  I confess, 
I see not the resurrection of the samc body proved,  from these 
words of St. Pnul, to be an article of' faith. 
Your lordship goes on:"  "St.  Paul indeed  saith, That we sow 
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not tllat body that shall be; but he speaks not of thc iclentity, but 
tile perfection  of it."  Here nly uncierstanding fhils nie ag'tin:  for I 
cannot understand St.  Paul to say, That the same identical sensible 
grain  of wheat,  which was  sow11  at seed-tlme, is tlie  very same 
,it11  every grain of wheat in the ear at harvest,  that sprang frorn 
it: yet so I must  understand  it, to make it prove that tlie same 
sensible body,  that is  laid  in the grave,  sliall  be the very same 
with that which shall be raised at the resurrection.  For I do not 
know of any seminal body in little, contained in the dead carcass 
ofany man or wonian, whlch, as  your lordsliip says, in seeds, having 
its pioper organical parts, shall afterwards be enlarged, and at the 
resurrection  grow up into the same man.  For I never thought of 
any seed or seminal parts, either of plant or animal,  c( so wondcr- 
fully  improved  by  the Provide~ice  of God,"  whereby the same 
$ant  or  animal  should beget itself; nor  ever heard,  that it was 
by Divine Providence designed to produce  the same individual, 
but for  the prodncing of future and distinct individuals,  for the 
c3ntinuation of the same species. 
Your lordship's next words are, * "  And although there be  such 
a difference from the grain itself, when  it comes up to be perfect 
corn, with root,  stalk,  blade, and ear, that it may be said to out- 
ward appearance not to be the same body; yet with regard to the 
seminal and organical pacts it is as much the same as a man grown 
up is the same with tlle embryo in the womb."  Answer.  It does 
not appear by any thing I can find In the text, that Sc. Paul here 
compared the body produced with the seni;nal and organical parts 
contained in the grain it sprang from, but with the whole sensible 
grain that was grown.  Microscopes had not then disco~ered  the 
,  little embryo plant in the seed: and supposing it should have been 
revealed to St. Paul (though in the scripture we find little revela- 
tion  of natural philosophy)  yet an argument taken from a thing 
perfectly unknown to the Corinthians, whom he writ to, could be 
of no manner of use to them; nor serve at all either to instruct or 
aonvince them.  But granting that those St. Paul writ to knew  it 
as well  as Mr. Lewenhock, yet your  lordship thereby proves not 
the raising of the same body:  your lordship says, it is as much the 
same [I crave  leave to add body]  "as a  man grown up is  the 
same"  (samc what, I beseech your lordship)? "  with the embryo 
in the womb."  For  that the body of  the embryo in  the womb 
and body of  the man grown up, is the same body, I thinlc no one 
will say; unless he can persuade himself,  that a body tI1'1t  is not 
the hundredth part of another is the same with that other; which 
I think no one will do, till having  renounced this dangerous way 
by ideas of thinking and reasoning,  he has learnt  to say  that a 
part and the whole are the same. 
Your lordship goes on, t  And although nlany arguments may 
be usell to prove that a nlan is not tlic same, brcause litk, which (!L- 
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pends upon the course of the blood, and thc manner of respiration 
and nutrition, is so different in both states ; yet that man would be 
tliought ridiculous that shoold seriously affirm that it was not the 
same man."  And your lordship says, ((1  grant that the variation of 
great parcels of matter in plants alters not the identity:  and that 
the organisation  of tlie parts  in  one  coherent body, ~artaking  of 
one con~nlon  life, makes  the identity of  a plant."  Answer.  I\fy 
lord, I think the question is not about the same nian, but the same 
body.  For though I do say  (somewhat * differently from what 
your lordsllip sets dowii as nly words here), "  That thatwhich has 
such an organisation as is fit to receive and distribute nourishment, 
so as to continue and frame the wood, bark, and leaves, &c. of  a 
plant, in which consists the vegetable life, continues to be the same 
plant, as long as it partakes  of  the same life, though that life be 
communicated  to new  particles  of  matter,  vitally united  to the 
living plant :" yet I do not remember that I any where say, That 
a plant, which was once no bigger than an oaten straw, and after- 
wards grows to be above a fathom about, is the same body, though 
it be still the same plant. 
The well-known  tree in Epping Forest, called the King's Oak, 
which frorn not weighing an ounce at first, grew to have many tons 
of timber in it, was all  along the same oak, the very same plant ; 
but nobody, I think, will  say that it was  the sanie body when it 
weighed a ton as it was when it weighed but an ounce, unless he 
has a ~r~ind  to signalize  himself  by saying, That that is the same 
body which has a  thousand particles of different matter  in it, for 
one particle that is the same; which is no better than to say, That 
a thousand different particles  are but one and the same particle, 
and one and the sanie particle is a thousand different particles;  a 
thousand times a greater absurdity  than to say  half is  whole, or 
the whole is the same with  the half;  which will be improved ten 
thousand times yet farther, if  a  man  shall  say  (as your lordship 
seems to me to argue here), That that great oak is the very same 
body  with  the acorn it sprang from, because  there was  in  that 
acorn an oak in little, which was afterwards (as ybur lordship ex- 
presses it) so much enlarged, as to  make that rnigllty tree.  For this 
embryo, ifl  may so call it, or oak in little, being not the hundredth, 
or perhaps the thousandth part of  the acorn, and the acorn being 
not tlie thousandth part of the grown oak, it will be very extraor- 
dinary to prove the acorn and the grown oak to be the same body, 
by a way wherein it cannot be pretended  that above one 
ot'an hundred thousand, or a million, is the same in the one body 
that it was in the other.  From which way of reasoning it will fol- 
low, that  a  nurse and her sucking child have the same body, arid 
be past  dnuht that a mother and her  infant have  the same body. 
Eut this is a  way of  certainty found out to establish  the articles 
of'  faith, and to overturn  the new method  of  ccct3inty that your 
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lordsllip says,  6L 1  have started, which is npt to leave men's  minds 
more doubtful than before." 
And now I desire your lordship to consider of what use it is to 
you in the present case to quote out of  my Essay these  words, 
61 That partaking  of one common life  makes  the  identity  of  a 
plant;"  since the question is not about the identity of a plant, bllt 
about the identity of a body:  it being a very different thing to be 
the same plant, and to be the same body.  For that which makes 
the same ~lant  does not make the same body; the one being the 
partakin$  in the same continued vegetable life, the other the con- 
sisfiing of  the same numerical particles of matter.  And therefore 
your lordship's  inference frorn my words  above quoted, in these 
which  you  subjoin*,  seems to me a very strange one, viz. '(  So 
that in things capable of any sort of life, tlle identity is consistent 
with a cont~nued  succession of parts;  and so the wheat grown up 
is the same body with the grain that was sown."  For I believe, if 
my words, from which you infer,  1'  And so the vheat grown up is 
the same body with the grain that was sown,"  were put into a syl- 
logism, this would hardly be br~ught  to be the conclusion. 
But your lordship goes on with consequence upon consequence, 
though I hilve not eyes acute enough every where to see the con- 
nexion,  till  you  bring  it to the resurrection  of  the same body. 
The connexion of your lordship's words -f  is  as followeth : a  And 
thus the alteration of the parts of the body at the resurrection is 
consistent with its identity, if its organisiltion and life be the same ; 
and this is  a real  identity  of  the body,  which depends not upon 
consciousness.  From whence  it follows, that to make  the same 
body, no more is required but restoring life to the organized parts 
of it."  If tlie question were about raislng the same plant, I do not 
say but there  might  be some appearance for making such an in- 
ference from my words as this:  (( Whence it fbllows,  that to make 
the same plant, no more is required but to restore life to tlie or- 
ganised  parts of it."  But this  deduction,  wherein,  from  those 
words of mine that speak only of the identity of a plant, your lord- 
ship infers, there is no more required to make the same body than 
to make the same plant,  being too subtle for me,  I leave to my 
reader to find out. 
Your lordship goes on and says,  that I grant likewise,  LL That 
the identity of the same man consists in a participation of the same 
continued life, by constantly fleeting particles  of matter in suc- 
cession, vitally united to the same organised body."  Answer.  I 
speak in these words of  the identity of the same man, and your 
lordship thence roundly concludes--'I  So that there is no difficulty 
of the sameness of the body."  But your lordship knows that I do 
not take these two sounds,  man  and body,  to stand for the same 
thing, nor the identity of the man to be the same with the identity 
of the body. 
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But let us read out your lordsllip's  words.  ++  lC So that there is 
no dificulty as to the sanicncss of the bocly, if life werc continued ; 
and if, by divine power,  life be restored to that material substance 
which alas before united, by a re-union  of' the soul  to it, there is 
no reason to deny the identity of  the body, not from  the cousci- 
ousness of the soul, but from  that life which  is tlie result of the 
union of the soul and body." 
If I understand  your  lorclsl~ip  right, you  in theso words,  fiom 
the passages above quoted out of my book, argue, that from those 
words of mine it will follow tliat it is or limy be  the same body that 
is raised  at the resurrection.  If so, nly lord, your  lordship has 
then proved, tliat my book is not inconsistent with: but conforma- 
ble to, tliis article of' the resurrection of tlie same body, which your 
lordship contends  for, and mill  havc to be an article of faith :  for 
tliougli I do by no means deily tliat the same bodies shall be raised 
:~t  thc last day, yet I scc iio~liing  your lordship has said  to prove 
it to Ilc alr articlr of faitl~. 
1;nt  your 1:~rtlshil) goes on with  your proofs and says, + "But 
%t 1':lul  stil! s~ipposcs  tliat it muat  be tliat n~aterial  substance to 
wllicl~  thc soul was  before united.  For,'  saiih he,  it is  sown 
in corruption, it is raiscd in incorruption:  it is sown in dishonour, 
it is rniscd in glory: it  is sown in mealiness, it is raised in power: 
it is so\vn a natural body, it is raise(\ a spiritual body.'  Can such 
a lnaterial substance, whicl~  was never united to the body, be said 
to IIC so\rn in corruption, and weakness, and dishonour?  Either, 
therefore, he iilust speak of  the same bocly, or his meaning cannot 
be coniprelicnded."  I ansmcr,  'L  Can such a niatcrial substance, 
wliicl~  was nevcr laid in the grave, be said to be sown," &c.?  For 
your lordsliip  says, 1  GL You tlo not say the same individual parti- 
'cles which were united  at the point  of death  sliall be raised  at 
the last day ;" and no other particles are laid in the grave but such 
as are united at the point of dcath: either therefore your lordship 
must  spcak of another body, ditfcrent from that which was sown, 
which  shall be raised, or else  your  meaning, I think, cannot be 
comprclierided. 
But ~vliatever  be your  meaning, your  lordship  proves it to be 
St. Paul's  meaning, that the same body shall be raised, which was 
sown,  in these following words,  $ "  For what does all this relate to a 
conscioils principle :'"  Answer.  The  scripture being express, that 
the same person should be raised and appear before the judgment- 
scat of Christ, that every one may receive according to what he 
hnd done in his  body; it was very well suited to comnlon appre- 
hensions (\~~liicli  refined not about 6L particles that had been vitally 
united to the soul")  to speak of the body which  each one was to 
havc aftcr the rcstirrection,  as he would be apt to spcak of it him- 
self.  For it bcinz his body both before and aftcr the l.esurrection, 
evcry one ordinarily speaks of his body as the same, though in a 
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strict slid l)l~ilosophical  sense, as your  lordsl~ip  speaks, it be not 
very same.  Thus it is 110  impropriety ofspeecli to say, 'i this 
body of mine,  wliicli was fbrmcrly strong and plump, is now weal< 
and wasted,''  though in such a sense as you are speaking liere  it 
be not tlie same body.  Revelation  declares nothing  ally  where 
conce~.ning  the same body, in  your  loidship's  sense of the same 
bo(ly, which appears not to have been thought of.  The apostle 
directly proposes nothing for or against  thc same body, as neces- 
sarJ: to be believed : that which  he is  plain  and direct in, is  111s 
opposing and condemning such curious questions abwt  the body, 
whish could serve only to perplex, not to confirm what was mate, 
rial and necessary for them to believe, viz. a day of judgment and 
to men in a future state; and therefore it is no wonder, 
that  mentioning  their  bodies,  lie should  usc a  way  of speaking 
suited to vulgar notions, from which it would be hard positively to 
conclude any thing for the determining of this question (especially 
against expressions in the same discourse that plainly incline to 
the other side) in a matter which, as it appears, tlie apostle thougllt 
not necessary to determinc, and tlie spirit of Got1 t!~ougllt  not fit 
to gratify any one's  curiosity in. 
Hut  your lordship says, "  The apostle speaks plainly ofthat 
body which was once cluicliened, arid  afterwards  fails to corrup- 
tion, ant1 is to be restored wit11 more noble qualities."  I wish your 
lordsliip  had  quoted  the words  of  St. I'aul,  wlicreirl  he speaks 
plainly  of that numerical  body  that was  once quickened;  they 
~vould  presently rlecidc this quest~on. Iht  your lordship  proves 
it by these follosing words of St.  Pa111 :  'L  For tliis corruption 111ust 
put on incorruption, and  thiq  niortal  must  put on iinll~ortalit~  ;'* 
to which your lordship aclds,  that you do not see how he could 
'  more expressly affirm  the identity of this corruptible body wit11 
that after the resurrection."  How c.xprc~a~lg  it is affirmed  by tile 
apostle, shall be considered  by and by.  111  the iiieall  titile, it is 
past doubt that your  lordship  best I\no\%s  what you  do or do 1101 
see.  llut this I would  be bold to say,  tliat if  St. Paul Iiad  any 
where in this chapter (where there arc so niaiiy occasions fbr it, ~f 
it had been necessary to have been believed)  but s;tid  in  express 
words that the same bodies  should be raised, every one else, who 
thinks ol'it, will  see he had more expressly afir~nccl  the identity 
of the bodies which men now have wit11 those they sl~all  have after 
the resurrection. 
The remainder of your lordship's period + is-"  Ancl that with- 
out any respect to the principle of self-consciousl~ess."  Answer.  ..  lhese words, I doubt not, have some meani~lg,  but I rnust own I 
know not what; either towards the proofof thc rcsurrcctior~  of the 
same body, or to show that any thing I have said concerning self- 
consciousness, is inconsistent :  fbr I do not rc~neniber  that 1  have 
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any wherc said, that the identity  of  body  consisted  in self-con- 
sciousness. 
Vrom  your  preceding  words,  your  lordship  concludes  thus: 
* lr  And so if the scripture be the sole foundation of our faith, this 
is an article of it."  My lord, to make the conclusion unquestion- 
able, I humbly conceive the words must run thus :  "  And so if tlie 
scripture, and your lordship's interpretation of it, be the sole foun- 
dation of our faith, the resurrection of the same body is an article 
of it."  For. with submission, vour lordship has neither produced 
express works  of scripture f;  it,  nor ~o-~roved  that to be the 
me'a,niug  of  any of those words  of  scripture which you have pro- 
duced for it, that a man who reads and sincerely endeavours to 
understand the scripture, cannot but find himself obliged to believe 
as expressly,  that the same bodies of the dead,"  in your lordship's 
sense, shall be raised, as "that  the dead shall be raised."  And I 
crave leave to give your lordship this  one reason for it.  He  who 
reads  with  attention  this discourse of  St. Paul t where  he  dis- 
courses of tlie resurrection, will  see that he plainly distinguishes 
between the dead that shall be  raised and the bodies of the dead. 
For it is vsxpor,  wavl~g,  oi are the nominative cases to f EyErpovrar, 
<wnvo~~a~juo~'lar,  E~E~~Y~UOY~UI,  all  along, and not  uwpala,  bodies ; 
which one may with reason think would somewhere or other have 
been expressed, if all thib had been snid to propose it as an article 
of faith, that the very same bodies  should be raised.  The sarne 
manner of  speaking  the spirit  of  God observes  all through the 
New Testament, where it is  said,  $  raise  the dead, quiclten or 
make alive the dead,  the resurrection  of  the dead."  Nay, these 
very words  of  our  Saviour, )I  urged by your  lordship for the re- 
surrection of the same body,  run thus : llav7~g  oi EY 701s  pvypsioig 
axsaov'lar 17s  pwvqs  av78,  xar ~xn'op~vuovrar.  oi fa ayaea  moiyaav7sg 
EIS UY~~UUIY  [w~g,  oi 8~ TU Qarrha wpaEavi~s  ~i;  avaraarv xpru~wg. 
Would not a  well-meaning  ~earcher  of  the scriptures be apt to 
think, that if the thing here intended by our Saviour wereto  teach, 
and propose  it as an article of  faith, necessary to be believed by 
every one, that the very same bodies of the dead should be raised ; 
wquld  not, I say, any one be apt to think,  that if  our  Saviour 
meant so, the words  should rather have been, waJa fa awpa7a 
ci  EY do15 ~V~LEIOIS,  i. e.  "  all  the bodies that are in the graves;" 
rather than  "all  who are in the graves ;"  which must denote per- 
sons, and not precisely bodies? 
Another evidence that St. Paul makes a distinction between the 
dead and the bodies of the dead, so that the dead cannot be  taken 
in this, 1 Cor. xv. to stand precisely for the bodies of the dead- are 
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these words of the apostle, * "  But some men will say, liow are the 
dead raised?  And with what bodies do they come?"  Which words, 
'6  dead"  and "  they,"  if supposed to stand precisely for the bodies 
of the dead, the question will run thus : "  How are  the (lead bodies 
raised?  And with what bodies do the dead bodies come?"  Which 
seems to have no very agreeable sense. 
This therefore being so, that tlie Spirit of God keeps so expressly 
to this  phrase, or form of speaking  in the New  Testament,  r6 of 
raising,  quickening, rising,  resurrection, 6.c. of  the dead,''  where 
the resurrection  of the last day is spo!ren  of; and that the body 
is  not  mentioned,  but  in  answer  to this question,  c6With  what 
bodies  shall those dead, who  are raised,  come?"  so that by the 
dead cannot precisely be meant the dead bodies:  I do not see but 
a  cliristian,  who  reads  the scripture  with  an intention  to 
belleve all that is there revealed to him concerning the resurrection, 
may acquit himself of his duty therein, without entering into the 
inquiry, whether the dead shall have the very same bod~cs  or no? 
Which  sort of inquiry the apostle, by the appellation he bestows 
here on him that makes it, seems not much to encourage.  Nor, 
if he shall thil~k  himself bound to determine concerning the identity 
of the bodies  of  the dead raised at the last  day, will  he, by the 
remainder  of  St. Paul's  answer,  find  the  determination  of  the 
apostle to be much in favour of  the very same body; unless  the 
being told, that the body sown is not that body that sliall be; that 
the body raised is  as different from that which was laid down, as 
the flesh of  man is from  the flesh of beasts, fisl~es,  and birds ;  or 
as the sun, moon, and stars are differen6 one from  another; or as 
different as a  corruptible, weak, natural, mortal body is from an 
incorruptible,  powerful,  spiritual,  immortal body; and lastly,  as 
difkrent as a body that is flesh and blood is from a body that is 
not flesh and blood;  "for  flesh and blood cannot,"  sags St. Paul, 
in this very place, j-  '<inherit  the kingdom of God :" unless, I say, all 
this, which is contained in St. Paul's words, can be supposed to be 
the way to deliver this as an article of faith,  which  is required to 
be believed  by every one,  viz.  "That  the dead should be raised 
with the very same bodies that they had before in this life;"  whicli 
article,  proposed in these  or the like  plain  and express  words, 
could have  left no room for doubt in the meanest  capacities,  nor 
for contest in the most perverse minds. 
Your lordship adds in the next words,  $ <<And  so it hath been 
always understood by the christian  church, viz.  That the resur- 
rectlon  of the same body,  in your lordship's  sense of the same 
body, is an article of faith."  Answer.  What the christian church 
has always understood  is beyond my knowledge.  But for those 
who, coming short of your lordship's  great learning, cannot gather 
the?  articles  of faith  from the understanding of  all  the whole 
chr~stian  cliurch,  ever  since the preaching  of  the gospel  (wbo 
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nlakc  the  iilr  greater  part  of  cliristia;~s,  1 tl~ink  I nlay  nine 
ht~utlrcil  ninety and nine of a  thousal~d),  but arc forced to l~avc 
recourse  to tlie  scripture to find  them there, 1 do not see that 
they will easily find there this prol)osetl ns  an article of fbith, that 
tl~crc  shall  be a  res~~rrection  of  thc sanle borly;  but that there 
sl~all  bc a resurrection of th~  ctcad, without explicitly deternlining, 
'I'llitt, they shall be raised r\-it11 ljodies made up wholly of the same 
pitrticles  which  were  once vitally  united  to their  souls  in their 
tbrriier  life,  tvitl~out  the mixture  of  any  one  other  particle  of 
nlattcr; wl~icll  is that which your lorilship means by the same body. 
1iut s~t~)~)osing  your lortlsllip to hnvc demonstrated this to be  an 
articlc oi. fBith,  tl~oagh  I  crave leave  to own, tIl:~t I do not see 
that  ill1  that your  lordsllip  has said here makes  it so  ~nuch  as 
probi~ble,  Whitt is all this to mq?  Yes, sap  your loidslrip in the 
t'ol1owing  wonls,  My idea  of personal  Identity is inconsistent 
with it, for it nl~tkes  the samc body wllicl~  was here united to tlie 
soul not to be necessary  to tlie doctrinc of the resurrection.  But 
any nlaterial substance united to the same principle of  conscious- 
n&s makes the same body." 
This is an argument of your  lordship's which  I am obliged to 
answer to.  But is it not fit I should first  understand  it, before I 
answer it? Now hcre I do not well  Itnow what  it is  to make a 
thing not to be necessary to the doctrine of the resurrection."  But 
to help n~yself  out the best I can, with a guess, I will  conjecture 
(w:~ich, in  disputing  with  learned  men,  is  not very  safe)  your 
lordship's meaning is, that a  my idea of personal identity makes it 
not  neces~ary,'~  that for  thc raising  the same person,  the body 
should be the same. 
Tour lordship's  next word is  but ;"  to which I am ready to 
reply, But what ? What does my idea of persolla1 ide~ltity  do  ?  For 
something of that kind the adverc;ative  particle "but"  should, in 
the ordinary construction of our language, introduce, to make the 
proposition clear and intelligible:  but hcre is no such thing.  "Uut," 
is  one of your  lordship's  privileged particles, which I must  not 
n~edtllc  with, for fear your lordship complain of me again, "as  so 
severe a critic, that for the least ambiguity in any particle, fill up 
pages in my answer, to make my book  look  considerable for the 
bulk of it."  I3ut since this proposition here, "my idea of personal 
identity makes the same body which was here united to the soul 
not necessary to the doctrine of the resurrection :  But any material 
slrbstance bking  united  to the same ~rinciple  of  consciousness, 
makes  the same body,"  is brought to prove my idea of  personal 
identity inconsistent witli  the article  of  the resurrection, I must 
make it out in some direct sense or other, that I may bee whether 
it I)c  both true and conclusive.  I  therefore venture to read it 
thus: "  My idea of  personal  identity makes llle same body wl!lch 
,vaa I~crc  united to the soul not to be nccessarj ;tt the resurrectlon ; 
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but allows, t11at any material  substance being united to tile ha111c 
pinciple of consciousness, makes the same body.  hlr,o,  111y idea 
of  personal identity is inconsistent with  tlie  article ot' the resur- 
rection of the same body." 
If this be your lordship's  sense in this passage, as I here have 
it to be, or else I know not what it is, I answer, 
I.  That my idea of  personal  identity does not  allow  that any 
material  substance,  being  united  to  the same principle  of  con- 
sciousness,  makes  the same body.  I say no  such  thing  in  my 
book,  nor  any thing from whe~~ce  it may bc inferred;  and your 
lordship would have done me a favour to have set down the words 
where I say so, or those from which you infer so, and sllowed ho~v 
it follows from any thing I have said. 
11. Granting that it were a consequence from my idea of' persolla1 
idcntity,  that "any material  substance, being  united to the same 
principle of consciousness, makes the same body ;" this would not 
prove that my idea of  personal  identity was inconsistent with this 
proposition,  "that  the same  body shall be raised;"  but, on tlie 
contrary, affirms  it:  since, if I affirm, as I do, that the same persons 
shall be raised, and it be a  consequence of  my idea of personal 
identity,  that "any  material  substance, being united  tc the same 
principle of consciousness, makes the same body;"  it fbllows,  that 
it' the same person be raised, the same body must be raised;  and 
so I have herein not only said nothing inconsistent with the resur- 
rection  of the same body, but have said more for it than your 
lordship.  For  there  can  be nothing  plainer,  than  that  in  the 
scripture it is revealed that the same persons sllall be raised, and 
appear before  the judgment-seat  of  Christ,  to answer  for  what 
they have done in their bodies.  If therefore whatever matter be 
joined to the same principle of consciousness makes the same body, 
it is demonstration, that if the same persons are raised, they have 
the same bodies. 
How then your lordship makes this an inconsistency witli  the 
resurrection is beyond my conception.  Yes," says your lordship,* 
"  it is inconsistent with it, for it makes the same body which was 
here united to the soul not to be necessary." 
111.  I answer,  therefore,  thirdly,  That this  is  the first  time I 
ever learnt that "not  necessary"  was the  same with ''  inconsistent." 
I say, that a body made up of the same numerical  parts of matter 
is not necessary to the making  of the same person;  from whence 
it will indeed ibllow, that to the resurrection  of the same person 
the samc numerical  particles of matter are not required.  What 
does your lordship infer from  hence ?  To wit, this :  Therefore he 
who  thinks, that the same particles  of matter are not necessary 
to the making of the same person,  cannot believe that the same 
persons shall be raised with bodies made of the very same particles 
of matter, if God should  reveal that it shall be so, viz. That the 
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same persons shall be raised with the same bodies they had before. 
Which is  all one as to say, that he who thought the blowing  of 
rams' horns was not necessary in itself  to the falling down  of  the 
walls of Jericho, could not believe  that they should fall  up011 the 
blowing of. rams' llorns, when God had declared it should be so. 
Your lordship says, "my idea of personal identity is inconsistent 
with the article of the resurrection:"  the reason you ground it on 
is this, because it makes not the same body necessary to the making 
the same person.  Let us grant your lordship's consequence to be 
what will follow fi-om it? No  less than this, that your lord- 
ship's notion (for I dare not say your lordship has any so dangerous 
things as ideas) of personal identity is inconsistent with the article 
of  the resurrection.  The demonstration of  it is  thus: your lord- 
ship says, * "  It  is not necessary that the body, to be  raised at the 
last  day,  should consist  of  the same particles  of  matter which 
were united  at the point  of  death;  fbr  there must be  a  great 
alteration in them in a lingering disease, as if a fat man falls into 
a consumption:  you do  not say the same particles which the sinner 
had at the very tirrle of  commission  of his sins;  for then a long 
sinner must have a vast  body, considering the continual spending 
of particles  by  perspiration."  And again,  here your  lordship 
says,  -f "  You  allow the notion of  personal  identity to belong  to 
the same man under  several changes of  matter."  From whicll 
words  it is  evident  that your lordship supposes a  person in this 
world  may be continued and preserved the same in a  body not 
consisting of  the same individual  particles of matter; and hence 
it  demonstratively  follows,  That  let  your  lordship's  notion  of 
personal identity be what it will, it malces '6  the same body not to 
be necessary to the same person;"  and therefore it is  by your 
lordship's  rule inconsistent  with  the article of  the resurrection. 
When your lordship shall think fit  to clear your  own notion  of 
personal identity from this  inconsistency with the article of  the 
resurrection, I do not doubt but my idea of  personal identity will 
be thereby  cleared to@.  Till then,  all inconsistency with  that 
article, which your lordsl~ip  has here charged 011  mine,  will  un- 
avoidably fall upon your lordship's too. 
But for the clearing of  both, give me leave to say, my lord, that 
whatsoever is not necessary, does not thereby  become inconsistent. 
It  is not necessary to the same person that his body should always 
consist  of  the same numerical  particles;  this  is  demonstration, 
because the particles of the bodies of the same persons in this life 
change every moment, and your lordship cannot deny it; and yet 
this makes it not inconsistent  with God's  nreserving,  if  he thinks 
fit, to the same persons  bodies  consisting  of the same numerical 
particles always from the resurrection to eternity.  And so like- 
wise though I say any thjng that supposes it not necessary, that 
the same numerical  particles,  which  were  vitally  united  to the 
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soul in this life, should be reunited to it at the resurrection,  and 
constitute the body it shall then have; yet it is  not inconsistent 
witIl this, that God may, if he pleases, give to every one a  body 
consisting only of  such particles as were before vitally united  to 
his  soul.  And thus,  I think,  I have  cleared  my book  fi.om  all 
that inconsistency which your  lordship charges on it, and would 
prsuade the world it has with the article of  the resurrection  of 
the dead. 
Only, befole I leave it,  I will  set down  the remainder of what 
your lordship  says upon this head, that though I see not the co- 
herence nor tendency of  it, nor the force of' any argument in it 
against me; yet that nothing may be omitted that your  lordship 
has thought fit to entertain your reader with on this new point, nor 
any one have reason to suspect that I have passed by any word of 
your lordship's  (on this now first introduced subject), wherein he 
might find your lordship had  proved what  you  had  promised  in 
your title-page.  Your remaining words are these: * lr The dispute 
is not how far personal  identity in itself nlay consist in the very 
same material  substa~lce;  for  we  allow  the notion  of  personal 
identity  to belong  to the  same  man  under  several  changes  of 
matter; but whether it dot11 not depend upon a vital union between 
the soul and body, and the life, which is consequent upon it; and 
therefore in the resurrection the same material substance must be 
re-united, or else it cannot be called a resurrection, but a renova- 
tion, i.  e  it may be a new life, but not a raising the body from the 
dead."  I confcss, I do not see how what is here ushered in by the 
words '( and therefore," isa consequence from the preceding words; 
but as to the propriety of the name, I think  it will  not  be mucl~ 
questioned, that if  the same man rise who  was dead, it may very 
properly  be  called  the resurrection  of the  dead; which  is  the 
language of the scripture. 
I must  not part with  this article  of  the resurrection without 
returning my thanks to your lordship for making me -f  take notice 
of  a  fault in my Essay.  When I wrote that book, I  took  it for 
granted,  as  I  doubt  not  but many  others  have  done,  that  the 
scripture had  mentioned, in  express terms, '  the resurrection  of 
the body.'  nut upon the occasion your lordship has given me in 
your last letter to look a little more narrowly into what revelation 
has  declared  concerning the resurrection,  and find~ng  no such 
express words in the scripture, as that  the body sliall rise or be 
raised, or the resurrection of the body ;" I shall in the next edition 
of it change these words of my book, $ ('  The dead bodies of men 
shall rise,"  into these of the scripture, ('  the dead shall rise."  Not 
that I question that the dead shall be raised with  bodies; but in 
matters of  revelation I think  it not  only safest, but our  duty, as 
far as any one delivers it for revelation, to keep close to the words 
of the scripture, unless he will assume to himself  the authority of 
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one inspired, or make  himself wiser than the Holy Spirit himself. 
If I had  spoke of the resurrection  in precisely scriptl~re  terms, I 
had avoided giving  your  lordship the  occasion  of making * here 
sucll a verbal ~.eflectlon  on my words:  a  What ! not if there be an 
idea of identity as to the body ?" 
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Of  other Relations. 
Propor-  1.  BESIDES  the before-mentioned  oc- 
tional.  casions  of  time, place,  and causality,  of 
comparing or  referring things one  to another, there 
are, as I  have  said, infinite  others,  some  whereof  I 
shall mention. 
First,  'I'he  first I shall name  is  some  one  simple 
idea ;  which being capable of parts or degrees, affords 
an occasion of comparing the subjects wherein it is to 
one another, in respect of  that simple idea, v.  g. whiter, 
sweeter, equal, more, kc.  These relations depending 
on the equality and excess of  the same simple idea, in 
several  subjects, may  be  called, if  one will,  propor- 
tional ;  and that thcse are only conversant about those 
simple  ideas received from  sensation  or reflection  is 
so evident, that nothing need be said to evince it. 
Naturitl.  Q $2. Secondly, Another occasion in com- 
paring things together, or comparing one 
thing, so as to include in that consideration some other 
thing, is the circ~lmstances  of  their  origin or begin- 
ning ;  which being not afterwards to be altered, make 
the relations depending thereon as lasting as the sub- 
jects to which they belong ; v. g. father and son, bro- 
thers, cousins-german,  &c. which have their relations 
by one community of blood, wherein they partake in 
several degrees :  countrymen, i. e. those who were born 
in the same country or tract of  ground;  and these I 
call natural relations : wherein we may observe, that 
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have  fitted their notions  and  words to the 
use of  common  life, and not  to the truth and extent 
of things.  For it is certain, that in reality the rela- 
tion is the same betwixt the begetter and the begot- 
ten  in  the several  races  of  other animals  as well as 
men :  but yet it is seldom said, this bull is the grand- 
father of such a calf; or that two pigeons are cousins- 
german.  It  is very convenient, that by distinct names 
these relations should be observed, and marked out in 
mankind ;  there being occasion, both in laws and other 
communications  one  with  another,  to mention  and 
take notice of men under these relations :  from whence 
also arise the obligations  of  several  duties  amongst 
men.  Whereas in  brutes, men having very little or 
no cause to mind these relations, they have not thought 
fit to give them  distinct and peculiar names.  This, 
by the way, may give us some light into the different 
state and growth of  languages ; which, being  suited 
only to the convenience of  communication,  are pro- 
portioned to the notions men have, and the commerce 
of thoughts familiar  amongst  them; and  not  to the 
reality or extent of things, nor to the various respects 
might be found among them, nor the different abstract 
considerations might be framed about them.  Where 
they had no philosopllical  notions, there they had no 
terms  to express  them:  and it is  no  wonder  men 
should have framed no  names  for those  things they 
found  no  occasion  to  discourse of.  From  whence 
it is easy to imagine why, as  in some countries,  they 
may have not so much  as the name for a horse ;  and 
in others, where  they are more  careful of  the pedi- 
grees of their horses than of their ,own, that there they 
may have not only names for particular horses, but also 
of their several relations of kindred one to another. 
§ 3.  Thirdly,  Sometimes  the  founda- 
tion of considering things, with reference 
to one another, is  some  act whereby  any one  comes 
by a moral  right, power,  or obligation,  to do  some- 
thing.  Thus a  general  is  onc  that hath  power  to (36  Of  other Relations.  Book 2. 
command an army ;  and an army under  n general is 
a collection of  armed men obliged to obey one  man. 
A citizen, or a burgher, is one who has a right to cer- 
tain privileges in this or that place.  All this sort de- 
pending upon men's  wills, or agreement in society, I 
call instituted or voluntary ;  and may be distinguished 
from the natural, in that they are most, if  not all of 
them, some way or other alterable and separable from 
the persons to whom they have  sometimes belonged, 
though neither  of  the substances,  so related, be de- 
stroyed.  Now, though these are all reciprocal as well 
as the rest, and contain in  them  a  reference  of  two 
things one to the other;  yet, because one of the two 
things often  wants  a  relative  name,  importing  that 
reference, men usually take no notice  of  it,  and the 
relation is con~monly  overlooked : zl.  g. a patron  and 
client are easily allowed to be relatio~ls,  but a co~lstable 
or dictator are not  so readily, at first hearing, consi- 
dered as such ; because there is no peculiar name for 
those  who  are under  the command of  a dictator or 
constable,  expressing  a  relation  to  either of  them; 
though it be certain that either of them hath a certain 
power over  some others; and so is so far related  to 
them, as well  as  a patron is to his client, or general 
to his army. 
- 
Moral.  t$  4.  Fourthly, There is another sort of 
relation, which is the conformity  or  dis- 
agreement men's voluntary actions have to a  rule to 
which they are referred, and by which they are judged 
of;  which, I  think,  may be  called moral relation, as 
being that which denominates our moral actions, and 
deserves well to be examined; there being no part of 
knowledge wherein we should be more careful to get 
determined  ideas,  and  avoid,  as  much  as  may  be, 
obscurity and confusion.  Human actions, when with 
their various ends,objects, manners, and circumstances, 
they are framed into distinct complex ideas,  are, as 
has been shown, so many mixed modes,  a  great part 
whereof  have  names  annexed  to them.  Thus,  sup- 
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posing  to be a readiness to acknowledge and 
return kindness received, polygamy to be  the having 
more wives than one at once ; when  we frame these 
thus in our minds, we have there so many de- 
termined ideas of mixed  modes.  But this  is  not  all 
that concerns our actions ; it is not  enough  to have 
determined ideas  of  them, and to know what names 
belong to such and such combinations of ideas.  We 
have  a farther and greater concernment, and that is, 
to know whether such actions so made up are morally 
good or bad. 
ij  5. Good and evil, as hath been shown, 
Moral  b. ii.  chap. 20. $  2. and chap. 81.  $  42.  ,,d  ,,,I.  are nothing but pleasure or pain,  or that 
which occasions  or procures  pleasure  or pain to us. 
Moral good  and  evil  then  is  only the confornlity or 
disagreement of  our  voluntary actions  to some law, 
whereby good or evil is drawn on us by the will and 
power of  the law-maker ; which  good and evil, plea- 
sure or pain, attending our  observance or  breach of 
the law, by  the  decree of  the law-maker,  is that we 
call reward and punishment. 
8 6.  Of  these  moral  rules  or laws, to  Moral rules. 
' which men generally refer, and by which 
they judge of the rectitude or pravity of their actions, 
there seem to me  to be three  sorts, with their three  . 
different enforcements, or rewards  and punishments. 
For since it would be utterly in vain to suppose ir rule 
set to the free actions of men, without annexing to it 
some enforcement of  good and  evil to determine his 
will,  we  must, wherever  we  suppose  a  law, suppose 
also some reward or punishment annexed to that law. 
It would be in vain for one intelligent being to set a 
rule to the actions  of  another,  if  he had it not in his 
power to reward the compliance with, and punish de- 
viation  from his rule, by some  good  and evil  that is 
not the natural product and consequence of the action 
itself.  For that being  a natural convenience, or in- 
convenience, would  operate of  itself  without  a  law. 
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This, if I mistake not, is  the true nature of  all law,  I 
properly so called. 
Laws.  5 7.  The laws that men generally refer 
their actions to, to judge of their rectitude 
or oblicluity,  seem to me  to  be these three.  1. The 
divine law.  2. The civil law.  3. The law of opinion 
or  reputation,  if  I may  so  call  it.  Ey the relation 
they bear  to the first  of  these,  men  judge  whether 
their actions are sins or duties ; by the second,  whe- 
ther they be criminal or innocent;  and by the third, 
whether they be virtues or vices. 
Divine law,  $ 8.  First,  the divine  law,  whereby I 
the measure  mean that law which God has set to the 
or sin and  actions of  men, whether promulgated  to 
duty.  them by the light of  nature, or the voice 
of  revelation.  That God  has  given  a rule whereby 
men should govern themselves, I think there is nobody 
so brutish as to deny.  He  has a right to do it ;  we are 
his creatures : he has goodness  and wisdom to direct 
our actions to that which is best ; and he has power 
to cnforce it by rewards and punishments, of  infiilite 
weight and duration, in another life ;  for nobody can 
take us out of his hands.  This is tlie only true touch- 
stone of inoral rectitude ; and by comparing them to 
this law it is that men judge of the most considerable 
moral good or evil of  their  actions:  that is, whether 
as duties or sins, they are like to procure them happi- 
ness or misery from the hands of the Almighty. 
Civil  law,  tj 9.  Secondly,  the civil  law, the rule 
the  measure  set by the commonwealth to the actions 
of crimes  of those who belong to it, is another rule 
and inno-  to which men refer their actions, to  judge 
cence.  whether  they be  criminal  or  no.  This 
law nobody overlooks, the rewards  and punishments 
that enforce it being ready at  hand, and suitable to the 
power that makes it ; which is the force of the com- 
monwealth, engaged to protect the lives, liberties, and 
possessions  of  those who  live  according  to its  law; 
and has power to take away life, liberty, or goods from 
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him who disobeys :  which is the punishment of offeilces 
comlllitted against this law. 
8 10. Thirdly,  the law  of  opinion  or 
reputation.  Virtue  and vice  are names  cal lalv tile 
pretended  and  supposed  every where to  measure of 
stancl  for  actions  in  their  own  nature  virtue and 
right and wrong ;  and as far as they really  vice. 
are  so  applied,  they so  far are coincident with  the 
divine  law  above-mentioned.  But yet  whatever  is 
pretended, this is visible, that these names virtue and 
vice, in the particular  instances of their application, 
through the several  nations  and  societies of  men in 
the world,  are constantly attributed only to such ac- 
.  tions as in each country and society are in reputation 
or discredit.  Nor is it to be thought strange that men 
every where should give the name of  virtue to those 
actions which amongst them are judged praiseworthy ; 
and  call  that  vice  which  they  account  blamable: 
since  otherwise  they would  condemn  themselves,  if 
they should think  any thing rigltt, to which they al- 
lowed  not  commendation;  any thing wrong,  which 
they let pass without  blame.  Thus the measure  of 
what is  every where called and esteemed virtue  and 
vice  is  the approbation or  dislike,  praise  or  blame, 
which by a secret and tacit consent  establishes itself 
in the several societies, tribes, and clubs of men in the 
world;  whereby several  actions  come  to find credit 
or disgrace amongst them, according to the judgment, 
maxims, or  fashion  of  that place.  For though men 
uniting into politic  societies have resigned up  to the 
public the disposing  of  all their  force,  so  that tliey 
cannot employ it against any fellow-citizens any far- 
ther  than  the law of  the country  directs;  yet they 
Wain still the power of thinking well or ill, approving 
or  disapproving  of  the actions  of  those  whom they 
live amongst  and converse with :  and by this appro- 
bation  and dislike they establish amongst themselves 
what they will call virtue and vice. 
$ 11. That this  is  the common  measure of  virtue 
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and vice  will  appear to any one who considers, that 
though that passes  for vice in one country which is 
counted  a  virtue.  or  at least not vice  in  another; 
yet, every where, virtue and praise, vice and blame, go 
together.  Virtue is every where that which is thought 
praiseworthy;  and nothing else but that which  has 
the allowance of public esteem is called virtue".  Vir- 
tue and praise are so united that they are called often 
by  the same name.  "  Sunt sua premia laudi,"  says 
Virgil ;  and so Cicero, "  nihil  habet natura yr~sta?ztius, 
qunnl Izonestatenz, qunm Znudem, qz~arn  dignitatenz, quam 
decus;  which, he tells you, are all names for the same 
* Our antlior, in his preface to the fourth edition, taking notice 
how npt men  have  been  to mistake him,  added  what here follows : 
Of this the ingenious author of  the discourse concerning the nature 
of  man has given me a late instance,  to mention no other.  For the 
civility  of  his  expressions,  and the  candour  that  belongs  to  his 
order, forbid me to think that he mould have closed his preface with 
an insinuation,  as if  in what I had  said, book  ii. chap. 28, concern- 
ing the third  rure which men refer  their actions to, I went  about 
to make  virtue  vice, and vice  virtue, unless  he had  mistaken  my 
meaning : wltich he could not have done, if he had but given himself 
the trouble to consider what the argument was I was then upon, and 
what was the chief design of  that chapter, plainly enough  set down 
in the fourth section, and those following.  For I was there not lay- 
ing down moral rules,  but showing the original and nature of moral 
ideas, and enumerating the rules men make use of in moral relations, 
whethcr those rules were true  or false;  and, pursuant  thereunto, I 
tell what has every where that denomination, which in the language 
of  that place answers to virtue and vice in ours; which alters not the 
nature of  things, though men do generally judge of  and denominate 
their actions according to the esteem and fashion of  the place or sect 
they are of. 
If he had been at the pains to reflect on what I had said, 1). i. c. 3-  ,  $ 18,  and  in this present  chapter,  4  13,  14,  15, and 20, he nrould 
have krrown what I think of  tlte eternal and unalterable nature of 
right and wrong,  and what I call virtue and vice : and if he had ob- 
served  that, in the place  he  quotes,  I only report  as matter of  fact 
what others call virtue and vice, he would not have found it liable to 
any great exception.  For, I thinlc, I am not  much  out in  saying, 
that one of  the rules made nse of  in the world for a ground or mea- 
sure of  a moral relation is that esteem and reputation which several 
sorts of actions find variously in the several societies of men, accord- 
ing to which they are there  called virtues or  vices;  and whatever 
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thillg,  Tusc. lib. ii.  This  is  the  language  of  the 
heatlien  philosophers,  who well  understood  wherein 
their notions of virtue and vice consistecl, and though 
by  the clii'ferent temper,  education,  fashion, 
maxims, or interests of  different sorts of men, it fell 
out that what was thought praiseworthy in one place 
escaped  not  censure in another;  and so in different 
authority the learned Mr. Lowde places in his old English dictionary, 
I dare say it nowhere  tells him  (if I sltould  appeal to it)  that the 
same action is not in credit called and counted a virtue in one place, 
which being in disrepute, passes for and under  the name of  vice in 
another.  The taking notice that men  besto\rr the n;lnies of  virtue 
and vice according  to this rule of  reputation  is all I Itarc clone, or 
can  be  laid  to my  charge  to have  (lone, towards  the mnlLing vice 
virtue, and virtue vice.  But tlte good Inan tloes well, ant1 ;~s  bccomes 
his calling, to be watchful in snclt points, and to tdte the alarm even 
at expressions wllich, standiug alone by tl~emselvcs,  lrrigl~t  sound ill, 
and be  suspected. 
It  is to this zeal, allowable in his futiction, that I forgive his citing, 
as he does,  these words of  rnine in 4  1 1. of  this chapter:  <'  The es- 
Itortations of inspired teachers have not feared to appeal to comnio~i 
repute:  'Whatsoever  tl~ings  are lovely,  whatsoever  things are of 
good report, if there be any virtue, if there be  any praise,'  kc. Phil. 
iv. 8,"  rvithout taking notice of  those in~mediately  prcccding, which 
introduce  them,  and  run  thus:  "Whereby  in  the  corruption  of 
manners,  tlte true boundaries of  the law of  nature, whiclt  ought to 
be the rule of  virtue and vice,  were  pretty ~rrell  prescrred ;  so  tltat 
even the exhortations of inspirctl teacllers," kc. by wlticll ~r~ortls,  and 
the rest of tltat section, it is plain that I brcugltt that passage of  St. 
Paul, not to prove that the general measure of  what men call virtue 
ant1 vice,  tltroughout the ~vorld,  was  the reputation  and f:isl~ior~  of 
each pltrticular society within  itself  but to sltom, that though  it 
were so,  yet,  for reasons I there give, men, in that way of  denomi- 
nating their actions. did not for the most  part much vary  from the 
law of  nature :  ~rrltic11  is that stantling and unalterable rule by wltich 
they ouglrt to judge of  the moral  rectitude and pravity of their ac- 
tions,  and accordingly denontinate  then1 virtues or vices.  Had Mr. 
Lo\v(le consiilerctl this, Ite n  ould have fonnd it little to his purpose 
to have quoted that passage  in a sense I used it not;  and ~sould,  I 
imagine,  have  spared  the explication  he subjoins to it, as not very 
necessary.  But I Itope this second edition \rill give hirn satisfactioti 
in the point, and that this matter is now so  expressed  as  to show 
him there was no cause of scruple. 
Tltougl~  I an1 forced to differ from him in those apprehensions he 
has ex1)ressed in the latter end of his preface, concerning what I 11,trl 
said about virtue a~td  vice;  yet we are better agreed than he thinks, societies, virtues i111d  vices were  changed ; yet, as  to 
the main, they for the most part liept the same every 
where.  For since  nothing can be more natural than 
to encourage with esteem and reputation that wherein 
every one finds his advantage, and to blame and dis- 
countenance the contrary, it is no wonder that esteem 
and discredit, virtue and vice,  should in a great mea- 
in what he says in  his third chapter, p.  78,  concerning  natural  in- 
scription and i~inate  notions.  I shall not deny him the privilege he 
clai~iis,  p. 52, to state the question as he ple:tses,  esllecially when he 
states it so  as to leave nothing in  it contrary to what I have said: 
for, according to him,  innate notions  being  conditional  things, de- 
pe~~diug  II~OII  the concurrence of scvcral other circumsta~ices,  in order 
to the soul's exerting them;  all that he says for  innate,  imprinted, 
impyessctl, notions (for of innate ideas he says nothing at  all) amounts 
at  last only to this, that there are certain propositions, which though 
the so111 from the beginning, or when a man is born, does not know, 
yet hp assistance from  the outward  senses,  and the help of  some 
previous  cultivation, it may afterwards come certainly to Iinow the 
truth of; which is no more than what I have affirmed  in my first book. 
For I suppose by the soul's exerting them he means its beginning to 
know them,  or else  the soul's  exerting  of  notions will  be  to me a 
very anintelligible expression ;  and I thinlc at best is a very unfit one 
in this case, it misleading  men's  thoughts  by  an insinuation,  as if 
these notions were in the mind before the soul exerts them,  i. e. be- 
fore they are known :  ~r~hereas  truly before they are known,  there is 
nothing of  them in the mind but a capacity to know them, when the 
concurrence  of  those  circumstances,  which  this  ingenious  author 
thinks uecessary in order to the soul's  exerting them,  brings them 
into our knowledge. 
P. 52.  I find him express it thus :  '' These natural notions are not 
so imprinted upon  the soul  as that they naturally and necessarily 
exert tl~cmselves  (even in children and idiots) without any assistance 
from the outlrard sense\, or 11 itlront the help of  some previous culti- 
vation."  I-Icrc 11c  says thcy exert  themselves,  as page 78, that the 
soul exerts them.  Wlren he 11:~  esplnined to himself or others what 
11e means by  the soul's  exerting innate  notions,  or  their exerting 
themselves,  and what  that prevIoIIs cultivation and circumstances, 
in order to their being exerted, are, he will, I suppose, find there is 
so little of  controversy between him and me in the point, bating that 
he calls that exerting of notions,  which I in a more vulgar style call 
knowing,  that I have reason to thinlc  he brought in my name upon 
this occ:~sion  only out of  the pleasure he has to speak civilly of  me; 
~r~hich  I ruust gratefully acknowledge 11c has done wherever he men- 
lions nlr, not without ronfelering on  me,  ;IS  some others havc done, a 
title I liar-e no right to. 
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sure every where correspond with  the unchangeable 
rule of right and wrong, ~lrllich  the law of God  llatll 
established: there being nothing that so directljr and 
visibly secures and advances the general good cf man- 
kind in this world as obedience to the laws he has set 
them ; and nothing that breeds  such  mischiefs  arid 
confusion as the neglect of them.  And therefore meii, 
without  renouncing  all  sense  and reason,  and their 
own  interest, ~l'hich  they'are  so  constantly true to, 
could  not  generally  mistake  in  placing  their  com- 
mendation and blame on that side that really deservcci 
it  not.  Nay,  even  those  men  whose  practice  was 
otherwise failed not to give their approbation right ; 
few being depraved to that degree as not to condemn, 
at least  in others,  the faults they themselves  were 
guiIty of: whereby, even in the corruption of manners, 
the true boundaries of the law of nature, which ought 
to be  the rule of  virtue  and vice,  were pretty well 
preferred.  So that even the exhortatioi~s  of  inspired 
teachers have not feared to appeal to colnmon repute : 
"Whatsoever  is lovely, whatsoever  is of good report, 
if  there  be  any virtue,  if  there be  any praise,"  kc. 
Phil. iv. 8. 
Its enforce-  $ 12. If any one  shall imagine that I 
ments corn-  have forgot my own notion of a law, when 
mendation  I make ?he  law, whereby nlen judge  of  -  - 
and dis-  virtue and vice, to be nothing else but the 
credit.  consent  of  private  men,  who  have  not 
authority enough to maie a law; especially wanting 
that, which is so necessary  and essential to a law, a 
power to enforce it : I think I may say, that he who 
imagines commendation and disgrace not to be strong 
motives  to men to accommodate themselves  to the 
opinions and rules of those with whom they converse, 
seems little skilled in the nature or history of  nun- 
kind :  the greatest part whereof he shall find to  govern 
themselves chiefly, if not solely, by this law of fashim ; 
and so they do that which keeps them in reput3tion 
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the magistrate.  The  penalties that attend the breach 
of God's  laws some,  nay, perhaps most men, seldom 
seriously reflect on ;  and amongst those that do, many, 
whilst they break  the law, entertain thoughts of fu- 
ture reconciliation,  and making  their peace for such 
breaches.  And as to the punishments  due from the 
laws  of  the commonwealth, they  frequently  flatter 
themselves with the hopes  of impunity.  But no man 
escapes the punishment  of their  censure and dislike, 
who offends  against  the fashion  and opinion  of  the 
compaiiy he keeps, and would recommend himself to. 
Nor is there one  of ten thousand who is stiff and in- 
sensible ellough to bear up under the constant dislike 
and condcn~nation  of his  own club.  He must be of 
a strange and unusual constitution who  can content 
himself  to live  in  constant  disgrace  and  disrepute 
with his own particular society.  Solitude many men 
have  sought,  and been  reconciled  to; but  nobody 
that has the least thought or sense  of  a man about 
him  can  live  in society  under  the constant dislike 
and  ill  opii~ion  of his  familiars, and  those  he  con- 
verses with.  This is a  burden too heavy for human 
sufferance :  and he must be made up of irreconcileable 
contradictions  who  can  take pleasure  in  company, 
and yet be insensible  of contempt and disgrace from 
his companions. 
These tl~rec  S 13. These three then, first, the law of 
laws the  God; secondly,  the law  of politic socie- 
rules of  ties ;  tliirdly, the law of fashion, or private 
moral g00d  censure; are those to which men variously 
and evil.  compare tlieir actions ; and it is by their 
conformity to one of  these laws that they take their 
measures  when  they  would judge  of  their  moral 
rectitude,  and  denominate  their  actions  good  or 
bad. 
Morality  is  § 14. Whether the rule, to which, as to 
the rclatioll  n touchstone, we  bring our voluntary ac- 
of  actions to  tions, to examine them by, and try their 
these  goodness, and accordingly to name them; 
Ch. 28.  Of  moral Relutions.  105 
which is,  as it were,  the mark  of  the value we  set 
upon  them: whether, I say, we  take that rule from 
the  fashion  of  the  country,  or the  will  of  a  law- 
maker, the mind is easily able to observe the relation 
any action hath to it, and to judge whether the action 
agrees or disagrees with the rule; and so hath a notion 
of moral goodness or evil, which is either conformity 
or not conformity of any action to  that rule; and there- 
fore is often called moral rectitude.  This rule being 
nothing but a  collection  of several simple ideas, the 
conformity thereto is but so ordering the action, that 
the simple  ideas  belonging to it may correspond  to 
those which the law requires : and thus we  see how 
moral beings and notions are founded on, and termi- 
nated  in these  simple ideas we  have received  from 
sensation or  reflection.  For example, let us consider 
the complex idea we signify by the word niurder ;  and 
when we have taken it asunder, and examined all the 
particulars, we shall find them to amount to a collec- 
tion of simple ideas derived from reflection  or  sensa- 
tion,  viz.  first,  from reflection  on the operations of 
our own  minds, we  have  the ideas  of  willing,  con- 
sidering,  purposing  beforehand,  malice,  or wishing 
ill to another ;  and also of life or perception, and self- 
motion.  Secondly, from  sensation we  have  the col- 
lection of those simple sensible ideas which are to be 
found in a man, and of  some  action, whereby we put 
an  end to perception  and  motion  in  the  man; all 
which  simple  ideas are  comprehended  in the word 
murder.  This collection of simple ideas being found 
by me to agree or disagree with the esteem of the coun- 
try I have been bred in,  and to be held by most men 
there worthy praise or blame,  I call  the  action vir- 
tuous or vicious:  if I have the will of  a supreme in- 
visible law-giver for my role; then, as I supposed the 
action  commanded  or  forbidden by  God,  I  call  it 
good or evil, sin or duty; and if I  compare it to the 
civil law,  the rule made  by the legislative power of 
the country, I call it  lawful or unlawful,  a crime or 108  OJrnorul  Relations.  Book 9. 
founded.  But  before I quit this argument, from what 
has been said, give me leave to observe, 
All relations  $ 18. First, That it is  evident that all 
terminate in  relation terminates in,  and is ultimately 
simp1e ideas.  founded on,  those  simple ideas we  have 
got from  sensation or reflection:  so that all that we 
have in our thoughts ourselves  (if we  think  of any 
thing,  or have  any  meaning)  or would  signify  to 
others, when we  use words standing for  relations, is 
nothing but some simple ideas, or collections of simple 
ideas, compared one with another.  This is so mani- 
fest in that sort called proportional, that nothing can 
be more: for when a man says honey is sweeter than 
wax,  it is  plain  that his thoughts,  in this  relation, 
terminate  in  this  simple  idea,  sweetness,  which  is 
equally true of all the rest ; though where they are 
compounded or decompounded, the simple ideas they 
are made up of  are, perhaps, seldom taken notice of. 
V.  g. when the word father is mentioned; first, there 
is meant  that particular  species, or  collective  idea, 
signified by the word man.  Secondly, those sensible 
simple ideas, signified  by the word generation ; and, 
thirdly,  the  effects  of  it, and  all  the simple  ideas 
signified by  the  word  child.  So  the  word  friend 
being taken for a man, who loves, and is ready to do 
good to another, has all these followisg ideas to the 
making of it up : first, all tlle simple ideas,  compre- 
Eiended  in the word  man, or intelligent being.  Se- 
condly, the idea of love.  Thirdly, tlle  idea of readi- 
ness  or  disposition.  Fourthly,  the  idea  of  action, 
which is any kind of thought or motion.  Fifthly, the 
idea of $ood,  which  signifies any thing that may ad- 
vance  hs  happiness,  and terminates,  at last,  if  ex- 
amined, in particular simple ideas; of which the word 
good in general signifies any one, but, if removed from 
all simple ideas quite, it signifies nothing at all.  And 
thus also  all moral words  terminate at last, though 
perhaps more remotely, in a collection of simple ideas : 
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the immediate  signification of  relative words  being 
very often other supposed known relations, which,  if 
traced one to another, still end in simple ideas. 
§ 19.  Secoiidly,  That in  relations  we  we  have ,,- 
have for the most  part, if not  always, as  dinarily as 
clear a notion of the relation, as we have  "c;~'  (or 
c1c;irer) a.  of those simple ideas wherein it  is founded.  n,tiol,  of tf,c 
Agreement, or disagreement, whereon re-  as 
lation  depends, bekg things whereof we  of  its fob- 
have  commonly as  clear iaeas as  of any  d"fion- 
other  wllstsoeier;  it being  but  the  distinguishing 
simple ideas, or their degrees one from another, with- 
out which we  could  have  no  distinct  knowledge  at 
all.  For if I have a clear  idea of sweetness, light or 
extension, I have too of equal, or more or less, of each 
of these: if I know what it is for one man to be born 
of  a woman, viz.  Sempronia,  I  know what it is  for 
another  man  to be  boril  of  the same wornan  Sem- 
pronia ;  and so have as clear a notion  of  brothers as 
of births, and perhaps clearer.  For if I believed that 
Sempronia dug 'Titus  out of the parsley-bed  (as they 
used to tell children) and thereby became his mother; 
and  that  afterwards, in the same  manner, she  dug 
Caius out of the parsley-bed; I had as clear a notion 
of the relation of brothers  between  them, as if I had 
all the skill of a  midwife : the notion  that the same 
woman  contributed,  as  mother,  equally  to  their 
births  (though I were ignorant  or  mistaken  in the 
manner of it), being that on which I grounded the re- 
lation, and that they agreed in  that circumstance of 
birth,  let it be what it will.  The comparing them, 
then, in their descent from the same person,  without 
knowing  the  particular  circumstances  of  that  de- 
scent, is enough to found my notion of their having 
or not having the relation  of  brothers.  But though 
the ideas of particular  relations are capable of being 
as clear and distinct in the minds  of  those who will 
duly  consider  them  as those  of  mixed  modes,  and 
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names belon.gin8 to relation  are often of  as  doubtful 
and uncertain signification as  those  of  substances or 
mixed modes, and much  more than  those  of  simple 
ideas ;  because relative words being the marks of this 
comparison, which  is  made  only by men's  thoughts, 
and is an idea  only in  men's  minds, men  frequently 
apply  them  to different  compcrisons  of  things,  ac- 
cording to their own  imaginations, which  do not  al- 
ways correspond with those of others using the same 
name. 
The  notion  $  20. Thirdly,  That in  these  I  call 
of the rela-  moral  relations  I have  a  true notion of  -  ~~ 
tion is the  relation,  by  comvarine, the  action  with 
same, whe-  the  rulk,  Ghethgr  thg rule  be  true  or 
ther the rule 
any action is  false.  For if  I measure  any thing by  a 
corn~ared  to  yard,  I know whether  the thing  I mea- 
be  t'rue or  sure be  longer or shorter than chat  sup- 
false.  posed  yard, though  perhaps  the yard I 
measnre  by  be  riot  exactly the standard,  which  in- 
deed is  another  inquiry: for though the rule be er- 
roneous, and I mistaken  in  it, yet the  a~.  1 i eeinent or 
disagreement observable in that which I compare with 
makes me perceive the relation.  Though measuring 
by a wrong rule, I shall thereby be brought to jud~e 
amiss of  its moral  rectitude, because I have  tried ~t 
by that which is not thc true rule;  yet I am not mis- 
taken in tlie relation which  that action bears to that 
rule I compare it to, which is agreement or disagree- 
ment. 
CHAPTER XXIX. 
Of  clear and obsczcre, distinct and confused Ideas. 
Ideas some  $ 1. HAVING  shown the original of our 
clear and  ideas, and  taken  a  view  of  their  several 
distinct,  sorts ;  considered the difference  between 
0b  the simple and the complex, and observed 
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how  the complex  ones  are divided  into  scure  and 
those of modes, substances, and relatioils ;  confused. 
a11  which, I think, is necessary  to be done by any one 
who would acquaint himself thoroughly with the pro- 
gress of the mind in its apprehension and knowledge 
of  things; it will,  perhaps,  be  thought I have  dwelt 
long enough upon the examination of ideas.  I must, 
nevertheless,  crave leave to offer some few other con- 
siderations concerning them.  The first is, that some 
are  clear,  and  others  obscure;  some  distinct,  and 
others confused. 
$ 2. The perception of the mind being  clear 
most aptly explained by words relating to  obscure ex- 
the sight, we  shall best understand what  ~!ained  by 
is meant by clear and obscure in our ideas  slght. 
by reflecting on what we call clear and obscure in the 
objects of sight.  Light being that which discovers to 
us visible objects, we give the name of obscure to that 
which is not placed  in  a  light  sufficient  to discover 
minutely to us the figure and colours, which are ob- 
servable in it,  and which, in  a better light, would be 
discernible.  In like  manner  our  simple  ideas  are 
clear when  they are such as the objects themselves, 
from whence they were taken, did or might, in a well- 
ordered sensation or perception, present them.  Whilst 
the memory retains them thus, and can produce them 
to +,he mind,  whenever  it has  occasion  to  consider 
them, they are clear ideas.  So far as they either want 
any thing of the original exactness,  or have lost any 
of their  first  freshness, and are, as it were, faded or 
tarnished by time ;  so far are they obscure.  Complex 
ideas, as they are made up of simple ones, so they are 
clear when the ideas that go to their composition are 
clear; and the number and order of those simple ideas, 
that are the ingredients of any complex one, is deter- 
minate and certain. 
$ 3.  The eauses of obscurity in simple  Causes of 
ideas seem  to be  either  dull organs,  or  obscurity. 
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objects, or else a weakness in the memory not able to 
retain them as received.  For to return again to visi- 
ble objects, to help us to apprehend this  matter : if 
the organs or faculties  of  perception, like wax over- 
hardened with cold, will not receive the impression of 
the seal, from the usual impulse wont to imprint it; 
or, like wax of a temper too soft, will not hold it well 
when well imprinted; or else supposinv the wax of a 
temper fit, but  the sealonot applied w~th  a sufficient 
force to make a clear inlpression :  in any of these cases, 
the print left by the seal  will  be  obscure.  This, I 
suppose, needs no application to make it plainer. 
Distillct alld  $ 4.  As a clear idea is that whereof the 
confused,  mind has such a full and evident percep- 
what.  tion, as  it does receive  from an outward 
ol~ject  operating duly 011  a well-disposed  organ ; so a 
distinct idea is that wherein the mind perceives a dif- 
ference from all other ; and a  confused idea is  such 
an one as is  not sufficiently distinguishable from an- 
other, from which it ought to be different. 
Objection.  5. If n;  idea  be  confused  but such 
as is not sufficicntlv distinnuishable from 
another, from which it sllould 6e diff&nt;  it will be 
hard, may any one say, to find any where a confused 
idea.  For let any idea be as it will, it can be no other 
but sucli as the mind perceives it to be ;  and that very 
perception sufficiently distinguishes it from all other 
ideas,  which  cannot  be  other, i.  e. different, without 
being perceived to be so.  No idea  therefore can be 
undistinquishable from another, from which it ought 
to be  ditlerent,  unless  you  would  have  it different 
from itself: for from all other it is evidently different. 
confusion of  6.  TO  remove  this  difficulty, and to 
ideas is in  help us to conceive aright what it is that 
reference to  makes the confusion ideas are at any time 
their names.  chargeable with,  we  must consider, that 
things ranked under distinct names are supposed dif- 
ferent enough  to be distinguished, that so each sort 
by its peculiar name may be marked, and discoursed 
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of apart upon any occasion :  and there is nothing more 
evident, than that the greatest part of different names 
are supposed to stand for different things.  Now evcry 
idea a man has  being visibly what it is,  and distinct 
from all other ideas  but  itself,  that which makes it 
confused is,  when  it is  such,  that it may as well bc 
called by another name as that which it is espressecl 
by:  the  difference  which  keeps  the  things  (to be 
ranked under those two different names) distinct, and 
makes some  of  them belong  rathcr  to the one, and 
some of  them to the other of those names, being left 
out; and so the distinction, which mas intended to be 
kept up by those different names is quite lost. 
$ 7.  The defaults which  usually occa-  Defaults 
sion  this  confusion,  I  think,  are  chiefly  allich make 
these following :  confusion. 
First,  When  any complex  idea  (for it  First, 
is complex ideas that are most  liable to  plex ideas 
confusion) is made up of too small a num-  nlade up of 
ber of simple ideas, and such only as are  $:  zs?'"' 
common  to  other  things,  whereby  the 
differences that make it deserve  a different name are 
left oot.  Thus he that has an idea made up of barely 
the simple ones of a beast with  spots, has  but 3 con- 
fused idea of  a  leopard ; it not being  thereby  suffi- 
ciently distinguished from a  lynx, and several other 
sorts of beasts that are spotted.  So that such an idea, 
though it  hath the peculiar name leopard, is not distin- 
guishable from those designed by the names lynx or 
panther, and may as well come under the namc lyns 
as leopard.  Horv  much  the  custom  of  defining  of 
words by general terms contributes to make the ideas 
we would express by them confused and undetermined, 
I leave others to consider.  This is evident, tliat con- 
fused ideas are such as rendcr the use of words  un- 
certain, and take away the benefit of  distinct names. 
When the ideas, for rhiclr we use different terms, have 
not a  difference  answerable  to their distinct names, 
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and so cannot be  distinguished  by  them,  there it is 
that they are truly confused. 
Secondly, or  8.  Secondly,  Another  fault  which 
its simple  makes our ideas confused is, when though 
onesjumbled  the particulars that make up any idea are 
in  number  enough;  yet  they  are  so 
together.  jumbled  together,  that  it  is  not  easily 
discernible whether it rnore belongs to the name that 
is given it than to any other.  There is nothing pro- 
perer to make us conceive this confusion, than a sort 
of pictures usually shown  as surprising pieces of art, 
wherein  the  colours,  as they  are laid by  the pencil 
on the table  itself,  mark out very  odd and unusual 
figures, and have no discernible order in their position. 
This draught, thus made up of parts wherein no sym- 
metry nor  order appears, is in itself no more  a con- 
fused thing than the picture of a cloudy sky ;  wherein 
though there be as little order of  colours  or figures 
to 'be found, yet nobody thinks it a confused picture. 
What is it then that makes  it be  thought confused, 
since the want of symmetry does not ?  as it is plain it 
does not ;  for  another draught made, barely in imi- 
tation of this. could not be called confused.  I answer, 
that which makes it  be thought confused is the apply- 
ing it to some name to which it does no more discern- 
ibly belong than to some other : v. g. when it is said 
to be the picture  of  a  man, or Caesar,  then  any one 
with reason counts it confuaed :  because it is not dis- 
cernible  in  that state to belong  more  to  the name 
man, or Caesar, than to the name baboon, or Pompey ; 
which are supposed to stand for  different ideas fro& 
those signified by man or Caesar.  But when a cylin- 
drical mirror, placed  right, hath reduced  those  irre- 
gular  lines an the table  into  their  due  order  and 
proportion,  then  the confusion  ceases,  and  the eye 
presently sees that it is a man,  or Caesar, i. e. that it 
belongs  to those  names;  and  that it is sufficiently 
distinguishable from a baboon, or Pompey,  i. e. from 
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the ideas  signified by  those  names.  Just thus it is 
with our ideas, which  are as  it were  the pictures of 
things.  No one of  these  mental draughts, however 
the parts  are put together,  can  be  called  confused 
(for they are plainly discernible as they are) till it be 
ranked under some ordinary name to which it cannot 
be discerned to belong, any Inore than it does to some 
other name of an allowed different signification. 
$ 9.  Thirdly, A third  defect that fre-  ThirdlJr,  or 
quently  gives  the  name  of  confused  to  are mutable 
our ideas, is when any one of them is un-  and unde- 
certain a~rd  undetermined.  Thus we may  termined. 
observe men,  who not forbearing to use the ordinary 
words  of  their language till they have learned  their 
precise signification,  change the idea they make this 
or that term stand for, almost as often as they use it. 
He that does this, out of uncertainty of what he should 
leave out, or put into his idea of  church or idolatry, 
every time he thinks of  either,  and holds not steady 
to any one precise combination of ideas that makes it 
up, is said to have a confused idea of idolatry or the 
church : though this be still for the same reason as the 
former, viz. because a mutable idea  (if we will allow 
it to be one idea)  cannot belong to one name rather 
than another ;  and so loses the distinction that distinct 
names are desirned for. 
U 
$ 10. By what has been  said, we may  Confusion, 
observe  how  much  names,  as  supposed  ,;thout  re-a 
steady signs  of  things,  and by their dif-  Jerence  to 
ference to stand for  and keep things di-  hard4 
I y conceiva-  stinct that in themselves are different, are  ble.  the occasion of denominatingideas distinct 
or confused, by a secret and unobserved reference the 
mind makes of its ideas to such names.  This perhaps 
will be fuller understood after what I say of words, in 
the tliird book, has been read  and  considered.  But 
without taking notice of  such a reference of  ideas to 
distinct names, as the signs of  distinct things, it will 
be hard to say what a confused idea is.  And  there- 
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fore  when  3 man  designs, by  any  name,  a  sort  of 
things, or any one  particular  thing, distinct from all 
others ;  the complex idea he annexes to that name is 
the more distinct, the more  articular  the ideas are, 
and the greater and  more  determinate  the number 
and order of them is, whereof it is made up.  For the 
more it has of these, the more  it has still of  the per- 
ceivable diserences, whereby it is  kept separate and 
distinct from all ideas belonging to other names, even 
those  that approach  nearest  to it; and thereby  all 
confusion with them is avoided. 
Confusion  $ 11. Confusion, making it a difficulty 
concerns al-  to  separate  two  things  that  should  be 
two  separated,concerns always two ideas ;  and 
ideas.  those  most,  which  most  approach  one 
another.  Whenever  therefore  we  suspect  any  idea 
to be confused, we must examine what other it is in 
danger  to  be  confounded  with,  or  which  it cannot 
easily  be  separated  from;  and that will  always be 
found  an idea  belonging  to  another  name,  and so 
should be a different thing, from which  yet it is not 
sufficiently distinct ;  being either the same with it, or 
making a part of it, or at least as properly called by 
that name,  as the other it is  ranked  under;  and so 
keeps not that difference from that other idea, which 
the different names import. 
Causes of  $  12.  This,  I  think,  is  the  confusion 
confusion.  proper to ideas, which still carries with it 
a secret reference to names.  At least, if there be any 
other confusion of ideas, this is that which most of  all 
disorders  men's  thoughts  and  discourses : ideas,  as 
ranked  under  names,  being those  that for  the most 
part men  reason  of  within  themselves,  and  always 
those which they commune  about with  others.  And 
therefore where there are supposed two different ideas 
marked by two different  names, which  are not as di- 
stinguishable as the sounds that stand for them, there 
never fails to be confusion ; and where any ideas are 
distinct,  as  the ideas  of  those  two  sounds they  are 
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marked by, there can be between them  no confusion 
The way to prevent it is to collect and unite into our 
complex idea, as precisely as is  possible, all those in- 
pedients whereby it is  differenc~d  from others ; and 
to them, so  united in  a determinate number  and or- 
der, apply steadily the same name.  But this neither 
acconimodating  men's  ease or vanity, or serving any 
design but that of naked  truth, which  is  not  always 
the  thing aimed  at, such  exactness  is  rather  to be 
wished than hoped for.  And since the loose applica- 
tion of  names to ul~determined,  variable,  and almost 
nu ideas, serves both  to cover our own ignorance, as 
well as  to perplex  and  confound others, which goes 
for  learning  and  superiority in  knowledge,  it is  no 
wonder that most Inen should use it themselves, whilst 
they complain  of  it in  others.  Though, I think, no 
small part of  the confusion to be found in the notions 
of men might by  care  and ingenuity be avoided, yet 
I  am far from concluding it every where wilful.  Some 
ideas are so complex, and made up of  so many parts, 
that the memory does not easily retain the very same 
precise combination of simple ideas under one name ; 
much less are we  able  constantly to divine  for what 
precise complex  idea  such a  name stands in another 
man's  use of it.  From the first of  these, follows con- 
fusion in a man's  own reasonings and opinions within 
himself;  from the latter,  frequent confusion  in  dis- 
coursing and arguing with others.  But having more 
at large treated of words, their defects and abuses, in 
the following book, I shall here say no more of it. 
fj 13. Our  complex  ideas  being  made 
Complex  up of collections,  and so variety of  simple  ideas may be 
ones, may accordingly be very clear  and  distinct in 
distinct in one part, and very obscure and  one parkand 
confused  in  another.  In  a  man  who  confused in 
speaks of  a  chiliaedron,  or  a  body  of  a  another. 
thousand  sides, the ideas  of  the figure may be very 
confused, though that of  the number be very distinct : 
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concerning that part  of  his  complex  idea which  de- 
pends upon the  nllrnber  of  a  thousand, he  is  apt to 
think he has a distinct idea of  a chilizdron ;  though it 
be plain he  has no precise  idea of its figure, so as to 
distinguish  it by  that,  from  one  that has  but  999 
sides ;  the not observing whereof causes no small error 
in men's thoughts, and confusion in their discourses. 
This, if not  $ 14. He that thinks he has  a distinct 
heeded,  idea of  the figure of  a chiliaedron,let him 
causes con-  for trial sake take another parcel of  the 
fusioninour  same  uniform  matter, viz.  gold  or  wax, 
arguings.  of an equal bulk, and make it into a figure 
of 999 sides : he will, I doubt  not, be  able to distin- 
guish these two ideas one from another, by the nuq- 
ber of sides ;  and reason  and argue distinctly  about 
them, whilst  he keeps his thoughts and reasoning to 
that pert only of  these  ideas which  is  contained  in 
their numbers ; as that the sides of  the one could be 
divided into two equal numbers, and of the others not, 
kc.  But when he goes about to distinguish them by 
their figure, he will there be presently at a loss, and 
not be  able, I think, to frame in his mind two ideas, 
one of them distinct from the other, by the bare figure 
of these two pieces  of  gold, as he  could, if the same 
parcels of gold were made one into a cube, the other a 
figure  of  five  sides.  In which  incomplete  ideas we 
are very apt to impose on ourselves, and wrangle with 
others, especially where  they have particular and fa- 
miliar names.  For being satisfied in that part of the 
idea, which  we  have  clear,-and  the name which  is 
familiar to us being applied to the whole, containing 
that part  also which  is imperfect  and obscure,-we 
are apt to use it for that confused part, and draw de- 
ductions fro:;?  it, in the obscure part of its signification, 
as confidently as we do from the other. 
Instance in  $ 15. Having frequently in our mouths 
eternity.  the name eternity, we are apt to think we 
have  a  positive  comprehensive  idea  of it, which is as 
much as to say that there is no part of  that duration 
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which is not clearly contained in our idea.  It is true, 
that he that thinks so may have a clear idea of dura- 
tion;  he may  also  have  a very clear  idea of  a very 
great length of  duration;  he may  also have a clear 
idea of the comparison of  that great one with still a 
greater :  but it not being  possible for him to include 
in his idea of any duration, let it be as great as it will, 
the whole  extent together of  a  duration,  where  he 
supposes no end, that part of  his  idea, which  is still 
beyond the bounds of  that large duration  he repre- 
sents to his own thoughts, is very obscure and unde- 
termined.  And hence it is,  that in disputes and rea- 
sonings concerning eternity, or any other infinite, we 
are apt to blunder, and involve ourselves in manifest 
absurdities. 
5 16. In matter we have no clear ideas  Divisibility 
of  the smallness  of  parts  much  beyond  of matter- 
the smallest that occur  to  any  of  our senses;,  and 
therefore when we talk  of  the divisibility of  matter 
in inznikm, though  we  have  clear  ideas  of  division 
and  divisibility,  and have  also  clear  ideas  of  parts 
made out of a whole by division; yet we have but very 
obscure and confused  ideas of  corpuscles, or minute 
bodies so to be divided, when by former divisions they 
are reduced  to a  smallness much exceeding the per- 
ception of any of our senses ;  and so all that we have 
clear and distinct ideas of, is of what division in general 
or  abstractedly  is,  and the  relation  of  totum  and 
parts ;  but of  the bulk of  the body, to be thus infi- 
nitely divided  after certain progressions, I think, we 
have no clear nor distinct idea at all.  For I ask any 
one, whether taking the smallest atom of  dust he ever 
saw, he has any distinct idea (bating still the number, 
which concerns not extension) betwixt the 100,000th, 
and the 1,000,000th  part of  it.  Or if  he thinks he 
can refine  his  ideas to that degree,  without  losing 
sight of them, let him add ten cyphers to each of those 
numbers.  Such a degree of  smallness is not unrea- 
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far brings it  no  nearer  the end of  infinite  division 
than the first division  into two halves does.  I must 
confess, for my part, I have no clear distinct ideas of 
the different bulk or extension of those bodies, having 
but a very obscure one of either of them.  So that, I 
think, when we talk of division of bodies in in@itum, 
our idea of  their distinct bulks, which  is  the subject 
and foundation of  division,  comes,  after a  little pro- 
gression, to  be confounded and almost lost in obscurity. 
For that idea, which is to represent only bigness,must 
be very obscure and confused, which we cannot distin- 
guish from one ten times as big, but only by number; 
so that we  have clear  distinct ideas, we  may say, of 
.ten and one, but no distinct ideas of two such exten- 
sions.  It is  plain  from hence, that when we talk  of 
infinite divisibility of body, or  extension, our distinct 
and clear  ideas  are only of  riumbers;  but the clear 
distinct ideas of extension, after some progress of di- 
vision, are quite lost:  and  of  such minute parts we 
]lave no distinct ideas at a11 ;  but it returns, as all our 
ideas of infinite do, at last to that of number always 
to be added; but thereby  never  amounts to any di- 
stinct idea of  actual infinite  parts.  We have, it is 
true, a clear idea of  division, as often as we think of 
it ;  but thereby we have no more  a  clear idea of in- 
finite parts in matter, than we have a clear idea of an 
infinite number, by being able still to add new num- 
bers to any assigned numbers we have :  endless divi- 
sibility giving us no more a clear and distinct idea of 
actually infinite parts,  than endless  addibility  (if I 
may so speak) gives us a clear and distinct idea of an 
actually infinite number ; they both  being only in a 
power still of increasing the number, be it already as 
great as it will.  So that of what remains to  be added 
(wherein  consists  the infinity),  we  have but an ob- 
scure, imperfect,  and conf~tsed  idea; from  or about 
which we  can argue or reason  with  no certainty or 
clearness, no more than we can in arithmetic, about a 
numbcr of which we have no such distinct idea as we 
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have  of 4 or 100 ; but only this relative obscure one, 
that compared to any other, it is still bigger ;  and we 
have no more a clear positive idea of  it when we say 
or conceive  it is  bigger, or more  than 400,000,000, 
than if  we  should  say  it is  bigger  than 4*0, or 4; 
400,000,000 having no nearer a proportion to the end 
of addition or number, than 4.  For he that adds only 
4 to 4,  and  so proceeds,  shall as soon  come  to the 
end  of  all  addition,  as  he that adds 400,000,000 to 
400,000,000.  And  so  likewise  in  eternity,  he  that 
has an idea  of  but four  years, has  as much  a  posi- 
tive complete idea of  eternity, as he that has one of 
4<00,000,000 of years : for  what remains  of  eternity 
beyond  either  of  these  two numbers  of  years  is  as 
clear  to the one  as the other; i. e.  neither  of  them 
has any clear positive idea of it at all.  For he that 
adds only four  years  to 4,  and so on, shall  as soon 
reach eternity as he that adds 400,000,000  of years, 
and  so on; or, if  he please, doubles  the increase  as 
often as he will:  the remaining abyss being still  as 
far beyond  the end of  all these progressions,  as it is 
from the length of  a  day or an hour.  For nothing 
finite bears any proportiorl to infinite ; and therefore 
our ideas, which are all finite, cannot bear any.  Thus 
it is also in our idea of  extension, when we  increase 
it by  addition,  as well  as when  we  diminish it by 
division, and would  enlarge  our thoughts to infinite 
space.  After a few doublings of  those  ideas of  ex- 
tension, which are the largest we are accustomed to 
have, we lose the clear distinct idea of that space:  it 
becomes  a  confusedly  great one,  with  a  surplus of 
still greater ; about which, when we would argue or 
reason, we shall always find ourselves at a loss ;  con- 
fused ideas in our arguings and deductions from that 
part of them which is confused dways  leading us into 
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CHAPTER XXX. 
Of  Real and Fantastical Ideas. 
Real ideas  I.  BESIDES  what  we  have  already 
are conform-  mentioned  concerning ideas, other consi- 
able to their  derations belong to them, in reference to 
archetypes.  things  from  whence  they  are  taken,  or 
which they may be  supposed to represent : and thus, 
I think, they may come under a threefold distinction; 
and are, 
First, either real or fantastical. 
Secondly, adequate or inadequate. 
Thirdly, true or false. 
First, by real ideas, I mean such as have a founda- 
tion in nature; such  as have  a  conformity  with the 
real being and existence of things, or with their arche- 
types.  Fantastical or chimerical I call such as have 
no foundation in nature, nor have any conformity with 
that reality of being to which they are tacitly referred 
as  to their  archetypes.  If  we  examine the several 
sorts of ideas before-mentioned, we shall find, that, 
Simple ideas  $ 2. First, our simple ideas are all real, 
all real.  all agree to the reality of things, not that 
they are all of  them the images or representations of 
what does exist; the contrary whereof, in all but the 
primary qualities of bodies, hath been already shown. 
But though whiteness  and coldness are no  more  in 
snow than pain is,  yet those ideas  of  whiteness and 
coldness, pain, &c. being in us the effects of powers in 
things without us,  ordained by our Maker to produce 
in us such sensations ;  they are real ideas in us, where- 
by  we  distinguish  the  qualities  that  are  really  in 
things  themselves.  For  these  several  appearances 
being  designed to be  the mark, whereby we  are to 
know  and distinguish  things  which  we  have  to do 
with, our ideas do  as well  serve us to that purpose, 
and  are  as  real  distinguishing  characters, whether 
they be  only  constant  effects,  or  else  exact  resem- 
blances of  something  in the things themselves;  the 
reality lying in that steady correspondence they have 
with the distinct  constitutions of  real  beings.  But 
whether  they  answer  to those  constitutions,  as  to 
causes  or  patterns,  it matters not;  it suffices  that 
they  are constantly  produced  by  them.  And  thus 
our simple ideas are all real and true,  because they 
answer  and agree to those  powers  of  things  which 
produce  thein  in  our  minds;  that being  all that is 
requisite to make them real,  and not fictions at plea- 
sure.  For in simple ideas  (as has been  shown) the 
mind  is wholly confined  to the operation  of  things 
upon it,  and cap make to itself no simple idea,  more 
than what it has received. 
$ 3.  Though the mind be wholly pas-  ~~~~l~~ 
sive in respect of  its simple ideas ;  yet I  ideas are vo- 
think we  may say, it is not so in respect  luntar~com- 
of its complex ideas :  for those being cam-  bination'. 
binations of simple ideas put together,and united under 
one general name;  it is plain that the mind of  man 
uses some kind of  liberty, in forming those complex 
ideas : how else comes it to pass  that one man's  idea 
of gold, or justice, is different from another's ? but be- 
cause he has put in, or left out of  his,  some simple 
idea, which the other has not.  The question then is, 
whit% of  these are real,  and which  barely imaginary 
combinations ?  What collections agree to the reality 
of things, and what not? And to this I say, That, 
$ 4.  Secondly,  mired modes and rela-  Mi\-cd 
tions  having  no  other  reality  but what  ,oa,,  ,,,s 
they have  in  the minds  of  men,  there is  of  consistent 
nothing  more  required  to this  kind  of  ideas, are 
ideas to make  them  real,  but that they  real. 
be so framed,  that there be a possibility of  existing 
conformable to them.  These ideas themselves being 
archetypes,  cannot differ from their  archetypes,  and 
so cannot be  chimerical,  unless  any one will jumble 
together in them inconsistent ideas.  Indeed,  as any 
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to them, by which he that has them in his mind would 
signify them to others, so bare possibility of  existing 
is not enough;  they  must  have  a conformity to the 
ordinary signification of the name that is given them, 
that they may not be thought fantastical :  as if a man 
would  give the name  of  justice  to that idea  which 
common use calls liberality.  But this fantasticalness 
relates  more  to propriety of  speech,  than  reality of 
ideas :  for a man to be undisturbed in danger, sedately 
to consider what is fittest to be done,  and to execute 
it steadily, is a mixed  mode, or a complex idea of an 
action  which  may  exist.  But to be  undisturbed  in 
danger,  without  using  one's  reason  or  industry,  is 
what is also possible to be ; and so is as real an idea 
as the other.  Though the first of  these,  having the 
name  courage given  to  it,  may,  in  respect  of that 
name, be a right or wrong idea :  but the other, whilst 
it has  not  a  common  received  name  of  any  known 
language  assigned to it,  is  not  capable  of  any  de- 
formity, being  made with no reference  to any thing 
but itself. 
$ 5. Thirdly, our complex ideas of sub- 
Ideas of sub- 
stances arc  stances being made all of them in reference 
real, when  to things existing without us, and intended 
they agree  to be representations of substances,as they 
ex-  really are; are no farther real than as they 
istence of 
things.  are such combinations of  simple ideas as 
are really  united,  and co-exist  in  things 
without us.  On the contrary,  those  are fantastical 
which are made up of such collections of simple ideas 
as were really never united, never were found together 
in any substance ;  u. g. a rational creature, consisting 
of a horse's head, joined to a body of human shape, or 
such as the centaurs are described :  or, a body yellow, 
very malleable,  fusible,  and fixed;  but lighter than 
common  water:  or  an uniform,  unorganized  body, 
consisting,  as to sense,  all of  similar parts, with per- 
ception and voluntary motion joined  to it.  Whether 
such  substances as these can  possibly exist  or  no, it 
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is probable  we do not know:  but be that as it will, 
these ideas of  substances being made conformable to 
no pattern existing that we know,  and consisting of 
such collections of ideas as no substance ever showed 
us  united together,  they ought  to pass  with  us  for 
bareIy imaginary: but much more are those complex 
ideas so, which  contain in them any inconsistency or 
contradiction of their parts. 
CHAPTER XXXI. 
Of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas. 
$ 1. OF our real ideas, some are ade- 
quate,  and some are inadequate.  Those  ideas a,e 
I call  adequate,  which  perfectly  repre-  such as per- 
sent  those  archetypes  which  the  mind  fectly repre- 
supposes them  taken from; which  it in-  ~~~~~s. 
tends them to stand for, and to which it 
refers them.  Inadequate ideas  are such, which  are 
but a  partial  or  incomplete  representation of  those 
archetypes to which they are referred.  Upon which 
account it is plain, 
8 2. First, that all our simple ideas are  Simple ideas 
adequate.  Because being nothing but the  all adquate. 
effects of certain powers in things, fitted 
and ordained by -~od  to ~roduce  such sensations in 
us,  they  cannoi but be correspondent and adequate 
to those powers : and  we are sure they agree to the 
reality of things.  For if sugar produce in us the ideas 
which we call whiteness  ai:d  sweetness, we  are sure 
there is  3 power  in sugar to produce those ideas in 
our minds, or else they could not have been produced 
by it.  And  so each  sensation  answering  the power 
that operates  on  any of  our senses, the idea so pro- 
duced  is  a real idea (and not a fiction of  the mind, 
which  has  no  power  to  produce  any  simple  idea), 1.26  Of  adequate a?td inadequate Ideas.  Book 2. 
and cannot  but be  adequate,  since it ought only to 
answer that power;  and  so all simple ideas are ade- 
quate.  It is true,  the things  producing in us these 
simple ideas are but few of  them  denominated by us 
as if  they  were  only  the causes  of  them,  but  as  if 
those  ideas were  real  beings  in  them.  For though 
fire be called painful to the touch, whereby is signified 
the power of ~roducing  in us the idea of  pain,  yet it 
is  denominated  also  light  and hot; as if  light  and 
heat were  really  something in the fire more than  a 
power to excite these ideas in us ;  and therefore arc 
called  qualities in,  or  of  the fire.  But these being 
nothing, in truth, but powers to excite such ideas in 
us, I must in that sense be understood, when I speak 
of secondary qualities, as being in things ;  or of their 
ideas,  as being  the objects  that excite them in us. 
Such ways of speaking, though accommodated to the 
vulgar notions, without which one cannot be well un- 
derstood, yet truly signify nothing but those powers 
which  are in  things  to excite  certain  sensations  or 
ideas in us:  since were there no fit organs to receive 
the impressions  fire  makes  on  the sight and touch, 
nor a mind joined to those organs to receive the ideas 
of  light and heat by those impressions from the fire 
or sun,  there would  yet be  no more li  ht or heat in  B  the world, than there would be pain, i  there were no 
sensible  creature  to feel  it,  though the sun  should 
continue just  as it is now,  and mount Btna flame 
higher than ever it did.  Solidity and extension, and the 
termination of it, figure, with motion and rest, whereof 
we have the ideas, would be  really in the world  as 
they are,  whether there were  any sensible being  to 
perceive them or  no;  and therefore we have reason 
to look on those as the real modifications of  matter, 
and such are the exciting causes of  all our various 
sensations from bodies.  But this  being  an inquiry 
not belonging to this place,  I shall enter no  farther 
into it, but proceed to show what  complex ideas are 
adequate, and what not. 
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9  3. Secondly,  our  complex  ideas  of 
Modes are  modes,  being  voluntary  collections  of  ad  enllate. 
sim~le  ideas  which  the  mind  ~uts  to- 
I 
getier without  reference  to any real  archetypes or 
standing patterns existing anywhere,  are and cannot 
but be  adequate ideas.  Because they  not being  in- 
tended  for  copies of  things really  existing,  but for 
made by the mind to rank and denominate 
things by,  cannot want any thing;  they having each 
of them  that combination of ideas,  and thereby that 
prfection which the mind  intended they should : so 
that the mind  acquiesces in them,  and can find no- 
thing wanting.  'd'hus  by having the idea of a figure, 
with  three  sides  meeting  at three  angles,  I have  a 
complete idea, wherein 1 recruire nothing else to make 
it perfect.  That the mind  is  satisfied with the per- 
fection of this its idea, is plain in that it does not con- 
ceive, that any understanding hath, or can have a more 
complete or perfect  idea of  that thing it signifies by 
the word  triangle,  supposing it to exist,  than  itself 
has  in  that complex  idea  of  three  sides  and  three 
angles; in which  is  contained  all that is or  can  be 
essential to it,  or necessary to complete it, wherever 
or however it exists.  But in our ideas of substances 
it is otherwise.  For there desiring to copy things as 
they  really  do exist,  and to represent  to ourselves 
that constitution on which all their properties depend, 
we perceive  our ideas attain not that perfection we 
intend : we find they still want something we should 
be  glad were  in  them;  and so  are all inadequate. 
But  mixed  modes  and  relations,  being  archetypes 
without patterns, and so having nothing to represent 
but themselves,  cannot but be adequate, every thing 
being so to itself.  He that at first put together the 
idea of  danger,  perceived  absence  of  disorder from 
fear,  sedate consideration  of  what was justly  to be 
done,  and  executing  that  without  disturbance,  or 
being deterred by the danger of  it, had  certainly in 
his mind that complex idea made up of that combina- 1  Of  adequate and inadequate Ideas.  Book 2. 
tion ; and intending it to be nothin6 else, hut what is, 
nor to have in it any other simple idcas,  but what it 
hath, it could not also but be an adequate idea: and lay- 
ing this up in his memory,  with the name courage an- 
nexed to it, to signify to others, and denominate from 
thence any action he should observe to agree with it, 
had  hereby a  standard to measure  and denominate 
actions  by,  as  they  agreed  to  it.  This  idea  thus 
made, and laid up for a pattern, must necessarily be 
adequate,  being  referred  to nothing  else  but itself, 
nor made by any other original,  but the good-liking 
and will of him that first made this combination. 
Modes, in  $ 4. Indeed another coming after,  and 
reference to  in  conversation  learning  from  him  the 
settled  word  courage,  may  make  an  idea,  to 
which  he gives  the  name  courage,  dif- 
be inade- 
quate.  ferent from what the first author applied 
it to,  and has in his mind, when he uses 
it.  And  in this case,  if he designs that his idea in 
thinking should  be  conformable to the other's  idea, 
as  the  name  he  uses  in  speaking is conformable  in 
sound to his,  from whom he learned it, his idea may 
be very wrong and inadequate :  because in this case, 
making the other man's  idea the pattern of  his  idea 
in thinking,  as the other man's  word  or sound is the 
pattern of  his in speaking, his idea is so far defective 
and inadequate,  as  it is distant from the archetype 
and pattern he refers it to, and intends to express and 
signify by the name he uses  for it; which  name he 
would have to be a sign of  the other man's  idea (to 
which, in its proper use, it is primarily annexed) and 
of  his  own,  as  agreeing  to it: to which,  if  his  own 
does  not exactly correspond,  it is  faulty and inade- 
quate. 
§ 5. Therefore these complex ideas of modes, when 
they are referred by the mind,  and intended to cor- 
respond  to the ideas in the mind  of  some  other in- 
telligent being, expressed  by thc names we apply to 
them,  they may be very deficient, wrong,  and inadc- 
Ch. 31.  0  f  nckquate and inadequate Ideas.  199 
quatc;  becausc  they  agree  not  to that  which  the 
mind designs  to be their archetype and pattern : in 
which respect only any idea of  rnodes can be wrong, 
jmperfect,  or inadequate.  And  on this  account our 
ideas of mixed modes are the most liable to be faulty 
of any other; but this refers more to proper speaking 
than knowing right. 
$  6  Thirdly,  what  ideas  we  have  of 
lllersofsub  substances I have  above  showed.  Now  ,tan,,,,  ., 
those ideas have in the mind a double re-  referred to 
ference : I. Sometimes they are referred  r~ale~ences, 
to a supposed real essence of each species  notadequate. 
of  things.  2. Sometimes  they  are only  designed  to 
be pictures and representations in the mind of things 
that do exist  by ideas of  those qualities that are dis- 
coverable in them.  In both which ways these copies 
of  those  originals and  archetypes are il~~perfect  and 
inadequate. 
First,  it is  usual  for  men  to make  the names of 
substances stand for things, as supposed to have cer- 
tain  real  essences, whereby  they  are of  this or that 
species :  and names standing for nothing but the ideas 
that are in men's  minds,  they must constantly  refer 
their  ideas to such real  essences,  as to tlicir  arche- 
types.  That men (especially such as have been bred 
up in the learning  taught in this part of  the world) 
do  suppose  certain  specific essences  of  substances, 
which  each  individual,  in its several  kinds, is made 
conformable to, and partakes of,  is so far from need- 
ing proof,  that it will  be thought strange if any one 
should do otherwise.  And thus they ordinarily apply 
the  specific  names  they  rank  particuIar  substances 
under to things, as distinguished by such specific real 
essences.  Who is there almost who would  not take 
it amiss  if  it should  be  doubted whether  he  called 
himself  a  man,  with  any  other  meaning  than  as 
having  the real  essence of a  man? And  yet  if  you 
demand what  those real essences are,  it is plain rnen 
are ignorant, and know them not.  From whence  it 
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follows, that the ideas they have in  their minds, be- 
ing referred to real essences, as to archetypes which 
are unknown,  must be so far from  being  adequate, 
that they cannot be supposed to be any representation 
of them at all.  The complex ideas we have of  sub- 
stances are, as it has been shown, certain colIections 
of simple  ideas that have been observed or supposed 
constantly  to exist  together.  But  such  a  complex 
idea cannot be the real essence of any substance ;  for 
then the properties we  discover  in  that body  would 
depend on that complex idea,  and be deducible from 
it, and their necessary connexion with it be  known; 
as a11  properties of  a triangle depend on, and, as far 
as they are discoverable, are deducible from, the com- 
plex idea of three lines, including a space.  But it is 
plain that in our complex ideas of substances are not 
contained such ideas, on which all the other qualities 
that are to be found in  them do depend.  The com- 
mon  idea men  have  of  iron,  is a  body  of  a  certain 
colour,  weight,  and hardness ; and  a  property that 
they look on as belonging to it is malleableness.  But 
yet this  property has no necessary  connexion  with 
that complex idea, or any part of it : and there is no 
more reason to think that malleableness  depends on 
that  colour, weight,  and hardness, than that colour, 
or that weight,  depends  on its malleableness.  And 
yet, though we know nothing of  these real essences, 
there is nothing more ordinary than that men should 
attribute the sorts  of  things to such essences.  The 
particular  parcel of  matter which  makes the ring I 
have  on my  finger  is forwardly, by  most men,  sup- 
posed to have a real essence, whereby it is gold ;  and 
from  whence those qualities  flow, which I find in it, 
viz.  its peculiar  colour,  weight,  hardness,  fusibility, 
fixedness, and change  of  colour  upon a slight touch 
of mercury, &c.  This essence, from which  all these 
properties  flow,  when  I  inquire  into  it,  and search 
after it, I plainly perceive I cannot discover :  the far- 
thest I can go is  only to presume,  that it being no- 
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thing but body,  its real essence,  or internal consti- 
tution, on which these qualities depend, can be nothing 
but the figure, size, and connexion of  its solid parts ; 
of neither of  which having any distinct perception at 
all, can I have any  idea  of  its essence,  which  is the 
cause that it has that particular  shining yellowness, 
a greater weight than any thing I know of  the same 
bulk, and a fitness to have its colour changed by the 
touch  of  quic~silver. If any one will say, that the 
real essence and internal constitution, on which these 
properties depend, is not the figure, size, and arrange- 
ment or connexion  of  its solid  parts,  but something 
else,  called  its  particular  form,  I am  farther from 
having any idea of its real essence than I was before : 
for I have an idea of figure, size, and situation of solid 
parts in general, though I have none of the particular 
figure, size, or putting together of parts, whereby the 
qualities above-mentioned  are produced ; which qua- 
lities I find in that particular parcel of matter that is 
on  my  finger,  and not  in  another  parcel of  matter 
with which I cut the pen I write with.  But when T 
am told that something besides the figure, size, and 
posture of the solid parts of  that body, is its essence, 
something called substantial form ;  of that, 1  confess, 
I have  no  idea  at all,  but  only of  the sollnd  form, 
which is  far enough from an idea of  its real essence 
or constitution.  The like ignorarice as I have of the 
real essence of  this particular substance, I have  also 
of the real essence of all other natural ones :  of which 
essences, I confess,  I have  no  distinct  ideas  at all ; 
and I am apt to suppose others, when  they examine 
their own knowledge, will  find  in themselves, in this 
one point, the same sort of ignorance. 
5 7.  Now then, when  men  apply to this particular 
parcel of matter on my finger a general name already 
in use, and denominate it  gold, do they not ordinarily, 
or are they not understood  to give  it that name  as 
belonging to a particular  species  of bodies, having a 
real internal essence ;  by having of  which essence this 
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have examined this species more accurately, could, I 
believe,  enumerate ten times  as many properties  in 
gold, all of them as inseparable froin its internal con- 
stitution as its colour  or weight :  and it is probable, 
if any one knew all the properties that are by divers 
men known of this metal, there would be an hundreci 
times as many ideas go to the complex  idea of gold, 
as any one man yet has in his ;  and yet, perhaps,  that 
not be the  thousandtl~  part of what is to  be discovered 
in it.  The  cllangcs which that one body is apt to re- 
ceive,  and make in other boclies,  upon a due applica- 
tion, exceeding far not only what we know, but what 
we are apt  to  imagine.  Which will not appear so much 
a paradox to any one who will but consiclcr how far 
men are yet from knowing all the propcrtics of that 
one, no very compound  figure, af  triangle ; though it 
be no small number  that are already by  niatliema- 
ticians cliscovered  of it.  .--- 
Icleas of sib-  $ 11. So that all our complex  ideas of 
stanccs, as  substances are imperfect and inadequate: 
collectionsof  which would be so  also  in matliematical 
their quali-  figures, if ~vc  were to have  our  complex 
tics, arc all 
i~ladcclunte.  ideas  of  them  only  by  collecting  their 
nronerties in  reference  to otlier  figures. 
I. 
L/ 
IIow uncertain and imperfect would our ideas be of 
an ellipsis, if we had no other idea of it  but some few 
of its properties ! Whereas,  having in our plain  idea 
the wliole essence of that figure, we from thence dis- 
cover  those properties,  and demonstratively see  how 
they flow, and are inseparable from it. 
Simplcideas,  $ 18. Thus the mind has three sorts of 
~x7v?ra,  and  abstract ideas or nominal essences : 
ailcquatc.  First,  simple ideas, which are ~x'ivta,  or 
copies; but yet certainly adequate :  because being in- 
tended to express nothing but the power in things to 
produce in the min(1 such a  sensation, that sensation, 
when it is produced, cannot but be tlle effect of  that 
powcr.  So the paper I write on having the powcr i11 
the liglit (I speak according to tlic coninion notioil of 
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light) to produce  in  men the sensation which I call 
white, it cannot but be the effect of  such a power, in 
something without the mind; since the mind has not 
the power to produce any such idca in itself, and being 
meant for nothing else but the effect of such a power, 
that simple idea is real and adequate ;  the sensation of 
white,  in  my  mind,  being  the effect  of  that power 
which is in the paper  to produce it, is perfectly ade- 
quate to that power,  or else that power would pro- 
cluce a different idea. 
$ 13. Secondly, the complex  ideas  of  Ideasof sub- 
substances are ectypes,  copies  too ; but  stances are 
not perfect  ones,  not adequate :  whicl~  is  ~L$~~;~~- 
very evident to the mind, in that it  plainly 
perceives  that whatever  collection of  simple ideas it 
makes of any substance that exists,  it cannot be sure 
tliat it exactly answers all that arc in that substance: 
since not having tried all the operations of  all otlier 
substances upon it,  and  found  all the alterations it 
~vould  receive from, or cause  in, other  substances,  it 
cannot have  an exact  adequate  collection  of  all its 
active and passive capacities,  and so not have an ade- 
quate complex  idea of  the powers  of  any substance 
existing, and its relations, which  is that sort of com- 
plex idea of substances we have.  And after all, if we 
would have,  and actually had, in our complex idea, 
an exact collection of all the secondary qualities  or 
powers of any substance, we  should  not yet thereby 
have an idea of  the essence oC  that thing :  for since 
the powers or qualities that are observable by us are 
not the real essence of that substance, but depend on 
it, and flow from it, any collection whatsoever of these 
qualities  cannot  be  the real essence of  that  thing. 
Whereby it is plain, that our ideas of substances  are 
not adequate, are not what the mind intends them to 
be.  Besides, a man has no idea  of  substance in ge- 
neral, nor knows what substance is in itself. 
$  14. Thirdly, complex ideas of  modes  I(leas of 
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rclatiotls arc  are not copies, nor madc after the pattern 
arclle typcs, 
i~nd  cannot  of any real existence,  to which  the mind 
bllt  ade-  intends them to be conformable,  and ex- 
quate.  actly to answer.  These being  such col- 
lections of simple ideas  that the mind itself puts to- 
gether, and such collections that each of them contains 
in it precisely all that the mind intends tliat it should, 
they are archetypes and essences of modes that may 
exist; and so are designed only  for, and belong  only 
to, such modes as, when they do exist, have an exact 
conformity  with  those  coinplex  idcas.  The  ideas, 
therefore, of modes and  relations  cannot but be ade- 
quate. 
CHAPTER  XXXII. 
Of  True and False Ideas. 
Truth and  5  1. THOUGFI  truth  and falsehood  be- 
falsellootl  long, in propriety of  speech, only to pro- 
1)ro1)crly bc-  positions, yet ideas are oftentiirles termed 
hito~ro- true  or  filse (as  what  words  are  there 
positions.  that  are  not  used  with  great  latitude, 
and with some deviation from their stpict and proper 
significations?)  Though I  think  that,  when  ideas 
themselves are termed true or false, there is still some 
secret or tacit proposition, which is the foundation of 
tliat denomination ;  as we shall see, if we examine the 
particular  occasions wherein  they come  to be  called 
truc or false.  In all which we shall find some kind of 
affirmation  or  negation, which is  the reason  of  that 
denomination. For our ideas, being nothing but bare 
a1q)earances or perceptions in our minds, cannot pro- 
pcrly and simply in themselves be  said  to be true or 
fi?lse, no more than a  single name  of any thing can 
1)c said to bc truc or false. 
~ct  ;LI)~I  y -  5 2. Illdeed both iileas ancl  words may 
sical trutlt  be said to bc true in a metaphysical sense 
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of  thc  word  truth,  as  a11  other  things  contirins a. 
that any way  exist  are said  to be  true,  1""- 
positiotl.  i.  e.  really  to  be  such  as  they  exist. 
Though  in  things  called  true,  even  in that  sense, 
there  is,  perhaps,  a  secret  reference  to our  ideas, 
looked  upon  as the  standards  of  that truth, wllicll 
amounts to a mental proposition, though it be usually 
not taken notice of. 
$ 3. Rut it is not in that metaphysical  No  as 
sense  of  truth  which  we  inquire  here, 
when we  examine whether our ideas are  arrcc  ill t~lc 
capable of being true or false, but in the  lnin(1,  true 
more ordiilary acceptation of those words :  or false. 
and  so I say, that the ideas in  our minds being only 
so  many perceptions,  or appearances  there,  none  of 
them are false :  the idea of  a centaur having no more 
falsehood in it, when it appears in our minds, than the 
name centaur has falsehoodin it, when it is pronounced 
by  our  mouths  or  written  on  paper.  For  truth or 
i'alsehood  lying always in some affirmation or  nega- 
tion, mental or verbal, our ideas are not capable, any 
of  them,  of  being false,  till  the mind  passes  some 
judgment  on them,  that is,  affirms  or  denies  some- 
thing of them. 
$ 4. VTT1ienever the mind  refers  any of  Ideas refel,- 
its ideas to any thing extraneous to them,  to a,ly 
they are then  capable  to be  called true  thing Iniiy 
or false; because  the mind  in such a re-  be true or 
ference makes a tacit supposition of their  false. 
conformity  to  that  thing: which  supposition,  as  it 
happens to be true or  false,  so the ideas themselves 
come  to  be  denominated.  The most  usual  cases 
wherein this happens are these following : 
$5. First, when the mind supposes any  otller men's 
idca it has  conformable to that in other  %~~;~~~ 
men's minds, called by the same common  andsupposed 
name ; v. 81 when  the  mind  intends  or  re:tIessences, 
judgesits  itleas  of  justice,  temperance,  arc wh;~t 
lnctl ~~sually  religion, to be the same with what  other  rcfcr their 
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Seconrlly, when the mind  supposes any idea it has 
in  itself  to  be  conformable  to some  real existence. 
Thus the two ideas of a man and a centaur, supposed 
to be the ideas of  real substances, are the one true, 
and the other false ;  the one  having  a conformity to 
what has really existed, the other not. 
Thirdly, when  the mind refers any of  its ideas to 
that real constitution and essence of any thing, where- 
on all its properties  depend : and thus tlie  greatest 
part, if not all our ideas of substances, are false. 
The cause  9 6.  These  suppositions  the  mind  is 
of such 1.c-  very apt tacitly  to make  concerning its 
fcrcnces.  own ideas.  But yet, if  we  will  examine 
it, we shall find it is chiefly, if not only, concerning its 
abstract complex ideas.  For the natural tendency of 
the inincl being towards kllow1edge;-and  finding that, 
if it should proceed by and dwell upon only particular 
things, its progress would be very slow, and its work 
endless ;-therefore  to shorten its way to knowledge, 
and make  each perception  more  comprehensive,  the 
first thing it does, as the foundation of the easier en- 
larging its knowledge, either by contemplation of  the 
things themselves  that it would know,  or conference 
with others about them, is to bind them into bundles, 
and rank  them so into sorts, that what knowledge it 
gets of  any  of  them it may  thereby with assurance 
extend to all of that sort; and so advance by larger 
steps in  that, which is its great business, knowledge. 
This, as I have  elsewhere  shown, is the reason why 
we  collect  things  under  comprehensive  ideas,  with 
names annexed to them, into genera and species,  i.  e. 
into kinds and sorts. 
7.  If therefore we  will  warily attend to the mo- 
tions of the mind, and observe what course it usually 
takes in its way to knowledge, we shall, I think, find 
that the mind  having  got an idea, which it thinks it 
may have use of, either in contemplation or discourse, 
the first thing it does is to abstract it, and then get a 
name to it; and so lay it up i11  its store-house,  the 
niemory, as containing the essence of a sort of tliings 
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of which that name is always to be thc mark.  IIcncc 
it is, that we may often observe, that when  any one 
sees a new thing of a kind that he kriows not, he pre- 
sently asks ~vllat  it is, meaning by that inquiry notliilig 
but the name.  As  if the name  carried  wit11 it tlie 
knowledge of the species, or the essence of it ;  wlicrcof 
it is indeed used  as the mark,  and is generally  sup- 
posed  annexed to it. 
9 8.  But this abstract idea being some-  c,,,,  ,f 
thing in the mind between the thing that  sncll rc- 
exists, and the name that is given  to it;  fcr"lc~s. 
it is in our ideas that both the rightness of  our know- 
ledge,  and tlie  propriety  or  iiltelligible~less of our 
speaking, consists.  And hence it is, that men are so 
forward to suppose that the abstract idcas they have 
in their  minds  are such as agree to the things exist- 
ing without them, to which they are referred ;  and are 
the same also to which the names  they give them do 
by  the use  and  propriety  of  that  language belong. 
For without this double conformity of their ideas, they 
find they should both think  amiss of things in tliem- 
selves, and talk of them unintelligibly to others. 
$ 9.  First then,  I  say,  that when  the  Simple ideas 
truth of  our  ideas  is  judged  of  by  the  may be false, 
conformity they have to the ideas which  in  refcrellce 
to others of  other men have, and commonly signify by  tile s;,lne 
the same nanie, they may be any of  them  name, but 
false.  But yet  simple ideas are least of  are lcast lia- 
all liable  to be  so mistaken ; because  a  ble to  so. 
man by his senses, and every day's  observation,  may 
easily satisfy himself what the simple ideas are wh~ch 
their several names that are in common use stand for ; 
they  being  but few  in  number,  and such  as  if  he 
doubts or nlistakcs  in, he may easily -rectic"y by  the 
objects they are to be found in.  Therefore it is sel- 
dom  that any  one  mistakes  in Elis  names  of  simple 
ideas,  or applies  the name red  to the idea green, or 
ilic name sweet to the idea bitter; much less are mcii 
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ferent senses, and call a colour by the name of a taste, 
&c.;  whereby it is evident that the simple ideas they 
call by any name are commonly the same that others 
have and mean when they use the same names. 
I~lcas  of  § 10.  Complex ideas are much more 
,llise(lnlo~es  liable to be false in this respect :  and the 
most liable  complex ideas of mixed modes much more 
to be falsein  than those of substances :  because in sub- 
this sense.  stances (especially those which  the com- 
mon and unborrowed names of any language are ap- 
plied to)  some remarkable sensible qualities,  serving 
ordinarily to distinguish one sort from another, easily 
preserve those, who take any cnre in the use of their 
words, from applying them to sorts of  snbstances to 
which they do not at  all belong.  But  in mixed modes 
we are much more uncertain;  it being not so easy to 
clctcrmine of  several actions, whether they are to be 
called  justice  or  cruelty,  liberality  or  prodigality. 
And so in referring our ideas to those of  other men, 
called by the same names, ours may be fialse ;  and the 
idea in our  minds,  which  we  express  by  the word 
justice,  may  perhaps  be that which  ought to have 
another name. 
Or at least  kj  11. But whether or no our ideas of 
to be  mixed modes  are  more  liable  than any 
tllougl~t  sort to be different  from  those  of  other 
false.  men,  which  are  marked  by  the  same 
names,  this at least is certain, tliat this sort of false- 
hood  is much more familiarly attributed to our ideas 
of mixed modes than to any other.  When a man is 
thougl~t  to have a false  idea of justice, or gratitude, 
or glory, it is for no other reason but that his agrees 
not with the ideas which each of those names are the 
signs of in other men. 
A1111  why.  5 12. The  reason whereof seeins to me 
to be this; that the abstract ideas of mixed 
modes being men's voluntary combinations of  such a 
precise collectiorl of siinpIe idens,-and  so the csscnce 
of each, species being made by men alone, whereof we 
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]lave  no other sensible  standard  existing  any where 
but the name itself, or the definition of that name,- 
we have nothing else to refer these our ideas of miset1 
modes to, as a  standard to which we would  conforrn 
them, but the ideas of  those who  are thought to use 
those names in their  most proper significations ; and 
so as our ideas conform or differ from them, they pass 
for  true  or  false.  And  thus  much  concerning  the 
truth and falsehood of  our ideas, in reference to their 
names. 
13.  Secondly,  as  to the truth and  A,  ref,rre,l 
falsehood of our ideas, in reference to the  torenl esist- 
real  existence  of  things : when  that  is  CUceS~ !'!"'C 
of our itle;~s  made the standard of &eir truth, none of  be fa,sc, 
them  can  be  termed false,  but  only our  bl~t  tllose (,f 
complex ideas of substances.  substances. 
6  -144.  First,  our  simple  ideas  being  First,sinl,,lc 
barely such perceptions as God has fitted  idens in tllis 
us to receive, and given power to external  sense not 
objects  to produce  in us  by  established  f~llse, and 
laws and ways, suitable to his wisdom and  why. 
goodness, thou~li  incolnprehensible to us, their truth 
consists in nothing else hut in such appearances as are 
produced in us, and must be suitable to those powers 
he has placed in external objects, or else they coultl 
not  be produced  in  us:  and thus  answering  tllose 
powers,  they  are  what they  sliould  be,  true  idcns. 
Nor do they become liable to any imputation of false- 
Iiood, if  the mind  (as in most men I belicve  it does) 
judges  these  ideas  to be  in  the things  tliemselves. 
For God, in his wisdom, having set them as marks of 
distinction in things, whereby we may be able to dis- 
cern one  thing from another,  and so  clloose  any of 
thern for our uses,  as we have occasion; it alters not 
tlie nature of our simple idea, whether we  think that 
the idea of blue be in the violet itself, or in our mind 
only;  and only the power of producing it by the tex- 
ture of its pal-ts, reflecting the pnrticlcs of lig-ht aftcr 
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texture in the object, by a regular and constant ope- 
ration, producing the same idea of blue in us, it serves 
us  to distinguish,  by  our eyes,  that from  any other 
thing, whether that distinguishing mark, as it  is really 
in  the violet,  be only a peculiar texture of parts, or 
else that very colour, the idea whereof (which is in us) 
is the exact resemblance.  And it is equally from that 
appearance to be denominated blue, whether it be that 
real colour, or only a peculiar texture in it, that causes 
in us that idea :  since  the name  blue notes properly 
nothing but that mark of distinction that is in a violet, 
discernible only by our eyes, whatever it consists in ; 
that being beyond our capacities  distinctly to know, 
and perhaps would  be  of  less  use  to us if  we  had 
faculties to discern. 
~hough  one  $$  15. Neither  would it carry any im- 
idea of  putation of falsehood to our simple ideas, 
blue should  if, by the different structure of our organs, 
be different  it were so ordered, that the same obiect 
from  an- 
other's.  should  produce  in  several  men's  mhds 
different ideas at the same time;  u. ,q. if 
the idea that a violet produced in one man's  mind by 
his eyes were the same that a inarygold produced in 
another man's,  and uice versa.  For  since  this  could 
never be known, because one man's  mind  could  not 
pass into another  man's  body,  to perceive  what ap- 
pearances  were  produced  by  those  organs ; neither 
the ideas hereby, nor the names would be at all con- 
founded, or any falsehood be in either.  For all things 
that had the texture of a violet, producing coristantly 
the idea that he called blue ;  and those which had the 
texture of a marygold, p2oducing constantly the idea 
which he as constantly called yellow ;  whatever those 
appearances were  in  his  mind,  he would be  able as 
regularly to distinguish  things for his  use  by  those 
appearances, and understand and signify those distinc- 
tions marked by the names blue and yellow, as if the 
appearances, or ideas in his mind, received from those 
two flowers, were exactly the same with the ideas in 
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other men's  minds.  I am nevertheless very  apt to 
think  that the sensible ideas produced by any object 
in  different  men's  minds  are  most  commonly  very 
near  and  undiscernibly  alike.  For which opinion, 1 
think, there might be many reasons offered :  but that 
being besides my present business, I shall not trouble 
my reader  with them;  but  only mind  him, that the 
contrary supposition, if it could be proved, is of little 
use, either for the improvement of  our knowledge or 
conveniency of life ;  and so we need not trouble our- 
selves to examine it. 
§ 16.  From  what  has been  said  eon-  First, 
cerning our  sinlple ideas, I think it evi-  ;aeas ;, 
dent, that our  simple ideas can none  of  sense not 
them be false in respect of  things existing  fd%  ad 
without  us.  For the truth of  these ap-  why. 
pearances, or perceptions in our minds, consisting, as 
has been  said, only in their  being  answerable to the 
powers in external  objects to produce by our senses 
such appearances in us;-and  each of them being in the 
mind, such as it is, suitable to the power that produced 
it, and which alone it represents ;-it  cannot upon that 
account, or as referred to such a pattern, be false.  Blue 
and yellow, bitter or sweet, can never be false ideas: 
these perceptions  in  the mind  are just such as they 
are there, answering the powers appointed by God to 
produce  them ; and so are truly what they are and 
are intended to be.  Indeed  the names may be mis- 
applied ;  but that in this respect makes no falsehood 
in  the ideas;  as if  a  man  ignorant in  the English 
tongue should call purple scarlet. 
$$  17.  Secondly, neither can our com-  Secondly, 
plex ideas of  modes, in reference  to the  modes not 
essence  of  any thing really  existing,  be  false. 
false.  Because whatever complex idea I have of any 
mode,  it hath no  reference  to any pattern  existing 
and made by nature : it is not supposed to contain in 
it any other ideas than what it hat11 ;  nor to represent 
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Thus when I have  the idea of  such  an action  of  a 
man, who forbears to afford himself such meat, drink, 
and clothing,  and other conveniel~ces  of  life,  as  liis 
riches and estate will be  suficient to supply, and liis 
station requires,  I have  no false  idea;  but  such an 
one as represents  an action, either as I find or ima- 
gine it; and so  is  capable of neither truth or fi~lse- 
hood.  But when I give the name frugality or virtue 
to this action, then it  may be  called  a false idea, if 
thereby it be  supposed to agree with  that idea,  to 
which, in propriety of  speech, the name of  frugality 
doth belong; or to be conformable to that law, which 
is the standard of virtue and vice. 
Thirdly,  5 1s.  Thirdly,  our  complex  icieas  of 
idcas of sub-  substances, being all referred to patterns 
stances  in things themselves, inay be fdlse.  That 
whcn false.  they are all false, when looked upon  as 
tllc representations of the unknown essences of things, 
is  so evident, that there needs nothing to be said of 
it.  I shall therefore  pass  dver that chimerical  sup.- 
position, and consider  them  as  collections of  simple 
ideas in the mind taken from combinations of  simplc 
ideas existing together constantly in things, of which 
patterns they  are the supposed copies : and in this 
reference of them to the existence of things they are 
false ideas.  I. When they put together simple idcas, 
which in the real existence of  things have no unioi~  ; 
as when to the shape and size that exist together in 
a horse is joined, in the same complex idea, the  power 
of barking like a dog :  which three ideas, however put 
together into one in the mind, were never united in 
nature ;  anci this therefore nlay be called a false idea 
of a horse.  2. Ideas of substances are, in this respect, 
also false, when  from  any collection  of  siml>lc ideas 
that do always  exist together, there is separated, by 
a direct negation, any other simple idea wllich is con- 
stantly joined with them.  Thus, if to estension, so- 
lidity, fusibility,  1111:  peculiar weightiness, ant1 ycllow 
0 nega-  colour of gold, any onc join ill his thoughts tli, 
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tion of a greater dcgrec  of  fixedness than is in lead 
or  copper,  he  may  be  said  to  have  a  false  coin- 
plex: iclea,  as well  as when  he joins  to those  other 
simple  ones  the idea  of perfect  itbsolute  fixedness. 
For either way, tile complex idea of gold being made 
up of sucll simple  ones  as have  no union  in  nnt~~l-c, 
may be termed falsc.  Hut if we leave out of this his 
comples iden, that of fisedncss quite, witllout cither 
actually joining to, or separating of it from the rcst in 
his  mind, it is, I think,  to be looked  on as an i~iade- 
yuate and imperfect  idea,  rather than  a  false one; 
since thou@  it contains not all the simple icleas that 
are united  In  nature,  yet it puts none together but 
what do rcnlly exist together. 
$ 19. 'I'l~ougl  in compliance  with the 
Tr,,tll  or  orclirlary way of  speaking I have sElowecl  fi,lsclloo,l al- 
in what sense, and upor1 what ground our  ways slrp- 
ideas may  be  sometimes  called  true or  I)('sc~  tirmi~tio~~  af-  or 
falsc; yet if we will a look little nearer into  ncg,t  oil. 
the matter, in all cases wlicre any idea is 
called true or falsc, it is from some juclglnellt that the 
mind makes, or is  supposed to make, that is true or 
false.  For trnth or  falsehood,  being  never without 
some  affirmation or negation,  express  or  tacit, it is 
not to be  founcl  but  where signs  are joilled  and se- 
parated, according to the agreement or disngl.cemcnt 
of tlie things they  stand for.  The signs we  chiefly 
use  are eitller  idcas  or words,  wl~crewith  we  make 
either mental or verbal  propositious.  Truth lies in 
so joining  or separating these  rcprcsentatives,  as the 
things they stand  for do in themselves agree or dis- 
agree;  ant1  falsehood  in the  contrary,  as  shall be 
more fully shown hercnfter. 
$ YO.  Any iclca then which we have in  j,1,,,  ;, 
our mintls, wliethcr conformable or ]lot to  tI~c~nseIves 
the existence of things, or to any idca in  llcitllcr  true 
the minds of  other men, cannot properly  [lor ~~ISC. 
for  this alone be called  false.  For thcse represcnta- 
tions, if they 1lar.c  notlling ill tlleln but what is really 
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existing in things without, cannot be thought false, 
being exact representations of  something ; nor yet, if 
they have any thing in them differing from the reality 
of things, call they properly be saiG to be false repre- 
sentations, or ideas of  things  they do not represent. 
But the mistake and falsehood is, 
~~~~~~f~l~~,  § 21. First, when the mind having any 
1. When  idea, it judges and concludes it the same 
judged  that is in other men's minds, signified by 
agreeable  to 
another  the same name ;  or that it is conformable 
idea,  to the ordinary received signification or 
without be-  definition of that word, when indeed it is 
ing so.  not: which is the most  usual  mistake in 
mixed modes, though other ideas also are liable to it. 
2. When  $ 28.  Secondly,  when it having a com- 
judged  to  plex idea made up of such a collection of 
agree to real  simple ones as nature never puts together, 
existence,  it judges it to agree to a species of  crea- 
when they  tures really existing ;  as when it joins  the  do not.  weight of tin to the colour, fusibility, and 
fixedness of gold. 
3.  When  § 23. Thirdly, when in its complex idea 
judged ade-  it has united a certain number of  simple 
quate~  with-  ideas that do really exist together in some 
Out  being so.  sort  of  creatures,  but has  also  left  out 
others as much inseparable, it judges this to be a per- 
fect complete idea of a sort  of  things which really it 
is not ;  v.  g.  having joined  the ideas of  substance, yel- 
low, malleable, most heavy, and fusible, it takes that 
complex idea to be the complete  idea of gold, when 
yet its peculiar fixedness and solubility in agnn re@a 
are as inseparable from those other ideas or qualities 
of that body,  3s they are one from another. 
4. When  §  94.  Fourthly,  the  mistake  is 
judged  to  greater, when I judge that this comp  yet  ex 
represent  idea contains in it the real essence of any 
the real 
essence.  body existing,  when  at least it contains 
bnt some  few of  those  properties  which 
flow  from  its real  essence  and  constitution.  I say, 
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only sonle few of those properties ;  for  those propcr- 
ties consisting mostly in the activc ilhd passive powers 
it has, in reference to other things, all that are vul- 
prly  known of any one body,  of which the coinplex 
idea of that kind of things is usually made, are but a 
very few, in comparison of what a man, that has seve- 
ral ways  tried  and examined  it,  knows  of  that one 
sort of things :  and all that the most expert man knows 
are but a few, in comparison of what are really in that 
body, and depend on  its internal or essential consti- 
tution.  The essence of a triangle lies in a very little 
compass, consists in a very few ideas,-three  lines in- 
cluding a space make up that essence,-but  the pro- 
perties that flow from this essence are more than can 
be  easily known  or  enumerated.  So I imagine it is 
in substances, their real essences lie in a little compass, 
though the properties flowing from that internal con- 
stitution are endless. 
§ 25. To conclude,  a  man having no  Ideas, wllen 
notion of  any thing without him, but by  false. 
the idea he has of it in his mind (which  idea he has a 
power to call by what name he pleases),  he mayin- 
deed make  an idea neither  answering the reason of 
things,  nor  agreeing to the idea commonly signified 
by other people's  words ; but cannot  make  a wrong 
or false idea of a thing, which is no otherwise known 
to him  but by  the idea  he  has  of  it:  u. g.  when I 
frame an idea of  the legs, arms, and body of a man, 
and join  to this  a  horse's  head  and neck,  T do not 
make a false idea of any thing ;  because it represents 
nothing without me.  But when  I call it a  man  or 
Tartar, and imagine it to represent  some real being 
without me, or to be the same idea that others call by 
the same  name ; in  either of  these  cases I may err. 
And upon this account it is, that it comes to be termed 
a false idea ;  though indeed the falsehood lies not in 
the idea, but in that tacit mental proposition wherein 
a conformity and resemblance is attributed to it, which 
it has not.  But yet, if having framed such an idea in 
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my mind,  without thinking either that existence, or 
the name man or Tartar, belongs to it, I will call it 
man or Tartar, I may be justly thought fantastical in 
thc naming, but not erroneous in my judgment ; nor 
tlie idea any way false. 
More pro-  § 26. Upon the whole matter, I think, 
perly to be  that our ideas,  as they are considered by 
rigllt  the mind, either in reference to the proper 
or !\rrollg.  signification of their names, or in reference 
to the reality of things, may very fitly be called right 
or wrong ideas, according as they agree or disagree 
to those patterns to which they are referred.  But if 
any one had rather call them true or false, it is fit he 
use a  liberty, which every one has, to call tliings by 
tllose names he thinks best; though, in  propriety of 
speech, truth or  falsehood will, I tliink, scarce agree 
to them, but as  they,  some  way  or other, virtually 
contain in them some incntal proposition.  The ideas 
that are in  a  man's mind,  simply considerecl, cannot 
be wrong, ~1111ess  complcx  ones, wllercin inconsistent 
parts are jumbled  together.  All  other ideas are in 
themselres right, and the knowledge about them right 
and true knowledge : but when we come to refer them 
to any  thing,  as  to their  patterns  and archetypes, 
then they are capable of  being wrong, as far as  they 
disagree with such nrchctypes. 
CHAPTER XXXIII. 
OJ ihe Association of  Ideas. 
Sometlling  $ 1. THERE  is scarce any one that does 
nureason-  not observe something that seems odd to 
able in most  him, ancl is in itsclf really extravagant in 
men.  the opinions,  reasonings,  and  actions  of 
other mcn.  The least flaw of this kind, if at all dif- 
ferent from his own, every one is quick-sighted enough 
to espy in  another, and will by the authority of rea- 
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son forwardly condemn, tliougli he be guilty of much 
greater unreasonableness  in  his owiri tcnets ant1 con- 
(luct, which he never perceives,  and will very liardly, 
if at all, be convinced of. 
$ 9. This proceeds not wholly from self-   NO^  ,,I,~II~ 
love, though that has oftcn a great hand  frolll  self- 
ill it.  Men of  fair minds, and not given 
up to the overweening of  self-flattery,  arc frcquciitly 
guilty of  it; ancl i11  inany cases oilc with amnzemci~t 
]lc;nrs tlie a:.g~~ings,  ancl is astonished at the obstinacy 
of n worthy man,  who  yields not to tlie  eviclencc  of 
reason, though laid before him as clear as daylight. 
$ 3.  This sort of  unreasonr~bleness  is  ~,,t  fro111 
usually imputed to education  and preju-  c(luc.;lti(bll- 
dice, and for the most part truly c~lo~igh,  thollgh that 
reaches not the bottom  of  the disease, nor ~110~11s  di- 
stinctly  enough wlience  it rises,  or  w1:crein  it lies. 
Education is often rightly assigner1 for tlie cause, a~icl 
prejudice is a good general nanic for tlie thing itsclf; 
but  yet,  I  think,  lie  ouglit  to lool;  a  little f:trtlicr, 
who would  trace tliis sort of madness  to the root it 
springs from, and so espl:~in  it, as to show wl~ence  tliis 
flaw has its originzl in very sober and rational minds, 
niid wherein it consists. 
$ 4i.  I shall be pardoncd  for calling it  A tlegrcc of 
by so liarsli a name as i-nadncss, when  it  ~ll;l(lllcss- 
is considerecl,  that opposition to reason  cleserves tliat 
name,  and is  really  madness;  and there  is scarce a 
man so free from it, but that if lie should always, on 
all occasions, argue or  (10  as in  sonic cases  he  con- 
stantly does,  would not be tllougl~t  fitter for Bedlam 
than civil conversation.  I (lo not liere mean when he 
is under the power  of  an unruly  passion,  but in the 
steady calm course of  his  life.  That which will yet 
more  apologize for  this harsh name,  and ung.ratefu1 
imputation on the greatest part of  manltind, is, that 
inquiring a little by the by  into the nature of  nlnd- 
ness, B. ii. c. xi.  $ 13. I found  it to spring from the 
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we are here speaking of.  This consideration of  the 
thing itself, at a time when  I thought not the least 
on the subject which I am now treating of, suggested 
it to me.  And if this be a weakness to ~vhich  all men 
are so liable ;  if  this be a taint which  so universally 
infects mankind ;  the greater care should be taken to 
lay it open under its due name, thereby to excite the 
greater care in its prevention and cure. 
From a  $ 5. Some of  our ideas have a natural 
wrong con-  correspondence and connexion  one with 
nexiou of  another :  it is the office and excellency of 
ideas.  our reason to trace these, and hold thein 
together in that union  and  correspondence which is 
founded in their peculiar beings.  Besides this, there 
is another connexion of ideas wholly owing to chance 
or custom:  ideas,  that in  themselves are not all of 
kin, come to be s9 united in  some men's  minds, that 
it is very hard to separate them ;  they always keep in 
company,  and the one no sooner  at any time  comes 
into the understanding, but its associate appears with 
it; and if  they are more  than two,  which  are thus 
united,  the whole  gang,  always  inseparable,  show 
themselves together. 
IS  con-  ~h'  S 6.  This strong combination of  ideas, 
nexion how  not allied  by nature, the mind  makes in 
made.  itself either voluntarily or by chance ;  and 
hence it comes  in different men to be very different, 
according to their different inclinations, education, in- 
terests, &c.  Custom settles habits of thinking in the 
understanding, as well as of  determining in the will, 
and of  motions in the body;  all which seems  to be 
but trains of motion in the animal spirits, which once 
set a-going,  continue in the same steps they have been 
used  to; which,  by  often  treading,  are worn  into a 
smooth path, and the motion in  it becomes easy, and 
as it were  natural.  As  far  as we  can  comprehend 
thinking, thus ideas seem to be produced in our minds ; 
or if tllcy are not, this may serve to explain their fol- 
lowing one  another in  an habitad train,  when  once 
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they are put into their track, as well as it does to ex- 
plain such motions of  the body.  A musician used to 
any tune will  find, that let it but once begin  in  his 
head,  the ideas  of  the several notes  of  it will follow 
one another orderly in his understanding, without any 
care or attention, as regularly as his fingers move or- 
derly over the keys of the organ to play out the tune 
he  has  begun,  though  his  unattentive  thoughts be 
elsewhere  a wandering.  Whether the natural cause 
of these ideas,  as well  as of  that regular dancing of 
his fingers, be the motion  of  his animal spirits, I will 
not determine, how probable soever, by this instance, 
it appears  to be  so: but this  may help  us  a  little 
to conceive  of  intellectual  habits,  and  of  the tying 
together of ideas. 
$ 7. That there are such  associations  some 
of them made by custom in the minds of  pathies an 
most  men,  I think nobody will  question,  effect of it- 
who  has well  considered  himself  or  others;  and to 
this, perhaps, might be justly  attributed most of  the 
sympathies and antipathies observable  in men, which 
work as strongly, and produce as regular effects, as if 
they were natural ;  and are therefore called so, though 
'  they at first had no other original but the accidental 
connexion of two ideas,  which  either the strength of 
the first  impression, or future indulgence so united, 
that they always afterwards  kept company together 
in that man's  mind, as if  they were but one idea.  I 
say most of the antipathies,  do not say all, for some 
of them are truly natural, depend upon our original 
constitution, and are born with us ; but a great part 
of those which are counted natural, would have been 
known  to be  from unheeded, though, perhaps,  early 
impressions,  or  wanton fancies  at first, which would 
have been acknowledged the original of them, if they 
had been warily observed.  A grown person  surfeit- 
ing with honey, no  sooner hears the name of  it, but 
his fancy immediately carries sickness and qualms to 
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other  ideas  of  dislike,  and  sickness,  and vomiting, 
presently accompany it,  and he is disturbed, b~lt  he 
knows from whence  to date this weakness,  and can 
tell  how  he  got this  indisposition.  Had this  hap- 
perled to him by an overdose of  honey, rvhen a child, 
a11  the  same  effects would  have  followed, but  the 
cause would have been  mistaken,  and the antipathy 
counted natural. 
9 8. 1  mention this  not out of  any great necessity 
there is, in this present argument, to distinguish nicely 
bctween natural and acquired antipathies ;  but I take 
notice  of  it for  another purpose, viz. that those who 
have children, or the charge of their education, would 
think it ~vorth  their  while  diligently to watch,  and 
carefully to prevent  the undue conneaion of ideas in 
the minds  of  young people.  This is  the time most 
suiceptilrle of lasting impressions ; and though those 
relating  to the health  of  the body  are by  discreet 
people minded  and fenced  against, yet I ain  apt to 
doubt, that  those which  relate  more  peculiarly  to 
the mind, and terminate in the  understanding or yas- 
sions, have been much less heeded than the thing de- 
serves : nay, thosc relating purely to the understand- 
ing have,  as I  suspect,  been  by  most  men  wholly 
overlooked. 
A great  5  (3.  This  Mrrong  connexion  in  our 
cause of er-  minds  of  ideas in  themselves  loose  and 
rors.  independent of  one another, has such an 
influence, and is  of  so  great force to set us awry in 
our actions, as well moral as natural, passions, reason- 
ings,  and notions  thcmsclves,  that perhaps  there  is 
not  any one thing that deservcs more to be looked 
after. 
Il~stances.  $ lo. The  ideas of goblins and sprights 
have really no more to do with darkness 
than light; yet let but a foolish maid inculcate these 
often on the mind  of  a  child,  and raise  them there 
together, possibly he shall never bc  able to separate 
them  again so long as he lives : but  tlnrkness  shall 
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ever  afterwards bring with  it those  frightful ideas, 
and they shall be so joined,  that he can no more bear 
the one than the other. 
tj 11. A  man receives a  sensible  injury from ano- 
ther,  thinks  on  the marl  and that  action  over  and 
over ; and by ruminating on them strongly, or much 
in his mind, so ccments those two ideas togcther, that 
be makes them almost one ;  never thinks on the man, 
but the pain and displeasure he suff'ered comes  into 
his niind with it, so that he scarce distinguishes them, 
but has as much an aversion for the one as the othcr. 
Thus hatrcds  are often begotten from slight and in- 
nocent occasions, and quarrels propagated  and con- 
tinued in tlie world. 
$ 1% A man lias suffcrcd pain  or sickness in  any 
place ;  he saw his friend die in such a room;  thougll 
these have in nature nothing to do one with another, 
yet when the idea of the place  occurs to his mind, it 
brings (the iinprcssioii being once made)  tliat of the 
pain arid displcnsure  with  it ; lie  corifounds  tliein  in 
his mind, and can as little bear the one as the othcr. 
8 13.  When  this  combiliotion  is  set-  w,ly  ti,ne 
tled,  and  while  it lasts, it is  not in  the  ,,,,,,  ,,,,,, 
power of reason to help us, arid relieve us  disortlcrs ill 
fi-om the eff'ects of it.  Tdeas in our minds,  tllc rllill(4 
11 11icll  rea-  when they are there, will operate accord- 
soil  ivl,, ot.  ing to their natures  and circumstances; 
and ]!ere  we  sce  the cause  why  time  cures certain 
affections, which  reason, though in tlie right, ant1 al- 
lorvcd to be so, has not power over, nor is able against 
them to prevail wit11 those who are apt to hearken to 
it in  otl~er  cases.  'I'hc  death of a cliild, tliat was the 
daily  delight  of  his  mother's  eyes,  and joy  of  her 
soul, rends from her licart tlie ~vliolc  cornfbrt of  her 
life, arid  gives  her all thc torment iinnginablc : use 
the consolations of  reason  ill this casc,  and you were 
as good preach ease  to one  on  the rack,  ancl  hope 
to allay, by rational disconrscs, thc pain  of  liis joints 
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tlie sense of that enjoyment, and its loss, from the idea 
of the child returning to her memory, all representa- 
tions,  though ever  so  reasonable,  are in vain;  and 
therefore some in whom the union between these ideas 
is never dissolved, spend their lives in mourning, and 
carry an incurable sorrow to their graves. 
Fartlier in-  $ 14. A friend of mine knew one per- 
of  fectly cured of  madness  by a  very  harsh 
the effect of  and offensive operation.  The gentleman, 
the associa-  who was thus recovered, with great sense 
of gratitude and acknowledgment, owned 
the cure all his  life after, as the greatest  obligation 
he could have received ;  but whatever  gratitude and 
reason suggested to him, he could never bear the sight 
of the operator: that image brought back with it the 
idea of that agony which he suffered  from his hands, 
which was too mighty and intolerable for him to en- 
dure. 
5 15.  Many  children imputing the pain  they  en- 
dured at school to their books  they  were corrected 
for, so join  those ideas together, that a book becomes 
their aversion, and they  are never  reconciled  to the 
study and use of them all their lives after ; and thus 
reading becomes a torment to them, which otherwise 
possibly  they might have made  the great pleasure of 
their lives.  There are rooms convenient enough that 
some men  caiinot  study in,  and fashions  of  vessels, 
which  though ever  so  clean  and commodious,  they 
cannot  drink  out of,  and that by reason of some ac- 
cidental ideas which are annexed to them, and make 
them offensive : and who  is there that hath not ob- 
served some man to flag at the appearance, or in the 
company of  some certain person not otherwise supe- 
rior to him, but because having once on some occasion 
got the ascendant, the idea of authority and dist,ance 
goes along with that of the person,  and he that has 
been thus subjected is not able to separatc them? 
$  16.  Instances of  this kind are so plentiflil every- 
where, that if I add one more, it is only for the plea- 
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sant oddness of it.  It  is of  a young gentleman, who 
having learnt to dance, and that to great perfection, 
there happened  to stand an old  trunk in tlie  room 
where he learnt.  The idea of  this remarkable piece 
of household stuff had  so  mixed  itself wit11 the turns 
and stcps of all his dances, that though in that cham- 
ber he could  dance excellently well, yet it was  only 
whilst  that trunk  was  there; nor  could he perform 
well in any other place, unless that or some such other 
trunk had its due position in the room.  If this story 
shall be suspected to be dressed up with some comical 
circumstances, a  little  beyond  precise  nature,  I an- 
swer for myself, that I had  it some years since from 
a very sober  and worthy man,  upon  his  own know- 
ledge, as  T report it; and I dare say, there are very 
few inquisitive  persons who  read this, who  have  not 
met with accounts, if not examples of this nature, that 
inay parallel, or at least justify this. 
$  17. Intellectual  habits  an2  Zefects  ~t,  infl,,,,,, 
this way contracted, are not less frequent  on intenec- 
and powerful, though less observed.  Let  tua'  habits- 
the itlens of  being  and matter be stronely joined  ei- 
ther by  education or inucli  thought, whilst these are 
still  combined in  the mind,  what notions,  what rea- 
sonings  will  there  be  about  separate spirits?  Let 
custoin  from the very  childhood  have joined  figure 
ancl shape to the idea of  God,  and what  absurdities 
will that mind be liable to about the Deity! 
Lct the idea of infallibility be inseparably joined  to 
any p~rson,  and these two constantly together possess 
the mind ; and then one body, in two places at once, 
shall unexamtned be swallowed for a certain truth, by 
an  implicit  faith, whenever  that imagined  infallible 
person dictates aid demands assent without inquiry. 
$ 18. Some such wrong and unnatural  Obscrvablc 
combinations  of  ideas  will  be  found  to  in different 
establish the irreconcilable oppositiori be-  sects. 
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we  cannot  imagine  every  one of  their followers to 
impose wilfully on himself, and knowingly refuse truth 
offered  by  plain  reason.  Interest, though it does a 
great deal in the case, yet cannot be thought to work 
whole societies of men to so universal a perverseness, 
as that every one of them to a man should knowingly 
maintain falsehood : some  at least must be allowed 
to do what  all pretend to, i. e.  to pursue truth sin- 
cerely;  and therefore there must be something that 
blinds their understandings, and makes them not see 
the falsehoocl  of  what they  embrace for  real truth. 
That which  thus captivates their reasons, and leads 
men of  sincerity blindfold  from common  sense, will, 
when examined, be found to be what we are speaking 
of:  some independent  ideas,  of  no  alliance  to  one 
another, are by  education, custom, and the constant 
din of their party, so coupled in their minds, that they 
always appear there together ;  and they can no more 
separate them in  their  thoughts than if there were 
but one idea,  and they  operate as if  they  were  so. 
This gives  sense  to jargon,  demonstration to absur- 
dities, and consistency to nonsense,  and is the foun- 
dation  of  the greatest, I had almost said, of  all the 
errors in the world;  or if it does not reach so far, it 
is at least the most dangerous one, since  so far as it 
obtains, it hinders  men  from seeing and examining. 
When two things in themselves  disjoinecl, appear to 
the sight  constantly  united;  if  the eye  sees  these 
things riveted, which are loose, where will you begin 
to rectify the mistakes that follow in two ideas, thnt 
they have been accustomed  so to join in their minds, 
as to substitute one for the other, and, as I am apt to 
think, often without perceiving it  themselves ?  This, 
whilst they are under the deceit of it, makes them in- 
capable  of  conviction, and they applaud themselves 
as zealous champions for truth, when indeed they are 
cnntending for  error ; and the conf~lsion  of  two clif- 
fcrent ideas, which  ct  customary connexion of them in 
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their minds hath to them made in effect but one, fills 
their heads with false views, and their reasonings with 
false consequences. 
8  I?.  Having thus given an account of  Co,,elusia,. 
the original, sorts, and extent of our ideas, 
with several other considerations, about these (I know 
not whether I may say)  instruments or materials  of 
our knowledge;  the method  I at first proposed  to 
myself would now require that I should immediately 
proceed to show what use the understanding makes 
of them, and what knowledge we have by them.  This 
was that which, in the first general view I had of this 
subject, was all that I thought I should have to do : 
but, upon a  nearer  approach, I find  that there is so 
close a connexion between ideas and words,  and our 
abstract ideas, and general words, have so constant a 
relation one to another, that it is impossible to speak 
clearly and  distinctly  of  our knowledge,  which  all 
consists in propositions, without considering first the 
nature,  use,  and  signification  of  language;  which 
therefore must be the busiiless of the next book. Ch. 1.  Words or Language in general.  159 
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CHAPTER  I. 
Of  Words or  Language in general. 
Man fitted  $ 1.  GOD  having  designed  man for  a 
to form arti-  sociable creature, made him not only with 
culate  an inclination, and under  a  necessity to 
sounds.  have  fellowship with  those  of  his  own 
kind,  but furnished him  also with language, which 
was to be  the great instrument and  common  tie of 
society.  Man therefore had by nature his organs so 
fashioned as to be fit to frame articulate sounds, which 
we call words.  But this was not enough to produce 
language ;  for parrots and several other birds will be 
taught to make  articulate sounds  distinct  enough, 
which yet, by no means, are capable of language. 
To make  5 2.  Besides  articulate sounds,  there- 
them signs  fore,  it  was  farther  necessary  that  he 
of ideas.  should  be  able  to use  these  sounds  as 
signs of internal conceptions; and to make them stand 
as marks for the ideas within his own mind, whereby 
they might be made known to others, and the thoughts 
of men's minds be conveyed from one to another. 
Tomake ge-  5 3.  But neither was  this sufficient  to 
neral signs.  make words so useful as they ought to be. 
It is not enough for the perfection of language,  that 
sounds can be made signs of ideas, unless those signs 
can be so made use of as to comprehend several par- 
ticular things :  for the multiplication of words would 
have perplexed their use, had  every particular thing 
need of a distinct name to be signified by.  To  remedy 
this  inconvenience,  language had  yet  a  farther im- 
provement in the use  of general terms, whereby one 
word  was  made  to mark  a  multitude of  particular 
existences:  which  advantageous use  of  sounds was 
obtained only by the difference of the ideas they were 
made signs of: those names becoming general, which 
are made  to stand  for  general ideas,  and those  re- 
meining particular,  where the ideas they are used for 
are particular. 
tj 4.  Besides  these names  which  stand  for  ideas, 
there be other words which  men make use of,  not to 
signify any idea, but the want or absence of some ideas 
simple or complex, or all ideas together ;  such as are 
nihil in Latin, and in English, ignorance and barren- 
ness.  All which negative or  privative words cannot 
be said  properly to belong  to,  or  signify  no  ideas : 
for then they would be perfectly insignificant sounds ; 
but  they  relate to positive  ideas,  and  signify their 
absence. 
tj 5. It  may also lead us a little towards  Words ulti- 
the original of all our notions and know-  mately de- 
ledge, if we remark how great a depend-  rived from 
ence our words have on common sensible  ;$  ::aie 
idens ;  and how those, which are made use 
of to stand for actions  and notions  quite 
removed from sense, have their rise from thence,  and 
from obvious  sensible  ideas are transferred  to more 
abstruse  significations, and made to stand for ideas 
that come  not under the cognizance  of our senses: 
u.g. to imagine,  apprehend, comprehend, adhere, con- 
ceive, instil, disgust, disturbance, tranquillity, &c. are 
all words taken from the operations of sensible things, 
and applied to certain modes of thinking.  Spirit, in 
its  primary signification, is breath : angel, a messen- 
ger: and I doubt not, but if we could trace them to 
their  sources,  we  shohld find,  in all languages,  the 
names, which stand for things that fall not under our 
senses, to have had their first rise from sensible ideas. 
By which we may give some kind of guess what kind 
of notions they were, and whence derived, which filled 
their  minds  who  were  the  first  beginners  of  lan- 
guages;  and  how  nature,  even  in  the  naming  of 160  Words  or Lnngtlage i72 pnernl.  nook 3. 
things, unawares sug~ested  to men the originals and 
principles  of  all  thew  knowledge : whilst,  to give 
nanles that n~i~llt  make known to others any opcra- 
tioils they felt in themselves,  or any other ideas that 
came not under their senses, they were fain to borrow 
words from ordinary known ideas of sensation, by that 
means to make  others  the more easily  to conceive 
those  operations  they  experimented  in  themselves, 
tvhich  made  no  outward sensible  appearances : and 
then when they had got known and agrced names, to 
signify those interllal  operations of their ow11 minds, 
they were  sufficiently furnished  to make known by 
words all their other ideas ; since  they could  consist 
of nothing, but either of outward sensible l~erceptions, 
or of the Inward operations of their minds about them: 
we havin8,  as has  been proved,  no ideas at all, but 
what orig~nally  come either from sensible objects with- 
out, or what we feel  within  ourselves,  from  the in- 
ward  workings of  our own spirits,  of which  we  arc 
conscious to ourselves within. 
Distribu-  $ 6.  But to understand  bcttcr the lxsc 
tion.  and force of  language, as  subservient  to 
instruction and knowledge,  it  will  be  convenient to 
consider, 
First,  To what it is that names, in the use of Ian- 
guage, are i~nmecliately  applied. 
Secondly,  Since  all  (except  proper)  names  are 
general, and so stand not particularly for this or that, 
single thing, but for sorts and ranks of things ;  it will 
be necessary to consider, in the next place, what thc 
sorts and kintls, or, if you rather like the L  a  t'  in names, 
what the species  and genera of things are ;  whcrein 
they consist, and how they come to be made.  Thcsc 
being (as  they ought) well looked into, we shall the 
better  come  to  find  the  right  use  of  words,  tlic 
natural advantages and defects of  langungc, and the 
remedies  that ought to be used,  to avoid the incon- 
venicnces of obscurity or uncertainty in the significn- 
tion of  words,  \vithout  which  it is  impossible to dis- 
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course  with  any  clearness  or  order  concerning 
knowledge : which  being  conversant  about proposl- 
tions,  and those  most  commonly universal  ones, has 
greater connexion  with  words  than perhaps  is  sus- 
pected. 
These considerations therefore shall be the matter 
of the following chapters. . 
8  1. MAN,  though he has great variety 
ords are  of thoughts, and such from which others, 
as well  as himself,  might  receive  profit  signs ncces- 
and delight ; yet they are all within his  sar~  for corn- 
own  breast,  invisible  and  hidden  from  mul'icatio". 
others, nor can of' themselves be made appear.  The 
comfort and advantage of society not being to be had 
without communication of thoughts, it was Recessary 
that  man should find out some external sensible signs, 
whereof those invisible ideas, which his thoughts are 
made up of, might be made known to others.  For this 
purpose nothing was so fit, either for plenty or quick- 
ness,  as those articulate sounds, which with  so much 
ease and variety he found himself able to make.  Thus 
we may conceive  how  words, which were by nature 
so well  adapted  to that purpose,  come to be made 
use of by men, as the signs of their ideas ;  not by any 
natural connexion  that there is between particular 
articulate  sounds and certain  ideas,  for  then there 
would be but one language amongst all men ;  but by 
a voluntary imposition, whereby such a word is made 
arbitrarily the mark of  such an idea.  The use tllen 
of words  is  to be  sensible  marks of ideas;  and the 
ideas they stand for are their proper  and immediate 
signification. 
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Words are  S 2.  The use inen have of these marks 
the sensible  being either to record their own thoughts 
signs of his  for tlle  assistance  of  their own memorv. 
ideas who  or as it were to bring out their ideas,  a& 
uses them.  lay them before tlle view of others ;  words 
in their prim&y or immediate signification stand for 
nothing but tlle ideas  in  the mind  of  him that uses 
them, how imperfectly soever or carelessly those ideas 
are collected from the things which they are supposed 
to represent.  When  a man  speaks to another, it is 
that he may be understood ;  and the end of speech is, 
that those  sounds,  as  marks,  may make known  his 
ideas to the hearer.  That then which words are the 
marks of are the ideas of the speaker : nor  can any 
one apply them, as  marlcs, immediately to any thing 
else but the ideas that he himself hath.  For this would 
be to make  them signs of  his  own  conceptions, and 
yet apply them  to other  ideas;  which  would be to 
make  them signs,  and riot  signs of  his  ideas at the 
same time ; and so  in  effect to have no signification 
at all.  Words being voluntary signs, they cannot be 
voluntary signs imposed by him  on things he knows 
not.  That would be to make them signs of  nothing, 
sounds without  signification.  A  man  cannot make 
his words the signs either of qualities in things, or of 
conceptions in the mind  of  another,  whereof  lie has 
none in his own.  Till he lias some  ideas of his own, 
he cannot suppose them to correspond with the con- 
ceptions of  another man;  nor  can  he use  any signs 
for  them:  for  thus  they  would  be  the  signs of  he 
knows not what, which  is in truth to be the signs of 
nothing.  13ut when  he represents  to himself  other 
men's ideas by  some of his own, if  he consent to give 
them the same nanles that other.men do,  it is still to 
his own ideas; to ideas that he has, and not to ideas 
that hc has not. 
S 3. This is  so  necessary in  the use  of  language, 
that in this respect the knowing and the ignorant, the 
Ical.ned  and  unlearnetl,  use  the  words  they  speak 
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any meaning)  all alike.  They, in every man's 
mouth, stand for the ideas he has, and which he would 
express by  them.  A  child  having  taken  notice  of 
nothing in the metal he  hears  called  gold, but the 
bright shining yellow colour, he applies the word gold 
only to his own idea of that colour, and nothing else ; 
and therefore calls the same colour in a peacock's tail 
pld.  Another  that  hath better  observed,  adds  to 
shining  yellow  great weight:  and  then  the sound 
pld, when he uses it, stands for a complex idea of  a 
shining yellow and very weighty substance.  Another 
adds to those qualities fusibility:  and then the word 
gold signifies  to him  a body,  bright, yellow, fusible, 
and very  heavy.  Another  adds malleability.  Each 
of these uses  equally the word gold, when they have 
occasion to express the idea which they have applied 
it to: but it is evident, that each can apply it only to 
his own idea ; nor can he make it stand as a sign of 
such a complex idea as he has not. 
$ 4.  But though  words,  as  they  are  Words often 
used  by  men,  can properly  and imme-  secretly re- 
diately signify nothing but the ideas that  ~~~~i~~~ 
are in the mind of the speaker ; yet they  in ,,t,,cr 
in their thoughts give  then1  a  secret re-  menssminds. 
ference to two other things. 
First, They suppose their words to be marks of the 
ideas in the minds also of other men, with wl:om  they 
communicate:  for else they should talk  in vain, and 
could not be understood, if  the sounds they applied 
to one idea were such as by the hearer were applied 
to another ; which is to speak  two languages.  But 
in this, men stand not usually to examine whether the 
idea they and those they discourse with have in their 
minds  be the same : but thinlc  it enough  that they 
use  the word,  as  they  imagine,  in the common  ac- 
ceptation of  that language;  in  which  they suppose, 
that the idea they make it a sign of  is precisely the 
same, to which the understanding men of  that country 
apply that name. 
,tr  e to  $ 5. Secondly, Because men would not 
tile reality  be  thought to talk  barely of  their  own 
of  things.  imaginat~ons,  but of  things as really they 
are ;  therefore they often suppose the words to stand 
also for the reality of things.  But this relating more 
particularly to substances,  and their  names,  as per- 
haps the former does to simple  ideas and modes, we 
shall speak of these  two  different  ways  of  applying 
words  more  at large, when we  come to treat of  the 
names of  fixed modes, and  substances in particular : 
though give me leave here to say, that it is a pervert- 
ing the use of words, and brings unavoidable obscurity 
and confusion  into  their  signification,  whenever  we 
make them stand for  any thing but those  ideas we 
have in our own minds. 
WTords  by  § G.  Concerning words also it is farther 
use readily  to  be  considered : first,  that they being 
excite iclcas.  immediately the signs of men's ideas, and 
by that means the instruments whereby men commu- 
nicate their  conceptions,  and express to one  another 
those  thoughts  and  imaginations  they  have  within 
their own breasts; there comes by constant use to be 
such a connexion  between  certain  sounds  and  the 
' ideas they stand  for, that the names heard almost as 
readily excite certain  ideas,  as if  the objects  them- 
selves, which  are apt to produce  them, did actually 
affect the senses.  Which is  manifestly so  in  all  ob- 
vious  sensible  qualities;  and  in  all  substances  that 
frequently and familiarly occur to us. 
Words often  § 7. Secondly, That though the proper 
used without  and immediate signification of words are 
signification.  ideas in the mind of  the speaker, yet be- 
cause by familiar use  from  our  cradles  we  come  to 
learn  certain  articulate  sounds very  perfectly,  and 
have them readily on our tongues, and always at  hand 
in our  memories,  but yet  are not  always careful to 
examine  or  settle  their  significations  perfectly;  it 
often happens that men, even when they would apply 
themselves to an attentive consideration, do set their 
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thoughts  more on words than things.  Nay, because 
words are many of them learned before the ideas are 
known for which they stand ;  therefore some, not only 
children, but men, speak  several  words no otherwise 
than parrots do, only because they have learned them, 
and have been accustomed  to those sounds.  But so 
far as  words  are of  use  and  signification,  so  far is 
there  a  constant coi~nexion  between  the sound and 
the idea, and a designation that the one stands for the 
other; without which  application  of  them,  they are 
nothing but so much insignificant noise. 
$ s.-~ords  by long aid familiar  use,  Their signi- 
as has been said,  come  to excite  in men  fication  ncr- 
certain ideas  so  constantly  and readily,  fectl~  a&- 
that they  are apt to suppose  a  natural  t""y' 
connexion between them.  But that they signify only 
men's  peculiar ideas, and that by a perfect  arbitrary 
imposition, is evident, in that they often fail to excite 
in others (even that use the same language) the same 
ideas we take them to be the signs of: and every man 
has  so  inviolable  a  liberty to make words stand  for 
what ideas he pleases, that no one hath the power to 
make  others have the same ideas in their minds that 
he has, when  they use  the same words  that he does. 
And therefore the great Augustus himself, in the pos- 
session of that power which ruled the world, acknow- 
ledged he could not make a new Latin word : which 
was as much as  to say,  that he could not arbitrarily 
appoint what idea any sound should be a sign of,  in 
the mouths and common language of his subjects.  It 
is true, common use by  a tacit consent  appropriates 
certain sounds to certain ideas in all languages, which 
so far limits the signification  of that sound, that un- 
less a man applies it to the same idea, he does not 
speak properly:  and let me add, that unless a man's 
words excite the same ideas in the hearer, which  he 
makes them stand for in speaking, he does not speak 
intelligibly.  Rut whatever be the consequence of any 
man's  using  of  words  clifferently, either  from  their 166  (;clzernl Ternis.  Book 3. 
gciicrnl nie:ti~ing, or the particular sense  of the per- 
soil to wlloiri lie acl(1resses them, this is certain, their 
signilicatioli, in his use of them, is limited to his ideas, 
a11d they cat] be signs of nothing else. 
CHAPTER 111. 
OJ'  ge?zeral  Ternzs. 
'1'I1(.grcatcst  9 1. ALL things that exist being par- 
~)ilrt  of words  ticulars,  it may perhaps be thougl~t  rca- 
gclicral.  sonablc that words,  whicli  ought to be 
conformed  to things,  should  be so  too;  I  mean in 
their signification : but yet we find the quite contrary. 
'Fhe  far  greatest part. of  words,  that niake  all lan- 
g:.uagcs, arc general terms ; which  has not been  the 
effect of  ncglect  or chance, but of reason and neces- 
sity. 
For cvcry  tj a.  First, It is impossible  that every 
,,r,l,  particul:~  tl~ing  should  have  a  distinct 
t11ing  to11;lr-c  1)eculiar name.  Far the signification ant1 
n;mlc is  use of worils, depending onthnt conncxio~l 
il~~l)ossi'ulc.  which the mind makes between its iileas 
and tlic sol~nds  it uses as signs of them, it is necessary, 
in the apl)licntion of names to things, that the mind 
should  have  clistinct  icleas  of  the things,  ancl retain 
also tlic particular name that belongs  to every one, 
with its pecnli:lr  appropriation  to that idea.  But it 
is l~eyonrl  the power of human capacity to frame and 
retain  distinct ideas of  all the particular  things we 
~nret  wit11 :  every bird and beast men saw, every tree 
ant1 plant that affected the senses, could not find n 
1'1ace  in  the most capacious undcrstunding.  If it be 
looked on as an instance of a prodigious memory, that 
some generals have l~ccn  nhle to call every soldier in 
thcir army by his proper name, we may easily find a 
rcnioii nliy rncn hnve never attcmptcd to give namcs 
lo clncsh  :Iicc~p ill tllcair  flock, nr  crow Illat flies  ovcr 
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their heads ;  much less to call every leaf of plants, or 
g-rain of  sand that came in their way, by a  peculiar 
name. 
$ 3.  Secondly,  If it were possible,  it  Alld useless. 
would vet be useless;  because  it woulcl 
not ser;e  to the chief end of language.  Men would 
in vain heap up names of particular thmgs, that would 
not serve them to communicate their thoughts.  Illell 
learl1 names,  and use thein in talk with others, only 
that they  may  be understood : which  is  then only 
done, when by use  or  consent  the sound I make by 
the organs of speech excites in another man's mincl, 
who hears it, the idea I apply  it to in  mine, whei~  I 
speak it.  This cannot be  (lone by names applied to 
particular things, whereof I alone having the ideas ill 
my mind, tlie names of t1len1 could not be significni~t 
or  intelligible  to another,  who  was  not  acquaintccl 
with all those very particular things which had fallen 
under my notice. 
$ 4,.  Thirdly, But yet  granting this  also  feasible 
(whicli  I think is not),  yet a distinct name for every 
particular thing would not be of any great use for the 
improvement  of knowledge ;  which  though founded 
in particular things, enlarges itself by general views, 
to which  things  reduced  into  sorts  under  general 
names  are properly  subservient.  These,  with  the 
names belonging to them, come within some compass, 
and  do  not multiply every  moment,  beyond  what 
either  the mind  can  contain  or use  requires : and 
therefore, in these, men  have for the most part stop- 
ped;  but yet not so as to hinder themselves  from 
distinguishing  particular  things  by  appropriated 
names, where convenience demands it.  And therefore 
in their own species, which they have most to  do with, 
and wherein they have often occasion to rnention par- 
ticular persons, they make use of proper names ;  and 
there distinct individuals have distinct denomin  a  t'  ions. 
$ 5.  Besides  persons,  countries  also,  What thillgs 
cities,  rivers,  mountains,  and  other  the  11;1\c proper 
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found peculiar names,  and that for the same reason ; 
they  being  such  as men  have  often  an occasion  to 
mark particularly, and as it were set before others in 
their discourses with  them.  And I doubt not, but if 
we had reason to mention  particular horses as often 
as we have to mention particular men, we should have 
proper names for the one, as familiar as for the other ; 
and Bucephalus would  be a word  as much in use  as 
Alexander.  And  therefore  we  see  that,  amongst 
jockeys, horses have their proper names to be known 
and distinguished by, as commonly as their servants ; 
because, amongst them, there is often occasion to men- 
tion  this or that particular horse,  when  he  is  out of 
sight. 
Hawgeneral  § 6.  The next  thing to be  considerecl 
words  are  is, how general words come  to be made. 
made.  For since  all  things that exist  are only 
particulars, how come we by general terms, or where 
find we  those  general natures they are supposed to 
stand for ?  Words  become  general,  by being made 
the signs of general ideas ;  and ideas become general, 
by separating from them the circumstances  of  time, 
and place,  and any  other ideas, that may determine 
them  to this  or  that  particular  existence.  By this 
way of abstraction they are made  capable of  repre- 
senting  more  individuals  than one;  each  of  which 
having in it a conformity to that abstract idea, is (as 
we call it) of that sort. 
§ 7.  But to deduce this  a little more distinctly, it 
will  riot  perhaps  be  amiss to  trace our notions  and 
names from their beginning, and observe by what de- 
grees we proceed, and by what steps we  enlarge our 
ideas from our first infancy.  There is nothing more 
evident, than that the  ideas  of  the persons  children 
converse with (to instance in them alone) are like the 
persons  themselves,  only  particular.  The  ideas  of 
the nurse and  the mother  are well  framed  in  their 
minds ;  and, like pictures of them there, represent only 
those individuals.  The names they first gave to them 
are confined  to  these individuals;  and the names of 
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nurse and  mamma  the  child  uses,  determine  them- 
selves to those persons.  Afterwards, when  time  and 
a larger acquaintance  have  made them observe, that 
there are a great many other things in the world that 
in  some  common  agreements  of  shape,  and  several 
other qualities, resemble their father and mother, and 
those persons they have been  used  to, they frame an 
idea, which  they find those many particulars do par- 
take in ;  and to that they give, with others, the name 
man  for  example.  And  thus they  come  to have  a 
general name,  and a  general  idea.  Wherein  they 
make nothing new, but only leave out of the complex 
idea  they had  of  Peter  and James, Mary and Jane, 
that which  is  peculiar  to each, and retain only what 
is common to them all. 
§ 8. By the same way that they come by the general 
name  and  idea  of  man, they easily advance to more 
general names and notions.  For observing that seve- 
ral things that differ from their idea of man, and can- 
not therefore be comprehended under that name, have 
yet certain qualities  wherein  they  agree with  man, 
by  retaining  only  those  qualities,  and uniting  them 
into  one  idea,  they  have  again  another  and more 
general idea;  to which  having given  a  name, they 
make  a  term  of  a  more  comprehensive  extension: 
which new idea is made, not by any new addition, but 
only, as  before,  by  leaving  out the shape, and some 
other properties  signified  by  the name  man, and re- 
taining only a body, with life, sense, and spontaneous 
motion, comprehended under the name animal. 
$ 9. That this is the way whereby men  General na- 
first  formed  general  ideas,  and  general  tures are no- 
names to them, I think, is so evident, that  thing but 
there needs  110  other proof of  it, but the  abstract 
considering of  a man's  self, or others, and  ideas. 
the  ordinary  proceedings  of  their  minds  in  know- 
ledge : and he that thinks general natures or notions 
are any thing else but such abstract and partial ideas 
of more complex ones, taken at first  from particular 
existences, will, I fear, be at a loss where to find thcni. 1 70  General Terms.  Eook 3. 
For let any one reflect, and then tell me, wherein does 
his idea of man differ from that of Peter and Paul, or 
his idea of horse from that of Bucephalus, but in the 
leaving out sometllirlg  that is  peculiar  to each indi- 
vidual, and retaining so much of those particular com- 
plex ideas of several particular existences as they are 
found to agree in ?  Of  the complex  ideas  signified 
by the names  mail  and horse, leaving out but those 
particulars  wherein  they  differ,  and retaining  otlly 
those  wherein  they  agree,  and  of  those  making  a 
new  distinct  complex  idea,  and  giving  the  name 
animal to it ;  one has a more general term, that com- 
prehends with man several  other creatures.  Leave 
out of the idea of animal, sense and spontaneous mo- 
tion;  and the remaining  complex idea, made up  of 
the remaining simple ones of  body, life, and nourisli- 
ment, becomes a more  general one,  under  the more 
comprehensive term viverzs.  And not to dwell longer 
upon this particular, so  evident in itself, by the same 
way the mind procceds to body, substance, and at last 
to being, thing, and such universal terms, which stand 
for  any of  our  ideas  whatsoever.  To conclude, this 
whole  mystery  of  genera  and  species,  which  make 
such a noise  in the schools,  and are with justice  so 
little regarded out of  them,  is  nothing  else but abs- 
tract ideas, more  or less  comprehensive, with  names 
annexcd to them.  In all which  this is  constant and 
unvariable, that every more  general term  stands for 
such an idea, and is  but a  part of  any of  those con- 
tained under it. 
Why the  $ 10.  This  may  show  us  the  reason 
gcnIls  is .,  why, in  the defining of  words,  which  is 
(1in:trily  nothing but declaring their significations, 
ma"c  use of  we make use of the genus, or next general 
ill clefini- 
tions.  word that comprehends it.  Which is not 
out of necessity, but only to save the la- 
bour of  enumerating the several simple ideas, which 
the next general word or  genus stands for ;  or, per- 
haps, somctiines the shame of not being able to do it. 
Gut though defining by  and cl$firentia  (I crave 
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leave to  use these terms of art, though ori,ninally Latin, 
since they most properly  suit those notions  they are 
applied  to)  I say,  though  defining by  the genus be 
the shortest way, yet I think it may be doubted whe- 
ther it be the best.  This I am sure, it is not the only, 
and so not absolutely necessary.  For definition being 
nothing  but  making  another  understand  by  words 
what idea the term clcfined stands for, a clefinition is 
best  madc  by  enumerating  those  siinple  ideas  that 
are combined ill the signification of the term defined ; 
and  if  instead  of  such an enumeration men have ac- 
customed themselves  to use  the next general term, 
it has not been out of necessity, or for greater clear- 
ness,  but for  quickness  and despatch sake.  For,  I 
tliink, that to one who desired to know what idea the 
word  man  stood  for,  if  it should be  said, that man 
was  a  solid  extencled  substance,  having  life,  sense, 
spontaneous motion, and the faculty of  reasoning ; I 
doubt not but thc meaning of the tern1 man would be 
as well unclerstoocl, and  the idea  it stands for  be at 
least as clcarly madc known, as wl~cn  it is defined to 
bc a rational animal : which by the several definitions 
of animal, .oit)cns,  ancl corpus, resolvcs itself into those 
criurricratcd  icleas.  I  have,  in  explaining the term 
inan,  followed  here  the  ordinary  definition  of  the 
scliools : wliicli though, perhaps, not the most exact, 
yet serves well enough to my present purpose.  And 
one  may, in this instance, see nc-hat gave occasion to 
tl~c  rule, that a  definition must consist of g,.e?zus  and 
(IiJicrentin: and it suffices to show us the little neces- 
sity therc is of such a rule, or advantage in the strict 
ohscrving of it.  For definitions, as has been said, be- 
ing only thc explaining of one word by several others, 
so that tlic nlcai~ing  or idea it stands for may be cer- 
tainly known ;  languages are not always so made ac- 
cording to the rules of logic, that every term can have 
its signlfication exactly and clearly expressed by two 
others.  Experience  sufficiently  satisfies  us  to the 
contrary; or else those wlio liave inadc this rule have 
donc ill,  that they have  given  us  so  few  clefinitions 1 72  General 2'ern~s.  Book 3. 
conformable  to  it.  But  of  definitions  more  in  the 
next chapter. 
Gcncral and  S 11. To return to general words, it is 
I,oivcrsalarc  plain by what has been said, that general 
creatures of  and universal belong not to the real ex- 
the ulldcr-  istence of  things,  but are the inventions 
stancling.  and creatures of the understanding, made 
by it for its own use, and concern only signs, whether 
words or ideas.  Words are general, as has been said, 
when used for signs of  general ideas, and  so  are ap- 
plicable indifferently to many particular things : 2nd 
ideas are general, when they are set up as the repre- 
sentatives of  many particular things; hut universality 
belongs  not  to  things themselves,  which  are  all of 
them particular in their existence;  even those words 
and  ideas which  in  their  signification  are general. 
When therefore we quit particulars, the generals that 
rest  are  only  creatures  of  our  own  making;  their 
general nature being nothing  but  the capacity they 
are put into by the understanding,  of  signifying  or 
representing many particulars.  For the signification 
they have is nothing but a relation, that by the mind 
of man is added to them (1). 
(1)  Against this the bishop  of Worcester ol~jects,  and our au- 
thor*  answers as followeth: "  However,"  saitll the bishop, "  the 
abstracted ideas are the work of the mind, yet they are not mere 
creatures of the mind ; as appears by an instance produced of the 
essence of the sun being in one single individual : in which case it 
is granted,  That the idea may be so abstracted, that more suns 
might agree in il, and it is as much a sort, as if there were as many 
suns as there are stars.  So that here we have a real essence sub- 
sisting in one individual, but capable of being multiplied into more, 
and the same essence remaining.  But in this one sun there is a 
real essence, and not a mere nominal  or abstracted essence :  but 
suppose there were more  suns, would not each of them have the 
real essence of the sun?  For what is it makes the second sun, but 
having  the same real  essence with  the first?  If it were but a 
nominal  essence,  then  the second would  have  nothing but  the 
name." 
This, as I understand it, replies Mr. Locke, is to prove that thc 
abstract  general  essence  of  any sort of  things, or  things of the 
* In his first  Icttcr. 
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§ 14. The next  thing therefore  to be  Abstract  considered is,  what kind of signification it  ;,leas  tllc 
is that general words have.  For as it is  essences of 
evident,- that they  do  not  signify barely  '11~ galera 
one particular thing; for then they would  Sl)ccics- 
not be general terms, but proper  names; so  on  the 
other  side  it is  as  evident,  they  do  not  signify  a 
same denomination, v. g. of man or marigold, hath a real being out 
of the understanding?  which, I confess, I am not able tcr conceive. 
Your lordship's proof here brought out of my essay, concerning 
the sun, I humbly  conceive,  will  not reach it; because what is 
said there,  does not at all  concern the real but nominal essence, 
as is evident from hence, that the idea I speak of there is a com- 
plex idea; but we have no complex idea of the internal constitu- 
tion  or real  essence of  the sun.  Besides, I say expressly,  That 
our distinguishing  substances into species, by names, is not at all 
founded on their real essences.  So  that the sun being one of these 
substances,  I cannot,  in  the place quoted by your  lordship, be 
supposed to mean by essence of the sun the real essence of the sun, 
unless I had so expressed it.  But all this argument will be at an 
end, when your lordship shall have explained what you mean by 
these words,  "true  sun."  In my sense of them, any thing will be 
a true sun to which  the name sun may be truly and properly ap- 
plied,  and to that substance or  thing the name sun may be truly 
and properly applied, which  has united  in it thnt combination of 
sensible  qualities,  by which  any thing else, that is called sun, is 
distinguished from other substances, i. e. by the nominal essence: 
and thus our sun is  denominated  and distinguished from a fixed 
star, not by a real essence that we do  not know (for if we did, it is 
possible we should find the real  essence or constitution of one of 
the fixed stars to be the same with that of our sun) but by a com- 
plex idea  of sensible qualities co-existing, which, wherever they 
are found, make a true sun.  And  thus I crave leave  to answer 
your  lordship's  question-"  Fpr what is it makes the second sun 
to be a true sun, but having the same real essence with the first? 
If  it were but a nominal essence, then the second would have no- 
thing but the name." 
I humbly conceive, if it had the nominal essence, it would have 
something besides the name,  viz.  That nominal essence which  is 
suficient to denomillate it truly a sun, or to make it be a true sun, 
though we know nothing of that real essence whereon that nominal 
one depends.  Your lordship will then argue, that that real essence 
is in the second sun, and makes the second sun.  I grant it, when 
the second sun comes to exist, so as to be perceived by us to have 
all the ideas contained  in aur complex idea, i. e. in  our  nominal 
essence of a sun.  For should it be true  (as  is now believed by 
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plurality;  for man and men would thcn signify tlie 
same,  and the distinction of  numbers  (as the gram- 
marians call them) would be superfluous and useless. 
That then which  general words  signify is  a  sort of 
things ; and each of  them does that, by being a sign 
of an abstract idea in the mind, to which idea, as things 
existing are found to agree, so they come to be ranked 
fixed stars, yet such a star could not for that be  by  us called a sun, 
whilst  it answers not our complex  idea, or nominal  essence of a 
sun.  But how far that will prove, that the essences of things, as 
they are knowable by us, have a reality in them distinct from tliat 
of abstract ideas in the mind, which  are merely creatures of the 
mind, I do not see;  and we shall  farther inquire, in considering 
your lordship's  following words.  "  Therefore,"  say you,  there 
must be a real essence in every individual of the same kind."  Yes, 
and I beg leave of your  lordship  to say, of a  different kind too. 
For that alone is it which makes it to be what it is. 
That every  individual  substance  has real,  internal,  individual 
constitution, i.  e. a  real essence, that makes it to be what it is, I 
readily grant.  Upon this your lordship says, "  Peter, Jsmes, and 
John, are all true and real men."  Answer.  Without doubt, sup- 
posing them to be men, they are true and real men, i. e. supposing 
the name of that species belongs to them.  And so three bobaques 
are all true and real bobaques, supposing the name of that species 
of animals belongs to them. 
For I beseech your lordship to consider, whether in your way of 
argnment, by naming them, Peter, James, and John, names familiar 
to us, as appropriated to individuals of the species man, your lord- 
ship does not first  suppose them men,  and then very safely ask, 
whether they be not all true and real men?  But if I should ask your 
lordship whether Weweena, Chuckery, and Cousheda, were true 
and real men or no? your lordship would not be able to tell me, 
till, I having pointed out to your lordship the individuals called by 
those names,  your  lordship, by examining  whether  they had in 
them those  sensible qualities which  your lordship has combined 
into that complex idea to which you give the specific name man, 
determined them all, or some of them, to be the species which you 
call man, and so to be true and real man; which when your lord- 
ship has determined, it is plain you did it by that which is only the 
nominal essence, as not knowing the real one.  But your lordship 
farther  asks,  What is it makes  Peter,  James,  and John real 
men?  Is it the attributing the general name to them?  No, cer- 
tainly; but that the true and real essence of a man is in every one 
of them." 
If, when your  lordship asks,  a  What makes them men?"  your 
lordship used the word making in the proper sense for the eficlent 
cause, and in that sense it were true, tliat  the essence of a man, 
under  that  name;  or,  which  is  all one,  be  of  that 
sort.  Whereby it is evident, that the essences of the 
sorts, or  (if the Latin word pleases better)  species of 
things, are nothing else but these abstract ideas.  For 
the having the essence of  any species being that which 
makes any thing to be  of  that species, and the con- 
formity to the idea to which the name is annexed be- 
i.  e. the specific essence of that species made a man ;  it wou!d  un- 
doubtedly follow, that this specific essence  had a reality beyond 
that of being only a general abstract idea in the mind.  But  when 
it is said, that it is the true and real essence of a man in every one 
of them that makes Peter, James, and John true and real men, the 
true and real meaning  of these words  is no more, but that the 
essence of that species, i. e.  the properties answering the cotnplex 
abstract idea to which the specific name is  given, being found in 
them, tliat makes them be properly and truly called men, or is the 
reason why they arc called men.  Your lordship adds,  'c And we 
must be as certain of this, as we are that they are men." 
How, I beseech your lordship, are we certain that they are men, 
but only by our senses,  finding those  properties in then1 whicl~ 
answer the abstract complex  idea, which is  in  our minds, of the 
specific idea  to which we have  annexed the specific name man? 
This I take to be the true meaning of what your lordship says ill 
tlie next words, viz. "  They take their denomination of being mcn 
from that common nature or essence which is in them;"  and I am 
apt to think tllese words will not hold true in any other scnse. 
Your lordship's fourth inference begins thus-'c  That tl~c  general 
idea is not made from the simple ideas by the mere act of the mind 
abstracting from circumstances, but from reason and consideration 
of the nature of things." 
I tllought, my lord, that reason and consideration had been acts 
of the mind, mere acts of tlie mind, when any thing was done by 
them.  Your lordship gives a reason fbr it, viz. '' For, when we see 
several individuals  that have  the same powers and properties, we 
thence infer, that there must be something common to all,  which 
makes them of one kind." 
1 grant the inference to be true; but must beg leave to deny 
that  this  proves, that the general idea thc name is annexed to, is 
not made by the mind.  I have said, and it agrees with what your 
lordship here says, * That '' the mind, in nlakmg its complex ideas 
of substances,  only fbllows  nature,  and  puts no ideas together, 
which  are not supposed  to have  an union  in nature.  Nobody 
joins the voice of a sheep  with the shape ot'a horse ;  nor tlie colour 
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ing that which gives a right to that name ;  the having 
the  essence,  and  the having  that  conformity,  must 
needs be the same thing;  since  to be of  any species, 
and to have a right to the name of that species, is all 
one.  As,  for example, to be a man, or of the species 
man, and to have right to the name man, is the same 
thing.  Again, to be  a  man,  or  of  the species man, 
ideas of any real substances ;  unless he has a mind to fill his head 
with chimeras, and his discourses with unintelligible words.  Men 
observing  certain qualities always joined  and existing  together, 
therein copied nature, and of ideas so un~ted,  made their colnplex 
ones of substance,"  &c.  Which is very little diff'erent from what 
your  lordship here says, that it is from our observation of indivi- 
duals, that we come to infer, "  that there is something common to 
them all."  But I do not see how it will  thence follow,  that the 
general or specific idea is not made by the mere act of the mind. 
No,"  says your lordship, "  there is something common to them 
all, which makes them of  one kind ; and if the difference of kinds 
be real, that which  makes them all of one kind must not be a no- 
minal, but real essence." 
This may be some objection to the name of  nominal essence ; 
but is, as I humbly conceive,  none  to the thing designed by it. 
There is an internal constitution of things,  on which their proper- 
ties depend.  This your lordship and I are agreed of, and this we 
call  the real  essence.  There are also certain complex ideas, or 
combinations  of these properties  in men's  minds, to which  they 
commonly  annex  specific names,  or names  of  sorts  or kinds of 
things.  This, I believe, your lordship does  not deny.  These com- 
plex ideas, for want  of  a better name, I have called nominal es- 
sences; how properly, I will not dispute.  But if any one will help 
me to a better name for them, I am ready to receive it; till then, 
I  must, to express myself,  use this.  Now,  my lord, body, life, 
and the power of reasoning, being not the real essence of a  man, 
as I believe your  lordship will agree, will  your lordship say, that 
they are not enough to make the thing wherein they are found, of 
the kind called man, and not  of the kind called baboon,  because 
the difference of  these kinds  is  real?  If this be not real enough 
to make the thing of one kind and not of another, I do not see how 
animal rationale  can be enough really to distinguish a man from a 
horse ; for that is but the nominal, not real essence of that kind, 
designed by the name man: and yet I suppose, every one thinks it 
real enough to make a real difference between that and other kinds. 
And  if' nothing will  serve the turn, to MAKE things  of one kind 
and not of another (which, as I have showed, signifies no more but 
ranking of them under different specific names)  but their real un- 
known constitutions, which are the real  essences we are speaking 
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and have  the essence  of  a  man  is, the same  thing. 
Now since nothing  can be a man, or have a right to 
the name man, but what has a conformity to the abs- 
tract idea the name man stands for ;  nor any thing be 
a man, or have a  right  to the species man, but what 
has the essence of  that species;  it follows, that the 
abstract idea for which  the name stands, and the es- 
of, I fear it would  be a  long while before we should have really 
different kind of substances, or distinct names for them, unless we 
could distinguish  them by these diferences,  of which we have no 
distinct conceptions.  For I think it would not be readily answered 
me, if I should demand, wherein  lies the real difference in the in- 
ternal constitution  of a stag from  that of a buck, which are each 
of them very well known  to be of one kind, and not of'the other ; 
and nobody questions but that the kinds, whereof each of them is, 
are really different. 
Your lordship farther says,  <'  And  this  difference doth not de- 
pend  upon  the complex  ideas  of substances, whereby men nrbi- 
trarily join  modes together in their minds."  I confess, my lord, I 
know not what to say to this, because I do not  know what these 
complex  ideas  of substances  are, whereby  men  arbitrarily  join 
modes together in their minds.  Eut I am apt to think  there is a 
mistake in the matter, by the words that follow,  which  are tlicse : 
L'  For let them mistake  in  their  complication  of ideas, either in 
leaving out or  putting in what dot11 not belong to them; and let 
their ideas be what they please,  the real essence of a man, atid a 
horse, and a tree, are  just what they were." 
The mistake I spoke of, I humbly suppose, is  this,  that things 
are here taken to be distinguished  hy their real essences ; when, 
by the very way of speaking of them, it is clear, that they are al- 
ready distinguished by their nominal essences, and are so takcn to 
be.  For what, I beseech your lordship, does your lordship mean, 
when you say, ''  The real  essence of a man, and a horse,  and a 
tree,"  but that there are such  kinds already set out by the signi- 
fication of  these names, man, horse, tree?  And what, I beseech 
your Iordship, is the signification of each of these specific names, 
but the  complex idea it stands for T  And that complex idea is the 
nonlinal  essence, and nothing else.  So that taking man, as your 
lordship does here, to stand tor a  kind or sort of individuals,  all 
which  agree in  that common complex idea, which  that specific 
name stands for, it is certain that the real essence of all the indi- 
viduals comprehended under  the specific name man, in your use 
of it, would be  just the same; let others leave out or put into their 
complex idea of man what they please;  because the real  essence 
on which that unaltered complex idea, i. e.  those properties depend, 
must necessarily be concluded to bc the same. 
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se~iee  of  thr species,  is  one  ancl  thc  same.  From 
.trllence it is cnsy to observe, that the essences of the 
sorts of things, and consequently the sorting of this, is 
tl~e  work~vlar~slli~  of the understanding, that abstracts 
and makes those general ideas. 
They arc thc  i$  13. I woulcl not here be thought to 
lI~orkmall-  forget, much  less to deny, that naturc in 
For I take it for  granted, tliat  in using the name man, in this 
place, your Iordsliip uses it for that complex idea \1~11ich  is in your 
lordship's  n~ind  of tl~at  species.  So  that your lordship, by putting 
it fbr, or substituting it in  the place of  that complex idea wherc 
you ray tile real  essence of it  is just  as it was, or tlie very sarnc 
is  it nlas, docs suppose the idea it stands fbr  to be steadily the 
same.  For, if I change the signification of the word nian, whereby 
it may not comprehend just  the same individuals which in your 
lordship's  sense it docs, but shut out some of those that to your 
lordship are men in your signification  of the word nian, or take in 
others to which your lordship does not allow the name man; I do 
not think you will say, that the real essence of man in both these 
senses is tlie same.  And yet your lordship seems to say so, wlicn 
yot~  say, "Let men mistake in thc comp!ication  of their ideas, ei- 
tiler in leaving out or putting in what clotll  not belong to them;" 
ancl let their ideas be what they please, the real essence of the in- 
dividuals comprehended under the names annexed to these ideas, 
will  be  the same:  for so, I humbly conceive, it must be put,  to 
make out what your lordship aims at.  For, as your lordship puts 
it by the name of man, or any other specific  name, your lordship 
seems to me to suppose, that that namc stands for and not for the 
same idea, at the  same  time. 
For example, my lord, let your lordship's  idea, to which you an- 
nex the sign man, be a rational animal :  let another man's idea be 
3  rational animal of such a shape; let a  tl~ird  man's idea be of an 
animal of such n  size  and  shape,  leaving  out rationality;  let n 
fburth's be an animal with a body of such a shape, and an imnia- 
terial substance, with 3 power ofreasoning; let a fifth leave orit of 
his idea an immaterial substance.  It is  plain  every one of these 
will call his a man, as well as your lordship; and yet it is as plain 
that men, as standing for all these distinct, complex ideas,caunot be 
supposed to have the same internal constitution, i. e. the same real 
essence.  The truth is, every distinct abstract idea with a name to 
it, inakes a real distinct kind, whatever the real essence (which we 
know not of any of them) be. 
And therefore I grant it true what your lordship says in the next 
words,  c6 And let the nominal essences differ never so rnuch,  thc 
real  common essence or nature of tlie sevcral kinds are not at all 
altered by thcn~,"  i.  e.  That our tlloughts or ideas cannot alter the 
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the nroduction of thilias makes scveral of  s11ij1  of the-  .-  " 
th&  alike :  there is nothing more obvious,  !lllderst'lll'l- 
lllg,Lllt have  especially in the races of animals, and all  tlleir folIll- 
things  propagated  by  seed.  But yet, I  tlatiou in tllc 
A  -- 
thing,  we  may  say ihe  sortillg of -them  silnilitrtdc 
under names  is  the work mans hi^  of  the  tllinb"s. 
understanding, taking occasion &om the similitude it 
observes amongst them to make abstract general ideas, 
and set them up in the mind, with names annexed to 
them as patterns or forms (for in that sense the word 
form has avery proper signification), to which as par- 
ticular  things  existing  are found  to agree,  so  they 
come to be of that species, have that denomination, or 
are put  into that classis. For when we say,this is a man, 
real constitiitions that are in things that exist, there is nothing more 
certain.  But yet it is true, that the change of ideas, to which are 
annex them, can and does alter the signification of their names, 
and thereby alter the kinds, wliich  by  these names we  rank and 
sort them into.  Your lordship farther adds,  And these real es- 
sences are unchangeable,"  i. c.  the internal constitutions  are un- 
changeable.  Of what, I beseech your lordship, are the  internal con- 
stitutions unchangeable ?  Not of any thing tliat exists, But of God 
alone;  for they may be changed dl  as easily  by tlmt hand that 
made them, as the internal frame of a  watch.  What then  is it 
that is uncl~mgeable? The internal constitution, or rzal essencc 
of a species ;  which, in plain English, is no more but this, whilst the 
same specific name, v. g.  of man, horse, or tree, is annexed to, or 
made the sign of the same abstract complex idea, under which I 
rank several individuals ;  it is impossible but the real constitution 
on which  that unaltered,  complex  idea, or  nominal  essence  de- 
pends, must be the  same, i.  e. in other words, where we find all the 
same properties, we have reason to conclude there is the same real, 
internal constitution from which those properties flow. 
But your lordsliip proves thc real essences to be unchangeable, 
because God makes them, in these foIlowing words: "  For, Iiow- 
ever there may happen some variety in  individuals by  particular 
accidents, yet the essences of men, and horses, and trees, remain 
always the same ;  because they do not depend on the ideas of men, 
but on the will of the Creator, who  hath made several sorts of 
beings." 
It  is true, the real constitutions or essences of particular things 
existing do not depend on the ideas of men, but on the will of the 
Creator :  but their being  ranked into sorts, under such and SLIC~I 
names, does dcpcnd, and tvliolly depend, on the ideas of mell. 
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that a horsc; this justice,  that cruelty; this a watch? 
that a jack;  wliat do we else but rank things under 
different specific names, as agreeing to those abstract 
ideas, of which we have made those names tlie signs  ? 
And wliat are the essences of those species set out and 
marked  by  names,  but those  abstract  ideas  in the 
mind ; which are as it were tlie bonds between parti- 
cular things that exist and tlie names they are to be 
ranked under?  And when  gencral names have any 
connexion with particular beings, these abstract ideas 
are the medium that unites them :  so that tlie essences 
of  species, as distinguished  and dcnorninated  by us, 
neither  are nor  can bc  any thing but those precise 
abstract ideas wc have in our minds.  And  therefore 
tlie supposeci real essences  of  substances, if different 
from our abstract ideas, cannot be tlie essenccs of tlie 
species  we  rank things into.  For two species  may 
be one as rationally, as two different essences be tlic 
cssence of  one species : and I demand what are the 
alterations may or may not be in a horse or lcad, with- 
out making either of  them  to be of  another species? 
In determining the spccics of  tllings by our abstract 
ideas, this is easy to resolve :  but if any one will regu- 
late himself herein by supposed real essences, he will, 
I suppose, be at a loss ; and lie will never  be able to 
know when  any thing precisely  ceases  to be of  the 
species of a horse or lead. 
Each tli-  5 14.  Nor  will  any one wonder,  that 
stinct abs-  I  say these  essences,  or  abstract  ideas 
tract  idea  (\l;liicli are the measures of nanie, and thc 
is a distillct  boundaries of species), are the workman- 
essence.  ship of the understanding, who considers, 
that at least the complex  ones. are often.  in several 
men, different collectibns of  si&lc  ideas :'  and therc- 
fore that is covetousness to one man, which is not so 
to another.  Nay, even in substances, where their abs- 
tract ideas  seem to be taken from the things them- 
selves, thcy are not  constantly the same; no not in 
that species  which  is  most  familiar to us,  and with 
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which we have  the most  intimate  acquaintance:  it 
having  been  more  than once doubted,  whether  the 
fatus born of  a woman were  a  man ; even so far, as 
that it hath been  debated, whether it were  or were 
not to be nourished  and baptized:  which  could not 
be, if the abstract idea or essence, to which the name 
man belonged,  were  of  nature's  making;  and were 
not  the uncertain  and various  collection  of  simple 
ideas, which tlie understanding put together, and then 
abstracting it, affixed a name to it.  So that in truth 
every distlnct abstract idea is a distinct essence : and 
the names  that stand for such distinct  ideas are the 
names of things essentially different.  Thus a  circle 
is as essentially different from an oval as a sheep from 
a goat; and rain is as essentially cliflerent from snow 
as water from earth; that abstract idea which is the 
essence of one being inlpossible to be communicated 
to the other.  And thus any two abstract ideas, that 
in any part vary one from another, with two distinct 
names annexed to them, constitute two distinct sorts, 
or,  if  you please,  species,  as essentially different  as 
any two of the most remote or opposite in the world. 
$ 16.  But since the essences of things  Real alld 
are thought  by  some  (and  not  without  nominal es- 
reason) to be wholly unknown, it may not  sence. 
be amiss to consider the several  significations of  the 
word essence. 
First,  essence may be  taken for the being of  any 
thing, whereby it is what it is.  And thus the real in- 
ternal, but generally, in substances, unknown  consti- 
tution of things, whereon  their  discoverable qualities 
depend,  may  be  called  their  essence.  This is  the 
proper original signification of the word, as is evident 
from the formation of it ; essenlia, in its primary no- 
tation, signifying properly being.  And in this sense 
it is still used, when we speak of the essence of parti- 
cular things, without giving them any name. 
Secondly, the learning and disputes of the schools 
having been much busied about genus and species, the 184  General Terms.  Book 3. 
word essence has almost lost its primary significatiol~; 
nnci instead  of the real constitution of things, has been 
almost wholly applied to the artificial constitution of 
genus and species.  It  is true, there is ordinarily sup- 
posed  a real constitution of  the sorts of things ;  and it 
is past doubt, there must be some real constitution on 
which any collection of simple ideas co-existing must 
depend.  But it being evident that things are ranked 
under names into sorts or species, only as they agree 
to certain  abstract  ideas to which  we have annexed 
those names,  the esscnce of each genus or sort comes 
to be nothing but that abstract idea which the general 
or sortal (if I may have leave so to call it from sort, 
as I do general from genus)  name stands for.  And 
this we shall find to be  that which  the word essence 
imports in its most familiar use.  These two sorts of 
essences,  I suppose, may  not unfitly be termed,  the 
one the real, the other the nominal essence. 
Constant  5 16. Between the nominal essence and 
connexion  the name there  is  so  near  a  connexion, 
between  the  that the name  of  any sort of  things can- 
name  and  not be attributed to any particular being 
nominal es- 
sence.  but what has this essence, whereby it an- 
swers  that  abstract  idea,  whereof  that 
name is the sign. 
Supposition,  § 17. Concerning the real essences of 
that species  corporeal  substances  (to  mention  these 
are distin- 
guished by  onli), there are, if I mistake not, two opi- 
+heir real  nions.  The one  is  of  those,  who  using  .  -  - .  -  -  - - -.  - 
essences,  the word essence for they know not vhaE, 
uscless.  suppose  a  certain  number  of  those  es- 
sences, according to which all natural things are made, 
and wherein they do exactly every one of  them par- 
take,  and so  become  of  this  or  that species.  The 
other and more rational opinion is, of those who look 
on all natural things to have a real, but unknown con- 
stitution  of  their  insensible  parts;  from which flow 
those sensiblc qualities which serve us to distinguish 
them one from another, according as we have occasion 
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to rank them into sorts under comuion deliotnin  ib t'  10115. 
The former of  these  opinions,  which  suppoxs tlicsc 
essences  as a  certain  number  of  forms  or  moulds, 
all natural things that exist are cast and do 
equally partake, has, I imagine, very much perplexed 
the knowledge of natural things.  The frequent pro- 
ductions of monsters, in all the species of animals, and 
of  changelings  and other  strange  issues  of  human 
birth, carry with them difficulties not possible to con- 
sist with this hypothesis :  since it is as impossible that 
two things, partaking exactly of the same real essence, 
should have different properties, as that two  figures 
partaking of the same real essence of a circle should 
have different properties.  But were  there no other 
reason against it, yet the supposition of essences that 
cannot  be  known,  and  the making  of  them  never- 
theless to be that which  distinguishes the species of 
things, is so wholly useless and unserviceable to any 
part of our knowledge, that that alone were sufficient 
to make us lay  it by, and content ourselves with such 
essences  of  the sorts  or  species of  things  as come 
within the reach of our knowledge :  which, when seri- 
ously considered,  will be found, as I have said, to be 
nothing else but those abstract complex ideas to which 
we have annexed distinct general names. 
§ 18. Essences being thus distinguished  Real and 
into  nominal and  real,  we  may  farther  nominal es- 
observe, that in the species of simple ideas  ~-!~i~~~m- 
and modes, they are always the same, but  ideas and 
in substances always quite different.  Thus  modes, dif- 
a figure, including a space between three  ferent in 
lines,  is  the real as well  as nominal  es-  Substancefi. 
sence  of  a  triangle;  it  being  not only the abstract 
idea to which the general name  is  annexed, but the 
very essentia or being of the thing itself, that founda- 
tion from which  all its properties flow, and to which 
they  are  all  inseparably  annexed.  But  it  is  far 
otherwise  concerning  that  parcel  of  matter  which 184  General =I%r-ms.  Rook 3. 
makes  the ring  on  my  finger, wherein these two cs- 
sences  are apparently  different.  For it is  the real 
constitution  of  its insensible parts on which  depend 
all those properties of colour, weight, fusibility, fixed- 
ness, &c. which are to be found  in it, which constitu- 
tion we know not, and so having no particular idea of, 
have no name that is the sign of it.  But yet it is its 
colour, weight, fusibility, fixedness, &c. which  makes 
it to be gold, or gives it a right to that name, which 
is therefore its nominal essence : since nothing can be 
called  gold  but what has  a  conformity  of  qualities 
to that abstract complex idea, to which that name is 
annexed.  But this distinction of  essences  belonging 
particularly to substances,  we  shall,  when  we  come 
to consider their  names,  have an occasion to treat of 
more fully. 
Essences ill-  $ 19. That such  abstract  ideas,  wit11 
generable  names to them, as we have been speaking 
and incor-  of,  are essences, may  farther  appear by 
ruptible.  what  we  are  told  concerning  essences, 
viz.  that they are all ingenerable and incorruptible : 
which  cannot  be  true  of  the  real  constitutions  of 
things which begin and perish with them.  All things 
+hat  exist, besides their author, are all liable to change ; 
especially those  things we  are acquainted with,  and 
have ranked  into bands under distinct names or en- 
signs.  Thus that which was grass to-day is to-morrow 
the flesh of  a sheep, and within  a few  days after be- 
comes  part of  a  man:  in  all  which,  and  the  like 
changes, it is evident their real essence, i. e.  that con- 
stitution,whereon the properties of these several things 
depended, is destroyed, and perishes with them.  But 
essences being taken for ideas, established in the mind, 
with  names  annexed to them, they are supposed  to 
remain  steadily  the  same,  whatever  mutations  the 
particular  substances  are  liable  to.  For  whatever 
becomes  of  Alexander  and Bucephalus, the ideas to 
which  man  and  horse  are  annexed  are  supposed 
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nevcrthclcss to remain the samc ; ant1 so the cssctlcc:; 
of thosc species arc prccerved wholc ant1 u~idestro~c(l, 
whntcver  changes 11nl)pen to any or  all of the ir~di- 
viduals  of  those spccics.  By this means the csscncc 
of a species rests safe and entire, without the cxistellcc 
of so much as one individual of that kind.  For were 
there now  no  circle existing anywhere in the world 
(as perhaps that figure  exists not  anywhere  exactly 
market1 out), yet the idea annexed to that name woultl 
not cease to bc what it is ;  nor cease to be as a pattern 
to determine which of the particular figures we meet 
with have or have not a right to the name circle, and 
so to show which of them, by having that essence, was 
of that species.  And though there neither were nor 
had been in nature such a beast as an unicorn, or such 
a fish as  a  mermaid;  yet supposing those  names  to 
stand for  complex  abstract  ideas that contained no 
inconsistency in them, the essence of a mermaid is as 
intelligible as that of a man ;  and the idea of an uni- 
corn as certain, steady, and  permanent  as  that of  a 
horse.  Bioiil  what has been  said it is evident, that 
thc doctrine  of  the immutability of  essences  proves 
them to be only abstract ideas ;  and is founded on thc 
relation established between them and certain sounds 
as signs of them ; and will always be true as long as 
the same name can have the same signification. 
9 PO.  To conclude,  this  is  that which  RecapituIa- 
in  short I  would  say,  viz.  that  all  the  tion. 
great  business  of  genera  and  species,  and  their es- 
sences, amounts to no more but this, That  men making 
abstract ideas, and settling them in their minds with 
names annexed to them, do thereby enable themselves 
to consider  things, and discourse of  them  as it were 
in bundles,  for  the easier  and readier  improvcmeat 
and eommunieation of their knowledge ;  which would 
advance  but  slowly  were  their  words and thoughts 
confined only to particulars. CHAPTER 1V. 
Of  /he Names of Simple Ideas. 
Namcs of  1.  THOUGH  all  words,  as  I  have 
simple ideas,  shown,  signify  nothing  immediately but 
lll~les  and  the ideas in the mind of the speaker ;  yet 
substances, 
have  each  upon  a  nearer survey we shall find that 
something  the names of  simple  ideas, mixed  modes 
peculiar.  (under  which  I  comprise  relations too), 
and natural substances, have each of them something 
neculiar and different from the other.  For example : 
1 - 
1.  Names of  § 2.  First,  The names of simple ideas 
simple ideas  and substances, with the abstract ideas in 
and sub-  the mind which they immediately signify, 
stances inti-  intimate also  some- real  existence,-from 
mate real 
existence.  which was derived their original pattern. 
But the names of mixed modes terminate 
in  the  idea  that is  in  the mind,  and lead not the 
thoughts any farther, as we shall see more at large in 
the following chapter. 
2. Names of  § 3.  Secondly,  The names  of  simple 
simple  ideas  ideas and modes  signify always the real 
and modes  as well as nominal essence of their species.  .. -  - 
"gnifya1-  But the names of natural substanc'es sig- 
ways both 
and  nify rarely, if ever, any thing but barely 
- --~ 
nominal es-  the nominal essences of those species ;  as 
sence.  we shall show in the chapter that treats 
of the names of substances in particular. 
3. Names of  § 4. Thirdly,  The  names  of  simple 
simple ideas  ideas are not  capable of  any definition ; 
undefinable.  the names of  all complex  ideas  are:  It 
has not, that I know, been yet observed by any body 
what words  are,  and what  are not capable of being 
defined; the want  whereof is (as I am  apt to think) 
not seldom  the occasion of  great wrangling and ob- 
scurity in men's  discourses, whilst some demand de- 
finitions of terms that cannot be defined ;  and others 
think they ought not to rest satisfied in an explication 
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made by a more general word, and its restriction (01.' 
to speak in terms of  art, by a genus and difference), 
when  even  after such  definition  made  according  to 
rule,  those  who  hear it have  often  no  more a clear 
conception  of  the  meaning of  the word  than  they 
had before.  This at least I think, that the showing 
what words are,  and what are not capable of defini- 
tions,  and wherein  consists a good definition,  is  not 
wholly  besides  our  present  purpose;  and  perhaps 
will afford so much light to the nature of these signs, 
and our ideas, as to deserve a more particular consi- 
deration. 
§ 5. 1 will  not here  trouble myself to 
if  prove that all terms are not definable from  Befinable, it 
that progress  in in$?zitum, which  it will  would be a 
visibly  lead  us into,  if  we  should  allow  process  in 
that all names could  be defined.  For  if  injniturn. 
the terms of one definition were still to be defined by 
another, where at last should we stop?  But I shall, 
from the nature of our ideas, and the signification of 
our  words,  show  why  some  names  can,  and others 
cannot, be defined, and which they are. 
$ 6.  I think it is agreed, that a defini-  what ad,- 
tion is  nothing else  but the showing the  finition is. 
meaning of  one word by several other not synonymous 
terms.  The meaning of  words being  only the ideas 
they are made to stand  for  by him that uses them, 
the meaning of any term is then showed, or the word 
is defined, when  by other words  the idea it is made 
the sign of, and annexed to, in the mind of the speaker, 
is  as it were  represented  or  set before  the view  of 
another,  and  thus its signification  ascertained : this 
is the only use and end of definitions ; and therefore 
the only measure of  what is or  is  not  a  good defi- 
nition. 
,  S 7. This being  premised,  I  say  that  simple ideas 
the names of simple ideas, and those only,  why unde- 
are incapable of being defined.  Tllc re3-  .  --- 
sou whereof  is  this;-that  thc scvcral  terms of  a de- finition, signifying several iileas, they can all together 
by no means represent an idea, which has no compo- 
sition at all : and therefore a definition, which is pro- 
perly  noihing but the showing  the meaning of  one 
word bv several others not signifying each the same 
tiling, [an  in the names of sigplewid&s  hare no place. 
Instances ;  S 8.  The not observing this difference 
motion.  in  our  ideas.  and  their names,  has  ~ro- 
duced that eminent triflkg in the schools which i's  so 
easy to be observed in the definitions they give us of 
some few of these simple ideas.  For as to the greatest 
part of  them,  even  those  masters  of  definitions were 
fain to leave them untouched, merely by the impossi- 
bility they found in it.  What more exquisite jargon 
could the wit of man invent than this definition, "  The 
act  of  a  being  in power,  as far forth as in power ?" 
which  would  puzzle  any  rational  man,  to whom  it 
was  not  already known  by its famous absurdity, to 
guess what word it could ever be  supposed to be the 
explication  of.  If Tully, asking a  Dutchman  what 
"beweeginge"  was, should have received  this explica- 
tion in his own  language, that it was "  actus entis in 
potentia quatenus in potesltia;"  I ask whether any one 
can imagine he  could  thereby have understood what 
the word  '<  bmeeginge"  signified,  or  have  guessed 
what  idea a  Dutchman  ordinarily  had  in his  mind, 
and would signify to another, when he used that sqund. 
$ 9.  Nor  have the modern philosophers,  who have 
endeavoured to throw off the jargon of the schools, and 
speak intelligibly, much better  succeeded in defining 
simple ideas,  whether  by explaining their  causes, or 
any otherwise.  The atomists, who  define motion to 
be a passage from one place to another, what do they 
more  than put one  synonymous  word for  another? 
For what is passage other than motion ?  And if they 
were asked what passage was, how would they better 
define it than  by  motion?  For is  it not at least as 
proper  and  significant to  say,  passage  is  a  motion 
from one place to another, as to say, motion is a pass- 
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age,  &c.?  This is  to  translate,  and not  to define, 
when- we change two words of  the same signification 
one for another ;  which, when one is better understood 
than the other, may serve to discover what idea the 
unknown stands for ;  but is very far from a definition, 
unless we will say every English word in the dictionary 
is  the definition  of  the Latin word  it answers,  and 
that motion  is  3,  definition  of  motus.  Nor  will  the 
successive application  of the parts of  the superficies 
of one body to those of another, which the Cartesians 
give  us,  prove  a  much  better  definition  of  motion, 
when well examined. 
$ 10. "  The act of perspicuous, as far  Ligllt.  forth as perspicuous,"  is  another peripa- 
tetic  definition  of  a  simple  idea;  which though not 
inore absurd than the former  of  motion, yct betrays 
its uselessness  and  insignificancy  more  plainly,  be- 
cause experience will easily convince  any one, that it 
cannot make the meaning of the word light (which it 
pretends to define)  at a11  understood by a blind man ; 
but the definition of motion appears not at first sight 
so  useless, because  it escapes this way of  trial.  For 
this  simple idea,  entering  by  the touch  as  well  as 
sight, it is impossible to show an example of any one, 
who has no other way to get the idea of  motion  but 
barely  by  the definition  of  that name.  Those who 
tell us that light is a great number of  little globules, 
striking briskly on the bottom of the eye, speak more 
intelligibly than the schools ;  but yet these words, ever 
so well  understood,  would  make  the idea  the word 
light stands for no more known to a man that under- 
stands it not before, than if  one  should  tell him that 
light was nothing but a company of little tennis-balls, 
which fairies a11  day long struck with raclrets against 
some  men's  foreheads,  whilst  ;hey  passed  by others. 
For granting this explication of the thing to be true, 
yet the idea of the cause of light, if we had it ever so 
exact, would no more give us the idea of light itself, 
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idea of the figure and motion of a sharp piece of steel 
would  give us  tlie idea of  that pain which it is able 
to cause in us.  For the cause of  any sensation,  and 
the sensation itself,  in  all the simple  ideas  of  one 
sense,  are two ideas ;  and two ideas so different and 
distant one from another, that no two can be more so. 
And therefore should Des Cartes's globules strike evcr 
so long on the retina of  a  man, who was  blind by a 
gutta serena, he would  thereby never  have  any idea 
of light, or any thing approaching it, though he un- 
derstood what little globules were, and what striking 
on another  body  was,  ever  so  well.  And therefore 
the  Cartesians  very  well  distinguish  between  that 
light which is the cause of  that sensation in us, and 
the idea which  is produced  in us by it, and is that 
which is properly light. 
Simple  § 11.  Simple ideas, as has been shown, 
idens ahy  are only to be got by those impressions 
undefinable,  objects  themselves  make on our minds, 
fartherex-  by the proper inlets  appointed  to each 
plained.  sort.  If they are not received this way, 
dl the words in the world, made use of to explain or 
define any of their names, will never be able to pro- 
duce in us the idea  it stands for.  For words being 
sounds, can produce in us no other simple ideas than 
of those very sounds, nor excite any in us but by that 
voluntary connexion  which  is known to be between 
them and those simple ideas, which common use has 
made them signs of.  He that thinks otherwise,  let 
him try if any words can give him the taste of a pine- 
apple, and make him have the true idea of the relish 
of that celebrated delicious fruit.  So far as he is told 
it has a resemblance with any tastes, whereof he has 
the ideas already in his  memory, imprinted there by 
sensible objects not strangers to his palate, so far may 
he approach that resemblance in his mind.  But this 
is not giving us that idea by a definition, but exciting 
in us other simple ideas by their known names ;  wliicl~ 
will be still very different  from the true taste of tliat 
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fruit itsclf.  I11  liglit and colours, and all other siml~lc 
ideas,  it is  the same  thing;  for  the signification of 
soullds is not iinturnl, but only imposed and arbitrn~.~. 
And no definition of light or redness is more fitted or 
able to produce either of  those ideas  in us, than the 
sound light or red by itself.  For to hope to produce 
an idea of light or colour by a sound, however formed, 
is to expect tliat sounds shonld be visible, or colours 
audible, and to make the ears do the office of all the 
other senses : which  is  all  one  as to say,  that  we 
might  taste,  smell,  and see by  the ears;  a  sort  of 
philosophy  worthy  only  of  Sancho Panla, who had 
the faculty to see Dulcinea by hearsay.  And therefore 
he that has not before received into his mind, by the 
proper inlet, the simple idea which  any word  stands 
for, can never come  to know the signification of that 
word by any other words  or sounds whatsoever, put, 
together according  to any rules  of  definition.  The 
only way is by applying to his senses the proper ob- 
ject, and so producing that idea in him, for which he 
has learned the name already.  A studious blind man, 
who had mightily beat his head about visible objects, 
and  made  use  of  the  explication  of  his  books ancl 
friends, to understand  tliose  names  of  light and co- 
lours which  often came in his way, bragged one day 
that he now understood what scarlet signified.  Upon 
which his  friend  demanding  what  scarlet  was? the 
blind man answered, It  was like the sound of a trum- 
pet.  Just such an understanding of the name of any 
other simple  idea will  lie  have,  who  hopes  to get it 
only from a definition, or other words made use of to 
explain it. 
$ 12.  The case  is quite otherwise in 
complex ideas ;  which consisting of several  ~~-'~~~~ve,l 
simple ones, it is in the power of words,  in co~np~~~s 
standing for tlie several  ideas that make  ideas, by 
that composition, to imprint complex idcas  inst;lt~('~s  of 
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stood.  In such  collections  of  ideas,  passing  under 
one name, definition, or the teaching the signification 
of  one  word  by  several others,  has  place,  and may 
make us understand the names of  things which never 
came within the reach of  our senses ;  and frame ideas 
suitable to those in other men's  minds, when they use 
those names:  provided that none of the terms of  the 
defi~ition  stand for  any such simple ideas, which he 
to whom the explication is made has never yet had in 
his thought.  Thus the word statue may be explained 
to a blind man by other words, when picture cannot; 
his senses  having .given  him  the idea of  figure, but 
not of  colours, whlch therefore words cannot excite in 
him.  This gained  the prize to the painter  against 
the statuary: each of which contending for the excel- 
lency  of  his  art, and the statuary bragging that his 
was to be preferred,  because it reached  farther, and 
even those who had lost their eyes could yet perceive 
the excellency of  it,  the painter agreed to refer him- 
self  to the  judgment  of  a  blind  man;  who  being 
brought where there was  a  statue, made by the one, 
and a picture drawn by the other, he was first led to 
the statue, in which he traced with his hands all the 
lineaments of  the face and body, and with great ad- 
miration applauded the skill  of  the workman.  But 
being led to the picture,  and having his  hands  laid 
upon it, was told that now he touched the head, and 
then the forehead, eyes, nose, &c. as his  hands rnovcd 
over  the parts of  the picture on the cloth, without 
finding any the least distinction :  whereupon he cried 
out,  that  certainly  that  must  needs  be  a  very  ad- 
mirable and divine piece of workmanship which could 
represent to them all those parts, where he could nei- 
ther feel nor perceive any thing. 
$ 13. He that should use the word rainbow to one 
who knew all those colours, but yet had  never  seen 
that phanomenon, would, by enumerating the figure, 
largeness, position,  and order of  the colours, so well 
define  that word,  that it might be perfectly under- 
stood.  But yet that def nition, how cxact and perfect 
soever, would never malre a blind Inan understand it; 
because several  of  the simple  ideas that make that 
complex one, being such as he never received by sen- 
sation and  experience, no  words  are able  to excite 
them in his mind. 
$  144.  Simple ideas, as has been showed, 
T,,p  salne of  can only be got by  experience, from those  comples 
objects which nre proper to produce in us  itleas WIIPII 
those perceptions.  When by this means  to  nl;~(lc 
ilitelligiblc  we have our minds stored with them, and 
by  .l,ds.  know the names for them, then we are in 
a condition to define, and by  definition to understand 
the names of complex ideas, that are made up of them. 
But when any term  stands for  a simple idea, that a 
man has never yet had in his mind, it is impossible by 
any words to make known its meaning to him.  When 
any term stands for an idea a man is acquainted with, 
but is ignorant that that term is the sign of it; there 
another  name, of  the same idea which  he  has beell 
acc~~~stomed  to, may make him undcrstantl its mcan- 
ing.  But in no case wrhatsoever is any name,  of  any 
simple idea, capable of a definition. 
$ 15.  Fourthly, But th0lig11 the names  4  Nalnr4 
of sirriple ideas have not the help of defini-  silnple ideas 
tiorl to determine their signification, yet  least doubt- 
that hinders not  but that they are gene-  hi. 
rally less doubtful and uncertain than those of  mixed 
modes and substances ;  because they stailding only for 
one simple perception,  men, for  the most part, easily 
and perfectly agree in  their  signification ; and  there 
is little room  for  mistake and wrangling about their 
meaning.  He that knows once that whiteness is the 
name of that colour  he has observed in snow or milk, 
will not be apt to misapply that word, as long as he 
retains that idea; which when he has quite lost, he is 
not apt to mistake the meaning of it, but perceives he 
understands  it not.  There is neither  a  multiplicity 
of  simple ideas to be put together,  which makes the 
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supposccl, but an unkno~vn  real esscncc, with proper- 
ties dcpeiirling thereon, the precise  numbcr  whereof 
is also  urilinown,  which  makes  the difliculty  in the 
names of substances.  But, on the contrary, in simple 
itleas the whole signification of the name is known at 
oncc, and consists not of  parts, whereof more or less 
being !)nt in, the idea may be varied, and so the sig- 
nification of namc be obscure or uncertain. 
5. SirnpIe  $ 16. Fifthly,  This farther may be ob- 
idcas  served conceriiing simple idcas and their 
fct~r  ascents  names, that they have but few nsccnts ill 
12  J  lil~~(i  pyadicnmejzlnli  (as they call it) from 
rlican~o/t(~li.  the lowest spccies to thc sztmnizlm ge?zzls. 
Tlic rcason ~hcrcof  is, that tl:e  lo~vcst  species being 
but one simple idea, nothing can be left out of it;  that 
so tlic difference being taken away, it  may agree wit11 
some other t11:ng  in one idea  common to them both ; 
which,  having  one  name,  is  the gcnz~s  of  the otlier 
t~vo  :  zt. g. tllcre is nothing that can be left out of the 
idea of  white  and red,  to make them agrce in one 
common appearance, and so have one general name ; 
as ratiol~ality  bciag left out of  tl~e  complex  idra of 
inan, inakes it agree with brute, in the more gerieral 
iclca and name of animal :  and therefore when, to avoid 
~~nplcasant  cnumcrations,  Inen  ~voulcl comprehend 
both nhite ancl  red,  sncl  several otlier  such simple 
iclcas, under one general name, tllcy have been fain to 
(lo it by a MTOI-d  which denotes orlly the way thcy get 
into the mind.  For whcn wliitc, rcd, ancl yellow  are 
all comprehended under the gcr:us or name colour, it 
signifies no more but such ideas  as are produced in 
the mind only by the sight, and have  entrance only 
through the eyes.  And ~vhen  they would frsme yet 
a more general term, to comprehend both colours and 
sounds, and the like simple ideas, they do it  by a word 
that signifies all such as come into tlie mind only by 
one sense : ancl  so the general  tern1 quality, in its 
ordinary  acceptation,  comprehends  colours,  sou~ids; 
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tastes, smclla, ancl tangible qualities, with distiiictioll 
froin estension, nnmbcr,  motion,  pleasure  and pitin, 
make impressions  on the mind, and introduce 
their ideas by more senses than one. 
$ 17.  Sixthly,  The names  of  simple  6. N ,,,,  ,f 
ideas, substances, and mixed modes, have  simple ideas 
also this difference ;  that those of mixed  at all 
modes stand fbr ideas perfectly arbitrary; 
arbitrary. 
those or substances are not  perfectly so,  but refer to 
a pattern, though with  some latitucle ; and those  of 
simple ideas are perfectly taken from the existence of 
things,  and are rnot  arbitrary at all.  Which,  what 
difference it mialtes in the significations of their names, 
we shall see in tlie following chapters. 
The names of siinplc invdcs differ  little from those 
of simple ideas. 
CHAPTER  V. 
1.  Trir nilmcs of mised modes Lii>g  TIICY  C,illl,l 
general, thcy  st:tnd,  ns  has bee11 shown,  ftVr  :L~,stfitct 
for sorLs or species of things, each of ~vhich iclcas,  as 
has its peculiar csscnce.  The  essences of  "ther gene- 
ral IlarnL-.  tliese  species  also, as Iias  been  showed, 
arc nothing but the  abstract  ideas in the mind,  to 
wliich the name is annexed.  Tlius far the names and 
essences  of  n~ised  modes  have  nothing  but what  is 
common to tlielri with otlier ideas : but if wc take a 
little nearer survey of  them, we  shall find t11:1t they 
habe sometlling peculiar, which perllaps may deserve 
our attention. 
$ 2.  The first particularity I shall ob-  idpas 
serve in them is, that tlie abstract idciis,  ttIcy ~t;,,~a 
or, if you please, the essences of the sew-  for are mndc 
ral species of mixed modes  are nrade by  ""- 
(!cr'.t;~i~di~~!;  the  understanding,  wherein  thcy  cliff'cbr 
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from those of  simple ideas:  in which sort the mind 
has no power to make any one, but only receives such 
as are presented  to it by the real existence of things 
operating up011 it. 
2. ~~d~  § 3. In the next place, these essences 
bitrarily,  of the species of mixed modes are not 0111~ 
alld without  made  by the mind, but made very  arbi- 
patterns.  trarily, made without patterns, or  refer- 
ence to any real existence.  Wherein they differ from 
those of substances, which  carry with  them the sup- 
position of son~e  real beiiig, from which they are taken, 
and to which they are conformable.  But in its com- 
plex ideas of mixed modes, the mind takes  a  liberty 
not to follow the existence of things exactly. It  unites 
and retains  certain  collections,  as  so  many  distinct 
specific  ideas,  whilst  others, that  as  often  occur  in 
nature,  and  are  as  plainly  suggested  by  out~varcl 
things, pass  neglected, without  particular  names  or 
specifications.  Nor does the mind, in these of mixed 
modes, as in the complex idea of substances, examine 
them by the real existence of things ; or verify them 
by patterns, containing such peculiar compositions in 
nature.  To  know whether his idea of adultery or in- 
cest be right, will  a inan seek  it any where amongst 
things existihg ?  Or is  it true, because  any one has 
been witness to such an action ?  No : but  it suffices 
here, that men  have  put together  such  a collection 
into one complex idea, that nlakes the archetype and 
specific idea, whether ever any such action were com- 
mitted in rerunz natzira or no. 
HOW  tllis is  5 44.  TO  understand this riglit, we must 
done.  consider  wherein  this  making  of  these 
complex ideas consists ;  and that is not in the making 
any new idea, but putting together those which  the 
mind had before.  Wherein the mind does these three 
things ; first, it chooses  a certain  number ; secondly, 
it gives  them  connexion,  and makes  them into  one 
idea ;  thirdly, it ties them together by a name.  If we 
examine how  the mind  proceeds in these,  anit  what 
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liberty it takes in tliem, we shall  easily 01,serve llolv 
these essences  of the species of mixed modes are tile 
~vorkmanship  of the mind ;  ant1 consequently, that the 
sl)ecies tllcmselves are of' men's  making. 
$ 5. Nobody can ctoubt, but that tl&e 
Evitlcntly  ideas of  mixed modes :ire made by a ro-  nLitrl,ry, i,, 
luntary  collection  of  ideas put toeether  tl,;,t tile i(lez, 
in the mind,inde~endcnt  from anv  ori~inal is oftex1 be- 
J  0--- 
patterns in  n;it;re,  wlio  will  but reflect  fU'" tlle ex- 
that  thi:;  sort of  comr~lex  ideas niav be  Istence. 
made, abstracted, and ilave names &en  them, and so 
a species be constituted, before any one individual of 
that species  ever existed.  Who can  doubt but  the 
ideas of sacrilege or adultery might be framed in the 
minds  of men, ancl have  names  given  them ; and so 
these species of  inixed  modes  be  constituted, before 
either of them was ever committed ; and might be as 
well discoursed of ancl reasoned about, and as certain 
truths discovered  of  tliem,  whilst  yet  they  had  no 
being but in the understanding, as well as now, that 
they have but too frequently a real existence ?  Where- 
by it is plain,llom  much t?le sorts of mixed modes are 
the creatures of  the understanding, where they haw 
a being as subservient to all the ends  of  real truth 
and knowledge,  as when  they really exist:  and we 
cannot doubt but law-makers  have often made laws 
about species  of  actions,  which  were  only the crea- 
tures of their own understandings ; beings  that had 
no other existence but in their  own  minds.  And I 
tlliiik nobody can deny, but that the resurrection was 
a species of mixed inodes in the mind before it really 
existed. 
5 6.  To see  how  arbitrarily these  es-  Instances; 
sences of mixed  modes are made  by the  murder, in- 
mind, we need but take a view of almost  cest,  stab- 
any of them.  A little 1ooking.into them  bing. 
will satisfy us, that it is the mlnd that combines seve- 
ral scattered independent ideas into one complex one, 
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the csscncc  of n  certain  species, witliout regulating 
itself  by  any  connexion  thcy  have  in  nature.  For 
what greater connexion in  nature has the idea of  a 
man,  than  the idea  of  a  sheep,  with  killing ; that 
this  is  made a  particular species of  action,  s~gnified 
by  the word  murder,  and  the other not? Or what 
union  is there in  nature between the idca of  the re- 
lation of  a father with killing,  than that of  a son, or 
ncighbour ;  that those are combirlctl into one com~~lex 
idea,  and  thereby  made  the essence  of  the  distinct 
species  parricide, whilst  the  other make  no  distinct 
species at all? But though they have illade killing a 
man's  father,  or mother,  a distinct species from kill- 
ing his  son,  or daughter;  yet,  in  some  other cascs, 
son and daughter are taken in too,  as well  as father 
ancl mother ;  and they are all equally comprehended 
in the same species,  as in that of  incest.  Thus the 
mind in inixed modes arbitrarily unites into complex 
ideas  such as it finds convenient ;  whilst others,  that 
have  altogether  as  much  union  in  nzture,  are left 
loose, and never combined into one idea, because they 
have  no need of  one  name.  It  is evident, then, that 
the mind  by  its free  choice  gives  a connexion  to a 
certain  number  of  ideas,  which  in  nature have  no 
more  union  with  one  another,  than  others  tlint  it 
leaves  out:  why else is  the part of  the weapon, the 
beginning  of  the wound  is  made with,  talcen  notice 
of  to make the distinct species called stabbing, and 
the figure and inatter of  the weapon left out? I do 
not say this is done without reason,  as we  shall see 
more by anci  by; but this I say,  that it is done by 
the free choice of  the mind,  pursuing its own ends; 
and that therefore these species of  mixed  modes are 
the workmanship of  the understanding ; and there is 
nothing  more evident,  than that,  for the most part, 
in the framing these  ideas the mind  scarchcs not its 
patterns in nature,  nor  refers  the ideas it makes to 
the real existence of  things ;  but puts sucli together, 
as  may  best  serve  its own  purposes,  without  tying 
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itself to a precise  inlitation of  any tliing  that really 
exists. 
$ 7.  But though these  complex ideas,  B~~ 
or  essences  of  mixed  modes,  depend  on  tiubscrvicut 
the mind,  and are made by it wcth great  t~tllecll(l  of 
liberty;  ykt  they  are not  made  at ran-  Iangnagc. 
darn, and j~imbled  together without any reason at all. 
' 
Tllougll  these  coiriplex  ideas  be  not  always  copied 
from nature,  yet tliey  are always suited to the end 
for which abstract ideas are made : and though tliey 
be coinbinations made of ideas that are loose enough, 
and  have  as  little  union  in  themselves,  as  several 
other to which the mind never gives a connexion that 
combines them  into one  idea; yet  they  are always 
made for the convenience of communication, which is 
the chief end of  language.  The use  of  language is 
by short sounds to signify with ease and despatch ge- 
neral  conceptions ; wherein  not  only  abundance of 
particulars may be contained, but also a great variety 
of independent ideas collected into one complex one. 
In  the  making  therefore  of  the  species  of  mixed 
modes,  men have  had  regard  only to such combina- 
tions as they had occasion to mention one to another. 
Those they have combined into distinct complex ideas, 
and given names to ;  whilst others, that in nature have 
as near an union, are left loose and unregarded.  For 
to go no  farther than human  actions  themselves,-if 
they  would  make  distinct  abstract  ideas  of  all the 
varicties  might  be  observed  in  them,  the  ri~~iriber 
must  be  infinite,  and the memory  confounded  with 
the plenty,  as well  as ovcrchargcd  to little purpose. 
It suiEces,  that men make and name so many com- 
plex  ideas of  these  nlised  modes,  as  they find  they 
have occasion to have names for,  in the ordinary oc- 
currence of  their affairs.  If they join  to the idea of 
killing the idea of  father, or rnothcr,  and so make a 
distinct species  from  killing  a  man's  son  or  neigh- 
bour, it is bccausc of  the digerelit heinousness of the 
crime,  and  tlic  distinct  punisllincnt  is  clue  to  the ROO  Nctnles (If~~rixect  Modes.  Book 3. 
murdering a man's  father and mother, diffcrent from 
what ought to be inflicted  011  the murder of  a son or 
neighbour;  and therefore  they  find  it necessary  to 
mention  it by  a distinct  name, which  is  the erid  of 
making that distinct  combination.  But though the 
itlcas  of  mother  and  daughter  are  so  differently 
treated, in rcfcrence  to the idea of  killing,  that tlie 
one is joined  with it,  to make a distinct abstract idea 
\vith a name, anJ SO a distinct species, and the other 
not ;  yet in respect of carilal knowletlge, they are  both 
taken in uncler incest : and that still for the same con- 
venience of  expressing under one name, and reckon- 
ing of  one species,  such unclean mixtures as have 3 
peculiar turpitude beyond others;  and this  to avoid 
circumlocutions and tedious descril~tions. 
Whereof the  $ 8. A  moderate sktlll  in different lan- 
intranslat-  guages will easily satisfy one of the truth 
iJde words  of  this,  it  being  so  obvious  to observe 
of divers  great store  of  words  in  one  language,  langnages 
are a proof.  which have not any tliat answer them  in 
another.  Which ~lainlv  slio~vs.  that those 
I  .I 
of  one country, by their customs and manner of  life, 
have  found  occasion to make several  complex ideas, 
and  given  names  to them,  which  others  never  col- 
lected  into specific ideas.  This could not have hap- 
pened, if  tlicse  species were the steady workmanship 
of  nature,  and not collections made and abstracted 
by the  n~ind,  in  order  to naming,  and for  tlie  con- 
~~cnieiice  of  communication.  Tlic terms of  our law, 
which are not empty sounds,  will hardly find words 
tli:tt  answer them in the Spanish or Italian, no scanty 
languages;  much less,  I think, could any one trans- 
late them into the Caribbce or Westoe tongues : and 
tlie Versura of the ILomans,  or Corban of  the Jews, 
have no words  in other lan~uages  to ansnicr them;  '? 
the reason \vhereof is plain, from what has been said. 
Nay, if we look  a little more nearly into this matter, 
tt~~d  exactly  compare diffcrent  languages,  we  shall 
find,  that though they have wortls which  in  transla- 
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tions and dictionaries are ~upposecl  to answer one an- 
other,  yet there  is  scarce one  of  ten  amongst  the 
names  of  complex ideas,  especially of  mixed  modes, 
that stands for the same precise idea, which the word 
does  that in  dictionaries  it is  rendered  by.  There 
are no ideas more common, and less compounded, than 
the measures of  time, extension, and weight, and the 
Latin names,  horn, pes,  fibra,  are without  difficulty 
rendered by the English names, hour, foot, and pound: 
but yet there is nothing more evident, than that the 
ideas  a Roman annexed to tliese L  a  t'  in  names  were 
very far  different  from  those which  an  Englishman 
expresses  by  those  English  ones.  And  if  either  of 
these should  make use of  the measures that those of 
the other lan~uage  designed by their names, he would 
be quite out in his  account.  These are too sensible 
proofs to be  doubted;  and we  shall find this much 
more  so,  in the  names  of  more abstract  and  com- 
pounded ideas, such as are the greatest part of  those 
which make up moral discourses : whose names, when 
men come  curiously to compare with tliose they are 
translated  into,  in  other  languages,  they  will  find 
very few of them exactly to correspond in the wllale 
extent of their signific  a  t'  lons. 
$9.  Tlic reason why I take so particular  shows 
noticc of this is, that we may not be mis-  species  to 
taken about genera and species, and their  be made for 
essences,  as if they were things regularly  communica- 
arid constantly made by nature, and had a  tion. 
real existence in  things;  when they appear, upon  8 
more wary survey,  to be nothing else but an artifice 
of  the understanding,  for the easier signifying such 
collections  of  ideas as it should  often have occasion 
to conlmunicate by  one general term; under which 
(livers particulars,  as far forth as they agreed to that 
abstract idea,  might be  comprehended.  And if  the 
cloubtful signification of  the wort1 species may make 
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modes are made by tlie understanding ;  yet, I think, 
it can by nobody be denied, that it is the mind makes 
those abstract complex ideas, to which specific names 
are given.  And if it be true,  as it is,  that the mind 
makes the patterns for sorting and naming of things, 
I leave it to be colisidered who makes the boundaries 
of the sort or species ;  since with me species and sort 
liave  no  other  difference  than  that of  a  Latin and 
English idiom. 
In mixed  $ 10. The near  relation  that there is 
lnorles it is  between  species, essences,  and their  ge- 
llamc  neral name, at least in mixed modes, will 
that ties the 
co,nbioation  farther appear, when we  consider that it 
together,  is the name that seems to preserve  those 
malies it  essences, and give them their lasting du- 
s~)ecies.  ration.  For the connexion  between  the 
loose parts of those complex ideas being made by the 
mind, this union, which has no  particular foundation 
in nature,  would  cease again, were  there not  some- 
thing that did,  as it were,  hold it together, and keep 
the parts from scattering.  Though therefore  it be 
the mind  that makes  the coilection,  it is  the name 
which  is as it were the knot that ties them fast to- 
gether.  What a vast variety of different  ideas does 
the word  triunzphtrs hold together,  and deliver  to us 
as one species !  Had this  name been never made,  or 
quite lost, we migl~t,  no doubt, have had descriptions 
of  what passed in  that solemnity : but yet,  I  think, 
that which holds those different parts together, in the 
unity of onc comples idea, is that very word  annexed 
to it; without which the several parts of  that would 
no  more  be  thought to innke  one  thing, than  any 
other show, which, having never been made but once, 
had never been  united into one coi~iplex  idea, uncler 
one  denomination.  How  much  therefore,  in mixed 
modes, the unity necessary to any essence depends on 
the mind, ancl  how  much the continuation and fixing 
of  that unity  depends on  the  name  in  comrxion  use 
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annexed to it,  I leave to be consiclcred by  thosc ~vllo 
look  upon  essences  and  species  as  real  establislled 
ellings in nature. 
$ 11. Suitable to this,  we find,  that men  speaking 
of  mixcd  modes,  seldom  iniagine  or  take  any other 
for species of them, but such as are sct out by nnmc : 
because  they being of  man's  making  oilly,  in  order 
to naming,  no  such species  are taken  notice  of,  or 
supposed to be,  unless a name be joined  to it, as the 
sign of man's  having combined  into one  idea  several 
loose ones;  and by that name giving a lasting union 
to the parts, which could otherwise cease to have any, 
as  soon as the mind  laid  by that abstract idea,  and 
ceased actually to think on it.  But when  a name is 
once annexed to it, wherein the parts of  that complex 
idea have a settled and perinanent union ; then is the 
essence as it were established, and the species looked 
on  as  complete.  For  to what  purpose  should  the 
memory  charge itself with such compositions,  unless 
it were by  abstraction to make them general? And 
to what purpose make them general,  unless  it were 
that they  mi5ht  have  general  names,  for  the con- 
venience of  discourse  and  communication ?  Thus we 
see, that killing a man wit11 a sword or a hatchet, are 
looked 011 as no distinct species of  action : but if  the 
point of the sword first  enter the body,  it passes for 
a distinct species, where it lias a distinct name ;  as in 
England,  in  whose  language it is  called  stabbing: 
but in another country, where it lias not happened to 
be specified  under a peculiar name,  it passes not for 
a distinct  species.  But in  the species of  corporeal 
substances,  though  it  be  tlie  mind  that makes  the 
nominal  essence;  yet  since  those  ideas  which  are 
combined  in it are supposed to have an union  in na- 
ture,  whether  the ti~ind  joins  them  or no,  therefore 
those  are looked  on as distinct names,  without any 
operation of  thc mind,  cither abstracting or giving rt 
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For the ori-  $  12.  Conformable  also  to what  has 
ginals of  been said. concerning the essences of th~ 
CI 
mixed  species of mixed modes, that they are the 
niotles, we 
look  no far-  crentures  of  the  understanding,  rather 
tl~ertl~an  the  than the works of  nature : conformable, 
mind, which  I say,  to this,  we find  that their names 
a'so shows  lead  our thoughts to the mind,  and no 
them to be 
aork-  farther.  When we  speak of  justice,  or 
manship of  a.  oratitude, we frame to ourselves no ima- 
tile under-  g~nation  of  any  thing  existing,  which 
standing.  nre would  conceive;  but  our  thoughts 
terminate in tlie  abstract ideas of those virtues,  and 
look  not farther:  as they  do,  when  we  speak of  a 
horse,  or iron, whose specific ideas we  consider not, 
as barely in the mind,  but as in things themselves, 
which  afford  the  original  patterns  of  those  ideas. 
But in  mixed modes,  at least tlie most considerable 
parts of  them, which are moral  beings,  we  consider 
the original patterns  as being in the mind;  and to 
those  we refer  for  tlie  distinguishing  of particular 
beings under names.  And hence I think it is,  that 
these essences of the species of mixed modes are by a 
more particular  name  called  notions, as, by a  pecu- 
liar right, appertaining to the understanding. 
Their being  $  13.  Hence  likewise  we  may  learn, 
madc by tile  why the complex  ideas of  mixed modes 
understand-  are commonly more compounded and de- 
ingwithout  compounded  than those  of  natural sub- 
patterns 
shows the  stances.  Because they being  the work- 
,,,,  manship  of  the understanding pursuing 
they are so  only its own ends, and the convenlency of 
compound-  expressing in short those ideas it would 
ed.  make  known  to  another,  it does  with 
great liberty unite often into one abstract idea, things 
that in their nature have no coherence;  and so, under 
one term,  bundle  together  a  great variety  of  com- 
pounded  and decompounded ideas.  Thus the name 
of procession,  what a  great mixture of  independent 
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ideas  of  persons,  habits,  tapers,  orders,  motions, 
sounds, does it contain in  that complex  one,  which 
the mind of  mail has arbitrarily put together, to ex- 
press by that one name ! Whereas the complex ideas 
of the sorts of substances are usually made up of only 
a small number of simple ones ; and in the species of 
animals,  these  two,  viz.  shape and voice,  comrnonly 
make the whole nominal essence. 
14. Another  thing we  may observe  Names of  from what has been said is, that the names  miledmodes 
of mixed modes always si~nify  (when they  stand always 
have any  determined sign~fication)  the real  fortheir real 
essences of their species.  For these  abs- 
tract ideas being the workmanship of  the mind,  and 
not referred  to the real  existence  of things, there is 
no  supposition  of  any thing inore signified by that 
name,  but barely that complex  idea the mind  itself 
has formed, which  is all it would  have expressed by 
it :  and is that on which all the properties of the spe- 
cies depend, and from which alone they all flow: and 
so in these the real and nominal essence is the same ; 
which of what concernment it is to the certain know- 
ledge of general truth, we shall see hereafter. 
9 15.  l'liis  also may show us  the rea-  wily their  son, why for  the most part thc names  of  ,,, 
mixed modes are got before the ideas they  usually got 
stand for are perfectly known.  Because  before their 
there being no species of these ordinarily  ideas. 
taken notice of, but what have names ;  and those spe- 
cies, or rather their essences, being abstract complex 
ideas made arbitrarily by the mind ;  it is convenient, 
il  not necessary, to know the names, before one endea- 
vour to frame these complex ideas :  unless a man will 
fill his head with a company of abstract complex ideas, 
which others having no names for, he has nothing to 
do with, but to lay  by and forget  again.  I  confess, 
tliat in the beginning of languages it was necessary to 
have the idea, before one gave it the name: an:l  so it 
is still, where making a new ccmplcx idea, one also, by a06  Nrrnles clfmi.red Modes.  Book 3. 
giving it :1  nclv nanlc, makes n new worcl.  Iillt  this 
concerns not  lang:.l~ages  nlnde, which have generally 
pretty well  provided  fbr  ideas, which nlen  haye fie- 
quent occasio!l to have and communicate :  and in such, 
I  ask, ~vhcther  it be  not the ordinary method,  that 
chilrlren 1e;~rii  the names of mixed modes, before they 
liave their ideas ? What one of a thousand ever frames 
the abstract ideas of glory and ambition, before he has 
heard the naines  of them? In simple ideas and sub- 
stances I grant  it is otherwise ;  which being such ideas 
as have a real existence and union in nature, the  ideas 
and naines are got one  before the other, as it hap- 
pens. 
Itcason of  S 16. What  has been said liere of mixed 
being so  modes, is with very little difference appli- 
1:~rge  on this  cable also to relations ;  which,  since every 
subject.  inan himself may observe, I n~ay  spare iny- 
self the pains to enlarge on : especially, since what 1 
have herc  said  concerning words  in tliis  third book, 
will  possibly  be  thought by somc  to be  ninch morc 
thnn t~lizt  so  slight  n  subject required.  1 allow it 
mig!lt  be brouglit into a narrower CO~I~>~ISS  ;  but I rvai 
\villing to stay iny reador  on an arg~ulncnt  that ap- 
pears to me new,  and a  little  out of  the way (I aln 
sure it is one I thought not of when I began to write), 
that by  searching it  to the bottom, and turning  it 
on  every side,  some part or  other might meet with 
every 01ie's thoughts, a~id  give  occasion  to tlie niost 
averse  or  negligent to rcflcct  on a general  miscar- 
riage, which,  though  of ;;reat  consecluence,  is little 
taken notice of.  When it is consiclcrecl what a putl- 
der is made about essences, ancl  how much  all sorts 
of knowledge, discourse, and conversation are pestel-cd 
and clisordercd  by the careless and cont'used use and 
application of words, it  will perhaps be tliought wort11 
wllile thoroughly to lay it open.  And I shall be par- 
dolled if I have dwelt long on m argument which 1 
think therefore ncccls  to be  inculcated; because the 
fhults, lucn  arc nsnally guilty of in this kind, arc not 
only the greatest hinclranccs  of  true knolvleclgc, hut 
are so well tliouglit of as to pass for it.  Mcn would 
oftcn see what a sniall pittancc  of rciison  and truth, 
or ~ossibly  none at all, is  mixed with  those Iiuffii~~ 
opinions they are swelled with, if they ~vould  but 100li 
beyoncl  fashionabIe  souncls, ant1  observe wli:~t ideas 
arc, or are not compreliendcd under those words with 
which they are so armed at all points, and with which 
they so confidently lay about them.  I shall imagine 
I have done somc  service to truth, peace, and learn- 
ing, if, by any enlargement on this sulrject, I can make 
men reflect  on  their  own usc of I~zngnagc  ;  and give 
them reason  to suspect, that since it is  frequent for 
others, it may also bc possible for the19 to have somc- 
times very good and approvcil words in their inoutlis 
and writings, with very uncertain, littlc, or no signi- 
fication.  And  therefore  it is  not  unreasonable  for 
t.11em to be wary herein themselves, and not to be un- 
willing to have them evamincd by others.  With this 
design, tlierefbre, I shall go 011 with what I have fnr- 
ther to sny coiiccrning this matter. 
CHAPTER VT. 
Oj  the Names q  f  Subsfa~~cs. 
$ 1. TIII:  common iialncs of sulrstances, 
Corn-  as well as other general terms, stand for  ,,,,  .  ,,,,,, 
sorts ;  which is nothing else but the being  ofsul,st;tnc.ee 
made signs of such complex ideas, wherein  fitall(l for 
several particular substances do, or might  sorts. 
agree, by virtue  of which  they are capable  of bei~ig 
comprehended in one common conception, and signi- 
fied  by  one  name.  I  say,  do or  might  agree:  for 
though there be but one sun existing in the world, yct 
tlie idea of it  being abstractecl, so that more substances 
(if  there were  several) might each  agree in it; it is 
as much a sort, as if there were as n~niiy  si~ns  as there 90s  Names of  Substarrces.  Book 3. 
are stars.  They want not their reasons  who  think 
there are, and that each fixed star would answer  the 
idea the name sun stands for, to one who was placed 
in  a due distance ; which, by the way, may show us 
how much  the  sorts, or, if  you  please,. genera and 
species of things (for thoseLatin terms s~gnify  to me 
tio more than the Englisll word sort) depend on such 
collectior~s  of ideas as men have made, and not on the 
real nature of things;  since it is  not iinpossible but 
that, in propriety of speech, that might be  a sun to 
one. which is a star to another.  - 
~hc  essence  $2.  The  measure ant1 boundary of each 
of  sort  sort, or species, whereby it is constituted 
is the abs-  t,hnt narticular  sort,  and  distinguished  ---..  . 
tract idea.  from ithers, is that we  call its essence, 
which  is  nothing  but that abstract  idea  to which 
the name is annexed : so that every thing contained 
in that idea is essential to that sort.  This, though it 
be all the essence of natural substances that we know, 
or by which we distinguish them into sorts ;  yet I call 
it  by  n peculiar  name, the  nominal essence,  to di- 
stinguish it from the real constitution of sohstances, 
upon which depends this nominal essence, and all the 
properties of that sort ;  which  therefore, as has been 
said, may be called the real essence: F. g. the nominal 
essence of  gold is  that complex idea  tlie word gold 
stands for, let it be, for instance, a body yellow, of a 
certain weight, malleable, fusible, and fixed.  But the 
real essence is the constitution of the insensible parts ' 
of  that body,  on which  those  qualities  and  all  the 
other properties of gold depend.  How far these two 
are different, though they are both called essence, is 
obvious at first sight to discover. 
~h~~~~i~~l  § 3. For though perhaps voluntary mo- 
and real es-  tion, with  sense  and reason, joined  to n 
sence dif-  body of a  certain  shape, be  the complex 
ferent.  idea  to which  I, and others,  annex the 
name man, and so be the nominal essence of the spe- 
cies so called ;  yet nobody will say that complex idea 
is thc real essence and source of all  tllosc opcrntions 
which are to be found in any individual  of that sort. 
The foundation of  all those  qualities, which  are the 
ingredients  of our complex  idea,  is  something quite 
different: and had we such a knowledge of that con- 
stitution of man, from which  his faculties of moving, 
sensation, ant1 reasoning, and other powers flow, and 
on which liis so regular shape depends, as it is possible 
angels  have,  and  it is  certain  his  Maker  has ;  we 
should have  a  quite  other  idea of his  essence  than 
what now is  contained  in  our definition of  that spe- 
cies, be it what it will :  and our idea of any individual 
man would be as far different from what it is now, as 
is his who knows all the springs and wheels and other 
contrivances  within,  of  the  famous clock  at  Stras- 
burgh, from that which a gazing countryman has for 
it, who barely sees tlie motion of the hand, and hears 
the clock  strike,  and observes  only  some of the out- 
ward appearances. 
§ 4. That essence, in tho ordinary use 
Notl~ing  cs-  of the word,  relates to sorts ; and that it 
selltial  to in-  is considered in particular beings no far-  dividuals. 
ther than as they are  ranked  into sorts; 
appears from hence : that take but away the abstract 
ideas,  by which we  sort individuals,  and rank them 
under common names,  and then the thought of  any 
thing essential to any of them instantly van~shes  ;  we 
have no notion of  the one without the other; which 
plainly shows their relation.  It,is necessary for me 
to be as I am ;  God and nature has made me so : but 
there is nothing 1 have is essential  to me.  An acci. 
dent,  or disease,  may very much alter my colour, or 
shape ; a fever, or fall, may take away my reason or 
memory, or both, and an apoplexy leave neither sense 
nor understanding, no  nor  life.  Other creatures of 
my shape may  be  made  with  more  and better,  or 
fewer  and worse  faculties  than I  have;  and others 
may have reason  and sense in a shape and body very 
different from mine.  None of  these are essential to 
VOL.  11.  1' the one,  or the other, or to any individual whatever, 
till the mind refers it  to some sort or species of things ; 
and then presently,  according to the abstract idea of 
that sort, something is found essential.  Let any one 
examine  his  own  thoughts, and  he will  find  that 
as  soon  as  he  supposes  or  speaks  of  essential,  the 
consideration of  some  species,  or the complex  idea, 
signified by some general name, comes into his mind; 
and it is in reference to that, that this or that quality 
is said to be essential.  So that if it be asked, whether 
it be essential to me or any other particular corporeal 
being to have reason?  I say no ;  no more than it is 
essential to this white thing I write on to have words 
in it.  But if that particular being be  to be counted 
of the sort man, and to have the name man given it, 
then reason is essential to it, supposing reason to be a 
part of the complex idea the name man stands for; as 
it is essential to  this thing I write on to contain words, 
if I will give it the name  treatise,  and rank it under 
that species.  So that essential, and not essential, relate 
only to our abstract ideas,  and the names annexed to 
them : which amounts to no more but this, that what- 
ever  particular  thing  has  not  in it those  qualities, 
which  are contained in  the abstract idea, which any 
general term stands for, cannot be ranked under that 
species, nor be called by that name, since that abstract 
iciea is the very essence of  that species. 
$ 5.  Thus if  the idea of  body,  with some people, 
be bare extension or space, then solidity is not essential 
to  body :  if others make the idea, to  which they give the 
name body, to be solidity and extension, then solidity 
is essential to body.  That therefore,  and that alone, 
is considered as essential, which makes a part of the 
colnplex  idea the name  of  a sort stands for, without 
which no particular thing can be reckoned of that sort, 
nor he entitled to that name.  Should there be found a 
parcel of  matter that had  all the other qualities that 
are in iron, but wanted obedience  to  the loadstone ; 
and would neither be drawn by it, nor receive direction 
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from it; would any o~~equestioi~,mI~ether  it \val~icd  tiny 
thing essential?  It nlould be absurcl to ask, TYhether 
a thing really existing wanted  any thing essential to 
it.  Or could it be demanded,  Whether this made an 
essential or specific difference or no ; since we have no 
other measure of essential or specific, hut our abstract 
ideas ?  And to talk of specific differences in nature, 
without reference to general ideas and names, is to talk 
unintelligibly.  For I would ask any one, What is suf- 
ficient to make  nn  essential  difference in nature, be- 
tween any two particular beings,  without any regard 
had to some abstract idea, which is looked upon as the 
essence and standard of a species?  All such patterns 
and standards being quite laid aside, particular beings, 
considered barely in themselves, will be found to have 
all their qualities equally essential ; and every thin$., 
in each individual, will be essential to it, or, which is 
more, nothing at all.  For though it may be reasonablc 
to ask,  Whether obeying the magnet be essential to 
iron? yet,  I think,  it is  very improper and  insigni- 
ficant to ask, Whether it be essential to the particolnr 
parcel  of  matter  I  cut  my  pen  with,  ~vithout  con- 
sidering it under the name iron, or as being of  a ccr- 
tain  species ?  And if, as has been  said, our abstract 
ideas,  which  have  names  annexed  to  them,  are the 
boundaries  of  species,  nothing  can  be  essential but 
what is contained in those ideas. 
5  6.  It is  true, I have  often mentioned a real es- 
sence, distinct in substances from those abstract ideas 
of them,  which I call their nominal essence.  By this 
real essence I mean the real constitution of any thing, 
which is the foundation of all those properties that are 
combined in, and are constantly found to co-exist with 
the  nominal  essence;  that  particular  constitution 
which  every thing  has within  itself, without  any re- 
lation to any thing without it.  But essence, even in this 
sense, relates to a sort,  and  supposes  a species: for 
being that real  constitation,  on which the properties 
depend,  it necessarily supposes a sort of things, pro- 
P 2 perties  belonging  only to species,  and not  to indi- 
I iduals ;  v. g. supposing the nolnil~ial  essence  of  gold 
to be  a  body  of  such  a peculiar  colonr anct ~veight, 
with malleability and fusibility, the real essence is that 
constitution  of the parts  of  matter,  011  wliich  these 
qualities  and  their  union  clepend;  and is  also  thc 
foundation of its solubility in aqua regia and other pro- 
perties accompanying  that complex idea.  Here arc 
essences and  properties, but all upon supposition of a 
sort, or general abstract idea, which is consitlercci as 
immutable :  but there is no individual parcel of matter, 
to 1vhic11 any of these  qualities  are so aiinexcd, as to 
be essential to it, or inseparable from it.  Tllnt which 
is essential belong;  to it as  conctition, n1icrel)y it is 
'I.  1011  of this or that sort : but  take awiiy tlle consider. t' 
of its being ranked  under tlic name of  so~nt.  abstract 
idea, and then thcrc is notl~ing  nec*essary  to it, iiotliin(r  *. 
inseparable from it.  Indeed, ns  to the real csscnces of 
substances, we only suppose their being, without prc- 
cisely knowing what they are :  but that whicli annexes 
them  still to the species, is the nominal  esseiicc,  of 
which they are the supposed foundation and cause. 
~h~,~~~i~~l  $  7. Tlie nest thing to be considered 
essence  is, by which  of  those  essences  it is  that 
bounds the  substances  arc determined  into sorts, or 
species.  species ; and that, it is e\  ident, is by tlic 
nominal essence.  For it is that alone that the ilnme, 
which is the mark of the sort, higr~iiies. It  ia  irtipossible 
therefore that any thing slioul(1 determine the sorts 
of things,  which we rank under general riaines,  but 
that idea which that name is designed as a mark for; 
which is that, as has been  shown,  wliich we  call no- 
minal essence.  Why do we say, this is a llorse, and that 
a mule;  this is an animal, that an herb ?  How comes 
any particular  thing to be  of  this  or  that sort, but 
because it has that non~inal  essence,  or, which is all 
one,  agrees to that abstract  idea  that name  is  an- 
nexed to?  And I desire any one but to reflect on his 
own thoughts, when he hears or speaks any of' thosc,or 
otller  names  of  substances,  to  know  what  sort  of 
cssenccs they stand for. 
$ 8. And that the species of things to us are nothing 
bllt the rankii~g  them under distinct names, accordil~g 
to thc complex idens in us, and not accordir~g  to pre- 
cise, distinct, real essences in them; is plain from hence, 
that we find many of the individuals that arc rankeci 
illto  one  sort,  called  by  one  common  name,  and so 
reccivecl  as being  of  one species, have  yet  qualities 
clepcntling on  their real constitutions, as far different 
one from another, as froni others, from wllicli they are 
accounted to differ specifically.  This, as it is easy to 
bc observetl by all who have to do wit11 natural boclics ; 
so  chemists especially are often,  by  sad expericiice, 
corivillced of  it,  when  they,  sometirncs in  vain,  seeli 
for the same qualities in one parcel of  sulphur, anti- 
inony, or vitriol, whicli they have found in others.  For 
though they arc bodies of' the same species, having the 
same nominal essence,  under the same name ; yet do 
they often,  upon  severe ways of examination, betray 
qualities so different one from another, as to frustrate 
the expectation and labour of very wary chemists.  But 
if things were distinguished into species, according to 
their real essences, it would  be  as impossible  to  find 
different properties in any two individual substances of 
the same species, as it is to find different properties in 
two circles, or two equilateral triangles.  That is pro- 
perly the essence to us,  which determines every parti- 
cular to  this  or that cll~ssis;  or, which is  the same 
thing, to this or that general name :  and what can that 
be else, but that abstract idea, to which that name is 
annexed? and so has,  in truth,  a  reference,  not so 
much to the being of particular things, as to their ge- 
neral denominations. 
$  9.  Nor indeed can rve  rank and sort  Not  re,l 
things, and consequently (which is the end  essence, 
of sorting) denominate them by their real  which we 
essences, because we know them not.  Our  '"OW  not. 
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distinction of substances, than a collection of those sen- 
sible ideas which we observe in them ;  which, however 
made with the greatest diligence and exactness we are 
capable of, yet is more remote from tlie true internal 
constitution, from which those qualities flow, than, as 
I said,  a countryman's  idea is  from  the inward con- 
trivance of that famous clock  at Strasburgh, whereof 
he only sees the outward figure and motions.  There is 
not so contemptible a  plant  or animal, that does not 
confound the most enlarged understanding.  Though 
the  familiar use of things about us take off our wonder; 
yet it cures not our ignorance.  When we come to ex- 
tlinine  the stones we  tread  on,  or the iron we  daily 
handle,we presently find we know not their make, and 
can give no reason of tlie different qualities we find in 
them.  It  is evident tlie internal constitution, whereon 
their properties depend, is unknown to us.  For to go 
no farther tlian the grossest and most obvious we can 
imagine alnongst them, what is that texture of parts, 
that real  essence, that  makes lead and antimony fusible ; 
wood and stones not? What  makes leadand iron malle- 
able, antimony and stones not  ?  And yet how infinitely 
these conie short of the fine contrivances, and uncon- 
ceivable real essences of plants  or animals,  every one 
knows.  Tlie workmanship of the all-wise and power- 
ful God, in the great fabric of the universe, and every 
part thereof, farther exceeds the capacity and compre- 
hension  of  the most iriquisitive and intelligent man, 
tlian the best c0ntrivanc.e  of  the most ingenious man 
doth the conceptions of the most ignorant of rational 
creatures. Therefore we in vain pretend to range things 
into sorts, ant1 dispose then1 illto certain classes, under 
names, by their real essences, that are so far from our 
discovery or comprehension.  A blind man may as soon 
sort things by their colours,  and he that has lost his 
smell  as well distinguish a  lily  and a  rose  by their 
odours,  as by  those  internal constitutions  which  he 
knows not.  If(: that thinks he can distinguish sheep 
and goats by their real essences, that are unknowii to 
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him, may be pleased  to try his skill in those species, 
called  cassiowary  and  querechinchio;  and  by  their 
illterilal rcal  essences  determine  the boundaries  of 
those  species,  without  knowing  tlie  complex  idea 
of  sensible qualities,  that each of  those names stand 
for,  in  the countries where those  animals  are to be 
found. 
9  lo.  Those therefore who have been  Notsubstall- 
taught, that  tlie several  species  of sub-  tial forr~ls, 
stances 1i:td  tlieir  distinct  internal  sub-  w'lich 
know less. 
stantin1 forms; and tl~at  it was those forrils 
~v11icli  made tlie  distinction  of  substances into  tiieir 
true species and genera;  were  led yet farther out of 
the way,  by having their ininds set upon fruitless in- 
quiries  after substantial forms, wholly unintelligible, 
and whereof we have  scarce so much as any obscure 
or confused conception in general. 
9  11. T1i:lt our ranking and distinguish-  Thatthe no- 
inr  natural substances into  snecies,  consists  minal es- 
inc'the nomiilal  essences th;  mind makes,  SC!lCe  is 
'  whereby we  i~nd  not in the real essences  to be found  ,listinguis,, 
in the things themselves, is farther evident  suecies far- 
from our heas of  spirits.  For the mind  ther evident 
getting, only by reflecting on its own ope-  spirits. 
rations, those simple ideas which it  attributes to spirits, 
it hath, or can have no other notion of spirit,  but by 
attributing all those operations,  it finds in itself, to a 
sort of beiiigs,  without consideration of matter.  And 
cven the most advanced notion we have of God is but 
attributing the same simple ideas which we have got 
from reflection on what we find in ourselves, ant1 wliicll 
we  conceive to have  inore perfection  in them,  than 
would  be in their absence ; attributing, I say,  those 
simple ideas to him  in an unlimited  degree.  Thus 
having got, from reflecting on ourselves,  the idea of 
existence,  knowledge,  power,  and pleas~zre,  each of 
which we find it better to have than to want ;  and the 
more  we  have of  each  the better; joining  all tllese 
together, wit11 infinity to each  of  them, we have thc 
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infinitely wise and happy Being.  And though we are 
told, that there are different specics of angels ;  yet  we 
know not how to frtime distinct specific ideas of  them : 
not out of  any conceit that the existence of rnore spe- 
cies than one of spirits is impossible, but because having 
no, more simple ideas  (nor being able to frame more) 
applicable to aucll  beings, but only those  few taken 
from ourselves, and from tlie actioas of our own minds 
in thinking, and being delighted, and nloving several 
parts of our bodies,  me  car1 no  otherwise distinguish 
in our conceptions  the several  specics  of  spirits one 
from another, but by attributing tliose operations and 
powers, we fiiid in ourselves,  to them in  a  higher or 
lower  degree; and  so  have  no very distinct  specific 
ideas of  spirit,;, cxccpt only of  God,  to whom IT~C  at- 
tribute both duration, and  all those other ideas with 
infinity ;  to the other spirits, with limitation.  Nor ns 
I humbly conceive  do we, between God and them in 
our ideas, put any difference by any number of simple 
ideas, which we have of one 2nd not of the other, but 
only that of infinity.  A11  the p;~rticular  ideas of exist- 
ence, knowled;;e,  will,  power. and motion,  kc.  being 
ideas derived f roln the operations of our minds, me at- 
tribute  a11  of  them to all  sorts  of  spirits,  with  the 
difference only of degrees, to the utmost we can ima- 
gine, even infinity, when we would frame,  as well as 
we can, an idea of  the first being;  who yet, it is cer- 
tain, is infinitely more rcmote,  in  the real excellency 
of his nature,  from  the highest  and perfectest of all 
created  beings,  than tlie  greatest man,  nay  purest 
seraph, is from the most contemptible part of matter; 
and  consequently must  infinitely  exceed  lvhat  our 
narrow understandings can conceive of him. 
Whereof  $  12. It is not impossible  to conceive, 
there ;ire  nor repugnant to reason, that there may 
probably  be  many species  of  spirits,  as  much  se- 
numberless 
species.  parated and diversified  one from another 
by distinct properties whereof we have no 
ideas, as the species of sensible things are distinguished 
one from another by qualities which we know ancl ob- 
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serve in then].  That there should be more species of 
intelligent creatures above us, than there are of sensible 
and material below us, is probable to me from hence; 
that  in all the visible corporeal world, we see no chasms 
or gaps.  All quite down from us the descent is by easy 
steps, and a continued  series of  things,  that in each 
remove  digcr very little one from  the other.  There 
are fishes that have wings, and are not strangers to the 
airy region ; and there are some birds that are inha- 
bit:ints  of the water, whose blood is cold as fishes, and 
their flesh so like ill taste, that the scrupulous are al- 
lowed them on fisli-days.  'I'liere are animals so near of 
kin botli  to birds  and  beasts,  that they  are  in  the 
middle between botli : amphibious animals link the ter- 
restrial and aquatic together; seals live at  land and sest, 
and por-poises  have the warm blood and entrails of a 
Iiog,  not  to mention what is coiifidently reported  of 
mermaids or sea-men.  Tl~ere  are some  brutes, that 
seem to have as much knowledge and reason as some 
that are  called  men;  and  the animal and vegeta1)le 
kingdoms are so nearly joined, that if you will take the 
lonesl of one, and the highest of  the other, there will 
scarce be perceived any great difference bctweeil them; 
ancl so on, till we coinc to the lowest and the most in- 
organical parts of matter, me  shall find every where, 
that the several species are linked together, and differ 
but in alrrlost inscnsiblc degrees.  And when we con- 
sider the infinite power and n'isclonl of the Maker, we 
]lave reason  to think, that it is suitable to the magni- 
ficent harmony of the ~~nivcrsc,  and tlie grcat design 
and infinite goodness of the architect, that the species 
of creatures should also, by gentle degrees, ascend up- 
ward from us toward his infinite perfection, as we see 
they graclually clesce~id  from us downwards: which if 
it be probable, we have reason then to be persuaded, 
that there are far more  species of creatures above us 
than there are beneath : we being,  in degrees of per- 
fection, much more remote from the infinite being of 
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that which approaches nearest to nothing.  And yet of 
all those distinct species, for the reasons abovesaid, we 
]lave no clear distinct ideas. 
Thenominal  $  13.  But to return to the species of 
essellce tllat  corporeal substances.  If I should ask any 
of tllespe-  one, whether ice and water were two di- 
ciesp proved  stinct species of things, T doubt not but I 
from water 
and ice.  should be answered in the affirmative :  and 
it cannot be denied, but he that says they 
are two distinct  species  is  in tlie right.  But if  an 
Englishman, bred in Jainnica,  who perhaps had never 
seen nor heard of ice, coming. into England in the win- 
ter, find the water,  he put in his basin at night, in a 
great part frozen in tlie morning, and not knowing any 
peculiar name it had, should call it  hardened water ;  I 
ask, whether this would  be a new species to him dif- 
ferent from water?  And,  I  think,  it would  be  an- 
swered here, it would not be to him a new species, no 
more than congealed  jelly, when it  is cold, is a distinct 
species from the same jelly  fluid  and warm ; or than 
liquid  gold in the furnace is  a  distinct species from 
hard gold in the hands of a workman.  And if this be 
so, it  is plain, that our distinct species are nothing but 
distinct complex  ideas,  with  distinct names annexed 
to them.  It is true, every substance that exists has its 
peculiar constitution,  whcl*eon ciepend  those sensible 
qualities and powers wc observe ill it ;  but the ranking 
of things illto  species, which  is  nothing but  sorting 
thein uncler  several titles, is doile by us accortliny to 
the ideas tliat we have of them :  which though suffic~ent 
to distinguish them by names, so that we may be able 
to discourse of them, when we have thcm not present 
before us; yet if we suppose it to bc done by their real 
internal constitutions, and tliat things existing are di- 
stinguished  by nature  into species,  by real essences, 
according  as we  distinguisli  them  into  species  by 
names, we shall be liable to great mistakes. 
DiRiculties  $ 144.  To  distinguish substantial beings 
against :r  into species, accorclirig  to tlie usual sup- 
position,  that  there  are certain  precisz 
csseilces  or forms  of  things,  whereby all  number of 
tile  individuals  existing  are  by  nature  feales~ences. 
tlistinguishecl into species, these things are necessary. 
tj  15.  First,  To  he assured tliat nature, in the pro- 
duction of things, always designs them to partake of 
certain regulated established essences, which are to be 
the models of all things to be produced.  This, in that 
crude sense it is  usually proposed, would need some 
better explication before it can fully be assented to. 
tj  16.  Secondly,  It would  be  necessary to know 
whether nature always attains that essence it designs 
in the production of things.  The irregular and mon- 
strous  births, that in divers sorts of animals have been 
observed, will always give us  reason to doubt of one 
or botli of these. 
5 17.  Thirdly, It ought to be determined whether 
those we call monsters be really a distinct species, ac- 
cording to the scholastic notion of  the word species ; 
since it is certain  that every thing that exists has its 
particular constitution : and yet we find that some of 
these monstrous productions have few or none of those 
qualities, which are supposed to result from, and ac- 
company the essence of that species, from whence they 
derive their originals, and to which,  by their descent, 
they seem to belong. 
$  18.  Fourthly,  The real essences of  Our nomi- 
those  things,  which  we  distinguish into  nal essences 
species,  any1 as so distinguished-we  name,  sub- 
stances not  ought to be known ; i. e. we ouglit to  have  col. 
ideas of them.  But since we are ignorant  lections of 
in these four points, the supposed-real es-  ~'roperties. 
sences  of  things  stand us  not  in stead for  the di- 
stinguishing substances into species. 
$  19.  Fifthly,  The only imaginable help  in  this 
ease would  be,  that having framed perfect  complex 
ideas of  the properties of  things, flowing  from their 
different real essences,  we should thereby distinguish 
them into species.  But neitlicr can this be done ; for QQO  Nnnies  cf  S~bs~rr?rccs.  Book 3. 
being ignorant of the real essence itself, it is impossible 
to know all those properties that flow from it, and are 
so annexed to it, that any one of them being away, we 
may certainly conclude,  that that essence is not there, 
and so the thing is not of that species.  We  can never 
know  what  is  the  precise number  of  properties de- 
pending on the real essence of gold, any one of  which 
failing, the real essence of gold, and consequentlygold, 
\:rould  not be there, unless we knew the real essence 
of gold itself, and by that tletermined that specics.  By 
the word gold here, I must be unclerstood to design a 
~mrticular  piece of matter; v. g.  the last guinea that 
was coinr~cl. For if it should stand here in its ordinary 
signification for tlint complex idea, whicli I or any one 
clse calls goltl ;  i.e.  for the nominal essence of gold, it 
would hc jargon : so hard  is  it to show the various 
meaning  ~irid  imperfection  of n  ords,  when we have 
nothing clsc but ~vords  to do it by. 
50.  By a11  :vl~icii it is  clear,  that our  distin- 
guishing substances into species by names,  is not  at 
all founded on their real essences ; nor can we pretend 
to range  and determine  illern  exactly  into  species, 
according to internal essential differences. 
uut  such  $ 21.  But since, as has been remarked, 
collection as  we liave need of general  words, thougll we 
our llarne  know not tlie real cssmces of things ;  all 
stands for.  we can do is  to collect such a number of 
simple ideas, as by examination we find to be united 
together in things  existing, and thereof to make one 
complex idea :  which, though it be not the real essence 
of any substance that exists, is yet the specific essence, 
to wliich our name belongs, and is convertible with it ; 
by which we may at  least try the truth of these nominal 
essences.  For example,  there be that say,  that the 
essence of  body is  extension:  if it be  so,  we  can 
never mistake in putting the essence of any thing for 
the thing itself.  Let us then in discourse put extension 
for body ; and when we  would  say that body moves, 
let us say that extension moves, and see how ill it will 
look.  He that shoulcl  say that one extension by im- 
pulse moves another extension, would, by tlie bare ex- 
T)rcssion,  sufficieiitly show the absurdity of such a.  no- 
tion.  'I'he  essence of any thing, in respect of us, is the 
wliolc coingles itfca,comprehendcd and marked by that 
name ; arid in substances, besides the several distinct 
simple ideas that inake them up, the confused one of 
substance, or of an unknown support and cause of their 
union, is always a part : and therefore tlie essence of 
body  is  not  bare extension,  but  an estenrlcd solid 
thing;  and so to say an extended solid thing nmoves, 
or impels another,  is  all one,  and as intelligible  as 
to say, body nloves or impels.  Likewise  to say,  that 
a rational animal is capable of conversation, is all one 
as to say a Inan.  But no one will say, that rationality 
is capable of  conversation,  because  it rnakes not the 
wliole essence to which we give the name man. 
$  B,L.  Tl~ere  are creatures in tlie world  Ourihstmct 
that have shapes like ours, but are hairv,  ideas are to  .' us the men-  and want language and reason.  Tllere are  ipe- 
naturals amongst us  that have   perfect!^  ci,,s;  in- 
our shape, but want reason,  and some of  stance in 
them language too.  Tllcre are creatures,  that of man. 
as it is siid ("sit  fides penes nuctorem,"  but there ap- 
pears no contradiction that there sliould bc such) that, 
with language and reason, ancl a shape in other things 
agreeing witli  ours,  have  l~airy  tails ; others  wliere 
tlie males have no beards, and others  where the females 
have.  If it be asked, whether these he all. men or no, 
all of human species ?  it is plain,  the question refers 
only to the norilina'i essence :  for those of tl~eni  to  whom 
tlie definition of the word man,  or the complex idea 
signified by that name, agrees, are men, and tlie other 
not.  But if the inquiry be made concerning the sup- 
posed real essence, and whether the ix~tcrnal  constitu- 
tion and frame of these several creatures be specifically 
different,  it is wholly impossible for us to answer, no 
part of that qoing into our specific idea ;  only we have 
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frame so much differs, the internal constitutiorl is not 
cxactly the same.  But what difference in the internal 
real constitution  makes  a  specific  difference, it is in 
vain to inquire ; whilst our nleasurcs of species be, as 
they are,  only  our  abstract  ideas,  which  we  know; 
and not that internal  constitution, which makes no part 
of them.  Shall the difference of hair only on the skin, 
be a mark of  a different internal specific constitution 
between a changeling and a drill, when they agree in 
shape, and want of reason and speech ?  And shall not 
the want of  reason and speech be a sign to us of dif- 
ferent real constitutions and species between a change- 
ling and a reasonable man ?  And so of the rest, if we 
pretend that distinction of  species or sorts is fixedly 
established by the real frame and secret constitutions 
of things. 
Species  not  9  23. Nor  let any one  say,  that the 
distinguish-  power of  propagation  in  animals  by the 
ed by ge-  mixture of mnle and female. and in ~lants  neration.  by seeds,  keeps  the supposed  red spe- 
cies  distinct  and  entire.  For  granting  this  to  be 
true, it would help  us  in  the distinction  of  the spe- 
cies of things no farther than  the tribes  of  animals 
and  vegetakes.  What  must  we  do  for  the rest? 
But in those  too it is  not  sufficient:  for  if  history 
lie not, women  have  conceived  by  drills;  and what 
real species, by that measure, such a production will 
be  in  nature, will  be  a new question : and we have 
reason to think this is not impossible,  since mules and 
jumarts,  the one  from  the  mixture  of  an  ass  and 
a  mare,  the  other  from the mixture  of  a bull  and 
a  mare, are so frequent in  the world.  I  once  saw 
a creature that was the issue  of  a cat and a rat, and 
had the plain marks of  both about it ;  wherein nature 
appeared to have followed the pattern of neither sort 
alone, but to  have jumbled them together.  To which, 
he that shall add the monstrous productions that are so 
frequently to be met within nature, will find it hard, 
even in the race of  animals,  to determine by the pe- 
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of what species every animal's issue is : and be 
at  loss about  the real essence, which  he thinks cer- 
tainly conveyed  by generation,  and has alone a right 
to tile  specific name.  But farther, if  the species  of 
animals and plants  arc to be  distinguished  only by 
propagation,  must I go to thc Pntlies  to see thc sire 
and dam of the one, and the plant from which the seed 
was gathered that produced the othcr, to know wlietlier 
tllis be a tyger or that tca? 
5  24.  Upon  the  whole  matter,  it is 
Not by sab-  that it is their own collections of 
starltinl 
sensible qualities,  that men make the es-  forms. 
sences of  their several sorts of substances ; 
and  that their real  internal structures are not con- 
sidered  by the greatest  part of  men,  in  the sorting 
them.  Much  less  were  any  substantial  forms  ever 
thought  on by  any, but those who have  in  this  one 
part of the world learned the language of the schools : 
and  yet  those  ignorant men,  who pretend  not  any 
insight into the real essences,  nor trouble themselves 
about substantial forms  but are content with knowing 
things  one  from another  by their  sensible  qualities, 
are often better acquainted with their differences, can 
more nicely distinguish them from their uses, and better 
know what they expect from each, than those learned 
quick-sighted  men, who look so deep into them, and 
talk  so  confidently  of  something  more  hidden  and 
essential. 
$  85. But supposing that the real es-  rile specific 
sences of substances were discoverable by  essences  are 
those  that  would  severely  apply  them-  made by the 
selves to that inquiry,  yet we  could  not  mind. 
reasonably  think,  that the ranking  of  things  under 
general names was regulated by  those internal real  , 
constitutions,  or  any  thing  else  but  their  obvious 
appearances :  since languages, in all countries, have 
been  established long before  sciences.  So that they 
have not been philosophers, or logicians, or such who 
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that have  made  the general names  that are in use 
amongst the several nations of  men : but those Inore 
or less comprehensive terms have for  the most part, 
in all languages, received their birth and signification 
from ignorant and illiterate people, who sorted and 
denominated  things  by  those  sensible  qualities they 
found in them; thereby to signify them, when absent, 
to others, whether they had an occasion to mention a 
sort or a particular thing. 
Therefore  $ 26. Since then it is evident, that we 
very various  sort and name substances by their nominal, 
and uncer-  and not by their  real essences ;  the next 
tain.  thing to be  considered  is,  how  and by 
whom  these  essences  come to be made.  As  to the 
latter, it is evident they are inade by the mind,  and 
not by nature : for were  they nature's  workmanship, 
they could not be so various  and different in  several 
men, as experience tells us they are.  For if we will 
examine it, we  shall not find  the noniinal essence of 
any one species of substances in all men the same; no 
not of  that, which  of  all others we  are the most in- 
timately acquainted with.  It could not possibly be, 
that the abstract idea to which the name man is given, 
should be different in several men, if it  were of nature's 
making; and that to one it should  be "animal  ra- 
tionale,"  and to another, "  aninla1 iinplunle bipes latis 
unguibus."  He that  annexes  the  name  lnan  to  a 
complex  idea  inade  up  of  sense  and  spontarieous 
motion, joined to a body of such a shape, has thereby 
one  essence  of  the species  man,  and he  that, upon 
farther  examination,  adds  rationality,  lias  another 
essence of the species he  calls man : by which nieans 
the same individual  will be a  true man  to the one, 
which is not so to the other.  I think, there is scarce 
any one will allow this upright figure, so well known, 
to  be the essential difKerence of the species man ;  and 
yet how far men  determine of  the sorts of  animals 
rather by  their shape than descent, is very visible: 
since  it has  been  more  than once  debated, whether 
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several human fmtuses sliould be preserved or received 
to baptism or  no,  only  because  of  the difference of 
their outward configuration from  the ordinary make 
of  children, without knowing whether they were not 
as capable of reason as infants cast in another mould: 
some whereof, though of an approved shape, are never 
capable  of  as  much  appearance  of  reason  all their 
lives as is to be  found in  an ape or an elephant, arid 
never  give  any  signs  of  being  acted  by  a  rational 
soul.  Whereby it is evident, that the outward figure, 
wllich  only was  found wanting, and not the faculty 
of reason, which nobody could know would be wanting 
in  its  due season, was made essential  to tlie  human 
species.  The learned divine and lawyer must, on such 
occasions,  renounce his  sacred definition of '' animal 
rationale,"  and substitute  some other essence of  the 
human species.  hlonsieur Menage furnishes us with 
an example worth tlie taking notice of on this occasion : 
'(When  the abbot of  St. Martin (says he) was  born, 
he had so little of tlie figure of a man, that it bespake 
hinl rather a monster.  It was  for  some time  undcr 
deliberation,  whether  he should  be  baptizcd  or  110. 
Howcvel-, he was  baptized  and declared a man  pro- 
visionally  [till  time  sliould  show  what  he  would 
prove.]  Nature  had  moulded  hini  so  untowardly, 
that hc was called all his life tlie Abbot Malotru, i. e. 
ill-sliapcd.  He was  of  Caen.  Mcnaginnn,  g  7, ;." 
This child, we see, was very near being excluded out 
of the species of man, barely by his shape.  He  escaped 
very narrowly as he was, and it is  certain a figurc a 
littlc more  oddly turned had  cast him,  and hc  hatl 
1)ccn  executed  as a  thing not to be nllo-cr~cd  to pass 
for a  nlarl.  And  yet  there can be no reason gi~cl~, 
why if  tlie  lillealnellts  of  his  face  had  been  n  little 
altereil, a rational soul could not have been lodged in 
'hiin;  whj :I visage somewhat longer, or a nose flatter, 
or ;L  wider mouth, could not Jlave consisted, as well as 
the rest of 111s  ill figure, with such a soul, such parts, 
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as made  him,  disfigured as he was, capable to be a 
dignitary in the church. 
$ 27.  Wherein, then,  would I gladly know, consist 
the precise  and unmo\~eable  boundaries of  that spe- 
cies ?  It is plain, if we examine, there is no such thing 
ma,de by nature, and established by her amongst men. 
The  real essence of that, or any  other sort of substances. 
it is evident we know not; and therefore are so unde- 
termined in our nominal essences, which we make our- 
selves, that  if several men were to be asked concerning 
some oddly-shaped  fetus, as soon as born, whether it 
were a man or no, it is past doubt,  one should meet 
with different answers : which  could not  happen,  if  * 
the nominal essences, whereby we limit and distinguish 
the species of substances, were not made by man with 
some  liberty,  but were  exactly copied from  precise 
boundaries set by nature, whereby it distinguished all 
substances into certain species.  Who  would undertake 
to resolve what species that monster was of which is 
mentioned  by Licetus,  lib. i. c. 3.  with a man's  head 
and hog's  body? or those other, which to the bodies 
of men had the heads of  beasts, as dogs, horses,  &c.? 
If any of  these creatures had lived,  and could have 
spoke, it  would  have  increased  the difficulty.  Had 
the upper part to the middle been of human shape, 
and all below swine; had it been murder to destroy it? 
Or must the bishop  have been  consulted, whether it 
were man enough to be admitted to t!le  font or no? as, 
I have been told,  it happened in France some years  , 
since, in somewhat a like case.  So uncertain are the 
boundaries of  species of animals  to us,  who have no 
other measures than the complex ideas of our own col- 
lecting :  and so far are  we from certainly knowing what 
a man is; though,  perhaps,  it  will  be judged  great 
ignorance to make any doubt about it.  And  yet,  I 
think, I may say,  that the certain boundaries of that 
species are so far from being determined, and the  pre- 
cise number of simple ideas, which make the nominal 
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essence, so far from being settled and perfectly known, 
that very material doubts may still arise about  it.  And 
I imagine, none  of the definitions of  the word  man, 
wllicIl we  yet have,  nor descriptions  of  that sort of 
animal, are so perfect and exact,  as to satisfy a con- 
siderate inquisitive person ; much less to obtain a ge- 
neral consent, and to be that which men would every- 
where  stick  by,  in the  decision of  cases, and deter- 
milling  of life  and death,  baptism  or no  baptism,  in 
productions that might happen. 
$ a$.  But  though these nominal essences  n,,t ,,t  ,, 
of substances are made by the mind, they  arbitrary  as 
are not yet made so arbitrarily as those of  mixed 
mixed modes.  To  the making of any no-  modes. 
minal  essence,  it is necessary,  First,  that the ideas 
whereof  it consists  have  such  an union  as to make 
but one idea, how compounded soever ;  secondly, that 
the particular  idea  so united  be  exactly the same, 
neither more nor less.  For if  two abstract  complex 
ideas differ either in number or sorts of their component 
parts, they make two different,  and not one and the 
same  essence.  I11  the first  of  these,  the mind,  in 
making its complex ideas of  substnnces,  only follows 
nature,  and puts  none  together which  are not sup- 
posed to have an union in nature.  Nobody joins the 
voice  of  a  sheep with  the shape of  a horse, nor  the 
colour of lead with the weight and fixedness of  gold, 
to be the complex ideas of any real substances; unless 
he has a mind to fill his  head with chimeras, and his 
discourse  with  ~~nintelligible  words.  Men observing 
certain qualities always joined and existing together, 
therein copied nature ; and of ideas so united, made 
their  complex ones  of  substances.  For though men 
may make what complex ideas they please,  and give 
what names  to them they will;  yet if  they will  be 
understood,  when  they  speak  of  things  really  ex- 
isting,  they must in some degree conform their ideas 
to the things they would speak of; or else men's  lan- 
guage will be like that  of Babel ;  and every man's words 
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being intelligible only to  himself, wonld no lonfi-er serve 
to  conversation,  and the ordinary afiiirs  of life, if the 
icleas they stand for  be not some way answering the 
common appearances and agrcement of substances, as 
thev reallv exist.  , 
Thoughver;  S 29. Secondly, though the mind of man, 
imperfect.  in making its  complex ideas of substances, 
never puts any together that do not really 
or are not supposed to co-exist; and so it truly borrows 
that union fi&  nature-yct  the number it-combines 
depends upon the various care, industry, or fancy of 
him that makes it.  Men generally content themselves 
with some few sensible obvious qualities ;  and often, if 
not always, leave out others as material, and as firmly 
united, as those that they take.  Of sensible substances 
there are two sorts; one  of  organized bodies, wllicli 
are  propagated by seed ;  and in these, the shape is that, 
whicll to us is tlie leading quality and most  charac- 
teristical part that determines tlie species : and therc- 
fore in vegetables and animals, an extended solid sub- 
stance of such a certain figure usually serves the turn. 
For however some men  seen1 to prize their deiinitioii 
of  animal rationale,"  yet slioulcl there n creature be 
found, that had language and reason, but partook not 
of the usual  shape of  man, I believe it would hardly 
pass for a man, how much  soever it were "  animal ra- 
tionale."  And if  Balaain's  ass had,  all liis  life,  dis- 
coursect  as ratio~ially  as he did  once with his master, 
I doubt jet whether any one would have tliouglit liirn 
worthy the name  man,  or  allowed him to be of  the 
same species with himself.  As in vegetables and ani- 
mals, it is the shape, so in most other bodies, not pro- 
pagated by seed,  it is  the colour ~ve  most fix on, and 
are most led by.  Thus where we  find  the colour of 
gold, we  are apt to imagine  all  the other qualities, 
comprehended in our complex idea, to be there also : 
and we commonly take these two obvious qualities, viz. 
shape and colour,  for so presumptive ideas of  several 
species, that in a good picture we readily say this is n 
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lion, and that a rose;  this is a gold, and that a silver 
goblet, only by the digerent figures and colours repre- 
sented to the eye by thc pencil. 
9  YO.  But  tllough  this  serves  well  w~lic~l 
eIlo~gll  for  gross  and  confused  concep-  serve for 
tions, and inaccurate ways of talking ant1  CU1lllnoll 
thinking ; yet men  are  far enough from  converse. 
having agreed on the precise number of simple icleas, 
or qualities, belonging to any sort of things, signified 
by its name.  Nor  is it a wonder,  since  it requires 
much time, pains,  and skill,  strict inquiry, and long 
examination,  to find  out what  and how many those 
simple ideas are, which are constantly and inseparably 
united in nature, and are always to be found together in 
the same subject.  Most men, wanting either time, in- 
clination, or industry  enough for this, even to some tole- 
rable degree, content themselves with some few obvious 
and outward appearances of things, thereby readily to 
distinguish  and sort them for thc  common affairs of 
life ;  and so, without farther examination, give  them 
names, or take up the names already in use:  which, 
though in common conversation they pass well enough 
for the signs of some few obvious qualities co-existing, 
are yet far enough from comprehending, in a settled 
signification, a precise number of simple ideas ; much 
less  all those which  are united  in nature.  He that 
shall consider,  after  so  much  stir  about genus  and 
species, and sudi a deal of  talk of specific differences, 
how few words we have yet settled definitions of; may 
with  reason  imagine  that those  forms,  which  there 
hath been so much noise  made  about,  are only chi- 
meras, which  give  us  no  light into  the specific na- 
ture of things.  And lie  that shall consider, how far 
the  names  and  substances  are from  having  signi- 
fications, wherein all who use thern do agree, will have 
reason to conclude, that though the nominal essences 
of substances are all supposed to  be copied from nature, 
j-et  they  arc all,  or  most  of  them,  very imperfect ; 
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several men, very different ;  and  therefore that these 
boundaries of  species  are as men,  and not as nature 
makes them, if at least there  are in nature any such 
prefixed  bounds.  It is  true,  that  many  particular 
substances are  so  made  by  nature,  that they  have 
agreement and likeness one with another, and so afford 
a  foundation  of  being  ranked  into sorts.  But the 
sorting of things by us, or the making of determinate 
species, being in order to naming and comprehending 
them under general terms ;  I cannot see how it  can be 
properly said, that nature sets the boundaries of the 
species of things :  or if it  be so, our boundaries of spe- 
cies  are not  exactly conformable  to those in nature. 
For we having need of general names for present use, 
stay not for a perfect  discovery of  all those qualities 
which would best show us their  most  material differ- 
ences and agreements ;  but we ourselves divide them, 
by certain  obvious  appearances, into species, that we 
may the easier under general names communicate our 
thoughts about them.  For having no other knowledge 
of  any substance,  but  of  the simple  ideas that are 
united in it; and observing  several particular things 
to agree with others in several of those simple ideas ; 
we make that collection our specific idea, and give it a 
generalname ;  that  in recording  our  thoughts, and in our 
discourse with others,we may in  one  short  word design all 
the individuals that agree  in that complex idea,without 
enumerating the simple ideas that make it  up ;  and so 
not waste our time and breath in tedious descriptions ; 
which we see they are fain to do, who would discourse 
of anv new sort of thin~s  thev have not vet a name for. 
J 
Essences of  $31.  B;  howkver these fpecies of sub- 
species  un-  stances pass well enough in ordinary con- 
der the s:ume  versation, it  is plain that this complex idea, 
wherein they &serve several individuals td 
different.  agree, is by different  men made very dif- 
ferently ;  by some  more,  and others less  accurately. 
In some, tl~s  complex  idea contains a greater, and in 
others a smaller number of qualities ;  and so is appa- 
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rently such as the mind makes it.  The yellow shining 
colour  makes  gold  to children;  others  add weight, 
malleableness,  and fusibility ; and others  yet  other 
qualities, which they find joined with that yellow co- 
lour, as constantly as its weight and fusibility : for in 
all these and the like qualities, one has as good a right 
to be  put into the complex  idea  of  that substance 
wherein they are all joined,  as  another.  And there- 
fore different men  leaving out or putting in  several 
simple ideas, which others do not, according to their 
various examination, skill, or observation of  that sub- 
ject, have different essences of gold ;  which must there- 
fore be of their own, and not of nature's making. 
$32. If the number of simple ideas, that  The more 
make the nominal essence  of  the lowest  general our 
species,  or first sorting of  individuals, de- ~~~~~;~~ 
pends on the mind of man variously collect-  plete  and 
ing them,  it is  much more evident  that  partial  they 
they do  so  in the  more  comprehensive  are- 
classes, which by the masters of logic are called genera. 
These are complex ideas designedly imperfect :  and it 
is visible at first  sight, that several of  those  qualities 
that are to be found in the things themselves are pur- 
posely left out of  generical  ideas.  For as the mind, 
to make general ideas comprehending several particu- 
lars,  leaves out those  of  time,  and  place,  and such 
other, that make them incommunicable to more than 
one  individual;  so to make  other  yet more general 
ideas, that may comprehend  different  sorts,  it leaves 
out those qualities that distinguish them, and puts into 
its new collection only such ideas as are common to 
several sorts.  The same convenience that made men 
express several parcels of yellow matter coming from 
Guinea and Peru under one name, sets them also upon 
making of one name that may comprehend both gold 
and  silver,  and some  other  bodies  of different sorts. 
This is done by leaving  out those qualities which are 
peculiar  to each  sort,  and retaining  a complex  idea 
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which the name metal Being annexed, there is a genus 
constituted ; the essence  whereof being that abstract 
idcn, containing only ~nalleableuess  and fusibility, with 
certain degrees of weight and fixeclness, wherein some 
bodies  of  sevcral  kinds agree,  leaves out the colour, 
and other qualities peculiar to gold and silver, and the 
other  sorts  comprellended  under  the  name  metal. 
Whereby it is  plain, that men follow not exactly tlle 
patterns  set them by nature, when  they  make their 
general ideas of substances ;  since there is no body to 
be found, which has bdrely malleableness and fusibility 
in it, ~vithout  other  qualities  as inseparable  as those. 
But men, in making their  general ideas, seeing more 
the convei~iei~ce  of  language and quick despatch, by 
short and coi~~prehensive  signs, than the true and pre- 
cise nature of things as they exist, have, in the framing 
their  abstract  ideas,  chiefly pursued  that cnd which 
was to be furnished with store of general and variously 
comprehensive names.  So that in this whole business 
of genera and species, the genus, or more comprehen- 
sive, is but a partial conception  of what is in the spe- 
cies, and the species but a partial idea of what is to be 
found  in  each individual.  If therefore  any one will 
think that a man,  and a horse, and an animal,  and a 
j~larit,  kc. are distinguished by real essences made by 
nature, he must think nature to be very liberal of these 
real essences, making one for body, another for an ani- 
mal, ant1 i~n~tller  for a horse; and all these essences libe- 
rally  bestowed  upon  Cuceplialus.  But if  we would 
rightly consider what is done, in all these genera and 
species, or sorts, we  should find that there is no new 
thing made, but only more or less compreliensive signs, 
whereby we may be enabled to express, in a few sylla- 
bles, great numbers of particular things, as they agree 
in more  or  less  general  conceptions, which we  have 
framed to that purpose.  In all which we may observe, 
that the more gcneral term is always the name of a less 
comples idcn;  and that each  genus  is but a partial 
coilceptioli of' the species comprehended under it.  So 
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illat if these  abstract general ideas be thought to be 
it can  only be  in  respect  of a certain esta- 
blished relation between them and certain names, which 
are made use of to signify them ;  and not in respect of 
any thing existing, as made by nature. 
i$  33.  This is  adjusted to the true end  ~h;~  nc- 
of  speech, which  is to be the easiest  and  cornrnodsted 
sllortest way  of communicating our notions.  to the end of 
For thus he, that would discourse of things 
speech. 
as they agreed in the complex ideas of extersion and 
solidity, needed  but use the word  body to denote all 
such.  He  that to these would join  others, signified by 
the words life, sense, and spontaneous motion, needed 
but use the word animal, to signify all which partook 
of those ideas:  and he that had made a complex idea 
of a body, with life, sense, and motion, with the faculty 
of reasoning, and a certain  shape joined  to it, needed 
but use the short monosyllable man to  express all parti- 
culars that correspond to that complex idea.  This is 
the propcr business of genus and species ;  and this men 
do, without any consideration of real essences, or sub- 
stantial forms, which come not within the reach of our 
knowledge, when we think of those things ;  nor within 
the signification of our words, when we discourse with 
others. 
$ 34. Were I to talk with any one of a 
Illstance in  sort of  birds I lately saw  in St. James's  ,,, ,,,,  ;,,. 
Park. about three or four feet high, with a 
covering of something between Teithers and hair, of s 
dark brown  colour, without wings,  but in the place 
thereof two or three little branches coming down like 
sprigs  of  Spanish broom,  long great legs,  with feet 
only of three claws, and without a tail; I must make 
this description of it, and so may make others under- 
stancl  me: but when I am told that the name of it is 
cassuaris, I may then use that word  to stand in dis- 
course for all my complex idea mentioned in that de- 
scription ;  though by that word, which is now become 
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constitution of that sort of animals than I did before ; 
and knew probably as much of the nature of that spe- 
cies  of  birds,  before  I  learned  the  name,  as  many 
Englishmen do of  swans, or herons, which are specific 
names,  very  well  known,  of  sorts  of  birds  common 
in England. 
$  35.  From what has been  said,  it is 
Mendeter-  evident,  that men make  sorts of  things.  mine the 
sorts.  For it being different essences alone that 
make  different  species,  it  is  plain  that 
they who make those abstract ideas, which are the no- 
minal essences, do thereby make the species, or sort. 
Should there be  a  body found,  having all the other 
qualities  of  gold, except  malleableness,  it would  no 
doubt be made a question whether it were gold or no, 
i. e.  whether it were  of  that species.  This could be 
determined only by that abstract idea to which every 
one annexed the name gold; so that it would be true 
gold to him, and belong to that species, who included 
not malleableness in his nominal essence, signified by 
the sound gold ;  and on the other side it would not be 
true  gold,  or  of  that species,  to him  who  included 
malleableness in his  specific idea.  And who, I pray, 
is it that makes these diverse species even  under one 
and the same name,  but men that make two different 
abstract ideas, consisting not exactly of the same col- 
lection of  qualities ?  Nor is it a mere supposition to 
imagine that  a  body  may  exist,  wherein  the  other 
obvious qualities of gold may be without malleableness; 
since it is certain, that gold itself will be sometimes so 
eager, (as artists call it) that it will  as little endure 
the hammer as glass itself.  What we have said of the 
putting in or leaving malleableness  out of  the  com- 
plex  idea the name  gold  is  by  any one  annexed  to, 
maybe said of its peculiar weight,fixedness, and several 
other the like qualities : for whatsoever is left out, or 
put in,  it is  still  the  complex  idea,  to which  that 
name is annexed, that makes the species ;  and as any 
particular parcel of  matter answers that idea, so the 
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name of  the sort belongs truly to it; and it is of that 
species.  And  thus  any  thing  is  true gold,  perfect 
metal.  All which  determination  of  the species, it is 
plain, depends  on the understanding of man, making 
this or that con~plex  idea. 
$ :$G. This then, in short, is the case :  na- 
ATature  ture makes many particular things which  ,,,,,,,  the  . - 
do agree one with another,  in many sen-  similitude. 
sible qualities,  and probably too in their 
internal frame and  constitution:  but  it  is  not  this 
real essence that distinguishes them into species ;  it is 
men, who, taking occasion from the qualities they find 
united in them, and wherein they observe often several 
individuals to agree,  range them  into sorts, in order 
to their naming, for the convenience of comprehensive 
signs ; under which  individuals,  according  to  their 
conformity to this  or that abstract idea,  come to be 
ranked as under ensigns ; so that this is of  the blue, 
that the red regiment ; this a man,  that a drill : and 
in this,  I think,  consists  the whole business of genus 
and species. 
S  37.  I do not deny  but nature, in the constant 
production  of particular beings,  makes them  not a1- 
ways new and various, but very much alike and of kin 
one to another: but I think it nevertheless true, that 
the boundaries of the species, whereby inen sort them, 
are made by men;  since  the essences  of  the species, 
distinguished  by  different  names,  are,  as  has  been 
proved, of man's  making, and seldom adequate to the 
internal  nature  of  the  things  they  are taken  from. 
So that we may truly say, such a manner of sorting of 
things is the workmanship of men. 
9  38.  One thing I doubt not  but will  Each  abs- 
seem very strange in this doctrine ;  which  tract  idea 
is, that from what has been said it will fol-  is an es- 
low, that each abstract idea, with a name  sence. 
to it, makes a distinct species.  But who can help it, if 
truth will have it so?  For SO it must remain till some- 
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distinguished  by something else, and let us see, that 
general trrms signify not our abstract ideas, but some- 
thing different from them.  I would fain know why a 
shock and a llouncl are  not as distinct species as a spaniel 
and an elephant.  We have  no other idea of the dif- 
ferent essence  of  an elephant and a  spaniel than we 
have of the different essence of  a shock and a hound ; 
all the essential difference, whereby we know and di- 
stinguish them one from another, coasistin~  only in the 
different collection of  siniple ideas,  to whlch we have 
given those different names. 
~~~~~~~~d  $ 39. HOW  much the making of species 
species  are  and genera is in order to general names, 
ill order to  andhow  much general names are  necessary, 
naming.  if not to the being, yet at least to tlie com- 
pleting  of  a  species,  and maklng it pass  for  such, 
will  appear, besides  what has  been  said  above con- 
cerning ice and water, in a very familiar example.  A 
silent and a striking watch are but one species to those 
who have but one name for them :  but he that has the 
name watch for  one,  and clock for the other, and di- 
stinct complex ideas, to which tliose names belong, to 
him they are different species.  It  will be said perhaps 
that the inward contrivance  and constitution  is dif- 
ferent between these two, which tlie watch-maker has 
a clear idea of.  And yet it is plain, they are but one 
species to him,  when he has but one name for them. 
For what is  sufficient  in the inward contrivance to 
make a new species? There  are some watches that are 
made with four wheels, others with five:  is this a spe- 
cific difference to the workman ?  Some have strings 
and physies, and others none ;  some have the balance 
loose,  and  others regulated by a  spiral spring,  and 
others by hogs' bristles :  are any or all of these enough 
to make  a  specific  digerence  to the workman,  that 
knows each of  these,  and several other different con- 
trivances; in the internal constitutions of watches ?  Tt 
is certain each of these hath a real difference from the 
rest : Ilut whether it be an essential, a specific cliF"erei1cc 
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or no,  relates  only to the complex idea to wliich the 
name watcli is given : as long as they all agrce in thc 
idea which that name stands for, and that name does 
not as a generical name comprehend different species 
under it,  they are not essentially nor  specifically dif- 
ferent.  But if  any one will  make  minuter  divisions 
from differences that he knows in the internal frame of 
and to such precise complex ideas give names 
that shall prevail;  they will  then  1)e  new spccics  to 
then1 who hare those ideas with names to them,  aid 
call, by those differences, distinguish watches into these 
several sorts, and then watcli \trill be a generical name. 
But yet they mould be no distinct species to men igno- 
rant of  clock-work,  and the inward contrivances of 
watches, who had no other idea but the outward shape 
and bulk, with the marking of the hours by the hand : 
for to them a11 those other names would be but syno- 
nymous terms for the same idea, and signify no more, 
nor no other thing, but a watch.  Just thus, I think, 
it is in  natural things.  Nobody will  doubt that the 
wheels or springs (if I may so say) within are different 
in a rational man and a changeling, no more than that 
there is a difference in the frame between a drill and a 
changeling.  But whether one, or both the differences 
be essential  or specifical,  is only to be  known to us 
by their agreement or disagreement with the complex 
idea that tlie name man stands for: for by that alone 
can it be determined, whether one or both, or neither 
of tliose, be a man or no. 
$ 40. From what has been  before said,  species 
we may see the reason why, in the species  artificii~l 
of artificial things, there is generally Icss 
~~~~~~~~~ss  confusion and uncertainty than in natural :  tllan na- 
because  an  artificial thing being  a  pro-  tural. 
duction of  man,  which  the artificer  de- 
signed,  and  therefore  well  knows  the idea  of,  the 
name  of  it  is  supposed  to stand for no  other idea, 
nor to import any other essence, than what is certainly 
to  be known,  and  easy enough  to be  apprehended. 238  Names of  Substances.  Book 3. 
For the idea or  essence  of  the several  sorts of  arti- 
ficial things consisting,  for the most part, in nothing 
but  the determinate  figure  of  sensible  parts ; and 
sometimes motion depending thereon, which the nrti- 
ficer fashions in matter such as he finds for his turn ; 
it is not beyond  the reach of  our faculties to attain a 
certain idea thereof, and to settle the signification of 
the names, whereby the species of artificial things are 
distinguished  with  less  doubt,  obscurity,  and equi- 
vocation,  than we  can in  things natural, whose  dif- 
ferences  and  operations  depend  upon  contrivances 
beyond the reach of our discoveries. 
Artificial  $ 41. I must be excused here if 1 think 
things of  artificial things are of  distinct species as 
distinct  well  as  natural : since I find they are  as 
spccies.  plainly and orderly ranked into  sorts, by 
different abstract ideas, with general names annexed to 
them, as distinct one from another as those of  natural 
substances.  For why should we not think a watch and 
pistol as distinct species one from  another  as a horse 
and a dog, they being expressed  in our  minds by di- 
stinct ideas, and to others by distinct appellations ? 
Substances  $  42.  This is  farther  to be  observed 
alone have  concerning substances, that they alone, of 
proper  all our several sorts  of ideas,haveparticular 
names.  or  proper  names, whereby one  only par- 
ticular  thing  is  signified : because  in  simple  ideas, 
modes, and relations, it seldom happens that men have 
occasion to mention often this or that particular when 
it  is absent.  Besides, the greatest part of mixed modes, 
being actions which  perish in their birth, are not ca- 
pable of  alasting duration ns substances, which are the 
actors,  and wherein  the simple ideas,  that make  up 
the  complex  ideas designed by the name, have a last- 
ing union. 
tj 43. I must beg pardon of  my reader, 
Difficillty to 
treat of  for having dwelt so long upon this subject, 
words.  and perhaps with some obscurity.  But I 
desire it inay be considered how difficult it 
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is  to  lead  another  by  words  into the thoughts  of 
things, stripped of those specifical differences we give 
them: which  things,  if  I  name  not,  I  say  nothing; 
and if I do name them, I thereby rank them into some 
sort or  other, and suggest to the mind  the usual abs- 
tract  idea  of  that species ; and so cross my purpose. 
For t.o talk of  a man,  and to lay by, at the same time, 
the ordinary signification of  the name  man, which is 
our complex idea usually annexed to it ; and  bid the 
reader consider man as he is in  himself,  and  as  he is 
really  distinguished from others in his internal consti- 
tution, or real essence ;  that is, by something he knows 
not what ; looks  like trifling : and yet thus one must 
do who would speak of the supposed real essences and 
species of things, as thought to be made by nature, if 
it be but only to make it understood that there is no 
such thing signified by the general names, which sub- 
stances are called by.  But because  it is  difficult by 
known familiar names to do this, give me leave to en- 
deavour by an example to make the different  considera- 
tions tlie mind has of  specific names and ideas a little 
more  clear;  and to show how the complex  ideas  of 
modes  are referred  sometimes  to archetypes  in the 
minds  of  other  intelligent  beings ;  or,  which  is 
the same,  to the signification  annexed by  others to 
their received names ;  and sometimes to no archetypes 
at all.  Give me leave also to show how the mind  a1- 
ways refers its ideas  of  substances, either to the sub- 
stances  themselves,  or  to the  signification of  their 
names  as to the archetypes ; and  also to make plain 
the nature  of  species,  or sorting of things, as appre- 
hended and  made  use of  by  us; and of  the essences 
belonging to those species, which is  perhaps  of  more 
moment, to discover the extent and  certainty of  our 
knowledge,  than we at first imagine. 
$ 44. Let us suppose Adam in the state  Instances of 
of a grown man, with a good understand-  mixedmodes 
ing, but in a strange country, with all things  ~~~~~,. 
new  and  unknown  about  him,  and  no 2  410  iQns?les  of  Substances.  Book 3. 
other faculties, to attain the knowledge of thcn~,  but 
what one of this age has now.  He observes  Lalnech 
more melancholy than usual, and imagines it to  be from 
a suspicion  he  has  of  his wife Adah (whom  he most 
ardently loved)  that she had  too  much kindness for 
another man.  Adam discourses these his thoughts to 
Eve, and desires her to take care that Adah commit not 
folly : and in these discourses with Eve he makes use 
of  tliese  two  new  words,  kinneah  and  niouph.  In 
time Adam's  inistake appears, for he finds Lainech's 
trouble proceeded from having killed a man : but yet 
the two names kinneah and niouph (the one standing 
for suspicion, in a husband, of  his wife's  disloyalty to 
him, and the other for the act of committing disloyalty) 
lost not their distinct significations.  It is plain then 
tliat  here were  two  distinct  complex ideas of mixed 
modes with  names  to them,  two distinct  species  of 
actions essentially different ; I ask wherein consisiecl 
the essences of  these two distinct species of actions? 
a ion cf  And it is plain it consisted in a precise combin  t' 
simple ideas, different in one from the other.  I ask, 
Whether the complex idea in Adam's mind, wliich he 
called kinneah,  were adequate or no ?  And it is plain 
it was ; for it being  a  combination  of  simple ideas, 
which he,without any regard to any archetype,witllout 
respect to any thing as a  pattern, voluntarily put to- 
gether, abstracted and gave the name kinneah to, to 
express in short to others, by that one sound, all the 
simple ideas contained  and united  in  that complex 
one ;  it must nccessarily follow that it was an adequate 
idea.  His own choice having made that combination, 
it had all in it lie intended it should, and so coulcl not 
but be perfect, could not but be adequate, it being rc- 
ferred  to  110  other arclietype wliich  it was  su1)posed 
to represent. 
tj  45.  These words,  kinneah and niouph,  by  de- 
grees, grew into common use ; and then the C~SC  was 
somcwhat altered.  Adam's  chiltlren had tllc same fa- 
culties,  and thereby the  saine power that 11e had  to 
what complex ideas of mixcd modes tlicy plenscd 
in their own minds ;  to abstract them, and make nhat 
sounds they pleased the signs of them : but the use of 
names being  to make  our ideas within us known to 
others, that cannot  be done,  but when the same sign 
for thc saine idea in  two who nrould cominti- 
nicate their thoughts and discourse together.  Thosc 
tllcrefore  of  Adam's  children,  tliat  found  thcse  two 
Miorcls, kinneah and niouph, in familar use, could not 
take them for  insignificant  souncls ; but must  needs 
conclude they stood  for something,  for certain ideas, 
:tbstract ideas, they being  general namcs, which abstract 
ideas were the essences of the species distinguisl~ed  by 
those names.  If therefore they would use these words 
as names of species already establishecl and agreed on, 
they were obliged to conform the ideas in their minds, 
signified by these names,  to the ideas that they stood 
for  in other  men's  minds,  as to their patterns and 
archetypes ; and then indeecl their ideas of these com- 
plex modes were liable to be iiiadeq~~atc,  as being very 
apt (cspecially those that consisted of colribiriations of 
many simple ideas) not to be exactly confarmable to 
the idcas i11 other nicn's  minds, using the same names; 
though for  this  tlicre  be  usually a remedy at hand, 
~vllicll  is to ask tlie  meaning of  any word we  under- 
stad  not, of liirtl that uses  it: it being as impossible 
to know certninly what the words jealousy  and adul- 
tery (wliich I  think  answer nwp  ancl  qinj)  stand for 
in another man's  mind, with whom I ~vould  discourse 
abotit them,  as it was impossible, in the beginning of 
language, to know what kinneah and niouph stood for 
in  mlotller  man's  niind,  without  explication,  they 
being voluntary signs in every one. 
9 46. Let us now also consider, after the 
Instance of  same manner, tlie namcs of substances in 
their  first  application.  One  of Adam's  in zahab. 
children,  ro~ling  on the mountains, lights 
011  a glittering substance which pleases his eye ;  hollle 
carries it to Adam, who, upon consideratio11 of  it, 
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finds  it to be  hard,  to have  a bright yellow colour, 
and an exceeding  great weight.  These,  perhaps at 
first, are a11  the qualities he takes notice of in it ;  and 
abstractin8 this  complex  idea,  consisting  of  a  sub- 
stance having that peculiar bright yellowness, and a 
weight very great in proportion to its bulk, he gives it 
tlie  name  zahab,  to denominate  and  mark  all sub- 
stances that havc these  sensible qualities in them.  It 
is evident now that, in this case, Adam acts quite clif- 
ferently from what he did before in forming those ideas 
of mixed modes, to which he gave the names kinneall 
and niouph.  For there he puts ideas together, only 
by his own imagination, not taken from the existence 
of any thing ; and to them he gave names to denomi- 
nate all things that should happen to agree to those his 
abstract ideas, without considering whether  any such 
thing did  exist or no; the standard there was of his 
own making.  Rut in the forming his idea of this new 
substance, he takes the quite contrary course ;  here he 
has a standard made by nature ;  and therefore being 
to represent that to himself,  by the idea he has of it, 
even when it is absent, he puts in no simple idea into 
his complex  one  but what hc has the perception  of 
from the thing itself.  He takes care that his idea be 
conformable to this archetype,  and intends the name 
should stand for an idea so conformable. 
§  47.  This piece of matter, thus denominated zahah 
by Adam,  being quite different from any ne had seen 
before,  nobody,  I  think,  will  deny  to be  a  distinct 
species, and to have its peculiar essence ;  and that the 
name zahab is the mark of the species, and a name be- 
longing to all things partaking in that essence.  But 
here it is  plain,  the essence,  Adam  made  the name 
zahab stand for, was nothing but a body hard, shining, 
vellow, and very heavy.  But the inquisitive mind  of 
&an,  not  content with  the knowledge of  these, as I 
may say,  superficial  qualities, puts Adam  on farther 
examination of this matter.  He  therefore knocks and 
1)c;its it with  flints, to see what nras discovcrnl~le  in 
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the inside:  he finds it yield  to blows,  but not easily 
separate into pieces:  he  finds  it will  bend  n.itllol;t 
breaking.  Is not now ductility to be added to his for- 
lner idea, and made part of tlie essence of the species 
that name zahab stands for ?  Farther trials discover 
fusibility and fisedness.  Are not they also, by the saine 
reason that any of the others were, to be put into the 
complex idea signified by the name zahab? If not, what 
reason will there be shown more for the one tEan the 
other?  If these must,  then all the  other properties, 
which any farther trials shall discover in this matter, 
ought by the same reasoii to make a part of the ingre- 
dients  of  the complex  idea,  which  the name  zahah 
stands for, and so be the essence of the species marked 
by  that  name : which properties,  because  they arc 
endless, it is plain that the idea made after this fashion 
by this archetype will be always inadequate. 
48.  But this is not all, it wonld also  ~h~i~  illeas 
follow, that the names of substances would  imperfect, 
not only have, (as in truth they have) but  tllere- 
would also be supposed to have,  different  fore various. 
significations,  as used by different men, which would 
very much cumber the use  of language.  For if evcry 
distinct quality, that were discovered in any matter by 
any one, were supposed to make a necessary part of 
the coinples idea, signified by the common name given 
it, it must follow,  that men  must suppose the saine 
word to signify different things in different men ;  since 
they cannot  doubt but different  men  may have  dis- 
covered  several  qualities  in  substances  of  the same 
denomination which others know nothing of. 
49.  To avoid this,  therefore,  thei 
have supposed a real essence belonging to  fix  their sne- 
ever7 s~ecies.  from which these nroieriies  cies. a 1.41 
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all flo;,  anj  would  have  their name  of  essence is 
the species stand for that.  But they not  supposed. 
having  any  idea  of  that real essence  in substnnces, 
and their words signifying nothing but the ideas they 
have; that which  is  done by this  attempt is only to 
R 9 pit the name  or  sound  ili  tlie  place  aiicl  stead of 
tl~c  thing having tliat  real  csscricc, without kiiowing 
wliat  tlic  real  csscnce  is : a11d  this  is  that wliich 
lncn clo,  when they speak of species of things, ns sup- 
p04i1g tl~ein  iiiadc  by nature,  and  distinguished  by 
rclal csscnccs. 
$ 50.  For let us considcr, when wc af- 
\\'liicli  sup-  ,  ii,,l  firm that all gold is fixcrl,  citlicr it means 
of 110 use.  that fixedness is  a 1)art of  the definition, 
part  of  tlic  nomil;nl  rsscnce  thc  word 
gold stands for ; and  so this affirmation,  all gold is 
fixed,  cont:riiis  no thin^  but  tlie  signification  of  the 
term gold.  Or  else  it  mcans,  that fixedness,  not 
being a part of  tlic  dcfinitioii  of  the gold, is a pro- 
perty  of  that substance itself:  in  which  case,  it is 
that the  nord gold  stan(1s  in  tlie  place of  a 
substance,  having  tlie  real  essence  of  a species  of 
thingsmadc by  natnre.  In mliicli way of  substitu- 
tion it Iias so confuscd  and  uncertain  a signification, 
that though this proposition, .gold is fixed, be in tlrat 
sense an affirrriatioll of something real, yet it is a truth 
will always fail 11s in its particular application, and so 
is  of  no  real use  nor certainty.  For let it be ever 
so truc, that all gold, i. e. all that lias the real essence 
of gold, is fixed, what serves this for, whilst we know 
riot  in this  sense what  is or is not gold?  For if we 
know not the real essence of gold, it is impossible we 
should know what parcel of  matter lias  tliat essence, 
aiicl, so ~vllether  it be true gold or no. 
$ 51. To  conclude : ~vliat  liberty Adam 
Conclusion.  had at first to make any complex ideas of 
mixed modes, by no othcr patterns but his 
own thoughts, tlie same have  all men ever since had. 
Ant1  tlie  same  necessity  of conforming  his  ideas of 
su1)stauccs  to tliings witllout  I~iin,  as  to  archetypes 
made 1)y nature,  tl~at  Adam was under,  if  lie would 
not  n  ilii~lly  imposc  up(,ii lliinself,  the same are all 
lnrli ever since ultdcr too.  Tlic sainc liberty also that 
Atlam hat1 of affi~i~lg  ally new nanlc  to ally idcn, the 
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same 113s any one still (cspccially the l~cgini~crs  of Ian- 
~~ages,  if we can imagine any such), 1)nt oilly with this 
difference, that  in  places whcrc llic~l  in  society 11a\  C: 
already cstablishetl a languagc amongst tlicin, the sig- 
nifications of  words  are very warily  ;~lrtl  sl);niiigly.to 
be altered: because men being furnisl~ctl  :~lrcatly  wltli 
rlames for their ideas, and common use Iinving appro- 
priated  known  names  to certain  ideas,  an  aff'cctrtl 
misapplication of  them cannot but be very ridiculous. 
He that  hat11  new  notions  will,  perhaps,  vciitnre 
sometimes  on  the  coining  of  new  terms  to expscss 
them; but incn think it a boldilcss, and it is unccrtaiii 
whether common  use will ever  make  them  pass  for 
current.  But in  coinmunicatioi~  with others, it is nc- 
cessary that we conforin tlie ideas we mnke the vulgar 
words of any language stand for to their known yro- 
per  significations  (which I have explained  at large 
already),  or  else  to make  known  that  new  signi- 
fication wc apply them to. 
CHAPTER  VII. 
6 1. BESIDES  ~vords  which  are names  F:rrticles 
of ide;rs  ill  the milid,  there are n  great 
p;rrts,  or  many others that arc madc use of to signify  ,vllol, ,,,- 
the conncxion that the mind gives to  ideas,  tences tog~- 
or propositions,  one with  another.  l'he  ther. 
mind, in  communicating its thought to others,  does 
not only need signs of the ideas it has then before it, 
but others also, to show or intimate some particular 
action of its own, at that time, relating to those ideas. 
l'his  it docs  several ways;  as is, and is  not, are tlie 
gcneral inarks of the mind, affirming or denying.  But 
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is in words no truth or  falsehood,  the mind  does,  in 
declaring its sentiments to others, connect  not only 
the parts of  propositions,  but whole  sentences one to 
another, with their several relations and dependencies, 
to make a coherent discourse. 
In them  2.  The words,  whereby  it signifies 
consists the  what  connexion it gives  to  the  several 
art of well  affirmations and negations,  that it unites 
in one  continued reasoning or narration, 
are generally called particles;  and it is in  the right 
use of these that more particularly consists the clear- 
ness  and  beauty  of  a  good  style.  To think  well, 
it  is  not  enough  that  a  man  has  ideas  clear  and 
distinct  in  his  thoughts,  nor  that  he  observes  the 
agreement  or  disagreement  of  some  of  them;  but 
he must think in train, and observe the dependence 
of  his  thoughts  and reasonings  upon  one  another. 
And  to express  well such  methodical  and rational 
thoughts, he must have words to show what connexion, 
restriction,  distinction,  opposition,  emphasis,  &c. he 
gives  to each respective  part of  his  discourse.  To 
mistake in  any of  these,  is to puzzle,  instead  of  in- 
forming  his  hearer;  and  therefore  it is  that those 
words which  are not truly by themselves the names 
of  any ideas, are of  such constant  and indispensable 
use  in language,  and  do much  contribute to men's 
well expressing themselves. 
They show  5 3.  This part of  grammar has  been 
what rela-  perhaps as much neglected, as some others 
the  over-diligently cultivated.  It  is easy for  mind gives 
to its own  men to write,  one after another, of  cases 
thoughts.  and genders, moods  and tenses, gerunds 
and supines:  in  these,  and the like, there has been 
great  diligence  used;  and  particles  themselves,  in 
some languages, have been, with great show of exact- 
ness,  ranked  into their several  orders.  But though 
prepositions  and  conjunctions,  &c.  are  names  well 
known in grammar, and the particles contained under 
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thein carefully ranked into their distinct subdivisions; 
yet ]le who would show the right use of particles, and 
what significancy and force  they have,  must take a 
little more  pains,  enter into his  own  thoughts,  and 
observe nicely the several postures of his mind in dis- 
coursing. 
5  4.  Neither  is  it enough,  for  the explaining  of 
these words, to render them, as is usual in dictionaries, 
by words  of  another tongue which  come nearest to 
their signification:  for what is meant by them is com- 
monly  as  hard  to be understood  in  one  as  another 
language.  They are all  marks  of  some  action,  or 
intimation of  the mind ;  and therefore to understand 
them rightly, the several views, postures, stands, turns, 
lin~itations,  and exceptioi~s,  and several other thoughts 
of the mind,  for which we have  either none, or very 
deficient names, are diligently to be studied.  Of these 
there is a great variety, much  exceeding the number 
of particles that most languages have to express them 
by;  and therefore it is not to be wondered that most 
of  these  particles have  divers, and sometimes almost 
opposite significations.  In the Hebrew tongue there 
is  a  particle,  consisting  of  but one  single letter,  of 
which there are reckoned up, as I remember, seventy, 
I am sure above fifty several significations. 
4  5.  Hut is a particle,  none  more  fa-  Instance in 
miliar in our language; and he that says  But. 
it is a discretive conjunction,  and that it answers sed 
in Latin, or mais in French, thinks he has sufficiently 
explained  it.  But it seems  to  me to  intimate  se- 
veral  relations  the  mind  gives  to the  several  pro- 
positions or parts of them, dieh  it joins by this mono- 
syllable. 
First,  ;;but  to say no  more:"  here  it intimates a 
stop of the mind in the course it was going, before it 
came quite to the end of it. 
Secondly, <;I  saw but two plants :" here it shows, 
that the mind  limits the sense to what is expressed, 
with a negation of  all other. 'l'liirdly,  '6  you pray;  but it is iiot that God would 
1)ring  ~OLI  to tllc true rcligioll," 
lJourthly,  but that l!c  would  confiriil you in your 
 ow^^."  Tlic first of tlicsc Buts intiniatcs a suppositioll 
ill the irlilld of something othcrwisc than it should 1)c ; 
thc lattcr shows, tlii~t  tllc mind inakcs a dircct oppo- 
sition bctwccu that, and what goes before it. 
I:iftlily,  "  all aiiilnals have  scnsc ;  but a dog is an 
aninin1 :" hcrc it signifies littlc more, but that the lattcr 
1)ro0position is joined  to tllc former, as the minor of a 
svllo~ri~in. 
-J--  0 
'rtiis ~linttcr  $  (i. To these, I doubt not, mi~llt  be 
but Ilfi~ltl.  added a rrcat many otlicr significations of 
<, 
toucG(l  this particle, if it ;<crc  my bisincss to csa- 
here.  mine it in its full lntituclc, and considcr it 
in all tlic places it is to be found :  which if one shoultl 
do, I doubt wl~cthcr  in all those manners it is made 
usc of  it would dcservc the title of  discrctivc, which 
gram1n:~rians  give to it.  But I intend not hcrc a full 
explication of this sort of signs.  The  instances I have 
given in this one, may .give occasion to reflect on thcir 
~isc  and force in languagc, and Scad us into the contcm- 
ylation of several actions of our minds in discoursing, 
wliicli it  has found n way to illtinlate to others by these 
particlcs ;  some whercof constantly, and others in cer- 
ttmin  constrnctions, havc tlic scnsc of a whole scntcnce 
contained in thcm. 
CHAPTElt VIII. 
Al)stritc4.  5 1.  Trre  ordinary words of I:inguag:.c, 
l,ot  nntl  our  common  use  of  them,  wol~ltl 
i::l I~avc  given  us  ligh:  into the naturc  of 
on<,  of ;lu-  our itleas, if tlicy had bccn but consiclcrcd 
other,  ul~tl 
wlly.  wit11  attention.  Tlic iiiind,  as has 1)ccll 
~liowii,  113s  a 1)owcr to abstract its iclcas, 
alltl so thcy bccomc essences, general csscnccs, whcrcby 
tllc sorts of tliings arc distinguished.  Now cach abs- 
tract idea being tlistinct, so that of any t\vo the onc call 
llcvcr  be  the  other,  the  iiliiid  will,  by  its  intuitive 
kllow]cclge, pcrccivc their difference ; anel tllercforc 111 
no two  wllole itleas can c\  cr bc afirmccl onc 
of another.  Tliis mc scc in thc con~iilor~  use of la~lgua~c, 
which permits not any two abstract worcls, or naincs of 
abstract icleas, to be affin~ied  ouc of niiotlicr.  For how 
near of  kin soelver  thcy may sccm to  be, and how certain 
SOCF cr it is, that man is an animal, or rational, or white, 
yet cvcry one at  first hearing perceives the falsehood of 
tllcsc l~ropohitions  ;  humanity is animality, or rationa- 
lity, or whiteness :  and this is as cvicleilt as any of tllc 
lnost  allowed maxims.  All our affirinations then arc 
only inconcrctc, which is thc affirming,  iiot onc abstract 
idca to be another, but one abstract idca to be ,joined to 
another :  whicl~  abstract idcas, in substanccs, may be of 
any sort ;  in all thc rest, arc littlc elsc but of relations ; 
and in substances, the most Srcqucnt  arc of powers ; 
v. g. "a man is white,"  signifies, that tlic  thing  th:at 
has tlic cssence of a man, has also in it the csscncc of 
whiteness, which is nothing but :L  power to producc the 
itlca of whiteness in one, whose cycs can discovcr orcli- 
narj 01)jects ;  or <'a  man is rational,"  sign~fics  that tllc 
same thing that hath the esscncc of a inan, llatli also ia 
it tlic csscnce of rationality, i. e. a power of reasoning. 
Q 2. Tliis distinction of names shows us  TIICY  show 
also tlic cliffcrciicc of our ideas : for if we  the tllf- 
obscrvc tlicni, wc shall find that our siinplc  f"rcn'e  of 
our idci~s.  idc'a~  have all abstract as wcll as coiicrctc 
names ; tlic one whcrcof is (to speak the languagc of 
grnm1n:~rians)  a substantive, tlic other an ntljcc.ti\.c ;  ;IS 
whitcncss, whitc, swcetncss, swcct.  The  likc also holds 
ill our ideas of modes and relations ; as justice,  just ; 
c'(lu:~lity,  cqual ;  only with thls diffcrcnce, that somc of 
tllc con~:rctc  names of relations, amongst Inen  chicfly, 
;L~.C'  st11)bt:~ntivcs  ;  as l)atcriiitas, patcr ;  wlicrcof it were 
cdby  to ~CII~C'I  it  TCilbOll.  Gltt LLS to o1ir  ideas of  sub- 350  Irnlpefl2ction of Words.  Book 3. 
stances, we have very few or no abstract nailles at all. 
For though the schools have introduced animalitas, hu- 
manitas, corporietas, and some others ;  yet they hold no 
proportion with that infinite nuniber of names of sub- 
stances, to which they never were ridiculous enough to 
attempt the coining of abstract ones :  and those few that 
the schools forged,  and  put into the mouths of their 
scholars, could never yet get admittance into common 
use, or obtain the licence of public approbation.  Which 
seems to me at least to intimate the confession of  all 
mankind, that they have no ideas of the real essences of 
substances, since they have not names for such ideas : 
which  no  doubt they would  have had,  had  not their 
consciousness to themselves of their ignorance of them 
kept them from so  idle an attempt.  And therefore 
though they had ideas enough to distinguish gold from 
a stone, and metal from wood ;  yet they but timorously 
ventured on such terms, as aurietas and saxietas,metal- 
lietas and lignietas, or the like names, which  should 
pretend to signify the real essences of those substances, 
whereof they knew they had no ideas.  And indeed it 
was only the doctrine of substantial forms, and the con- 
fidence  of mistaken pretenders to a knowledge that they 
had not, which first coined,  and then introduced  ani- 
malitas, and humanitas, and the like ;  which yet went 
very little  farther than  their ownschools, and could never 
get  to be current amongst understanding men.  Indeed, 
humanitas was a word familiar amongst the Romans, 
but in afar  different sense, and stood not for the abstract 
essence of any substance ;  but was the abstracted name 
of a mode, and its concrete humanus, not homo. 
CHAPTER IX. 
Words arc  $j 1.  FROM  what has  been  said in the 
used for rc-  foregoing chapters, it is easy to perceive 
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what imperfection  there is in language,  corcli~ig  and 
and how the very nature of words makes 
cating our  it almost  unavoidable for  many  of  them  tbugllts. 
to  be  doubtful  and  uncertain  in  their 
To  examine the perfection or imperfec- 
tion of words, it is necessary first to consider their use 
and end: for  as they are more or less fitted to attain 
that, so are they more or less perfect.  We have, in the 
former part of this discourse, often upon occasion men- 
tioned a double use of words. 
First, one for the recording of our own thoughts. 
Secondly, the other for the communicating of  our 
thoughts to others. 
$ 2. As to the first of these, for the re-  words 
cording our own thoughts for the help of  will serve 
our own memories, whereby, as it were, we  for 
talk to ourselves, any words will serve the 
turn.  For since sounds are voluntary and indifferent 
signs of any ideas, aman may use what words he pleases, 
to signify his own  ideas to himself:  and there will be 
no imperfection in them, if he constantly use the same 
sign for the same idea ;  for then he cannot fail of having 
his meaning understood, wherein consists the right use 
and perfection of language. 
$ 3.  Secondly, as  to communication of  c,,,,~;- 
words, that too has a double use.  cation by 
1. Civil.  words civil 
11. Philosophical.  or philoso-  phical.  First, by their civil use, I mean such a 
communication of thoughts and ideas by words, as may 
serve for the upholding common conversation and com- 
merce, about the ordinary affairs and conveniencies of 
civil life, in the societies of men one amongst another. 
Secondly, by the philosophical use of words, I mean 
such an use of them as may serve to convey the precise 
notions of  things, and to express, in  general proposi- 
tions, certain and undoubted truths, which  the mind 
may rest upon, and be satisfied with, in its search after 
he  knowledge.  These two uses are very distinct ;  arid a great deal less exactness will scrvc in the one than in 
the othcr, as we shall see in what follows. 
The imper-  $ 4. The chief end of language in coin- 
fevtion of  munication being to be understood, worcls 
words is the  serve not well for that end, neither in civil 
nor p1~ilosopl~ical  discourse,when any word  ncss of their 
,ignifiCu-  does not excite in the hearer the same iden 
tion.  which  it stands for  in the mind  of  tlic 
speaker.  Now since  sounds have no na- 
tural connexion wit11 our ideas, but have all their sig- 
ilification from  the arbitrary imposition of  men, the 
doubtfulness  and  uncertainty  of  their  signification, 
which is the imperfection we liere are speaking of, has 
its cause more in the ideas they stand for, than in any 
incapacity there is in one souncl more than in another, 
to signify  any idea: for in that regard they  are all 
equally perfect. 
That then which  makes  doubtfulness and uncer- 
tainty  in  the signification of  some more than other 
words, is the difference of ideas they stand for. 
Causes of  $ 5. Words having  naturally no signi- 
their imper-  fication,  the idea  which  each stantls for 
fcction.  must be learned and retained by those who 
would exchange thoughts,  and hold  intelligible dis- 
course with others in any Iangungc.  I3at this is  hardcst 
to be done whcrc., 
First, the itlcas they stand for are very coinl)lcx, and 
madc 111)  of' a great ri~lmher  of ideas put togetlicr. 
Sccontlly, where tlie  itleas they  stand for have no 
certaiil conilcxion in naturc ; and so no settled stand- 
ard, any where in nature existing,  to rectify and ad- 
just tllcin by. 
Tllirdly, when  the signification  of  the word  is rc- 
ferred to a ~tandard,  which  stantlard is not easy to be 
known. 
Fourthly, where the signification of the word, and 
the  real essence  of  the  thirig, are not  exactly  the 
same 
'I'hebc  are difficulties that attend the signification of 
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worcls that are intelligible.  Those which are 
ilitelligible at all, such as names standing for any 
ideas, which another lias not organs or faculties 
to attain,--as  the names of colours to a blind man, or 
sounds to a deaf man,-neecl  not here be mentioneti. 
111  all these cases we  shall find  an imperfection  in 
words, nrliicll I shall  more  at large explain,  in their 
Ilarticular application to our several sorts of ideas :  for 
if we  esalnine tliern, we  shall find that the names of 
mised  modes are most liable to doubtfulness and im- 
perfection, for the two first of these reasons;  and tl~e 
narnes of substances chiefly for the two latter. 
9 G.  First, the names  of  mixed  modes  ~h, 
are many of them liable to great uncer-  of mixed 
tainty and obscurity in their signification.  modes 
doubtful.  I.  Because of  that great  co~nyosition  First, be- 
these complex ideas are often made up of.  cause the 
To make words  serviceable to the end of  ideas they 
communication,  it is  necessary  (as  has  st""d  for are 
been  said) that they excite in the hearer  so complex. 
exactly the same idea  they stand for  in the mind of 
the  speaker.  Without  this,  men  fill  one  another's 
heads with noise ant1 sounds ;  but convey not thereby 
their tlloughts, and lay not before  one  another their 
ideas,  which  is  tlle  end of  discourse  and language. 
But when a word stands for a very complex idea that 
is compounded and decompounded, it is not easy for 
men  to form  and retain that idea  so exactly  as to 
lnake the name in common  use  stand for  tlie  same 
precise idea, without  any the least variation.  Hence 
it comes to pass, that men's  names of very compound 
jhs,  s~~cli  as for tlle most part are moral words, haye 
seldom, in two different men, the same precise signifi- 
catioii; since  one man's  complex idea seldom agrees 
wit11  another's,  and often  differs frorn  his own, frorn 
that which  lie had yesterday, or will hnve to-morrow. 
$ 7.  11.  Because  tlic  names  of  mixed  sec0,~~iy, 
"odes,  for the most  part, want standards  because 
ill  llnturr, whereby men  inny  rectify and  theyhnve no 
"(lj1lst  their significotiol:~  ; tllcrcfore they 
starldnrds are very various and doubtful.  They are asselnblages 
of  ideas  put  together  at the pleasure  of  the inincl, 
pursuing its own  ends of  discourse,  and  suited to its 
own  notions;  whereby  it  designs  not  to  copy  any 
thing  really  existing,  but to denonlicate  and ranli 
things, as they come  to agrce with  those  archetypes 
or  forms  it has  made.  He  that  first  brought the 
word  sham,  or wheedle, or  banter, in  use, put togc- 
ther, as he thought fit,  those  ideas he made it stc~ild 
for :  and  as it is with any new naines  of  modes, that 
are now brought into any language,  so  it  was with 
the old ones, when they were first made use of.  Names 
therefore that stand for collections of ideas which the 
mind  makes at pleasure,  must needs  be of  doubtful 
signification, when such collectiolls  are no where  to 
be found constantly united in nature, nor any patterns 
to be shown whereby men  may adjust them.  What 
the word murder, or sacrilege, &c. signifies, can never 
b.:  known from things themselves :  there be  many of 
the parts of  those complex  ideas which  are not visi- 
ble in the action  itself;  the intention of the mind,  or 
the relation of holy things, which make a part of inur- 
der or sacrilege, hare no necessary connesion with the 
outward and visible action of him that coinlnits either : 
and the pulling the trigger of the gun, with which the 
murder is committed, and is all the action that perhaps 
is visible, has no  natural  connexion with those other 
ideas that make up the complex one, named  murder. 
They have their union and combination only from the 
understanding, which unites them under one namc :  but 
uniting them without any rule or pattern, it cannot be 
but that the signification of the name that stands for 
such voluntary collections should be often various  ill 
the minds of different men, who hare scarce any stai~l- 
ing rule to regnlate themselves and their notions by, in 
such arbitrary ideas. 
Propriety  S 8.  It is true, coinmon use, that is the 
not a sutiici-  rule of  propriety, may be  supposed  here 
elit remedy.  to afford  sonle aid, to settle the significn- 
tion of language ;  ailtl it cannot be denied 
but that in  some incasure it does.  Common  use  re- 
gulntcs thc meaning of words pretty well for colnll~oll 
con\.ersation;  but  riobody  having  an  authority  to 
establish the precise signification of  words, nor deter- 
mine to what  ideas  any one  shall  annex them,  com- 
lllon use is not sufficient to adjust tllcnl to pllilosol)lli- 
cal discourses;  there being scarce  any name  of'  ally 
very complex  idea  (to say  nothing  of  othcrs) wllicll 
incommon use has not agreat latitude, ai~clwhich,  kecp- 
in% within the bounds of  propriety, may not be mntlc 
the sign of far different ideas.  Besides, the rule au(1 
measure of propriety itself being no where established, 
it is often matter of dispute whether this or that way of 
using a word be propriety of speech or no.  Froin all 
which it is evident, that the riamcs of such kind of very 
complex ideas are naturally liable to this imperfection, 
to be of doubtful and uncertain signification ;  and even 
in men that have a mind to understand one another, (lo 
not always stand for the same ideain speaker and hearer. 
Though the names glory and gratitude be the same in 
every man's mouth through a whole country,  yet the 
complex collective idea, which every one thinks on, or 
.  intends  by that name, is apparently very different in 
inen using the same language. 
9.  fhe  way also wYher2n  the names  The \vay of 
of  mixed  modes  are ordinarily  learned,  learl,inz 
0  does  not a little contribute to the doubt-  these names 
fulness  of  their  signification.  For if we  contributes 
also to their  will observe how children learn languages,  do,,btful-  we  shall find  that to make them under- 
stand what the naines of  simple ideas, or 
substances, stand for, people ordinarily show them the 
thing, whereof they would  have  them have the idea; 
and then repeat to them the name that stands for it, as 
white, sweet, milk, sugar, cat, dog.  But as for mixed 
modes, especially the most  material  of  them,  inoral 
lyords, the souilds are usually learned first;  and then 
to know what complex ideas they stand for, they are 
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happens for the most part) areleft to  tlieir own observa- 
tion  and industry;  which  being little laid out in the 
search of the true and precise meaning of names, these 
moral \vords  are  in  most  men's  mouths  little more 
than bare  sounds; or ~vhen  the!.  hare any, it is  for 
the most part but a very loose and undetermined, and 
conscqnently obscure ant1 confused signification.  And 
even tliose themselves, who have with more attention 
settled tlieir notions,  do yet hardly avoid  the incon- 
venience, to have  them stand for complex ideas, dif- 
ferent from  those which  other,  even  intelligent  and 
studious men,  make them the signs of.  Where shall 
one find  any, either controversial  debate, or familiar 
discourse.  concerning honour,  faith,  grace,  religion. 
church, bc. wherein  it is not easy to observe tlie dif- 
ferent notions men have of them? which is nothing but 
tllis,that they arenot agreed in the signification of those 
words, nor hare in their minds the same complex ideas 
~vliicli  tlleymakc them stand for: and so all the contests 
tliat  follow thereupon are only about the nieaning of 
n sound.  And hence we see, tliat in the interpretation 
of laws,  whether divine  or human,  there is no end; 
comments beget comments, and explications make new 
lnatter for esplications; and of limiting, distinguisliin~, 
varying the signification of these moral words, there 1s 
no end.  Tllesc ideas of men's n~aking  are, by men still 
having tlie same power, multiplied in in$?zitum.  Many 
a man rvlio was pretty  well satisfied of the meaning of 11 
text of scripture, or clause in the code, at  first reading, 
has 1)y consulti~~g  co~nmentators  quite lost the sense 
of it, and by tliese elucidations given rise or increase 
to his doubts, and drawn obscurity upon the place.  I 
say not illis, tliat I think commentaries needless;  but 
to shorn how uncertain the names of mixed modes nn- 
tcrally arc, even in the mouths of tliose who had both 
tlie inte~ltion  and the faculty of speaking as clearly as 
Inng~~age  was capal~le  to express their thoughts. 
IIence unn-  $ 10.  What obscurity this has unavoid- 
1:  1- a1)lybrought  11pon  the  n-ritings of inen,who 
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lived  in remote  ages  and  different  scurity  i,, 
countries,it will be needless to take notice;  in ancient 
since  the numerous  volumes  of  learned  authors. 
men,  employing their thoughts tliat way,  are pro3fs 
Inore than enough to show what attention, study, sa- 
gacity, and reasoning are required, to find out the true 
meaning  of  ancient  authors.  But there  being  no 
writings  we have any great  concernment to be very 
solicitous  about the meaning of,  but those that con- 
tain either truths we  are required to believe, or laws 
we are to obey,  and draw inconveniences on us when 
we mistake  or transgress ; we  may  be  less  anxious 
about  the sense of  other  authors,  who writing but 
their own opinions, we are under no greater necessity 
to know them than they to know ours.  Our good or 
evil  depending  not  on their decrees, we  may safely 
be  ianorant  of  their notions : and  therefore,  in the 
reading of them,  if they do not use their words with 
a  due clearness  and perspicuity,  we  may  lay them 
aside, and, without any injury done them, resolve thus 
with ourselves : 
cc  Si non vis intelligi, debes negligi." 
§ 11.  If the signification of the names 
of  of  mixed  modes  are uncertain,  because  substances 
there  he  no  real  standards  existing in  ofdoubtful 
nature to which those ideas are referred,  ~jg*~~fica- 
and by which they may be adjusted ; tlie  tlon. 
names  of  substances are of  a  doubtful signification, 
for  a  contrary reason,  viz.  because  the  ideas  they 
stand  for  are supposed conforn~able  to the reality of 
things, and are referred to standards made by nature. 
In  our ideas of substances, we have not the liberty, as 
in mixed modes, to frame what combinations we think 
fit, to be the characteristical notes to rank and deno- 
minate  things by.  In these  we  must follow nature, 
suit our complex ideas to  real existences, and regulate 
the signification  of  their names by the things them- 
selves, if we will have our names to be signs of them, 
and stancl for them.  Here, it is true, we havc patterns 
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to follo~v,  but patterns that will make the signification 
of  their names very uncertain ;  for names must be of a 
very unsteady and various meaning, if the ideas they 
st:tnd  for  be  referred  to standards without us, that 
either cannot be known at all, or can be known but 
imperfectly and uncertainly. 
IGtrnes of  $  12.  The names of  substances have, 
sllbstanres  as lias been shown,  a  double reference in 
referred,  their ordinary use. 
1. TO  real  First, sometimes they are made to stand 
essences 
that  cannot  for, and so their signification is supposed 
be known.  to  agree to, the real constitution of  things, 
from which all their properties flow,  and 
in  wliich they all centre.  But this real constitution, or 
(as it is  apt to be  callcct) essence, being  utterly un- 
known to ns, any sound that is put to stand for it  must 
be very unccrtnin in its application ; and it  will be im- 
possible to know what things are, or ought to he callecl 
an horse,  or anatomy, ~vhen  tllose words  are put for 
real essences that we have  no ideas of  at all.  And 
therefore, in this sulq~osition,  the names of substance.; 
being referred  to standards that cannot  be kno~vn, 
their  significations can never  be  acljusted  and csta- 
blished by those standards. 
2. To co-ex-  $13. Secondly, the simple ideas that arc 
istillg quali-  found to co-esist in substances being that 
ties, which  ml~ich  their  names imillediately  signify, 
areknown  these,  as united  in the several,  sorts of 
but imper- 
fectly.  things, are the proper standards to whicli 
their names  are referred,  and by wliich 
their significations may be best rectified.  But neither 
will these archetypes so well serve to  this purpose, as  to 
leave these names without veyy various and uncertniia 
si8nifications : because  these  simple  ideas  that  co- 
exist, and are united in the same subject, being very 
numerous, and 1;aving  all an equal right to go into thc 
complex  specific  idea, which  the specific name is to 
stand for; men,  thong11 they propose to themselves 
thc rcry sainc sub,ject to considcr, yct frninc very clifl 
fercnt ideas about it ; 311d  SO the name tlicy usc for it 
unavoidably comes to have,  in several nlcn,  very dif- 
ferent significations.  The  simple qualities n hich make 
up  complex ideas, being most of  tlrein powers, in 
to changes, whicli they are apt to make in, or 
receive from, other bodies, are almost infinite.  He  that 
sllall but observe what a  great variety of  alterations 
any one of the baser metals is apt to receive from thc 
different application  only of  fire;  anel  how  much  n 
greater number of  changes any of  them will  receive 
jn the hands of a cliemist,  by the application of other 
bodies ;  will not think it strange that I count the pro- 
perties of any sort of bodies  not easy to be collected, 
and completely known by the ways  of inquiry, wllicll 
our faculties are capable of.  They  being therefore at 
least so many that no man can know the precise and 
definite number, they are differently discovered by dif- 
ferent men, according to their various skill, attention, 
and ways of handling; who therefore cannot choose but 
have different ideas of the same substance, ancl there- 
fore make the signification  of its common name very 
various and uncertain.  For the  complex ideas of sub- 
stances being made up of such simple oncs as are sup- 
posed to co-exist in nature, every one has a right to put 
into his complex idea those qualities he has fo~uld  to be 
united together.  For though in the substance of gold 
one  satisfies  hiinself  with  colour  ancl  weight,  yet 
another thinks solubility in aq. regia as necessary to 
be joined  with that colour in his idea of  gold  as any 
one does its fusibility;  solubility in  aq. regia being n 
quality as constantly joined with its colour and wei~$it, 
as fusibility, or any other; others put in its ciuctility 
or fixedness, &c. as they have been taught by tradition 
or experience.  Who of  all these has established the 
right signification of the word gold? or who shall be 
the judge  to determine?  Each has its standard in 
nature, which he appeals to; and with rcasori  thinks 
he has the same right to put into his complex  idea, 
signified by the word gold, those qualities ~vhich  upoll 
b 2 a60  Imperfection  of  Words.  Book s. 
trial he has found united,  as another, who has not so 
well examined, has to leave them out ;  or a third, who 
has made other trials, has to put in others.  For the 
union  in  nature of  these  qualities  being  tlie  true 
ground of  their union in one complex idea, who can 
say, one of them has more reason to be  put in, or left 
out,  than another?  From hence  it will  always un- 
avoidably follow, that the complex ideas of substances, 
in men using the same name for them, will be very 
various ; and so the significations of  those names very 
uncertain. 
3. To  co-ex-  $ 14.  Besides, there is scarce any parti- 
isting qua,i-  cular thing existing, which, in some of its 
ties which  simple ideas, does not communicate with a 
are known  greater,  and in others a less number of par- 
but  fectly.  imper-  ticuler beings :  who shall determine, in this 
case. which are those that are to make un 
the  precise collection that is to be signified by the sp;- 
cific name;  or can, with any just authority, prescribe 
which obvious or common qualities are to be left out; 
or  which more secret, or  more particular, are to be put 
into the signification  of  the name of any substance? 
All which  together seldom  or never  fail to produce 
that various  and doubtful signification in the names 
of substances, which causes such uncertainty, disputes, 
or mistakes, when we come to a philosophical use  of 
them. 
With this  $15. It is true, as to civil and common 
impw'fec-  conversation,  the general names  of  sub- 
tion, thev  stances. regulated in their ordinarv sicrnifi-  -,  , " 
may serve  cation 6v  ;me  obvious aualities. (as bv the 
'\  4 
fOrcivil*but  shape  abd figure in thhgs of  known se-  not well for 
philosophi-  mind  propagation,  and  in  other  sub- 
cal use.  stances, for the mostpart, bv colour, ioined 
with some other sen$ble qialities) dX  well 
enough to design the things men would be understood 
to speak of; and so they usually conceive well enough 
the substances meant by  the word gold, or apple, to 
distinguish the one from  the other.  Rut in philoso- 
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inquiries and debates,  where  general  truths 
are to be  established, and  consequences drawn from 
positions  laid  down-there  tlie  precise  significatioll 
of  the names  of  substances will  be  found,  not only 
not to be well  established,  but  also very hard  to be 
so.  For example, he that shall make malleableness, 
or a certain  degree of  fixedness,  a  part of  his com- 
idea of gold, may make propositions ~wncernin~ 
gold,  and  draw consequences  from  them,  that will 
truly and clearly follow from gold,  taken  in  such a 
signification; but yet such as another man can never be 
forced to admit, nor be convinced of their truth, who 
makes not malleableness, or the same degree of fixed- 
ness, part of that complex idea, that the name gold, in 
his use of it, stands for. 
9  16. This is a natural, and almost un- 
Instance  avoidable  ixnperfection  in  almost all the  liquor. 
names  of  substances,  in  all  languages 
whatsoever,  which men  will  easily  find,  when  once 
passing from confused or loose notions,  they come to 
more  strict  and  close  inquiries : for  then  they will 
be  convinced how  doubtful and  obscure those words 
are in  their signification, which  in ordinary use  ap- 
peared very clear and determined.  I was  once  in a 
meeting  of  very  learned  and  ingenious  physicians, 
where by chance there arose a question, whether any 
liquor passed through the filaments of tlie nerves.  The 
debate having been managed a good while, by variety 
of arguments on both sides, I (who had been used  to 
suspect that the greatest parts of  disputes were more 
about the signification of words than a real difference 
in the conception  of things) desired, that before they 
went any farther on in this dispute,  they would first 
examine, and establish amongst them, what the word 
liquor signified.  They at first were a little surprised 
at the proposal;  and had they been persons less in- 
genious, they might perhaps have taken it for avery fri- 
volous or  extravagant one ;  since there was no one there 
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what the word liquor stood for ;  which I think, too, none 
of the most perplexed names of substances.  However, 
they were pleased  to comply with  my motion ; and, 
upon examination, found that the signification of  that 
word was  not  so settled  and  certain as they had all 
imagined,  but that  each  of them made it a sign of a 
different complex idea.  This made them perceive that 
the main of their dispute was about the signification 
of that term; and that they differed very little in their 
opinions  concerning  some  fluid  and  subtile  matter 
passing through the conduits of  the nerves ;  though 
it was not so easy to agree whether it was to be called 
liquor  or no-a  thing which,  when considered,  they 
thought it not worth the contending about. 
Instance  S  17.  How much this is the case in the 
gold.  greatest part of disputes that men are en- 
gaged so hotly in, I shall perhaps have an 
occasion in another place to take notice.  Let us only 
here consider a little more exactly the fore-mentioned 
instance of the word gold, and we shall see how hard it 
is precisely to determine its signification.  1 thinlr all 
agree to make it stand for a body of a certain yellow 
shining colour; which being the idea to which children 
have annexed that name, the shining yellow part of a 
peacock's  tail is ploperly to them gold.  Others find- 
ing fusibility joined  with that yellow colour in certain 
parcels of matter, make of that combination a complex 
idea, to  which they give the name gold, to denote a sort 
of substances ;  and so exclude from being gold a11 such 
yellow shining  bodies,  as  by fire will be  reduced to 
itshes ;  and admit to be of that species, or to be com- 
prehended under that name gold, onlysuch substances, 
as having that shining yellow colour, will by fire be re- 
duced to fusion, and not to ashes.  Another, by the same 
rcason,adds the  weight; which being a quality asstraitly 
joinctl with that colour as its fusibility,  he thinks has 
the same reason to be joined  in its idea, and to be sig- 
nified by its rlanle ; anti therefore tlie other made up of 
body, of' such a colour and f'uaibility, to be imperfect ; 
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and 50 on of all the rest : wherein no one can show a 
reas011 why some of the inseparable qualities, that are 
always united in nature, should be put into the nominal 
essence, and others left out ;  or why the word gold, sig- 
nifying that sort of body the ring on his finger is made 
of,  should  determine  that sort,  rather by its colour, 
weight, and fusibility, than by its colour, weight, and 
solubility in aq. regia : since the dissolvinq it by  that 
liquor is as inseparable  from it as the f&on  by  fire ; 
and they are both  of them  nothing but the relation 
which that substance has to two other bodies, which 
have a power to operate differently upon it.  For by 
what right is it that fusibility comes to be a part of the 
essence signified by the word gold, and soIubility but a 
property of it ;  or why is its colour part of  the essence, 
and its malleableness but a property?  That which I 
mean is this : That these being all but properties de- 
pending  on  its real  constitution,  and  nothing  but 
powers, either active or passive,  in reference to other 
bodies;  no  one has  authority  to determine the sig- 
nification of the word gold (as referred to such a body 
existing in nature) more  to one collection of ideas to 
be found in that body tlian to another :  whereby the sig- 
nification of that name must unavoidably be very un- 
certain ;  since, as has been said, several people observe 
several properties in the same substance ;  a,nd, I think, 
I may say nobody at all.  And therefore we have but 
very imperfect descriptions of things, and words have 
very uncertain significations. 
18.  From what has been  said,  it is  ~h,  .,,,, 
easy to observe what has been before re-  of simple 
marked, viz.  That the  names  of simple  ;EbL  ideas are, of  all others, the least liable to  ful. 
mistakes,and that for these reasons.  First, 
because the ideas they staud for,  being each but one 
single  perception,  are  much  easier  got,  and  more 
clearly retained, than the more  complex  ones ; and 
t,herefore  are  not  liable  to  the  uncertainty  which 
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and mixed  modes,  in  which  the precise  number of 
simple ideas, that make then1 up, are not easily agreed, 
and so readily kept in the mind :  and secondly,because 
they  are never  referred  to any other  essence,  but 
barely  that  perception  they  immediately  signify ; 
which  reference  is  that  which  renders  the  signifi- 
cation of  the names  of  substances naturally so per- 
plexed, and gives occasion to so many disputes.  Men 
that  do not perversely use  their  words,  or on pur- 
pose  set themselves to cavil, seldom mistake,  in any 
language  which  they  are  acquainted  with,  the  use 
and signification of  the names of simple ideas :  white 
and sweet,  yellow  and bitter,  carry a  very  obvious 
meaning with them,  which  every one precisely com- 
prehends,  or easily perceives  he is ignorant  of,  and 
seeks to be informed.  But what precise  collection 
of  simple  ideas  modesty  or  frugality  stand  for  in 
another's  use,  is not so certainly known.  And  how- 
ever we are apt to think we well enough know what 
is meant  by gold  or  iron; yet the precise  complex 
idea others make them the signs of, is not so certain ; 
and I believe  it  is very  seldom that, in speaker and 
hearer,  they  stand  for  exactly the same  collection: 
which  must  needs  produce  mistakes  and  disputes, 
when  they are made  use  of  in  discourses,  wherein 
men  have  to  do  with  universal  propositions,  and 
would settle in  their minds universal truths, and con- 
sider the consequences that follow from them. 
And next  5  19. By the same rule,  the names of 
to them,  simple modes are, next to those of simple 
simple  ideas, least liable todoubt anduncertainty, 
modes.  especially those of  figure and number, of 
which men have so clear and distinct ideas.  Who  ever, 
that had a mind to understand them, mistook the or- 
dinary meaning of seven, or a triangle? And in general 
the least compounded ideas in every  kind have the least 
dubious names. 
The most  5 20. Mixed  modes, therefore,  that arc 
doubtfulare  made up but of a few and obvious simplc 
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ideas, have usually names of no very uncer-  the names of 
taill signification ;  but the names of mixed  "erY corn- 
pounded 
modes, which comprehend a great  number  mixed 
of  simple  ideas,  are commonly of a very  modes and 
doubtful and undetermined  meaning,  as  substances. 
has been shown.  The names of substances, being an- 
nexed to ideas that are neither the real essences nor 
exact representations of the patterns they are referred 
to, are liable yet to greater imperfection and uncer- 
tainty,  especially when  we  come  to a  philosophical 
use of them. 
Q 21.  The  great disorder that happens in  why  this 
our names of substances, proceeding for the  imperfec- 
most part from our  want of knowledge,and  tion charged 
inability to penetrate into their real con-  UP0n 
stitutions, it may probably be wondered, why I charge 
this as an imperfection rather upon our words than un- 
derstandings.  This exception has so much appearance 
of justice,  that I think myself obliged to give a reason 
why I have followed this method.  I must confess then, 
tl~at  when I first began this discourse  of  the under- 
standing, and a good while  after, I had  not the least 
thought  that any consideration  of words was  at all 
necessary to it.  But when,  having passed  over the 
original and composition of our ideas, I began to exa- 
mine  the extent and  certainty of  our knowledge, I 
found  it had  so near a  connexion  with words,  that, 
unless their  force  and  manner  of  signification  were 
first  well  observed,  there  could  be very  little said 
clearly and pertinently concerning knowledge; which 
being  conversant  about truth,  had constantly to do 
with propositions ;  and though it  terminated in things, 
yet  it was  for  the most  part so much by the inter- 
vention of  words,  that they seemed scarce separable 
from  our general knowledge.  At least,  they inter- 
pose themselves so much between our understandings 
and the truth, which it would contemplate and appre- 
hend, that, like the medium through which visible  ob- 
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cast a mist before our eyes, and impose upon our un- 
derstandings.  If we consider, in the fallacies men put 
upon themselves as well as others, and the mistakes in 
men'sdisputes and notions,how great a part is owing to 
words, and their uncertain or mistaken significations- 
we shall have reason to think this no small obstacle in 
the way to knowledge ;  which, I conclude, we are the 
more carefully to be warned of, because it has been so 
far  from being taken notice of as an inconvenience, that 
the arts of improvingit have been made the business of 
men's  study,  and obtained the reputation of learning 
and subtilty, as we shall see in the following chapter. 
But I am apt to imagine, that were the imperfections 
of lanpage, as the instruments of  knowledge, more 
thoroughly  weighed,  a  great  many  of  the  contro- 
versies that make  such  a noise  in the world,  would 
of themselves cease ; and the way to knowledge, and 
perhaps peace, too, lie a great deal opener than it does. 
This should  $  li2.  Sure I am, that the signification 
teach us  of words in all languages, depending very 
moderation,  much on the thoughts,  notions,  and ideas 
in imposing  of him that uses them,  must unavoidably 
our own 
sense of old  be ofgreat uncertainty to men of the same 
authors.  language and country.  This is  so  evi- 
dent in  tl~e  Greek authors, that he that 
shall peruse their writings will find in almost every one 
of them a distinct language, though the same words. 
But when to this natural  difficulty in every country 
there shall be added  different  countries and remote 
ages,  wherein  the  speakers  and  writers  had  very 
different  notions,  tempers,  customs,  ornaments,  and 
figures of  speech,  &c. every one of which influenced 
the  signification of  their  words  then,  though  to us 
now they are lost and unknown ;  it would become us 
to be charitable one to another in our interpretations 
or misurlderstanding of those ancient writings; which 
though of  great concernment  to be  understood, are 
liable to the unavoidable difficulties of speech, which 
(if we except the names of simple ideas, and some very 
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things) is not capable, without a constant de- 
fining  the terms, of  conveying the sense and intention 
of t]le speaker, without any manner of doubt and un- 
certaii~ty,  to the hearer.  And in discourses of religion, 
law, and morality,  as they are matters of the highest 
concernment, so there will be the greatest difficulty. 
9 23. The  volumes of interpreters and commentators 
on the old and new Testament are but too  manifest 
proofs of this.  Though every thing said in the text be 
infallibly true, yet the reader may be, nay cannot choose 
but be, very faIlible in the understanding of it.  Nor is 
it to be wondered, that the will of God, when clothed 
inwords, should be liable to that doubt and uncertainty 
which  unavoidably  attends  that sort of  conveyance ; 
when even his Son, whilst clothed in flesh, was subject 
to all the frailties and inconveniences of human nature, 
sin excepted : and we ought to magnify his goodness, 
that he hath spread before all the world such legible 
chnractcrs of his works and providence,  and given all 
mankind so sufficient  a light of  reason,  that they to 
whom this written word never came, could not (when- 
ever they set thew-dves to search) either doubt of thc 
being of a God, or of the obedience due to him.  Since 
then the precepts of natural religion are plain, and very 
intelligible to all mankind, and seldom come to be con- 
troverted;  and other revealed  truths, v~hich  are con- 
veyed to us by hooks and languages, are liable to the 
common  and natural obscurities and difficulties inci- 
dent to words; methinks it would become us to be more 
careful and diligent in observing the former, and iess 
magisterial,  positive,  and imperious,  in imposing our 
own sense and interpretations of the latter. Abuse  of  ?l/ords.  Book 3. 
CHAPTER X. 
Of the Abuse  Words. 
Abuse of  $ I. BESIDES  the imperfection that is na- 
words.  turally in language, and the obscurity and 
confusion that is so hard to be avoided in 
the use of words,  there  are several wilful  faults and 
neglects which men are 'guilty of  in this way of com- 
munication, whereby they render these signs less clear 
and distinct in their signification  than naturally they 
need to be. 
First,Words  §  2.  First,  in  this kind,  the first and 
without  most palpable abuse is, the using of words 
any, or  without  clear  and  distinct  ideas ; or, 
without  which  is worse,  signs without  any thing 
clear ideas.  signified.  Of these there are two sorts. 
I. One may observe, in all languages, certain words, 
that, if they be examined, will be found, in their first 
original and their appropriated use,not to  stand for any 
clear and distinct ideas.  These, for the most part, the 
several sects  of  philosophy  and religion have  intro- 
duced.  For their authors  or promoters, either affecting 
something singular and out of the way of comlnon ap- 
prehension,  or  to support some strange opinions,  or 
cover some weakness  of  their hypothesis, seldom fail 
to coin new words, and such as, when they come to be 
examined,  may justly  be  called  insignificant  terms. 
For having  either had  no determinate  collection  of 
ideas annexed to them, when they were first invented, 
or at  least, such as, if well examined, will be found in- 
consistent;  it  is  no  wonder  if  afterwards,  in  the 
vulgar  use  of  the same  party,  they  remain  empty 
sounds, with little or no signification, amongst those 
who  think it  enough  to  have  them  often  in  their 
mouths,  as  the  distinguishing-  characters  of  their 
cl~urcli,  or school, without much troubling their heads 
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to examine what are the precise ideas they stand for. 
1  sllall  not  need  here  to heap  up instances;  every 
man's  reading and conversation will  sufficiently fur- 
nish him: or if he wants to be better stored, tlic great 
mint-ma~t~rs  of this kind of terms, I mean the school- 
men and metaphysicians,  (under  which, I think,  thc 
clispllting  natural  and  moral pliilosophers  of  these 
latter ages may be comprehended) have wherewithal 
abundantly to content him. 
$ 3. 11.  Others there be who extend this abuse yet 
farther; who take so little care to lay by words,which, 
in their primary notation, have scarce any clear and di- 
stinct ideas which they are annexed to; that, by an un- 
pardonable negligence, they familiarly use words,which 
the propriety of language has affixed to very important 
ideas,  without any distinct meaning at all.  Wisdom, 
glory, grace, &c.  are words frequent enough in every 
man's  mouth ; but if  a great many of those who use 
them  should be askecl what they mean by them, they 
would be at a stand, and not know what to answer :  :L 
plain  proof,  that though  they  have  learned  those 
sounds,  and have them ready at their tongues'  end, 
yet  there are no  determined  ideas laid  up in  their 
minds, which are to be expressed to others by them. 
$ 4. Men having been accustomed from  occasioned 
their  cradles  to learn words,  which  are  by learning 
easily got and retained, before they knew  names be- 
or had framed the complex ideas to which  fore  ideas  the  they 
they were annexed,  or which were to be  belong  to. 
found in the things they were thought to 
stand  for; they usually  continue  to do so  all their 
lives; and, without taking the pains necessary to settle 
in their minds determined ideas, they use their words 
for such unsteady and confused notions as they have, 
contenting themselves  with  the  same  words  other 
people use :  as if their very sound necessarily carried 
with it constantly the same meaning.  This, though 
men nlake a shift with, in the ordinary occurrences of 
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and therefore they make  signs till they are so;  yet 
this insignificancy in their words, when tliey come to 
reason concernin5 either their tenets or interest, mani- 
festly fills their d~scourse  with abundance of empty un- 
intelligible noise and jargon; especially in moral mat- 
ters, where the words for the most part standing for 
arbitrary  and numerous  collections  of  ideas,  not re- 
gularly and permanently united in nature, their bare 
sounds are often only thought on, or at least very ob- 
scure and uncertain notions annexed to them.  Men 
take the words they find in use amongst their neigh- 
bours ;  and that they may not seem ignorant what they 
stand for,use them~onfidently~witl~out  much troubling 
their heads about a certain  fixed  meaning: whereby, 
besides the ease of it, they obtain this advantage ;  that 
as in such discourses they seldom are in the right, so 
they are as seldom  to be convinced  that they are in 
the wrong ;  it being all one to go about to draw those 
inen out of  their mistakes,  who have no settled no- 
tions, as to dispossess a vagrant of his habitation, who 
has  no  settled  abode.  This I guess to be so;  and 
every one may observe in himself and others whether 
it be or no. 
2. Unstendy  tj  5. Secondly,  another great abuse of 
application  words is  inconstancy in  the use of  them. 
of  them.  It is hard to  find a discourse written of any 
subject, especially of controversy, wherein 
one shall not observe, if he read with attention, the same 
words  (and those commonly the most material in the 
discourse, and upon which the argument turns) used 
sometimes for one collection of simple ideas, sncl some- 
times for another; which is a perfect abuse of language. 
Words being intended for signs of my ideas, to makq 
them  known to others, not by any natural signification, 
but by a voluntary imposition-it  is plain  cheat and 
abuse, when  1 make  them  stand  sometimes  for  one 
thing  and  solnetilnes  for  another;  the wilful  doing 
whereof  can be imputed to nothing but great  folly, 
or  grcntcr  clisllonesty : and  a  man,  in his  accounts 
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with another, may,  with as much  fairness, make the 
of  numbers stand sometimes for  one and 
sometimes  for  another collection of units,  (v.  g. this 
3 stand  sometimes  for three, sometimes for 
four, and sonletinles for eight) as in his discourse, or 
reasoning,  make the same words  stand for different 
collections of  simple ideas.  If men should do so in 
their reckonings, I wonder who would have to (10 with 
them ?  One who would speak thus, in the affairs and 
busi~ess  of the world, and call eight sometimes seven, 
and  soinetinies  nine,  as  best  served  his  advantage, 
would  presently have clapped  upon  him  one  of  the 
two naines  men  are commonly disgusted with : and 
yet in arguings and learned contests, the same sort of 
proceedings passes commonly for  wit  and learning : 
but to me it appears a  greater dishonesty  tha11  th~ 
~nisplacing  of counters in the casting up a debt; and 
the cheat the greater, by how much truth is of greater 
concernment and value than money. 
5 6. Thirdly, another abuse of language  3. Affcctrtl 
is an a3ectecl obscurity, by either applying 
.rV1.0llg' :q'-  old words  to new and  unusual significa-  p,ir;,tion. 
tioils, or introducing new ant1 ambiguous 
terms, without defining either;  or else putting tl;c:u 
so together, as nmy co~~found  their ordinary menniilg;., 
Though the Peripatetic philosophy has been most elxi- 
nent in this way, yet other sects have riot been n.holly 
clear of it.  There are scarce any  of them that are not 
cumbered with some difficulties (such is the imperfec- 
tion of human knowledge) which  tliey have been fain 
to cover with obscurity of terms, and to coilfound  the 
signification of words, whicl1,like a mist before people's 
eyes,  might hinder their weak  parts from being dis- 
covered.  That body and extension, in common use, 
stand for two distinct ideas,  is  plain  to any one that 
will but  reflect  a  little : for were  their signific  t'  8 1011 
precisely the same, it would be proper, and as intelli- 
gible to say, the 1)ody of  an extension, as the cstcii- 
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it necessary to confound  their signification.  To  this 
abuse,  and the mischiefs  of  confounding  the  signi- 
fication  of  words,  logic  and tlle  liberal  sciences,  as 
they have been handled in the schools, have given re- 
putation :  and the admired art of dispoting hath added 
much to the natural imperfection of languages, whilst 
it 113s  becn  made  use  of  and fitted  to perplex  tlle 
signification  of  words,  more  than  to  discover  the 
knowledge  and  truth of  things:  and  he that  sill 
look  into that sort of  learned writings, will find the 
words there much more obscure, uncertain, and unde- 
termined in their meaning than they are in ordinary 
convers  a  t'   on. 
Logic and  $ 7.  This is unavoidably to be so, where 
disputehave  men's parts and learning are estimated by 
much con-  their skill in disputing.  And if reputation 
tributed to 
this.  and reward shall attend these conquests, 
~vhich  depend mostly on the fineness and 
niceties of words, it ii no wonder if the wit of man, so 
employed,  should perplex,  involve,  and subtilize the 
signification of sounds, so as never to want something 
to say, in  opposing  or defending  any question;  the 
victory being adjudged not to him who had truth on 
his side, but the last word in the dispute. 
Calling it  $ 8.  This,  though  a very useless skill, 
subtiltye  and that which I think the direct opposite 
to  the ways of knowledge, hath yet passed 
hitherto under  the laudableand esteemed names of sub- 
tilty and acuteness ; and has llad the applauso of the 
schools, and encouragement of one part of the learned 
Inen of the world.  And no wo~lcier  ;  since the philoso- 
phers of old (the disputing and wrangling philosophers 
I mean, such as Lucian wittily and with reason taxes) 
and the schoolmen since,aiming at glory and esteem for 
their great and  universal knowledge, (easier a great  deal 
to be pretended to than really acquired) found this n 
good expedient to corer their ignorance with a curious 
and iilesplicable web of perplexed words, and procure 
to  themselves the admiration of others by unintelligible 
terms, thc apter to produce wonder, because tl~cycould 
llot  be understood: whilst it appears in all history, that 
tllese profound doctors were no wiser, nor more usef~ll, 
than their neiglibours;  and brought but small advarl- 
tap  to human life, or the societies wherein they lived; 
unless the coining of new words,  where they produced 
no new things to apply them to, or the perplexing or 
obscuring the signification of old ones,  and so bringing 
all things into question and dispute, were a thing pro- 
fitable to the life of inan, or worthy commenclatiorl and 
reward. 
9. For not.cvithstanding these learnecl  Tllis learn- 
disputants,  these all-know~ng  doctors,  it  ing very 
was to the unscholastic statesman that the  little bene- 
governments of the  world owed their  peace,  fits society. 
defence, and liberties; and from the illiterate and con- 
temlied  mechanic (a  name of disgrace) that they re- 
ceived the improvcmcnts of useful arts.  Nevertheless, 
this artificial ignorance and learned gibberish prevailed 
mightily in these last ages, by the ii~tercst  and artifice 
of those who found no easier way to  that pitch of autho- 
rity and doininion they have attained, than by amusing 
.the men of business and ignorant with hard words, or 
employing the ingenious and idle in intricate disputes 
about unintelligible  terms,  and  holding them  per- 
petually entangled in that endless labyrinth.  Besides, 
there is no such way to gain admittance, or give de- 
fence to strange  and  absurd doctrines,  as  to guard 
them round about with legions of  obscure, doubtful, 
and undefined words : ~vhich  yet make these retreats 
more like the (lens of  robbers,  or holes of foxes, than 
the fortresses of fair warriors ;  which  if it be liarci to 
get them out of,  it is not for tlie streiigth that is in 
them,  but the briars and thorns,  and the obscurity 
of  the  thickets  they  are beset  with.  For untrutll 
being  unacceptable to the mind of man, there is no 
other defence left for absurdity but obscurity. 
9  10. Thus learned ignorance, and this  13utdestrcjys 
art of keeping, even inquisitive men, from  the instru- 
true kno~vledge,  hath bcen propagated in  ments 
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knowledge  the  world,and hath much perplexed, whilst 
and~~mnu*  it pretended to inform the understanding. 
nication.  For we see that other well-meaning and 
wise men, whose education and parts had not acquired 
that acuteness, could intelligibly express themselves to 
one another; and in its plain use make a benefit of lan- 
guage. But though unlearned men well enough under- 
stood the words white and black, &c. and had constant 
notions of  the ideas signified by those words; yet there 
were philosophers found, who had learning and subtilty 
enough to prove,  that snow was black ; i. e.  to prove 
that white was black.  Whereby they had the advan- 
tage to destroy  the  instruments  and  means  of  dis- 
course, conversation,  instruction, and society;  whilst 
with great art and subtilty they did no more but per- 
plex  and  confound  the  sigr~ification  of  words;  and 
thereby render language less useful than the real de- 
fects of it had made it; a gift, which the illiterate had 
not attained to. 
useful as  5  11. These  learned  men did  equal17 
to confound  instruct men s understandings, and profit 
the sound of  their lives, as he who should alter the sig- 
the  letters'  nification of  known characters, and by a 
subtle  device  of  learning,  far  surpassing the capa- 
city of the illiterate,  dull,  and vulgar,  should, in his 
writing,  show that he could  put A  for B,  and D for 
E, &c.  to the no  small  admiration  and  benefit of 
his reader :  it being as senseless to put black,  which 
is  a word  agreed  on  to  stand for one  sensible idea, 
to put it,  I  say,  for  another, or the  contrary  idea, 
i.e. to call snow black,  as to put this mark A, which 
is a character agreed on to stand for one modification 
of sound, made by a certain motion of  the organs of 
speech,  for  B; which  is  agreed  on  to  stand  for 
another modification of  sound,  made by another cer- 
tain mode of the organs of speech. 
This art has  $12.  Nor hath this mischief stopped in 
perplexed  logical niceties, or curious empty specula- 
and  tions ; it hath invaded the great concern- 
justice.  ments of human life and society, obscured 
perplexed the material truths of law and divinity; 
brought confi~sion,  disorder, and uncertainty into the 
affairs  of mankind; and if not destroyed, yet in a great 
measure rendered useless, these two great rules,religion 
and  justice.  What have the greatest part of the com- 
rnents  and disputes upon  the laws of  God  and man 
served for,  but to make the meaning more  doubtful, 
and perplex the sense? What have been the effect of 
those multiplied curious distinctions and acute niceties, 
but obscurity and uncertainty, leaving the words more 
unintelligible,  and the reader more  at a loss?  How 
else comes it to pass that princes, speaking or writing 
to their servants, in their ordinary commands, are easily 
understood;  speaking to their people, in their laws, are 
not so?  And, as I remarked before, doth it not often 
happen, that a man of an ordinary capacity very well 
understands a text or a lam that he reads, till he con- 
sults an expositor, or goes  to counsel ; who,  by that 
time he hath done explaining them, makes the words 
signify either nothing at all, or what he pleases. 
5 13. Whether any by-interests of these  ~,d  aught 
professions have occasioned this, I will not  not to pass 
here  examine; but I leave it to be consi-  for learning. 
dered,  whether  it  would  not  be well for  mankind, 
whose concernment it is to know things as they are, and 
to do what they ought,  and  not  to spend their lives 
in talking about them,  or tossing words to and fro; 
whether  it would  not be well, I say,  that the use  of 
words were made plain and direct, and that language, 
which was given us for the iniprovement of knowledge 
and bond of society, should not be employed to  darken 
truth,  and unsettle people's  rights;  to raise  mists, 
and render unintelligible both morality and religion ? 
Or that at least, if this will  happen, it should not be 
thought learning or knowledge to do so ? 
$ 14.  Fourthly, another great abuse of  4. Talting 
words is the taking them for things.  This,  them for 
though it  in some degree  concerns all names  things. 
in general, yet more particularly affects those of sub- 
T 2 stanccs.  To this  abuse those mcn  are most  subject 
who most  confine their thoughts to any one system, 
and give themselves up into a  firm belief of the per- 
fection of any received hypothesis; whereby they come 
to  be persuaded, that the terms of that sect are so suited 
to  the nature of things, that they perfectly correspond 
with their real existencc.  Who  is there, that has been 
bred 111)  in  the Peripatetic pl~ilosopl~y,  who does not 
think the ten names, under which are ranked the ten 
l~edicaincnts,  to  he  exactly conformable  to the na- 
ture of things ?  Who is  there of  that school that is 
not persuacled, that substantial forms, vegetative souls, 
abhorrcncc of  a vacuum, intentiorla1 species, &c.  are 
something real ?  These words men have learned from 
their very entrancc upon knowledge, and have found 
their masters and systems lay great stress upon them; 
and  therefore  thcy cannot quit the  opinion, that  they are 
conformable to nature, and arc the representations of 
something that really exists.  The  Platonists have their 
soul of the world, and tlic Epicureans their endeavour 
towards motion  in their atoms, whcn  at rest.  There 
is scarce any sect in philosophy has not a distinct set 
of  terms,  that others  undcrstanci not; but yet  this 
gibberish, wllich,  in  the weakness  of  human  under- 
standing,  serves so well  to palliate  men's  ignorance, 
and cover their errors, comes, by familiar use amongst 
those of the same tribe,  to seem the most important 
part of language, and of all other the terms the most 
significant.  And should aerial and atherial vehicles 
come once, by the prevalency of that doctrine,  to be 
generally received  any where,  no doubt those  terms 
would make impressions on men's  minds, so as to esta- 
l~lish  them  in the persuasion  of  the reality of  such 
things, as much as Peripatetic forms  arid  intentional 
species have heretofore done.  - 
Instance,  in  15. How much names taken for things 
matter.  are apt to mislead the understanding, the 
attentive reading of philosophical writers 
would abundantly  discover ;  and that, perhaps, in words 
little suspected of any such misuse.  I shall instance in 
one only, and that a very familiar one:  how many in- 
tricate disputeshave there  been about matter,asif there 
were some such thing really in nature, distinct from 
body;  as it is evident the word  matter stands for an 
idea distinct from the idea of bocly!  For if the ideas 
these two terms stood for were precisely the same, they 
indiff'erently,in all places, be put for one another. 
But we see,  that though it be proper to say, there is 
one matter of all bodies,  one cannot say there is one 
body of allmatters :  we familiarly say,one body is bigger 
than another; but it sounds harsh (and I think is never 
used) to say,one matter is bigger than another. Whence 
comes this then?  viz. from hence,  that though matter 
and body be not really distinct, but wherever there is 
the one there is the other; yet matter and body stand 
for two different  conceptions, whereof  the  one is in- 
complete, and but a part of the other.  For body stands 
for a solid extended figured substance, whereof matter 
is but a partial and more confused conception, it seem- 
ing to me to be used for the substance and solidity of 
body, without taking in its extension and figure : and 
therefore it is that speaking of matter, we speak of it 
always as one, because in  truth it expressly contains 
nothing but the  idea of a solid substance, whicll is every 
where the same, every where uniform.  This being our 
idea of matter, we  110  more  conceive or speak of dif- 
ferent matters in the world than we do of  different so- 
lidities; though we both conceive and speak of different 
bodies, because extension and figure are cxpablc of va- 
riation.  But since solidity cannot exist without exten- 
sion and figure, the taking matter to be the name of 
something really existing under that precision has  no 
doubt produced those obscure and uriintelligible dis- 
courses and disputes,  which have filled the heads and 
books of philosophers, concerning  materiaprima ;  which 
imperfection or abuse, how far it may concern a great 
many other general terms,  I leave  to be considered. 
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a great many fewer disputes in the world, if words were 
taken for what they are,  the signs of  our ideas only, 
and not for things  themselves.  For when we  argue 
about matter, or any the like term, we truly argue only 
about the idea we express by that sound, whether that 
precise idea agree to any thing really existing in na- 
ture or no.  And if  men would  tell what ideas they 
make their words  stand  for,  there could  not be half 
that obscurity or wrangling, in the search or support 
of truth, that there is. 
Thismakes  § 16.  But whatever inconvenience fol- 
errors last-  lows from this mistake of words, this I am 
ing.  sure, that by constant and familiar use they 
charm men into notions  far remote from the truth of 
things.  It would be a hard mutter to persuade any one 
that the words which  his father or schoolmaster, the 
parson  of  the parish, or such a reverend doctor used, 
signified nothing that really existed in nature ;  which, 
perhaps, is none of  the least causes  that men are so 
hardly drawn to quit their mistakes, even in opinions 
purely philosophical,  and where they have no  other 
interest but truth.  For the words they have  a long 
time been used to remaining firm in  their minds, it is 
no wonder that the wrong notions  annexed to them 
should not be removed. 
5. Setting  $ 17. Fifthly,  another abuse of words, 
them for  is the setting them in the place of things 
what they  which they do or can by no means signify. 
cannot sig-  We  may observe, that in the  general names 
nify.  of substances,whereof the  nominalessences 
are only known to us, when we put them into propo- 
sitions, and affirm or deny any thing about them, we 
do  most commonly tacitly suppose,or intend  they should 
stand for the real essence of a certain sort of substances. 
For when a man says gold is malleable, he means and 
would insinuate something more than this, that what I 
call gold is malleable, (though truly it amounts to no 
more) but would have this understood, viz. that gold, 
i.  e. what has the real  essence of gold, is malleable; 
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which amounts to thus much, that malleableness de- 
pends on, and is inseparable from, the real essence of 
gold.  But a man not knowing wherein that realessence 
consists, the connexion in his mind of malleableness is 
truly with an essence he knows not, but only with 
the sound gold he puts for it.  Thus when we say, that 
allimal  rationalt. is,  and  animal  implume b@es  latis 
unAruibus is not a good definition of a man ;  it is plain, 
we suppose the name man in this case to stand for the 
real essence of a species, and would signify, that a ra- 
tional animal better described that real essence than a 
two-legged animal with broad nails, and without fea- 
thers.  For else, why might not Plato as properly make 
the word dvOpwaos,  or man, stand for his complex idea, 
made up of the  idea of abody, distinguished from others 
by a certain shape and other outward appearances, as 
Aristotle make the co~nplex  idea, to which he gave the 
name oZvOpwao{,  or man,  of body and the faculty of rea- 
soning joined  together; unless  the name  a"vefwao5,  or 
man, were supposed to stand for something else than 
what it signifies ;  and to be put in the place of some 
other thing than the idea  a man professes  he would 
express by it ? 
$18. It  is true, the names of substances  v.g, Putting 
would be much more useful, and proposi-  them for the 
tions  made in thein much  more certain,  realessences 
were the real essences  of  substances the  of 
ideas  in  our  minds  which  those  words  stances. 
signified.  And it is  for want  of  those real essences 
that  our words  convey  so  little  knowledge  or  cer- 
tainty  in  our discourses  about them : and  therefore 
the mind,  to remove  that imperfection as much as it 
can,  makes  them,  by  a  secret  supposition,  to stand 
for  a  thing,  having  that real  essence,  as if thereby 
it made some  nearer  approaches  to it.  For though 
the word man or gold signify nothing truly but a com- 
idea of properties united  together in one sort of 
substances;  yet there is scarce any body in the use of 
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to stand for a thing having the real essence, on which 
these prope~ties  depend.  Which is so far from dimi- 
nishing tlic imperfection of our words, that by a plain 
abuse it adds to it when we would make them stand 
for something,  which  not being in our complex idea, 
the name we use can no wavs be the sign of. 
J  V 
I-Iencc we  $ 19. This shows us the reason why in 
think ever"  illixed modes any of the ideas, that make 
change of'  the coinposition bf the complex one, being 
Our  idea in  left out or changed,  it is  allowed  to be 
substances 
not to  another thing,  i. e.  to be of another spe- 
change the  cies : it is  plain  in  chance-medley, man- 
species.  slaughter,  murder,  parricide,  &c.  The 
reason whereof is,  because the complex idea signified 
by that name is the real as well as nominal essence ; 
and there is no secret  reference of  that name to any 
other csseiice but that.  But in substances it is not so. 
For though in tliat called gold one puts into his com- 
plex idea what  another leaves  out,  and uice uersa; 
pet men do not usually think that therefore the species 
is changed:  because they secretly in their minds refer 
that name,  and suppose it annexed to a real immuta- 
ble essence of  a  thing existing,  on which those  pro- 
perties depend.  He that adds to his  complex  idea 
of  old  that of  fixedness and solubility in aq. regia, 
which he put not in it before,  is  not thought to have 
changed the species ;  but only to have a more perfect 
idea, by adding another simple idea, which is always in 
fact joined with those other, of which his former com- 
plex idea consistecl.  But this reference of the name to  a 
thing, whereof we had not the idea, is so far from help- 
ing at all,  that it  only serves the more to involve us 
in difficulties.  For by this tacit reference to the real 
essence of that species of bodies, the  word gold (which, 
by  standing  for amore  or less  perfect  collection of simple 
ideas, serves to design tliat sort of body well enough in 
civil discourse)  comes to liave no  signification at all, 
being put for somewhat,whereof we have no idea at  all, 
arid so can signify nothing at all, when the body itself 
is away.  For however it  may be thought all one ;  yet, 
if well  considered, it will be  found a quite different 
thing to  argue about gold in name, and about a parcel 
in the body itself, v. g. a piece of leaf-gold  laid before 
us ;  though in discourse we are fain to substitute the 
name for the thing. 
$ 20. That which I  think  very  much  Thecauseof 
disposes men to  substitute their names for  ,bus,,  a 
the real essences of species, is the supposi-  supposition 
tion before-mentioned, that nature works  of nature's 
regularly in the  of things, and  z$i:&v 
sets the boundaries to each of those species,  larlv.  -.  .  -  J - 
by giving exactly  the  same  realinter41  con- 
stitution to each individual, which we rank under one 
general name.  Whereas any one  who observes their dif- 
ferent qualities can hardly doubt, that many ofthe in- 
dividuals called by the same name, are, in their inter- 
nalconstitution, as different one from another  as several 
of those which are  ranked  under different specific names. 
This supposition, however, that the same precise and 
internal constitution goes always with  the same spe- 
cific name,  makes men  forward to take those names 
.for the representatives of those real  essences,  though 
indeed they signify nothing but the complex ideas they 
have in their minds when they use them.  So that, if 
I may so say, signifying one thing, and being supposed 
for, or put in the place of another, they cannot but, in 
such a kind of use, cause a  great deal of uncertainty 
in  men's  discourses;  especially  in  those  who  have 
thoroughly imbibed the doctrine of substantial forms, 
whereby they  firmly  imagine the several  species  of 
things to be determined and distinguished. 
$ 21. But howeverpreposterous and ab-  This abuse 
surd it  be to  make  our  names stand for ideas  containstwo 
we have not, or (which is all one) essences 
~:EPP~-  that we know not, it being  in effect to  make 
our words the signs of nothing ; yet it  is evident to any 
one, who ever so little reflects on the use men make of 
their words, that there is nothing more familiar.  When 28  2  Abzrse  OJ  Words.  Book 8. 
a man asks whether this or that thing he sees, let it  be 
a drill, or a monstrous fet~ls,  be a man or no ;  it is evi- 
dent, the question is not, whether that  particular thing 
agree to his complex idea, expressed by the name man ; 
but whether it has in it the real essence of a species of 
things, which he supposes his name man to stand for. 
In which may of using the names of  substances there 
are these false suppositions contained. 
First, that there are certain precise essences, accord- 
ing  to  which nature  makes all particular things, and by 
which they are distinguished into species.  That every 
thing has a real constitution, whereby it is what it is, 
and on which  its sensible  qualities  depend,  is  past 
doubt ;  but I think it has been proved, that this makes 
not the distinction of  species,  as we  rank them,  nor 
the boundaries of their names. 
Secondly, this tacitly also insinuates,  as if we had 
ideas of these proposed essences.  For to what purpose 
else is it  to  inquire whether this or that thing have the 
real essence of the species man, if we did not suppose 
that there were such as pecific essence known? which 
yet is utterly false : and therefore such application of 
names, as would make them stand for ideas which we 
have  not,  must needs  cause  great  disorder  in  dis- 
courses and reasonings about them, and be a great  in- 
convenieuce in our communication by words. 
6.  A suppo-  $22.  Sixthly, there remains yet another 
sition  more  general, though  perhapsless observed, 
wordshave a 
certain and  abuse of words :  and that is, that men hav- 
evident sig-  ing by a long and familiar use annexed to 
nification.  them certain ideas, they  are apt  to imagine 
so near and necessary a connexion between the  names 
and the signification they use them in, that they for- 
wardly suppose one cannot but understand what their 
meaning is ;  and therefore one  ought  to  acquiesce in the 
words delivered,  as if it were past doubt,  that, in the 
use of those common received sounds, the speaker and 
hearer had necessarily the same precise ideas.  Whence 
presuming, that when they have in  discourse used any 
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term, they  have thereby,as itwere, set before others the 
very thing they talk of; and so  likewise taking the 
words of others as naturally stariding for just what they 
tl~emselveshave  been accustomed to apply  them to, they 
never trouble themselves to explain their own, or un- 
derstaild clearly others' meaning.  From whence com- 
monly proceed noise and wrangling, without improve- 
ment or information; whilst men take words to be the 
constant  rcgular marks of  agreed notions, which  in 
truth are no more but the voluntary and unsteady siglls 
of their own ideas.  And yet men think it strange, if in 
discourse, or (where it is often  absolutely necessary) 
in dispute,  one sometimes  asks the  meaning of their 
terms: though the arguings one may every day observe 
in  conversation  make it evident, that there are few 
names of complex ideas which any two men use for the 
same just precise collection.  It is hard to name a word 
which will  not be a  clear instance of this.  Life is a 
term, none more familiar.  Any one almost would take 
it for an affront to be asked what he meant by it.  And 
yet if it comes in question,  whether a,  plant,  that lies 
ready formed in the seed, have life; whether the em- 
bryo in  an egg before  incubation,  or a  man  in  a 
swoon without sense  or motion, be alive  or no; it is 
easy to perceive that a clear, distinct, settled idea does 
not always accompany the use of so known a word as 
that of life is.  Some gross and confused conceptions 
men  indeed  ordinarily have,  to which they apply the 
common words  of  their language; and such a  loose 
use of  their words serves  them well  enough in their 
ordinary discourses or affairs.  But this is  not suffi- 
cient for philosophical inquiries.  Knowledge and rea- 
soning require precise determinate ideas.  And though 
men will not be so importunately dull, as not to under- 
stand what others say without demanding an expli- 
cation of their terms; nor so troublesomely critical, as 
to correct others in the use of the words they receive 
from them ;  yet where truth and knowledge are con- 
cerned in the case, I know not what fault it can be to 284  Abuse (g  CYords.  Book 3. 
desire  the  explication  of words  whose  sense  seems 
dubious; or why a man should be ashamed to own his 
ignorance  in what sense another man uses his words, 
since he has no other way of certainly knowing it but 
by being informed.  This abuse of taking words upon 
trust has nowhere spread so far, nor with so ill effects, 
as amongst men of letters.  The  multiplication and ob- 
stinacy of disputes, which have so laid waste the intel- 
lectual world, is owing to  nothing more than to this 
ill use of words.  For though it be generally believed 
that there is great diversity of opinions in the volumes 
andvariety of controversies the  world is distracted with, 
yet the most I can find that the contending learned 
men of different parties do, in their arguings one with 
another, is,  that they speak different languages.  For 
1 am apt to imagine, that when any of  them, qnitting 
terms, think upon things,  and know what they think, 
they think  all the same ; though pefhaps what they 
would have, be different. 
The ends of  $  23. TO  conclude  this  consideration 
language :  of the  imperfection and abuse of language; 
1.Toconve~ the ends of language in our discourse with 
our ideas.  others being chiefly these three:  first,  to 
make known one man's  thoughts or ideas to another; 
secondly,  to do it  with as much ease and quickness as 
possible;  and,  thirdly, thereby to convey the know- 
ledge  of  things:  language  is  either  abused or  de- 
ficient when it fails of any of these three. 
First,words fail in the first of these ends, and lay not 
open one man's  ideas to another's view:  1. When men 
have names in their mouths without any determinate 
ideas in their minds, whereof they are  the signs ;  or,  8. 
When they apply the conimon received names of any 
language  to ideas,  to which the common use of that 
language does not apply them :  or, 3. When they  apply 
them very unsteadily, making them stand now for one, 
and by and by for another idea. 
2.  To do it  §  24.  Secondly, men fail of conveying 
their thoughts with all the quickness and 
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ease tlint may be, wlien they liavc COIII~~CX  x\-itll tluicl<- 
ideas without  having any distinct names  ness. 
for  them.  This is  sometimes the  fnnlt  of  tlic  Inn- 
page  itself, which has not in it a  sound yet apl)lictl 
to such a signification; and sometimes thc fault of the 
man, wlro has not yet learneil the name for tll:~t   id^:^ 
]le would sholv another. 
$  95. Thirdly, there is no knowledge  R. Tilrre- 
of things conveyed  by men's words, wlicn  to 
their  ideas  agree not  to the  reality of  vey the 
things.  Though it be a defect,  that has 
of things.  its original in our ideas,  which are not so 
conformable to  the nature of things,as attention, study, 
and application might inake them ; yet it fails not to 
extend itself to our words  too, when we use them as 
signs of  real beings, which  jet never 11nd  any reality 
or existence. 
$ 86.  Iqirst, he that hat11 worcls of any 
language. without  distinct  ideas  in  Iris  ~~~~~~~'~n  mind to which hc  applies  them, does,  so  tllese. 
far  as he uses  them  in  discourse,  only 
make a noise ~vithont  any sense or signification ; and 
how Icaarnid socver he  may seem by the  use of lrard words 
or learned terms, is not much more advanced thereby 
in knowledge than he would be  in learning, who had 
nothing  in his  study but the bare  titlcs  of  books, 
without possessing the contents of them.  For a11  such 
words,  however put into discourse,  according to the 
right  construction  of  grammatical rules,  or the har- 
mony of well-turned periods,  do yet amount to nothing 
but bare sounds, and nothing else. 
5 27. Secondly, hc that lias complex idcas, without 
particular names for them, would be in no better case 
than a bookseller, who had in his ~varehouse  volunles 
that lay there unbound, and without titlcs ;  which he 
could therefore inake known to others only by shoning 
the loose sheets, and communicate then1 only by tale. 
This man is hindered in his discourse for want of words 
to communicate his comples idcas, which  he is there- 886  Abuse  of  Ft7ords.  Book 3. 
fore forced to make known  by an enumeration of the 
simple ones that compose them;  and so is fain often 
to use  twenty words,  to express  what  another  man 
signifies in one. 
§ 28.  Thirdly, he that puts not constantly the same 
sign for the same idea, but uses the same words some- 
times in one, and  somstinles  in another signification, 
ought to pass in the schools and conversation for as fair 
a man,  as he does in the market  and exchange, who 
sells several things under the same name. 
$29. Fourthly, he tliat applies the words of any lan- 
guage to ideas different from those to which the com- 
mon use of that country applies them, however his own 
understanding may be filled with truth and light, will 
not by such words  be  able  to convey much  of it to 
others, without defining  his terms.  For however the 
sounds  are such as  are familiarly known,  and easily 
enter the ears of those who are accustomed to them ; 
yet standing for other ideas than those  they usulally 
are annexed to, and are wont to excite in the mind of 
the hearers, they cannot make known the thoughts of 
him who thus uses them. 
5 30. Fifthly, he that imagined to himself substances 
such as never have been, and filled his head with ideas 
which have not any correspondence with the real na- 
ture  of  things,  to  which  yet he  gives  settled  and 
defined  names,  may fill his  discourse,  and  perhaps 
another man's  head, with the fantastical imsginittions 
of his own brain, but will be very far from advancing 
thereby one jot in real and true knowledge. 
§  31.  He tliat hat11  names  without ideas,  wants 
meaning in his words, and speaks only empty sounds. 
He that hath complex ideas without nanies ibr them, 
wants liberty and despatch in his expressions, and is 
necessitated  to use  periphrases.  He that  uses  his 
words loosely and unsteadily, will either be not minded, 
or not understood.  He illat applies his names to ideas 
different  from  their eomnlon use, wants propriety  in 
his language, and spea1:s  gibberisli.  And he that llath 
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the ideas of substances disagreeing with the real exist- 
ence  of  things,  so  far  wants  the materials  of  true 
knowledge  in his  understanding,  and  hath  instead 
thereof chimeras. 
$  39. In our  notions  concerning  sub- 
How  stances, we are liable to all the former in-  substances. 
co~~velliencies  :  v. g. he tliat uses the word 
tarantula, without having  any imagination or idea of 
what it stands for,  pronounces a good word ; but so 
long means nothing at all by it.  2. He that in a new- 
discovered country shall see  several sorts of  animals 
and vegetables, unknown to him before, may have as 
true  ideas  of  them  as of  a  horse  or  a  stag; but 
can speak of  them  only by a description, till he  shall 
either  take  the  names  the natives  call  them by, or 
give them names himself.  3.  He that uses the word 
body sometimes for pure extension, and sometimes for 
extension  and  solidity together,  will  talk very falla- 
ciously.  4. He  that gives the name horse to that idea, 
which common usage calls mule, talks improperly, and 
will not be understood.  5.  He that thinks the name 
centaur stands for some real being, imposes on himself, 
and mistakes words for things. 
§ 33. In modes arid relations generally 
How in  we are liable only to the four first of these  ,,aes  .,a 
inconveniencies ; viz. 1. I may have in my  relations. 
memory the names of modes, as gratitude 
or charity, and yet not have any precise ideas annexed 
in my thoughts to those names.  I.  I may have ideas, 
and not know the names that belong to them ;  v. g. I 
lnay have the idea of  a man's  drinking till his colour 
and humour be  altered,  till his tongue trips,  and his 
eyes look red, and his feet fail him ;  and yet not know, 
that it is to be called drunkenness.  3. I may have the 
ideas  of  virtues or  vices,  and  names also, but apply 
them amiss :  v. g. when I apply the name frugality to 
that idea which others call and signify by this sound, 
covetousness.  4. I may use any of those names with 
inconstancy.  5. But, in modes and relations, 1 cannot 
have ideas disagreeing to the existence of things : for 98s  Abtrse  oJ'  Words.  Book 3. 
nlodes bcing complex ideas made by the mind at plea- 
sure ; and relation being but by way of considering  or 
colnparing two things together, and so also all idea of 
my own making;  these ideas can scarce  be found to 
disagree with any thing existing, since they are not 
in the mirid as the copies of things regularly made by 
nature, nor as properties inseparably flowing from tlic 
internal constitution or essence of any substance; but 
as ii,  were patterns lodged in my memory, with names 
annexed to them, to denonlirlate actions and relations 
by,  as  they come to exist.  But the mistake is com- 
monly  in  my  giving  a  wrong  name to my concep- 
tions;  and so using words  in  a different  sense from 
other  I am not understood,  but am thouglit 
to  have  wrong  ideas  of  them,  when I  give  wrong 
names to them.  Only if I put in my ideas of  mixed 
modes or  relations any inconsistent  ideas together, I 
fill my head  also wit11 chimeras;  since  such ideas, if 
well examined, cannot so much as exist in the mind, 
much less  any real  being ever be clenominated  from 
them. 
7.Fiqrative  5 34,. Since wit and fai~y  find casier en- 
speech also  tertainment  in  the world  than dry truth 
an abuse of  and  real kiio~vledge,  figurative specches 
*""gUage.  and  allusion  in  language n  ill  linrtlly be 
admitted as an imperfection or abuse  of  it.  I  con- 
fess, in discourses where we seek rather pleasure and 
delight than information and improvement, such orna- 
ments as are borrowed fro111  them can scarce pass for 
faults.  But yet if we would speak of things as they are, 
we  must allow that all the  art of  rhetoric,  besides 
order and clearness,  all the artificial  and  figurative 
application of words eloquence hath invented, are for 
nothing  else  but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the 
passions, and thereby mislead the  judgment, and so in- 
deed are  perfect cheats, and therefore,however laudable 
or allowable  oratory may render  them in harangues 
and popular addresses,  tliey are certainly, in all dis- 
courses that prete~itl  to inform  or instruct, wholly to 
be a\oiclccl ; a~ltl  I\ hcre trgtli ili~tl  k~io;,lcdgc  arc coil- 
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cerned, cannot but be thought a great fault, either of 
tlie  language  or  person  that  makes  use  of  them. 
What, and how various tliey are, will  be  superfluous 
here to take  notice;  the  books  of  rlietoric  which 
abound  in the world will  instruct those who want to 
be informed :  only I cannot but observe how little the 
and improvement of truth and knowledge 
is the care and concern of inankind ;  since the arts of 
fallacy are endowed and preferred.  It  is evident how 
much men love to deceive and be dcceived, since rhe- 
toric,  that powerful  instrument  of  error and deceit, 
has its established  professors, is publicly taught, and 
has always been had in great reputation :  and, 1 doubt 
not, but it will be thought great boldness, if not bru- 
tality in me, to have said thus much against it.  Elo- 
quence, like the fair sex, has too  prevailing  beauties 
in it to su&r  iteelf  ever to be spoken against.  And 
it is in vain to find fault with those  arts of  deceiving 
wherein men find pleasure to be deceived. 
CHAPTER XI. 
Of the Remedies qf  the  foregoing  Impe  flections  and 
Abztses. 
1. THE  natural and improved imper- 
They are  fections of languages we have seen above  ,,&-  at large;  and  speech  being  the great  ing. 
bond that holds society together, and the 
common conduit whereby the improvements of know- 
ledge  are conveyed from  one  man,  and one genera- 
tion to another; it would well  deserve  our most se- 
rious  thoughts to consider what  remedies  are to be 
found for the inconveniencies above-mentioned. 
5 8. I am not so vain to think, that any 
Are  oy.  one can pretend to attempt the perfect re- 
forming the languages of the world, no, not so much as 
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of his own country, without rendering himself ridicu- 
lous.  To require that men should use their words con- 
stantly in the same sense, and for none but determined 
and uniform ideas,would be to think that all men should 
have the same notions, and should talk of nothing but 
what they have clear and distinct ideas of; which is not 
to be expected by any one, who hath not vanity enough 
to imagine lie can prevail with men to be very knowing 
or very silent.  And he must be very little skilled in 
the world, who thinks that a voluble tongue shall ac- 
company only a good  understanding;  or  that men's 
talking much or little should hold proportion only to 
their knowledge. 
~~t  yet ne-  5 3.  Rut though the market  and ex- 
cessary to  change must be left to their own ways of 
~hil~so~~~.  talking, and gossipings not be robbed  of 
their ancient privilege ;  though the schools and men of 
argument would  perhaps take it amiss  to have  any 
thing  offered to abate the length, or  lessen the num- 
ber, of  thcir disputes :  yet methinks those who pretend 
seriously  to search  after  or  maintain  truth,  should 
think  themselves  obliged  to  study how  they might 
deliver themselves without obscurity, doubtfulness, or 
equivocation, to which men's  words are naturally lia- 
ble, if care be not taken. 
Misuse of  $ 4. For he that shall well consider the 
words  the  errors  and  obscurity,  the  mistakes  and 
great cause  confusion,  that are  spread in  the world 
of errors.  by an ill use of words, will find some rea- 
soil to doubt whether  language,  as it has  been  em- 
ployed, has contributed  more to the improvement or 
hinderance  of  knowledge  amongst  mankind.  How 
many are there that, when they would think on things, 
iix their thoughts only oil words, especially when they 
would apply their minds to moral matters?  And who 
then can wonder, if the result of such contemplations 
and reasonings, about little more than sounds, whilst 
the ideas they annexed to them are very confused and 
very unsteady, or perhaps none at all,-who  can won- 
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der, I say, that such thoughts and reasonings end in 
nothing but obscurity and mistake, without any clear 
i~lilpment  or knowledge ? 
J ----0  <, 
§ 5. This inconvenience, in an ill use of 
words, men suffer in their own private me- 
ditations : but much more minifest are the disorders 
which follow from it, in  conversation,  discourse,  and 
arguing~  with others.  For language being the great 
conduit whereby men convey their discoveries, reason- 
ings,  and knowledze, from  one  to another; he that 
makes an ill use of it, though he does not corrupt the 
fountains of knowledge, which are in things themselves; 
yet he does, as much as in him lies, break or stop the 
pipes, whereby it is distributed to the public use and 
advantage of  mankind.  He that uses words without 
any clear and steady meaning, what does he but lead 
himself and others into errors ?  And he that designedly 
does it, ought to be looked on as an enemy to truth and 
knowledge.  And  yet who  can wonder  that  all the 
sciences  and parts of  knowledge  have been so over- 
charged with obscure and equivocal terms, and insigni- 
ficant and doubtful expressions, capable to make the 
.most attentive or quick-sighted very little or not at  all 
the more knowing or orthodox; sincc subtilty, in those 
who  make  profession  to teach  or  defend truth, hath 
passed so much for a virtue :  a virtue,  indeed, which, 
consisting for the most  part in nothing but the falla- 
cious and illusory use of obscure or deceitful terms, is 
only fit to  make men more conceited in their ignorance, 
and more obstinate in their errors. 
$ 6.  Let us look into the books of con-  And wran- 
troversy of  any kind ;  there we shall see,  gling. 
that  the effect  of  obscure,  unsteady, or 
equivocal terms, is nothing  but noise  and wrangling 
about sounds, without convincing or bettering a man's 
understanding.  For if the idea be not agreed on be- 
twixt  the speaker  and hearer,  for which  the words 
stand, the argument is  not about things, but names. 
AS  often  as  such a word, whose  signification is not 
u e ascertained betwixt tl~em,  comes  in use, their  under- 
standings  hare  no  other object wherein  they agree, 
but barely the  sound; the  things that they tliink on 
at that time, as expressed  by that word,  bcing quite 
different. 
$ 7.  Whether a bat be a bird  or no, is 
Instance, bat 
arid bird.  not a question; whether a bat be another 
thing than indeed it  is, or have other qua- 
lities than indeed it has, for that would be extremely 
absurd  to tlouht  of:  but  the  qiicstion  is,  1.  Either 
betn  eeri tliose  that  acknowledge  themselves to have 
but  impcrfcct  ideas  of  one  or  both  of  this  sort  of 
things, for which these names are supposed to stand; 
and then it is a real inquiry concerning the name of a 
bird or a bat, to make their  yet iillpcrfect ideas of it 
more complete, by examining whether  all tlie simple 
ideas,  to wllic11,  combined  together,  they both  give 
the name bird, be all to be found in a bat: but this is 
a question only of inquirers (not  disputers) who  nei- 
ther affirm,  nor  deny,  but examine.  Or, 2. It is  a 
question between disputants, whereof the one affirms, 
and the othcr  denies, that a bat is n bird.  And then 
the question is  barely about the signification  of one 
or both  these words; in  that they not having  both 
tlie same con~plex  ideas, to which they give these two 
names, one l~olds,  and the other denies, that these two 
names  may be  affirmed one of  another.  Were they 
agreed in the signification of these two names, it were 
impossible they should  dispute  about them :  for they 
would  presently and clearly cce  (were  that adjusted 
between them) whether  all the simple ideas,  of  the 
more general name bird, were found in the comples 
idea of 3 bat, or no ;  and so there could be no doubt, 
whether a bat were  bird  or no.  And here I desire 
it  may be considered, and carefully examined, whether 
the greatest part of the disputes in the world are not 
merely verbal,  and about the signification of words ; 
and whether,  if the terms they are made in were de- 
fined, and reduced in their signification (as they must 
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be  they  signify  anything)  to determined  col- 
lections  of  tlie  simple  idens they do or should stand 
for, those  disputes would not end of  themselves, and 
immediately vanish.  I leave it then to be considered, 
what  the learning  of  disputation is,  and  how  well 
they are employed for the aclval~tage  of themselves or 
others, whose  business is only the vain ostentation of 
sounds ; i. e. those who  spend their  lives  in disputes 
and  controversies.  When I  shall  see  any  of  those 
strip  all  his terms of ambiguity and ob- 
scurity (which every one may do in the words he uses 
himself) I shall think him a champion for knowledge, 
truth, and peace, and not the slave of vain-glory, arn- 
bition, or a party. 
$ 8.  To  remedy the defects of  speech before-men- 
tioned to some degree, and to prevent the inconveni- 
encies  that follow from them, I imagine the observa- 
tion of these following rules may be of use, till some. 
body  better  able shall judge  it worth his  while to 
think  more  maturely on this  matter,  and oblige the 
world with his thoughts on it. 
First, a man  shall take care to use no  ~~~~d~, 
word  without  a  signification,  no  name  to use no 
without  an  idea for  which  he makes  it  word with- 
stand.  This rule will riot seem altogether  aut an idea. 
needless  to any one who  shall  take  the  pains to re- 
collect how often he has met with such words,  as in- 
stinct,  sympathy and antipathy, 8.c.  in the discourse 
of others, so made use of, as he might easily conclude, 
that those that used them had no Ideas in their minds 
to which they applied them; but spoke them only as 
sounds,  which  usuully  served  instead  of  reasoils  on 
the like  occasions.  Not but  that these  words,  and 
the like, have very proper significations in which they 
may be used ; but  there being  no natural connexion 
between  any  words  and  any ideas,  these,  and  any 
other, may  be  learned by  rote,  and pronounced  or 
writ by  men  who have  no  ideas in their  minds  to 
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make  them  stand ;  which is necessary they should, if 
men would speak intelligibly even to themselves alone. 
2. TO  have  $ 9.  Secondly, it is not  enough a man 
distinct ideas  uses  his  words  as  signs of  some  ideas : 
annexed  to  those he annexes them to, if they be sini- 
them in  ple, must be clear  and  distinct ;  if  com-  modes.  plex,  must  be  determinate, i.  e. the pre- 
cise  collection  of  simple  ideas  settled  in  the mind, 
with  that sound  annexed  to it,  as  the  sign of that 
precise determined collection,  and no other.  This is 
very  necessary  in  names  of  modes,  and  especially 
moral words ;  which  having  no  settled objects in na- 
ture, from whence their ideas are taken, as from their 
original,  are  apt to be  very  confused.  Justice is a 
word in every man's mouth, but most commonly with 
a very  undetermined  loose  signification : which  will 
always be so, unless a man has in his  mind a distinct 
comprehension of  the component parts that complex 
idea consists of: and if it be decompounded, must be 
able to resolve  it still on, till he at last comes to the 
simple ideas that make it up :  and unless this be done, 
a man makes an ill use of the word, let it be justice, 
for example, or any other.  I do not say, a man need 
stand to recollect,  and make this analysis  at large, 
every time  the word justice  comes  in  his way :  but 
this  at least  is  necessary, that he have so examined 
the signification of that name, and settled the idea of 
a11  its parts in his  mind, that he can  do it when he 
pleases.  If one, who makes his complex idea of jus- 
tice to be such a treatment of  the person or goods of 
another as is according to law, hath not a clear  and 
distinct idea what  law is, which makes a part of  his 
complex  idea of  justice,  it is plain his idea of  justice 
itself will be confused and imperfect.  This exactness 
will, perhaps, be judged very troublesol~le  ;  and there- 
fore  most  men will  think they may be excused from 
settling  the complex  ideas  of  mixed  modes  so  pre 
cisely in their minds.  But yet I must say, till this be 
done, it must not be wondered that they have a great 
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deal of obscurity and confusion  in  their own  minds, 
and a great deal of  wrangling in their discourse with 
others. 
5  10. In the names of substances, for a  And distinct 
right  use of  them,  something more is re-  and con- 
quired than barely determined ideas.  In  formable in 
these the names must also be conformable 
to things as they exist : but of this I shall have occa- 
sion to speak  more at large by and by.  This exact- 
ness is absolutely necessary in inquiries after philoso- 
phical  knowledge,  and in controversies  about truth. 
And though it would be well too if it extended  itself 
to common  conversation,  and the ordinary affairs of 
life; yet I think that is scarce to be expected.  Vul- 
gar notions suit vulgar  discourses ;  and both, though 
confused enough, yet serve pretty well the market and 
the wake.  Merchants  and lovers, cooks  and  tailors, 
have  words wherewithal  to despatch their  ordinary 
affairs;  and so, I think, might  philosophers  and dis- 
putants too, if they had a mind to understand, and to 
be clearlv understood. 
$  11. '~hirdl~,  it is  not enough  that  3. propriety, 
. men  have  ideas,  determined  ideas,  for 
which  they make  these  signs stand; but they must 
also take care to apply their words,  as  near  as  may 
be, to such ideas as common use has annexed them to. 
For  words,  especially of  languages already framed, 
being  no  man's  private  possession,  but  the  com- 
mon  measure of  commerce  and communication, it is 
not  for  any  one,  at pleasure,  to change  the  stam 
they are current in, nor  alter the ideas they are a[ 
fixed to; or  at least, when there is a necessity  to do 
so,  he is  bound  to give  notice  of  it.  Men's  inten- 
tions in speaking are, or at least should be, to be un- 
derstood ;  which cannot be without frequent explana- 
tions, demands, and other the like  incommodious  in- 
terruptions, where  men  do not  follow  common  use. 
Propriety of  speech is that which  gives our thoughts 
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ease  and  advantage:  arid  therefore  deserves  some 
part of our care and study, especially in the names of 
moral words.  The proper  signification  and  use of 
terms is best  to be learned from those who in their 
writings and discourses appear to have had the clear- 
est notions, and applied to them their terms with the 
exactest  choice  and  fitness.  This way  of  using  a 
man's  words,  according to the propriety of  the lan- 
guage, though it have  not  always the good fortune 
ta  be  understood,  yet  most  commonly  leaves  the 
blame of  it on  him, who  is  so unskilful  in  the lan- 
guage he speaks, as not to understand it, when made 
use of as it ought to be.  " 
$  12. Fourthly, but  because  common 
4. To make 
known their  use  .  has  .  not so visibly annexed any signi- 
meaning.  fication to words, as to make men  know 
always certainly what they precisely stand 
for;  and because  men, in the improvement  of  their 
kniwledge,  come to have ideas different from the vul- 
gar and  ordinary received ones, for which they must 
either make new words (which  men  seldom venture 
to do, for fear  of  being thought guilty of affectation 
or novelty) or else must use old  ones  in  a new signi- 
fication : therefore,  after the observation of the fore- 
going rules, it is  sometimes  necessary, for the ascer- 
taining the signification  of  words,  to declare their 
meaning ;  where either common use has left it uncer- 
tain and loose  (as it has in most names of very com- 
plex ideas) or where the term, being very material in 
the discourse, and that upon which it chiefly turns, is 
liable to any doubtfulness or mistake. 
And that  5  13. As the ideas men's  words stand 
three ways.  for  are of different sorts; so the way of 
making known the ideas they stand for, when there 
is occasion, is also different.  For though defining be 
thought the proper way to make known the proper 
signification of words,  yet there are some words that 
will not be defined, as there are others, whose precise 
meaning  cannot be  made known but by  definition; 
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and perhaps a third, which partake somewhat of both 
the other, as we shall see in the names of simple ideas, 
modes, and substances. 
5  14.  First, when a man makes use  of  ,.  In simple 
the name  of  any simple idea,  which  he  ideas, bysy- 
perceives is not understood, or is in danger  nonymous 
to be mistaken, he is obliged by the laws  terms> or 
of  ingenuity,  and the end of  speech,  to 
declare his  meaning, and make known what idea he 
makes it  stand for.  This, as has been shown, cannot be 
done by definition; and therefore, when a synonymous 
word fails to do it, there is but one of these ways left. 
First, sometimes the naming the subject, wherein that 
silnple idea is  to be found, will make its name to be 
understood by those who are acquainted with that sub- 
ject, and know it by that name.  So to make a couatry- 
man understand what "  feuille-morte" colour signifies, 
it may suffice to tell him, it is the colour of  withered 
leaves  falling  in  autumn.  Secondly,  but  the  only 
sure way  of  making  known  the signification  of  the 
name of any simple idea is by presenting to his senses 
that subject  which may  produce it in his mind,  and 
. make him actually have the idea that word stallds for. 
S 15. Secondly, mixed modes, especially  2. I,, mixed 
those  belonging  to morality, being  most  modes, by 
of them such combinations of ideas as the  definition. 
mind  puts  together  of  its own  choice,  and whereof 
there are not  always standing patterns to be found 
existing;  the signification of  their  names cannot  be 
made known, as those of simple ideas, by any showing; 
but, in recompense thereof, may be perfectly  and ex- 
actly defined.  For they being combinations of several 
ideas, that the mind of man has arbitrarilyput together, 
without reference to any archetypes, men may, if they 
please, exactly know the ideas that go to each com- 
position, and so both use these words in a certain and 
undoubted signification, and perfectly  declare, when 
there is occasion, what they stand for.  This, if well 
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not their discourses about moral things very clear and 
distinct.  For  since  the precise  signification  of  the 
names of  mixed modes,  or, which is all one, the real 
essence of each species is to be known, they being not 
of nature's  but man's  making, it is a great negligence 
and  perverseness  to discourse  of  moral things with 
uncertainty and obscurity;  which is more pardonable 
in treating of natural substances, where doubtful terms 
are hardly to be avoided, for a quite contrary reason, 
as we shall see by ar\d by. 
Morality ca-  $ 16. Upon this ground it is, that 1 am 
pable of de-  bold to think  that morality is capable of 
xnonstration.  demonstration,  as  well  as mathematics : 
since  the  precise  real  essence  of  the things  moral 
words stand for may be perfectly known ; and so the 
congruity and incongruity of  the things  themselves 
be  certainly  discovered;  in  which  consists  perfect 
knowledge.  Nor  let any one object, that the names 
of substances are often to be made use of in morality. 
as well as those of  modes,  from which will  arise ob- 
scurity.  For  as  to  substances,  when  concerned  in 
moral discourses, their divers natures are not so much 
inquired  into as  supposed; v.  g.  when  we  say that 
man is subject to law, we mean nothing by man but 
a corporeal rational  creature : what the real essence 
or other qualities of  that creature are, in this case, is 
no way considered.  And therefore,  whether a child 
or  changeling  be  a  man in  a  physical  sense,  may 
amongst the naturalists be as disputable as it will, it 
concerns not at all the moral man, as I may call him, 
which is this immoveable  unchangeable idea,  a cor- 
poreal rational being.  For were there a monkey, or 
any other creature, to be  found, that has the use  of 
reason to such a degree as to be  able to understand 
general signs, and to deduce consequences about ge- 
neral ideas, he would no doubt be subject to law, and 
in that sense be a man, how much  soever he differed 
in shape from  others  of  that name.  The names of 
substances, if  they be used  in them as they should, 
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call no more disturb moral than they do matllematical 
discourses : where,  if  the mathematician  speaks of  a 
cube  or  globe of gold, or any other body, he has his 
clear settled idea which varies not, though it may by 
mistake  be  applied  to a particular  body to which it 
belongs not. 
17.  This 1  have here mentioned by the  Definitions 
by, to show of what consequence it is for  can  make 
men, in their names of mixed modes, and  dis- 
collsequently in a11 their moral discourses,  courses clear. 
to define  their words when  there is  occasion : since 
thereby moral knowledge may be brought to so great 
clearness  and certainty.  And it must be great want 
of ingenuity (to say no worse of it) to refuse to do it: 
since a definition is the only way whereby the precise 
meaning of moral words can be known; and yet a way 
whereby their meaning may be known certainly, and 
without  leaving  any  room  for  any contest about it. 
And therefore the negligence or perverseness of man- 
kind cannot be excused, if their discourses in morality 
be  not  much  more  clear than those in  natural phi- 
losophy: since they are about ideas in the mind, which 
are none of them false or disproportionate :  they having 
no external beings for the  archetypes which they are 
referred to, and must correspond with.  It  is far easier 
for  men  to frame in their minds an idea which shall 
be  the standard  to which  they will  give  the name 
justice,  with which pattern, so made,  all  actions that 
agree shall pass under that denomination; than, having 
seen Aristides, to frame an idea that shall in all things 
be  exactly like him;  who  is  as he is, let men make 
what idea they please of him.  For the one, they need 
but  know the combination of  ideas that are put to- 
wether in their  own minds ; for the other, they must  a  Inquire into the whole  nature,  and  abstruse  hidden 
-- -- --- 
constitution, and various qualities of  a thing existing 
without them. 
$ 1s. Another reason that makes the de-  And is the 
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cially  of  moral  words,  is  what I mentioned  a  little 
before, viz. that it is the only way whereby the signi- 
fication of  the niost of  them can be  known with cer- 
tainty.  For  the ideas they stand for  being for  the 
most part such whose component parts nowhere exist 
together, but scattered and miogled with others, it is 
tlie mind alone that collects them, and gives them the 
union of one idea: and it  is only by wortls, enumerating 
the several simple ideas which  the mind  has united, 
that we can make known to others what their names 
stand for; the assistance of  the senses in this case not 
helping us, by the proposal of sensible objects, to show 
the ideas which our names of this kind stand for, as it 
does often in the names of  sensible  simple ideas, and 
also to some degree in those of substances. 
3. In sub-  § 19. Thirdly, for  the  explaining  the 
stances, by  signification of the names of substances, as 
showingant1  they stand for the ideas we  have of  their 
defining.  distinct species,  both the fore-mentioned 
ways, viz.  of  showing  and defining,  are requisite in 
many cases to be made use  of.  For there being or- 
dinarily in each sort some leading qualities, to which 
we suppose the other ideas, which  make up our com- 
plex idea of that spccies, annexed; we forwardly give 
t]le  specific name to that thing, wherein that cliarac- 
teristical mark is found, which we take to be the most 
distinguishing idea of that species.  These leading or 
characteri:;tical (as I may call them) ideas, in the sorts 
of  animals  and vegetables,  are (as  has  been  before 
remarked,  ch. vi.  S 29. and ch. ix. $  15.) mostly figure, 
and in inanimate bodies colour, and in some both to- 
gether.  NOW, 
Ideas of  the  $ 20.  These leading sensible  qualities 
leding qua-  are those which make the chief ingredients 
lities of  sub-  of  our  specific  ideas,  and corisequently 
stances are  the mostL  observable and invariable  part 
best got by  in the definitions of our specific names, as  showing. 
attributed to sorts of substances coming 
under  our  knowledge.  For though the sound man, 
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in its own nature, bc as apt to signify acomylcx idea, 
made  up of  animality ant1 ratio~ir!liiy, rlnited  in tlie 
same  sul~~ject,  as  to signify  ally  othcr  coinbinatioii; 
yet used as a mark to stantl for a sort of creatures we 
count of our own kind, perllaps, tlie outward slinpe is 
as necessary to be taken into our complex idea, signi- 
fied by the word man, as any othcr we find in it: anci 
therefore  why  I'lato's  "  animrrl  implunze  bipcs  lctis 
ungziibus" should not be a good definition of tlie name 
man, standing for that sort of  creatures, will  not be 
easy  to  show :  for  it is  tlle  slinpe,  as  the  leading 
quality, that seems  more  to determine  that species 
than a  faculty of  reasoning,  which  appears  not  at 
first, and in some never.  And if this be not allowed 
to be so, I clo  riot l<nolrr  how they can he excused from 
murder who kill  inoilstrous birtlis, (as  we call tl~em) 
because  of  an unordinary  shape,  without  knowing 
whether they have a ratiorkal  soul or 110;  which  can 
be no more discerned in a well-formed  than ill-shaped 
infant, as soon  born.  And who is it has informed 
us,  that  n  rational  soul  can  inhabit  no  tenemcnt, 
unless it lias just  such a sort of  frontispiece ; or can 
join  itself to, and inforin no sort of body but one that  *. 
is just of  such an outward structure? 
5  21.  Now these leading qualities  are best made 
known by showing, and can hardly be  made  known 
otherwise.  For  the shape of  an horse, or cassuary, 
will be but rudely and imperfectly imprinted on the 
mind by words;  the sight of  the  animals  doth it n 
thousand times better: and the idea of the particular 
colour of gold is not to be got by any description of 
it, but only by the frequent exercise of tlle eyes about 
it, as is evident  in those wlio  are used to this metal, 
who will frequently distinguish true from counterfeit, 
pure from adulterate, by the sight ;  where others (who 
have as good eyes,  but  yet  by use  have not got the 
precise  nice  idea of  that peculiar  yellow)  shall  not 
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those other simple ideas, peculiar in their kind to any 
substance, for which  precise ideas there are no pecu- 
liar names.  The particular ringing sound there is in 
gold, distinct from the sound of other bodies,  has no 
particular name  annexed to it, no more than the par- 
ticular yellow that belongs to that metal. 
The ideas of  5 22.  But because  many of the simple 
theirpowers  ideas that make up our specific  ideas of 
best by de-  substances are powers which  lie  not ob- 
finition.  vious to our  senses in the things as they 
ordinarily appear ;  therefore in the signification of our 
names of substances, some part of the signification will 
be better  made known by enumerating those  simple 
ideas than  by showing the substance itself.  For  he 
that to the yellow shining colour of gold got by sight, 
shall, from my enumerating them,  have  the ideas of 
great ductility, fusibility, fixedness,  and  solubility in 
aq. regia, will have a perfecter  idea of  gold than he 
can have by seeing a piece  of  gold, and thereby im- 
printing in his  mind only its obvious qualities.  But 
if the formal  constitution of  this shining, heavy, duc- 
tile thing (from whence all these its properties flow) 
lay open to our  senses, as the formal  constitution or 
essence of a triangle does, the signification of the word 
gold might as easily be ascertained as that of triangle. 
A reflection  $ 83. Hence we  may take  notice how 
ontheknow-  much the foundation of all our knowledge 
ledgeof syi-  of  corporeal  things  lies  in  our  senses. 
rits.  For  how  spirits,  separate  from  bodies 
(whose knowledge  and idens of these things are cer- 
tainly much more  perfect than ours) knolv them, we 
have no notion, no idea at all.  The whole extent of 
our knowledge  or  imagination  reaches  not  beyond 
our  own  ideas  limited  to  our  ways  of  perception. 
Though yet it be not to be doubted that spirits of a 
higher rank than those  immersed  in flesh may have 
as clear ideas of the radical constitution of  substances, 
as wo have of a triangle, and so perceive how all their 
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properties  and operations flow from thence : but the 
manner  liolv  they come  by that  knowledge  exceeds 
our conceptions. 
$ 04. But though  definitions will serve  4. Ideas also 
to explain the names of substances as they  ofsubstances 
stand for our ideas ;  yet they leave them  must be 
not  without  great imperfection  as  they  conforma- 
bleto things.  stand for things.  For our names of sub- 
stances being not put barely for our ideas, but being 
made use of ultimately to represent things, and so are 
put in their place ;  their signification must agree with 
the truth of things as well as with men's  ideas.  And 
therefore in substances we  are not  always to rest in 
the ordinary complex idea,  coinmonly received as the 
signification of that word, but must go a little farther, 
and  inquire into the nature  and  properties  of  the 
things themselves, and thereby perfect, as much as we 
can, our  ideas of their distinct  species ; or else learn 
them from such as are used to that sort of things, and 
are experienced i.1 them.  For since it is intended their 
names should stand for such collections of simple ideas 
as do really exist in things themselves, as well as for 
the complex idea in other men's  minds, which in their 
ordinary acceptation  they stand for: therefore to de- 
fine their names right, natural history is to be inquired 
into;  and  their  properties  are,  with  care  and exn- 
mination, to be found  out.  For it is not enough, for 
the avoiding  inconveniencies  in  discourse  and  argu- 
ings  about natural  bodies  and substantial things, to 
have learned, from the propriety of the language, the 
common,  but  confused,  or  very  imperfect  idea,  to 
which each word is applied, and to keep them to that 
idea in our use of them :  but we  must, by acquainting 
ourselves with the history of  that sort of things, rec- 
tify  and settle our  coinplex  idea  belonging to each 
specific  name;  and  in  discourse  with  others,  (if we 
find them mistake us) we ought to tell what the com- 
plex  idea is,  that  we  make  such a  name  stand for. 
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had occasion to consult them, will have reasoil to con- 
fess, that he has a clearer idea of apium or ibex, from 
a little print of that herb or beast, than he could ]lave 
from a long definition  of the naines of either of  then,. 
And so no doubt lie would have of  strigil and sistrum, 
if,  instead of  curry-comb and cymbal, which  are the 
English names dictionaries  render them by,  he could 
see stamped in the margin  small pictures of these in- 
struments, as they were in use  amongst the ancients. 
''  Toga, tunica, pallium,"  are words  easily translated 
by gown,  coat,  and cloak ; but we  have thereby no 
more true ideas of the fashion of those habits amongst 
the Romans than we  have  of  the faces of the tailors 
who msde them.  Such things as these, which the eye 
distillpishes by their  shapes, would bc bcst  let into 
the mind  by draughts made of  them,  and more de- 
termine the signification of such words than any other 
words set for them,  or  made  use  of  to define them. 
But this only by the by. 
5. By con-  § 26. Fifthly, if men will not be at the 
stancy in  pains  to declare  the  meaning  of  their 
theirsignifi-  words, and definitions  of  their terms are 
cation.  not to be had; yet this  is  the least that 
can  be expected, that in  all discourses, wherein one 
man  pretends  to  instruct or  convince  another,  he 
should  use  the  same  word  constantly  in  the same 
sense:  if  this were  done  (which  nobody  can  refuse 
without  great disingenuity),  many  of the books  ex- 
tant might be  spared;  marly of  the controversies in 
dispute would  be  at an end; several  of  those great 
volumes,  swoln with  ambiguous words,  now used  in 
one  sense,  and  by and  by  in  another,  would  shrink 
into a very narrow compass ;  and many of the philoso- 
phers'  (to mention  no other) as well as poets' works, 
might be contained in a nutshell. 
When the  5  27.  But after  all,  the  provision  of 
variation is  words is so scanty in respect of  that infi- 
to be ex-  nite variety of  thoughts, that men, want- 
~~lained.  ing terms  to  suit their  precise  notions, 
will, notwithstanding their  utmost  caution,  be forced 
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often  to use  the  same word  in  somewhat  different 
senses.  And  though  in  the continuation of  a dis- 
course, or the pursuit of  an argument, there can be 
hardly room to digress into a particular definition as 
often as a man varies  the signification  of  any term ; 
yet the import of the discourse will, for the most part, 
if there be no designed fallacy, sufficiently lead candid 
and intelligent  readers  into the true meaning of it: 
but where there is  not  sufficient to guide the reader, 
there it concerns the writer  to explain his  meaning, 
and show in what sense he there uses that term, Ch. 1. 
R  0 0 1i  IV. 
Our know-  § 1.  SINCE  the mind, in all its thoughts 
ledge con-  and reasonings, liath no other iinmcdiate 
versant  object  1)ut its o~n  ideas, which  it alone 
about our  does  or  can  conte~nplate;  it is  evident, 
ideas.  that  our  knowledge  is  only  conversant 
about them. 
Knowledge  5  S. Knowledge  then  seems  to me to 
is the  Ile ;lothing  but t11e perception of the con- 
ception  of  nexion  and  agreement,  or  disagreelnent  the agree- 
mellt or dis-  and rep~lgnanc.);,  of any of our ideas.  In 
agreement  this  alone  it consists.  Where  this  per- 
of two  ideas.  ception is, there is knowledge ;  and where 
it  is not, there, tliough me may fancy, guess, or believe, 
yet we always come short of  knowleclge.  For ~~llell 
we know that white is not black, what (10 mc!  elsc but 
perceive that these two ideas  clo  not agree?  TVlien 
we possess  ourselves with the utmost security of  tlie 
demonstration, that the three angles of a triangle are 
equal to two right ones,  what do we more but per- 
ceive, that equality to two right ones does necessarily 
agree to, and is inseparable from, the three angles of 
a triangle* ? 
* The placing of certainty, as Mr. Locke does, ill the perception 
of  the  agrcenlont  or  disagreement  of' our  idcas,  the  bisl~o~)  of 
Worcester  suspects  may  he  of  dangerous  consequence  to  thar 
article  of faith  which  he has  endeavoured  to tfefknd;  to wl~ich 
Mr. iocke  answers?, since your lordsh~p  hath not, as I rcmembcr, 
? In his second letter to the bishop of Worcester. 
3.  But to understand  a.  little  more  This agree- 
distinctly wherein  this agreement or dis-  ment four- 
consists, I think we may reduce  fold. 
it  to these four sorts: 
I. Identity, or diversity. 
2. Relation. 
3. Co-existence, or necessary connexion. 
4. Real existence. 
§ 4. First, as to the first sort of  agree-  1. of  iden- 
ment or disagreement, viz. identity or di-  tity or 
versity.  It is  the first act of  the mind,  fiversity. 
when it has any sentiinents or ideas at  all, to perceive 
its  ideas;  and  so  far as it perceives  them,  to know 
each  what it is,  and thereby also  to perceive  their 
shown, or pone al)out to show, how this proposition, viz. that cer- 
tainty consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement 
of  two ideas, is opposite or  inconsistent wit11  that article of  faith 
which your lordahip has endeavoured  to  defend; it is  plain, it is 
but your lordship's fiar, that it may be of dangerous conzequence 
to it, which, as I hun~bly  conceive, is  no  proof that it is any way 
inconsistent with that article. 
Nobody, I think, can blmr~e  your lordship, or any one else, for 
being concerned for any article of  the christian faith;  but if that 
concern  (as it may, and as we  know it has done) makes any one 
apprehend danger, where no  danger is, are we, therefore, to give 
up and condemn any proposition, because any one, tho~lgh  of  the 
first rank and magnitude, fears it may he of dar~gerous  consequence 
to any truth of religion, without showing that it is so? If such fears 
be the measures whereby to judge of truth and f~lsehood,  the affirm- 
ing that there are antipodes would be still a heresy;  and the doc- 
trine of the motion of the earth must be rejected, as overthrowing 
the truth of  the scripture; for of that dangerous consequence it 
has been apprehendect  to be, by many learned and pious divines, 
out of their great concern for religion.  And yet, notwithstanding 
those great apprehens;ons of what dangerou3 consequence it might 
be, it is now universally received by learned men, as an undoubted 
truth; and writ for by some, whose belief of the scripture is not at 
all  questioned;  and particularly, very lately,  by a  divine  of the 
church of England, with great strength of reason, in his wonderfully 
irlgenious New Theory of the Earth. 
The reason your lordship gives of  your fears, that it may be of 
such  dangerous consequence  to that article of  faith which  your 
lordship  endeavours  to  defend,  though  it occur  in  more  places 
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difference,  and that  one is not  another.  This is  so 
absolutely necessary,  that without it there could be 
no knowledge, no reasoning,  no ima~iriation,  6.  no  di- 
stinct thoughts at all.  By this the m~nd  clearly and 
infallibly perceives each idea to agree with itself, and 
to be what is ; and all distinct ideas to disagree, i. e. 
the one not to be the other:  and this it does without 
pains, labour,  or deduction ; but at first view,  by its 
natural  power  of  perception  and  distinction.  And 
though men of art  have reduced this into those general 
rules,  "what  is,  is,"  and  "it  is  ilnpossible  for  the 
same thing to be and not to be,"  for ready application 
in all cases, wherein  there may be occasion to reflect 
on it; yet it is certain, that the first exercise of  this 
mischief,  i,  e.  to  oppose that article of  faith  which  your lord- 
ship hat11 endeavoured to defend.  But, my lord, if  it be a reason 
to lay by any thing as bad,  because  it is,  or  may  be used  to 
an ill  purpose, I know  not what will  be innocent enough to be 
kept.  Arms, which were  made for our  defence,  are sometimes 
made use of to do mischief;  and yet they are not thought of dan- 
gerous consequence for all that.  Nobody lays by his sword  and 
pistols,  or thinks  them  of such  dangerous consequence  as to be 
neglected, or thrown away, because robbers, and the worst of' men, 
sometimes make use of them, to take away honest men's lives or 
goods.  And the reason  is, because they were designed, and will 
serve to preserve  them.  And who knows  but this  may  be the 
present case?  If  your lordship thinks, that placing of certainty in 
the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas be to be 
rejected as false, because you apprehend it may be of dangerous 
consequence to that article of faith :  on the other side, perhaps 
otheis, with  me, may think it a defence against  error, and so (as 
being of good use) to be received and adhered to. 
I would not, my lord,  be hereby thought to set up my own, or 
any one's  judgment against your lordshi  's.  But I have said this 
only to show, whilst  the argument lies &r or against the truth of 
any proposition,  barely in an imagination that it may be of conse- 
quence to the supporting or overthrowing of any remote truth; it 
will be impossible, that way, to determine of the truth or falsehood 
of that proposition.  For imagination will  be set up against ima- 
gination, and the stronger probably will be against your lordship; 
the strongest  imaginations being  usually  in the weakest  heads. 
The only way, in this case, to put it past doubt, is to show the in- 
consistency of the two propositions;  and then it will be seen, that 
oi~e  overthrows the other; the true, the false one. 
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faculty is  about particular  ideas.  A  man  infallibly 
knows, as soon as ever he  has them in his mind, that 
the ideas he calls white ancl round, are the very ideas 
they are, and that they are not  other ideas which he 
calls red or square.  Nor can any maxim or plsoposi- 
tion in the world  make hiin  know it clearer or surer 
than he did  before,  and without  any  such  general 
rule.  This then is the first  agreement  or  disagree- 
ment, which the mind  perceives in its ideas ;  which it 
always perceives at first sight: and if there ever hap- 
pen any doubt about it, it will always be found to be 
about the names,  and not the ideas themselves, whose 
identity and diversity will always be perceived as soon 
and clearly as the ideas themselves  are; nor can it 
possibly  be otherwise. 
Your  lordship says,  indeed, this  is a new method  of certainty. 
I will not say so myself;  for fear of deserving a second reproof from 
your  lordship, for being too forward to assume to myself the ho- 
nour  of being an original.  But this, I think, gives me occasion, 
and will excuse me from being thought impertinent, if I ask your 
lordship, whether there be any other, or older method of certainty ? 
and what  it is? For,  if  there be no other,  nor  older than this, 
either this was always the  method  of certainty, and so mine is no 
new one; or else the world is obliged to me for this new one, after 
having  been  so long in the want of so necessary a thing as a me- 
thod of certainty.  If there be an  older, I am sure your lordship 
cannot but know it;  your condemning mine as new, as well as your 
thorough insight into antiquity, cannot but satisfy every body that 
you do.  And therefore to set the world right in a thing of that 
great concernment,  and to overthrow mine,  and  thereby prevent 
the dangerous  consequence there is  in my having  unreasonably 
started it, will not, I humbly conceive, misbecome  your lordship's 
care of that article you have endeavoured to defend, nor the good- 
will  you  bear  to truth in general.  For I will be answerable for 
m  self, that I shall; and I think I may be for all others, that they  i"  a1  will give off  the placing  of certainty in  the perception of the 
agreement or disagreement of ideas, ifyour lordship will be pleased 
to show that it lies in any thing elsc. 
But truly, not to ascribe to myself an invention of what has been 
as  old  as  knowledge is in the world, I must own, I am not guilty 
of  what  your lordship is pleased  to call  starting new methods of 
certainty.  Knowledge, ever since there has been any in the world, 
has consisted in one particular  action in the mind; and SO,  I con- 
ceive, will continue to do to the end of it.  Ant1 to start new nlc- 2. Relative.  $ 5. Secondly, the nest  sort of  agrec- 
~nent  or clisagrccinc nt, tlic mind perceives 
in any of its idcas, may, I tl~ink,  be called relative, and 
is nothing. but the perception of tl~c  relation between 
any  two ideas,  of what  kind  soever,  whether  sub- 
stances, modes, or any other.  For  since  all  distinct 
ideas must eternally be known not to be the same, and 
so be universally and constantly denied onc of another, 
there could be no room for any positive knowledge at 
all, if we could not perceive any relation between our 
ideas,  and find  out the agreement  or  disagreement 
they have one with another, in several ways the mind 
takes of comparing them. 
thods  of' knowlerlge,  or  certainty, (for  they are to me the same 
thing) i. e. to find out and propose new methods of attaining know- 
ledge, either with more ease and quickness,  or  in  things yet un- 
known, is what I think  nobody could blame:  but this is not that 
which  your lordship here means,  by  new  n~etllods  of  certainty. 
Your lordship,  1 think,  means  by it,  the placing  of certainty in 
wherein  either  it  does not  consist,  or else wherein it 
was ,lot placed  before  now; if this be to be called a new method 
of  certainty.  As to the latter  of these, I shall  know whether I 
am guilty or no, when your  lordship will do me the favour to tell 
me wherein  it was  placed  before:  which  your  lordship  knows I 
professed  myself  ignorant  of, rvhen I writ  nly book,  and so I am 
still.  But if starting new methods of  certainty be the placing of 
certainty in something wherein it does not consist; whether I have 
(lone  that or no, 1  must appeal to the experience of mankind. 
There  are several  actions  of  men's  n~inds,  that they are con- 
scious to themselves of performing, as willing, believing, knowing, 
&c.  they have so particular  sense of, that they can distin- 
guish them  one from  another; or else  they could not say, when 
they ~villed,  when  they believed,  and when  they knew any thing. 
Bllt though these actions were different enough from one another, 
not to be confounded  by those who  spoke  of  them,  yet nobody, 
that 1 had met with, had, in their writings, particularly set down 
wherein the act of' knowing precisely consisted. 
To  this reflection  upon the actions of my own mind the subject 
of nly Essay concerning Human Understanding naturally led me; 
wherein if l have done any tliiilg  new,  it has been to describe to 
others,  more p~rticularly  than  had  been  done before, what it is 
their  minds  do when  they  perfbrm  that  action which  they call 
knowing ; and if,  upon  examination, they observe I have given a 
true account of  that action of their nlinls in all the parts of' it, I 
Cll.  1. 
9 6. Thirdly, the third  sort of  agree- 
ment, or disagreement, to be found in our  :;tge:~"x-  ideas, which the perception of the mind is 
employed  about, is co-existence,  or  non-co-existence 
in the same subject; and this belongs particularly to 
substances.  Thus  when  we  pronounce  concerning 
gold  that  it  is  fixed,  our knowledge  of  this  truth 
amounts  to no  more  but  this,  that  fixedness,  or  a 
power to remain  in  the fire unconsumed,  is an idea 
that always accompanies, and is joined with that par- 
ticular sort of yellowness, weight, fusibility, malleable- 
ness, and solubility in aq. regla, which make our com- 
plex idea, signified  by the word gold. 
suppose it  will be in vain to dispute against what they find and feel 
in themselves.  And if I have not told tliem right and exactly what 
they find and feel in themselves, when their minds perform the act 
of knowing, what I have  said will be all in  vain;  men will  not be 
persuaded against their senses.  Knowledge is an internal percep- 
tion of their rninds;  and if, when they reflect on it,  they find it is 
not what I have said it is, my groundless conceit will not be heark- 
ened to, but be exploded by every body, and die of itself: and no- 
body need to be at any pains to drive it out of the world.  So im- 
possible is it to find out, or start new methods  of certainty, or to 
have them  received, if  any one places it in any thing but in that 
wherein it really  consist,^:  much less can any one be in danger to 
be misled into error,  by any such  new,  and  to  every one visibly 
senseless, project.  Can it be supposed, that any one could start a 
new method of seeing, and persuade men thereby that they do not 
see what they do see?  Is it  to be feared,  that any one can cast 
sucli a mist over their eyes, that they sl~ould  not know when they 
see, and so be led out of'their way by it? 
Knowledge, I find in myself,  and I conceive in others, consists 
in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of the imme- 
diate objects of the mind in thinking, wllich I call ideas: but whe- 
ther it does so in others or  no,  must be determined by their own 
experience, reflecting  upon the action of their mind in knowing; 
for that I cannot  alter,  nor, I think,  they themselves.  But whe- 
ther they will call those immediate objects of their minds in think- 
ing ideas or no, is  perfectly in  their  own  choice.  If they didike 
that name, they may call them notions or conceptions, or how they 
please; it n~atters  not, if they use tliem so as  to  avoid  obscurity 
and confusion.  If they  are constantly  used  in the same and a 
known  sense, every one has the liberty to please himself  in  his 
terms; there lies  neither  truth,  nor  error,  nor  science,  in that; 314  h'nowledge.  Book 4. 
5 7.  Fourthly, the fourth and last sort 
4. Of  is that of actual and real existence agree- 
existence.  ing to any idea.  Within these four sorts 
of agreement or disagreement is, I suppose, contained 
all the knowledge we have, or are capable of: for all 
the inquiries  we  can  make  concerning  any  of  our 
ideas, all that we know or can affirm concerning  any 
of  them, is,  that it is, or is  not,  the same with  some 
other; that it does, or does  not, always co-exist with 
some other idea in the same  subject; that it has this 
or that relation with some other idea ;  or that it has a 
real existence without  the mind.  Thus blue  is  not 
though those that take them for things, and not for what they are, 
bare arbitrary signs  of  our  ideas,  make  a  great deal  ado often 
about them; as if some great mat,ter lay in the use of this or that 
sound.  All that 1  know or  can imagine of difference about them 
is, that those words are always best, whose  sigriifications are best 
known in the sense they are used; and so are least apt to breed 
confusion. 
My lord, your lordship hat11 been pleased to find fault with my 
use of the new term, ideas, without  telling  me a better name for 
the immediate objects of the mind in thinking.  Your lordship also 
has been pleased  to find fault with  my definition  of  knowledge, 
without doing me the favour  to give me a better.  For it is only 
about my definition of knowledge that all this stir concerning cer- 
tainty is made.  For, with  me, to know and to be certain is the 
same thing; what I know, that I am certain of; and what I am cer- 
tain of, that I know.  What reaches to knowledge, 1  think may be 
called certainty; and what comes short of certainty, I think cannot 
be called  knowledge;  as your  lordship could not but observe in 
the 18th section of chap. 4. of my 4th book, which you have quoted. 
My definition of knowledge stands thus:  knowledge seems to 
me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion and agree- 
ment, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas."  This 
definition your lordship dislikes, and apprehends it may be of dan- 
gerous consequence as to that article of christian faith which your 
lordship hath endeavoured to defend.  For this there is a very easy 
remedy:  it is but for your  lordship  to set aside this definition of 
knowledge by  giving us a better,  and this  danger is  over.  But 
your lordslup  chooses  rather to have a controversy with my book 
for having it in it, and to put me upon the defence cf it; for which 
I must  acknowledge  myself  obliged to your lordahip for affording 
me so much of your time, and for allowing me the honour of'con- 
versing so much wit11 one so fdr above 11le iri all respecTs. 
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;  is of identity :  two triangles upon equal bases 
hetween two parallels  are equal ; is of relation : iron 
is susceptible of  magnetical impressions ; is of co-ex- 
istence :  God is ;  is of real existence.  Though identity 
and co-existence  are truly nothing  but  relations,  yet 
they are such peculiar ways of agreement or disagree- 
ment of  our  ideas,  that they deserve well to be con- 
sidered  as  distinct heads, and not  under relation in 
general ;  since they are so different grounds of affirma- 
tion  and negation,  as will  easily appear  to any one, 
who will but  reflect on what is said in several places 
of  this  essay.  I should  not  proceed to examine the 
several degrees of  our knowledge, but that it is neces- 
sary first to consider the different  acceptations of the 
word knowledge. 
Your lordship says, it may be of dangerous consequence to that 
article  of christian faith which  you  have  endeavoured to defend. 
Though the laws of' disputing  allow bare denial as a sufficient an- 
swcr to sayings, without any offer of a proof: yet, my lord, to show 
liow willing I arn to give your lordship all satisfaction, in what you 
apprehend may be of  dangerous consequence in my book,  as to 
that article, I shall not  stand still sullenly, and put your lordsliip 
upon the difficulty  of showing wherein that danger lies; but shall, 
on the other side, endeavour to show your lordship that that defini- 
tion  of mine, whether true or false, right or wrong, can be of no 
dangerous consequerlce to that article of faith.  The reason which 
I shall offer fbr it is this : because it can be of no consequence to 
it at all. 
That which your lordship is afraid it may be dangerous to, is an 
article of faith : that which your lordship labours and is concerned 
for,  is  the certainty of faith.  Now,  my lord,  I humbly conceive 
the certainty of faith, if your  lordsliip  thinks fit  to call it so, has 
nothing to do with the certainty of  knowledge.  As to talk of the 
certainty of faith, seems all one to me, as to talk of the knowledge 
of believing, a way of speaking not easy to me to understand. 
Place  knowledge in what you will; start what new methods of 
certainty you please, that are apt to leave men's minds more doubt- 
ful than before;  place certainty on such ground as will leave little 
or no knowledge in the world : (for these are the arguments your 
lordship uses against my definition of knowledge) this shakes not at 
all, nor in the least  concerns the assurance of faith ; that is quite 
distinct from it, neither stands nor falls with knowledgc. 
Faith stands by itself, and upon grounds of its own ;  nor can be 
removed froin  them, and  placed  on  those  of  knowlcilge.  Their 316  K~zozvledge.  Book 4. 
Knowledge  8. There are several ways wherein the 
actual or  mind is possessed of truth, each of which 
h*itual.  is called knowledge. 
1.  There is actual knowledge, which is the present 
view the mind  has of  the agreement or disagreement 
of any of its ideas, or of the relation they have one to 
another. 
2. A man is  said to know  any proposition, which 
having been once laid before his thoughts, he evidently 
perceived the agreement or disagreement of the ideas 
whereof it consists ; and so lodged it in  his memory, 
that whenever that proposition  comes again to be re- 
flected on, he, without doubt or hesitation,  embraces? 
grounds are so far from being tlie same, or having any thing com- 
mon,  that when  it  is  brought to  certainty,  faith is destroyed; it 
is knowledge then, and faith no longer. 
With what assurance soever of believing I assent to any article 
of faith, so that I steadfastly venture my all upon it,  it is still but 
believing.  Bring it to  certainty, and it ceases to be faith.  I be- 
lieve that Jesus Christ was crucified,  dead, and buried, rose again 
the third day from the dead,  and ascended into heaven :  let now 
such methods of knowledge or certainty be started, as leave men's 
minds more doubtful than befbre ;  let tlie grounds of knowledge be 
resolved into what  any one pleases,  it touches not my faith ; the 
foundation of that stands as sure as before,  and cannot be at all 
shaken by it; and one may as well say, that any thing that weakens 
the sight, or casts a mist  before tlie  eyes, endangers the hearing, 
as that any thing which  alters the nature of knowledge  (if  that 
could be done) should he of dangerous consequence to an article 
of faith. 
Whether then I am or am not mistaken in the  lacing certainty 
in the perception of  the agreement  or disagree~~rent  of  ideas,- 
whetl~er  this  account of  knowledge be true or false,  enlarges or 
straitens the bounds of  it more than it sl~onld,-faith  still stands 
upon its own bas~s,  which  is  not  at all altered by it; and every 
article of that has just tlie same unmoved foundation, and the very 
same credibility, that it had before.  So that, ni;  lord, whatever I 
have said about certainty, and IIOW much ooever I nlay be out in 
it, if I am  mistaken, your lordsllip  has no reason  to apprehend 
my  danger to any article of faith from tllence ;  every one of them, 
stands upon  the same bottom  it dld  before, out of  the reach of 
what belongs to knowledge and certainty.  And thus much of my 
way of certainty by idea. ; whicll, I hope, will satisfy your lorclshlp 
IIOW  far ~t  is froin bei~~g  dangerous to any article of the cliristinn 
faith \rhatsocvcr. 
the right side,  assents to and is certain of the truth of 
it.  This, I think,  one may call habitual knowledge: 
and thus a man may be said to know all those truths 
which are lodged in his memory, by a foregoing clear 
all(l full perception, whereof the mind is assured past 
doubt,  as often as it has occasion to reflect on them. 
For  our finite  understandings  being  able  to think 
clearly  and distinctly but  on  one  thing at once,  if 
men  had  no  knowledge  of  any more than wlint they 
actually thought on, they would all be very ignorant ; 
and he that knew most,  would kilow but one truth, 
that being all he was able to think on at one time. 
tj 9.  Of habitual knowledge, there are 
Habitual  also, vulgarly speaking, two degrees : 
knowletlge  First, the one is of such truths laid up in  twofold. 
the  memory, as, whenever they occur to the 
mind, it  actually perceives the relation is between those 
ideas.  And this is in all those truths whereof we have 
an  intuitive knowledge; where the ideas themselves, by 
an immediate  view,  discover their agreement or dis- 
agreement one with another. 
Secondly,  the other is of such truths, whereof  the 
mind having been convinced, it retains the memory of 
the conviction, without the proofs.  Thus a man that 
remembers certainly  that he once perceived the demon- 
stration, that the three angles of a triangle are equal 
to two right ones, is certain that he knows it, because 
he cannot doubt the truth of it.  In his adherence to  a 
truth, where the demonstration by which it  was at  first 
known is forgot, though a man may be thooght rather 
to believe  his  memory than really to know,  and this 
way of entertaining a truth seemed formerly to me like 
something between opinion and knowledge ; a sort of 
assurance which exceeds bare belief, for that relies on 
the testimony of another : yet upon a due examination 
I find it comes not short of perfect certainty, and is in 
effect true knowledge.  That which is apt to mislead 
Our first thoughts into a mistake in this matter is, that 
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is not perceived,  as it was at first, by an actual view of 
all the intermediate ideas, whereby the agreement or 
disagreement of those in the proposition was at  first  per- 
ceived ; but by other intermediate ideas, that show the 
agreement or disagreement of the ideas contained in the 
proposition whose certainty we remember.  For exam- 
ple, in this proposition,  that the three angles of a tri- 
angle are equal to two right ones, one who has seen and 
clearly perceived the demonstration of this truth  knows 
it to be true, when that demonstration is gone out of 
his mind ;  so that at  present it is not actually in view, 
and possibly cannot be recollected :  but he knows it in 
a different way from what he did before.  The agree- 
ment of the two ideas joined in that proposition is per- 
ceived, but it is by the intervention of other ideas than 
those which at  first produced that perception.  He re- 
members,  i. e.  he knows  (for remembrance is but the 
reviving  of  some  past knowledge)  that he was once 
certain of  the truth of this proposition, that the three 
angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones.  The 
immutability of the  sacme  relations between the same 
immutable things, is now the idea that shows him that 
if the three angles of  a triangle were once equal to 
two right ones, they will always be equal to two right 
ones.  And  hence  he comes to be certain, that what 
was once true in the case,  is always true; what ideas 
once  agreed,  will  always  agree ; and consequently 
what he once knew to be true, he will always know 
to be true,  as long as he can remember that he once 
knew it.  Upon this ground it is, that particular de- 
monstl-ations  in  mathematics  afford  general  know- 
ledge.  If then  the  perception  that the same ideas 
will eternally have the same habitudes and relations, 
be not a sufficient ground of  knowledge, there could 
be no  knowledge of  general  propositions  in matlle- 
matics ;  for no mathematical demonstration would be 
any other than particular : and when  a man had de- 
monstrated any proposition concerning one triangle or 
circle,  his  knowledge  would  not  reach beyond  that 
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particular diagram.  If he would extend it further, lie 
must renew his demolistration i11  another instance, be- 
fore he could know it to be  true in  ariother like tri- 
angle,  and so on: by which  means  one  could never 
come to the knowledge  of  any general propositioils. 
Nobody, I think, can deny that Mr. Newton certainly 
ltnows any proposition, that he now at any time reads 
in his book, to be true; though he has not in actual view 
that admirable chain  of  intermediate ideas, whereby 
he at first discovered it to be true.  Such a memory as 
that, able to retain such  a train of  particulars,  may 
be well thought beyond the reach of human faculties ; 
when  the very  discovery,  perception,  and laying to- 
gether that wonderful connexion of  ideas, is found to 
surpass  most  readers'  comprehension.  But yet it is 
evident, the author himself  knows  the proposition to 
be true,  remembering he once  saw  the connexion of 
those  ideas,  as  certainly  as  he  knows  such  a  man 
wounded another, remembering that he saw him run 
him through.  But because the memory is not always 
so clear as actual perception, and does in all men more 
or less decay in length of time, this amongst other dif- 
ferences is one, which shows that demonstrative know- 
ledge is  much  more  imperfect  than intuitive,  as we 
shall see in the following chapter. 
CHAPTER 11. 
Of the Degrees  oJ our  Knowledge. 
1.  ALL our knowledge consisting,  as 
I have  said,  in the view the mind  has of 
its own ideas, which is  the utn~ost  light and greatest 
certainty we,  with  our  faculties,  a.nd in  our way of 
knowledge,  are capable of; it may not  be  amiss  to 
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ferent clearness of  our knowledge seeins to ine to lie 
in tlie different way of perception the mind has of the 
agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas.  For if 
we will reflect on our own ways of thinking, we sllall 
find that sometimes the mid  perceives the agreement 
or disagreement of  two icleas immediately by  thein- 
selves,  without  tlie  intervention  of  any  other:  and 
this, I think, we  may call intuitive knowledge.  For 
in this  the mind  is  at no pains  of  proving  or  exa- 
mining,  bnt  perceives  the  truth,  as  the  eye  dot11 
light,  only by  being  directed toward  it.  Thus the 
mind perceives,  that white is not black, that a circle 
is not a triangle,  tliat three are more than two,  and 
equal to one and two.  Such kind of truths the mind 
perceives at the first sight of  the ideas together,  by 
bare intuition, without the intervention of  any other 
idea ; and this kind of knowledge is the clearest and 
most  certain  that human frailty is  capable of.  This 
part of knowledge is irresistible, and like bright sun- 
shine forces itself immediately to be perceived,  as soon 
as ever the mind turns its view that way; and leaves 
no room for hesitation, doubt, or examination, but the 
mind is presently filled with the clear light of it.  It 
is on this intuition tliat depencls all the certainty and 
evidence of all our knowledge ;  which certainty every 
one finds to be so great, tliat he cannot imagine, and 
therefore  not  require a  greater : for a  man  cannot 
conc'eive himself capable of a greater certainty, than 
to know that any idea in his mind is  such as he per- 
ceives it to be; and that two ideas,  wherein lie  per- 
ceives a difference, are different and not precisely the 
same.  He  that demands a greater certainty than this, 
demands he knows not what, and shows only tliat he 
has a mind to be a sceptic, without being able to be so. 
Certainty depends so wholly 011  this intuition, that in 
the next degree of knowledge, which I call demonstra- 
tive, this intuition is necessary in all the connerions of 
the  intermediate ideas, ~vitilout  which we cannot attain 
knowledge and certainty. 
5 2.  The next degree of knowledge is, 
Demonstr:l-  where the mind perceives  the agreement 
or disagreement of any ideas, but not im- 
mediately.  Though wherever the mind perceives the 
or disagreement of any of its ideas, there be 
certainknowledge; yet it does not always happen that 
the mind sees that agreement or disagreement whicll 
there is between them, even where it is discoverable: 
and in that case remains in ignorance, and at most gets 
no farther than  a probable conjecture.  The reason 
why the mind  cannot always perceive  presently  the 
agreement or disagreement  of  two ideas is,  because 
those idcas, concerning whose agreement or disagree- 
rncnt the inquiry is made,  cannot by the mind bc  so 
put together as to show it.  In  this case then, when the 
mind cannot so bring its ideas  together,  as by their 
in11nediat.e comparison, and as  it were justn-position 
or application one to another, to perceive their agree- 
ment or disagreement, it is fain,  by the intervelition 
of other ideas (one or more, as it happens) to discovcr 
the agreement or disagreen~cnt  whicli it searches; and 
this is that which we call reasoning.  Thus the mind 
being willing to Bnow the agreement or disagrecrnent 
in bigress, between the three angles of a triangle and 
two rlght  ones,  cannot by  an immediate  view  and. 
comparing them do it : because  the three  angles  of 
a triangle  cannot be brought at o:lce,  ancl  he com- 
pared with any one or two a~igles;  and so of this the 
mind has no immediate,  no intuitive knowledge.  In 
this  case  the mind  is  fain  to find  out some  other 
angles, to  which the three angles of a triangle have an 
equality ;  and, finding those equal to two right oncs, 
comes to  know their equality to two right ones. 
3  3.  Those intervenini ideas  wl;ch  .,,  serve to show the agreement of any two  proofs. 
others. are called  roofs : and where the 
agreement and diskgreemcnt is by this means plaiilly 
and  clearly perceived,  it is  called  clemonstration,  it 
being shown to the understanding, ant1 tlic mind made 
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to see that it is so.  A quickness in  the mind  to finct 
out thcse intermediate  ideas  (that shall discover  the 
agrcci-uent  or  disagreement  of  any  other)  and  to 
apply them  right, is, I suppose,  that which  is  called 
sagacity.  .,  " 
Gut; not so  $  4,.  This  knowledge  by  intervening 
easv.  proofs,  though it be certain, yet the evi- 
dence of  it is not altopether so clear and 
0 
bright, nor the assent so ready,  as in intuitive know- 
ledge.  For though,  in demonstration, the mind does 
at  last perceive the agreement or disagreement of the 
ideas itconsiders ;  yet ~t  is not without pains and atten- 
tion:  there must be  more than one transient view to 
find it.  A steady application and pursuit are required 
to this discovery : and there must be a progression by 
steps and degrees,  before  the mind  can in this  way 
arrive at certainty,  ancl  come  to perceive the agree- 
inent or repugnancy  between  two ideas  that need 
proofs and the use of reason to show it. 
xot  wit),out  $ 5. Another di~crence  between intui- 
precedent  tive and deinonstrntive knowledge is, tlint 
doubt.  though in the latter all doubt be re~xovcd, 
when by the intervention of the intermediate ideas the 
agreement or disagreement is perceived ; yet  heforc 
the clemonstration  there was n doubt, which  in intui- 
tive kno~vledge  cannot happen  to the minrl, that has 
its faculty of  perception  left  to a  degree capable of 
distinct ideas,  no more  than it can be a doubt to the 
eye (that can distinctly see white and black) whether 
this ink and this paper be all of a colour.  If there be 
sight  in  the  eyes,  it will  at  first  glimpse,  without 
hesitation,  perceive tlle words  printed  on this paper 
different from the colour of  the paper:  and so if  the 
mind have the faculty of  distinct perceptions,  it will 
perceive the agreement or disagreement of those ideas 
that produce  intuitive knowledge.  If the eyes have 
lost the faculty of  seeing,  or the mind of perceiving, 
Ire in vain inquire after the quickliess of sight in one, 
or clearriess of' perception in the o ther. 
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tj  6. It  is  true,  the  perception  pro-   NO^ SO 
duced by demonstration is also very clear,  clear. 
yet  it  is often with  a  great abatement of  that evi- 
dent lustre and full assurance that always accompany 
that which I call intuitive ; like a  face  reflected  by 
several mirrors ow to another,  where as  long  as it 
retains the similitude and agreement with the object, 
it procluces  a kno~vletlge;  but it is  still in every suc- 
cessive reflsction with a lessening of that perfect clear- 
ness  and distinctness which is in the first, till at last, 
after inany removes, it has a great mixture of dimness, 
and is  not  at first  sight so  knotirable,  especinlly  to 
weak eyes.  Thus it is with  knowledge made out by 
a long train of proof. 
§  7.  Now,  in every step reason makes 
ill  rlemonstrative  knowledge, there is an  E:i  intuitive knowledge of  that agreement or 
disagreement it seeks with the next inter-  evidence. 
inediate ides,which it  uses as a proof: for 
if it were not so, that yet would need a proof;  since 
without  the  perception  of  such  agreement  or  dis- 
agreeincnt, there  is no  knowledge  produced.  If it 
be perceived by itself, it is intuitive knowledge : if it 
cannot be perceived by  itself,  there is need  of  some 
intervening idea, as a common measure to show their 
agreement  or disagreement.  By  which  it is  plain, 
that  every  step  i11  reasoning  that protluces  know- 
ledge  has intuitive  certainty; which when  the mind 
perceives, there is no more required, but to remember 
it to make the agreement or disagreement of the ideas, 
concerning which we inquire, visible and certain.  So 
that to make any thing a demonstration, it is neces- 
sary to perceive the iminediate agreement of the inter- 
vening ideas, whereby the agreement or disagreement 
of the two ideas under examination (whereof the one 
is always  the first, and the other the last in the ac- 
count) is found.  This  intuitive perception of the agrec- 
ment or disagreement of the intermediate ideas, in each 
step and progression  of  thc demonstration, must also 
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be carried exactly in  the mind,  and a  man must  be 
sure that no part is left out : which  because in long 
cleductions, and the use of  many proofs, the memory 
does not always so readily and exactly retain ;  there- 
fore it comes to pass,  that this is more imperfect than 
intuitive knowledge, and men embrace often falsehood 
for demonstrations. 
Hence the  $8.  The  necessityof this intuitive know- 
mistake  ledge, in each step of  scielltifical or de- 
pracognitis  monstratire  reasoning,  gave  occasion,  1 
et praecon-  imagine, to that mistaken  axiom, that all 
cessis."  reasoning was "  ex przcognitis et przcon- 
cessis ;" which  how  far it is  mistaken,  I  shall  have 
occasion to sliow more at large,  when I come to con- 
sider propositions, and particularly those propositions 
which  are called maxims ; and to show that it is by 
a mistake  that they are supposed to be  the founda- 
tions of all our knowledge and reasoninns. 
$  9.  It  lyas  been  gener2ly taken for 
Demonst?'-  granted, that mathematics  alone  are ca-  tion not ll- 
mited to  pable of  demonstrative certainty:  but to  - 
quantity.  have such an agreement or disagreement, 
as may intuitively be perceived, being, as 
I iina~inc,  not the privilege  of  the ideas of number, 
extension,  and figure  alone,  it may  possibly be  tlie 
want of  due method  and application  in us,  and not 
of  sufficient  evidence in  things,  that  demonstr  a  t'  ion 
has been thought to have so little to do in other parts 
of knowledge, and been  scarce so much as aimed at 
by any but mathematicians.  For whatever ideas we 
have, wherein the mind  can perceive  the immediate 
agreement  or  disagreement  that is  between  them, 
there the mind  is  capable  of  intuitive knowledge; 
and where it can perceive the agreement or disagree- 
ment;  of any two ideas,  by an intuitive perception of 
the agreement or disagreement they have  with  any 
intermediate ideas,  there the mind is capable of  de- 
monstration, which  is  not  limited to ideas of  exten- 
sion, figure, number, and thcir modes. 
10.  The reason why it has been gc-  Why it has 
nera1.l~  sougllt for,  and  supposcd  to be  so 
only in those, I iniagiiie has been not only  tirought. 
the ceneral usefulness  of  those  sciences ;  '  , 
but because, in comparing their cquality or cxccss, the 
lnodes of numbers have every the lcast tliff'crencc very 
clear and perceivable:  and though in extension every 
the least excess  is not so perceptible,  yet  tlie  mind 
has found out ways to examine and discover denlon- 
stratively  the just equality of  two angles, or extell- 
sions,  or figures : and both  these,  i. e.  nu~nbcrs  an(1 
figures, can be set down by visible and lasting marks, 
wherein  the ideas under  consideration  are perfectly 
determined;  which  for  the most  part they  are not, 
where they are marked only by names and words. 
$ 11.  But in other simple ideas, whose  modes and 
differences are made and countecl by degrees, and not 
quantity, we have not so nice  and accurate a distinc- 
tion of  their differences,  as to pcrceirc and find ways 
to measure their just equality, or tlie lcast diff'erences. 
For those  other  simple ideas,  being  appearances  of 
sensations, produced in us by the size,figurc, numbcr, 
and motion  of  minute  corpuscles  singly  insensible; 
their different degrees also depend upon the variation 
of some or of all those  causes : which since it cannot 
be observed by us in particles of matter, whereof each 
is too subtile to be  perceived,  it is ixnpossible  for us 
to Ii;~ve  any exact measures of  the different  degrees 
of these simple ideas.  For supposin8 the sensation or 
idea we name whiteness be produced in us by a certain 
number of globules,  which,  having  a verticity about 
their own centres, strike upon the retina of  the eye 
with  a  certain  degree of  rotation,  as  well  as  pro- 
gressive  swiftness; it will  hence  easily  follow,  that 
the more  the superficial  parts  of  any  body  are so 
ordered,  as to reflect the greater number of globules 
of light, ant1 to give  them  the proper rotation, which 
is fit to producc this sensation of white in us, the more 
white will that tmdy appear, tliat from an e(1ual space 326  Degrees  of  Knowledge.  Book 4. 
sends to the retina the greater number of  such cor- 
puscles, with that peculiar sort of  motion.  I do not 
say,  that the nature of  light  consists  in very small 
round globules, nor of whiteness in  such a texture of 
parts as gives  a  certain rotation  to  these globules, 
when  it reflects  them;  for  I  am  not  now  treating 
physically of  light  or  colours:  but this,  I think,  I 
may say,  that I cannot (and I would be glad any one 
would  make intelligible that he did)  conceive  how 
bodies without us can any ways affect our senses, but 
by the immediate contact of the sensible bodies them- 
selves, as in tasting and feeling, or the impulse of some 
insensible particles coming  from  them,  as  in seeing, 
hearing,  and  smelling;  by  the digerent  impulse  of 
which parts, caused by their different size, figure, and 
motion, the variety of sensations is produced in us. 
$ 12. Whether then they be  globules,  or  no,-or 
whether they have a verticity about their own centres 
that produces the idea of whiteness in us,-this  is cer- 
tain, that the more particles of light are reflected from 
a body, fitted to give them that peculiar motion, which 
produces the sensation of whiteness in us,-and  pos- 
s~bly  too,  the quicker  that peculiar  motion  is,-the 
whiter does  the body appear from which the greater 
number are reflected,  as is evident in the same piece 
of paper put in the sun-beams,  in the shade, and in a 
dark hole ;  in each of which it will produce in us the 
idea of whiteness in far different degrees. 
$  13.  Not knowing therefore what number of par- 
ticles, nor what motion of them is fit to produce any 
precise  degree of whiteness,  we  cannot demonstrate 
the certain equality of  any two degrees of whiteness, 
because we have no certain standard to measure them 
by,  nor means to distinguish  every the least real dif- 
ference, the only help we have being from our senses, 
which in this point fail us.  But where the difference 
is so great as to produce in the mind clearly distinct 
ideas,  whose  differences  can  be  perfectly  retained, 
there these  ideas  or colours,  as we  see  in different 
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kinds,  as blue  and red,  are as capable of demonstra- 
tion as ideas of number and extension.  What I have 
here said of whiteness and colours, I think, holds true 
in all secondary qualities, and their modes. 
$ 14.  These two, viz. intuition and de-  sensitive 
rnonstration, are the degrees of our know-  knowledge 
ledge;  whatever  comes  short of  one  of  ofpa*icular 
these,  with  what  assurance  soever  en?- 
braced, is but faith, or opinion, but not knowledge,  at 
least in all general truths.  There is, indeed, another 
perception of the mind, employed about the particular 
existence  of  finite beings  without  us ; which  going 
beyond  bare probability,  and yet  not  reaching  per- 
fectly to either of the foregoing degrees of certainty, 
passes under the name of  knowledge.  There can be 
nothing  more certain  than  that the idea we  receive 
from an external object is in our minds ;  this  is  in- 
tuitive knowledge.  But whether there be  any thing 
more  than barely that  idea  in our  minds,  whether 
we  can  thence  certainly infer  the existence  of  any 
thing without us,  which corresponds to that idea, is 
that whereof some men think there may be a question 
made;  because  men  may  have  such ideas  in their 
minds,  when  no  such  thing exists,  no  such object 
affects their senses.  But yet here,  I  think,  we  are 
provided with an  evidence, that puts us past doubt- 
ing: for I ask any one, whether he be not invincibly 
conscious to himself of a different perception, when he 
looks on the sun by day,  and thinks  on it by night; 
when  he actually tastes wormwood,  or smells a rose, 
or only thinks on that savour or odour  ?  We as plainly 
find the difference there is between an idea revived in 
our minds by our own memory,  and actually coming 
into our minds by our senses,  as we  do between any 
two distinct ideas.  If any one  say,  a dream may do 
the same thing,  and all these  ideas may be produced 
in us without any external objects ;  he may please to 
dream that I make him this answer;  1.  That it is 110 
great matter,  whether I remove  this scruple or no: 
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oi' no use,  truth and knowledge nothiug.  (3.  That I 
bclic~re  hc will  allow  a  very  manifest difference  he- 
tween  dreaming of  being  in the fire,  and being ac- 
tually in it.  But  yet if he be resolved to appear so scep- 
tical as to  maintain, that what I call being actually 
in  the fire  is  nothing but a  dream,  and we cannot 
thereby ccrtainly  know  that any such thing  as fire 
actually exists without us ;  I answer, that we certainly 
finding that pleasure  or pain follows upon the appli- 
cation of certain objects to us, whose existence we per- 
ceive, or dream that we perceive, by our senses ;  this 
certainty is as great as our happiness  or misery, be- 
yond which we  have no concernment  to know,  or to 
be.  So that, I think, we  may add to the two former 
sorts of knowledge this  also  of the existence of par- 
ticular external objects,  by that perception  and con- 
sciousness we have of the actual cntrarice of ideas from 
them, and allow these three degrecs of knowledge, viz. 
intuitive,  demonstrative,  and  sensitive : in  each  of 
which there are different degrees and ways of evidence 
and certainty. 
Knowledge  $  1,5.  But  since  our  knowledge  is 
not alwilys  founded  on,  and  employed  about,  our 
clear, where  ideas only, will it not follow from thence, 
theideas  that it is conformable  to onr ideas;  and 
:we so.  that where our ideas are clear and distinct, 
or obscure and confused,  our linowledge will  be so 
too?  To wllich  I  answer,  no:  for  our  knowledge 
consisting in tllc perception of  the agreement or dis- 
agreement of any two ideas, its clearness or obscurity 
consists in the clearness or obscurity of that perception, 
and not in the clearness or obscurity of the ideas them- 
sclvcs ;  v. g. a man that 113s as clcar idcas of the angles 
of n triangle, and of equality to  two right ones, as any 
mathematician in the world, may yet have but a very 
obscure perception  of  their agreement,  and so have 
but a very obscure knowledge of it.  But ideas, which 
by  reason  of  their  obscurity or otherwise  arc  con- 
fl~sed,  cannot  produce  any  clear  or distinct  know- 
Icdge; because  as far as any ideas are confused,  so 
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far the mind  cannot perceive  clearly,  whether they 
agree or disagree.  Or to express the same thing in a 
way less apt  to be misunderstood ;  he that hath not de- 
termined ideas to  the words he uses,  cannot make pro- 
positions of them, of whose truth he can be certain. 
CHAPTER 111. 
Of  the  Extent  qf  Human  Knowledge. 
$ 1. KNOWLEDGE,  as has been said, lying in the per- 
ception of the agreement  or disagreement of any of our 
ideas, it follows from hence, that, 
First, we can have knowledge no farther  *.Nofarther 
than we have ideas.  than we 
5 2. Secondly,  that we have no know-  have ideas. 
ledge farther than we  can have  percep-  2.Nof~1rt11er 
than we can  tion of  their agreement or disagreement. 
Which percept~on  being,  1.  Either by in-  their agree- 
tuition, or the immediate comparing any  ment or dis- 
two ideas;  or,  2.  By reason,  examining  "greernent. 
the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, by the in- 
tervention of  some  others; or, 3.  By sensation,  per- 
ceiving the existence of particular things :  Ilence it also 
follows, 
$ 3. Thirdly, that we cannot have an in-  3. Intuitive 
tuitive knowledge that shall extend itself  kllowlc(ke 
to dl  our ideas,  and all that we would 
know  ahout  them ; because  we  cannot  ;,,I  the re- 
examine  and perceive  all  the relations  lations of all 
they have one  to another  by juxta-posi-  our ideas. 
tion,  or an immediate comparison one with anotl~cr. 
Tllus having the ideas of an  obtuse and an acute angled 
triangle,  both drawn froin  equal bases,  and between 
Parallels, I can,  by intuitive knowledge, perceivc the 
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whether they be equal or no ;  because their agreement 
or disagreeinent in equality can never be perceived by 
an  immediate  comparing  them:  the  difference  of 
figure makes their parts incapable of  an exact imme- 
diate application ;  and therefore there is need of some 
intervening qualities to measure them by, which is de- 
monstration,  or rational knowledge. 
$4. Fourthly, it follows also, from what 
4. Nor de-  is above observed, that our rational know- 
monstrative 
knowledge.  ledge cannot reach to the whole extent of 
our ideas ; because between two different 
ideas we would examine, we cannot always find such 
mediums,  as we can  connect one to another with an 
intuitive knowledge, in all the parts of the deduction ; 
and wherever that fails, we come short of knowledge 
and demonstration. 
5. Sensitive  5 5. Fifthly, sensitive knowledge reach- 
knowledge  ing no farther than the existence of things 
narrower  actually present to our senses, is yet much 
than either.  narrower than either of the former. 
§ 6.  From all which  it is evident, that 
6.  Our 
knowledge  the extent  of  our knowledge  comes  not 
therefore  only short of the realityof things, but even 
narrower  of the extent of our own ideas.  Though 
thanour  our  knowledge  be limited  to our  ideas, 
ideas.  and cannot exceed them either in extent or 
perfection ;  and though these be very narrow bounds, 
in respect of the extent of all being, and far short of 
what  we  may justly  imagine  to  be  in  some  even 
created understandings,  not  tied  down  to  the dull 
and narrow information which  is to be received from 
some few, and not very acute ways of perception, such as 
are our senses ;  yet it  would be well with us if our know- 
ledge were but as large as our ideas,  and there were 
not many doubts and inquiries concerning the ideas we 
have, whereof we are not,  nor I believe ever shall be, 
in this world  resolved.  Nevertheless I do not ques- 
tion  but that human knowledge,  under the present 
circumstances  of  our  beings  and constitutions, may 
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be carried much  farther than it has hitherto been, if 
men would sincerely,and with freedom of mind, employ 
all that industry and labour of  thought, in improving 
the means of  discovering truth, which they do for the 
colouring or support of falsehood, to maintain a system, 
interest,  or party, they are once engaged in.  But yet 
after all, I think I may, without injury to human per- 
fection, be confident, that our knowledge would never 
reach to all we might desire to  know concerning those 
ideas we have;  nor be able  to surmount a11  the dif- 
ficulties, and resolve all the questions, that might arise 
concerning any of them.  We  have the ideas of a square, 
a circle, and equality; and yet, perhaps, shall never be 
able to find a circle equal to a  square,  and certainly 
know that it is so.  We have the ideas of matter and 
thinking *,  but possibly shall never be  able  to know, 
whether any mere material being thiaks,orno;  it being 
* Against  that assertion  of  Mr. Locke,  that possibly we shall 
never be able to know whether any mere material being thinks or 
no,  kc. the bishop of Worcester argues thus :  if this be  true, then, 
for all  that we  can know by our ideas of  matter and thinking, 
matter may have a power of thinking :  and, if this hold, then it is 
impossible  to prove a  spiritual substance in us from the idea of 
thinking:  for how can we be assured by our ideas, that God hath 
not given such a  power  of thinking to matter so disposed as our 
bodies are  ?  especially since it is said  -I-,  '' That, in respect of our 
'<  notions,  it is not much more remote from our comprehension to 
"  conceive that God can,  if  he pleases,  superadd to our idea of 
"  matter a faculty of thinking,  than  that he should superadd to 
"  it another substance,  with  a  faculty  of  thinking."  Whoever 
asserts  this  can never prove  a  spiritual substance in us from a 
faculty  of thinking,  because  he cannot know,  from the idea of 
matter  and thinking,  that matter so disposed  cannot think:  and 
he cannot be certain,  that God hath not framed the matter of our 
bodies so as to be capable of it. 
To  which Mr. Locke j:  answers thus :  here your lordship argues, 
that upon my principles it cannot be proved that there is a spiritual 
substance in us.  To  which,  give me leave,  with  submission, to 
say, that I think it may be   roved from my principles,  and I think 
I have done it; and the proof in my book stands thus : First,  we 
experiment  in  ourselves  thinking.  The idea  of  this  action  or 
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mode of thinking is  inconsistent with  tlie idea of self-subsistence, 
and therefore has a necessary connexion with a support or subject 
of inliesion:  the idea of that support is what  we  call  sr~bstance  ; 
and so from  thinking  experimented in us,  we  liave a proof of a 
thinking substance in  us, which in my sense is a  spirit.  Against 
this your  lordship will  argue, that,  by what I have said of  the 
possibility that God  may,  if  lie  pleases,  superadd  to matter  a 
faculty of thinking, it can never be proved that tliere is a spiritual 
substance in us,  because,  upon  that supposition,  it  is  possible it 
may be  a material substance that thinks in us.  I grant it ;  but add, 
that the general idea of substance being  the same every where, 
the modification of thinking, or the power of tliinking, joined to it, 
makes it a spirit,  without  considering what other modificatioils it 
bas, as, whether it has the modification of solidity, or no.  As, on 
the other  side,  substance,  that has  the modification of solidity, 
is  matter,  whether  it has  the  modification  of  thinking,  or  no. 
And  therefore, if  your lordship  means by a  spiritual,  an imma- 
terial substance, I grant I have not proved, nor upon my principles 
can it be proved,  (your lordship meaning, as I think you  do, de- 
monstratively proved) that there is an immaterial substance  in  us 
tliat thinks.  Though I presume, from what I have said about this 
supposition of a system of matter, thinking"  (which  there demon- 
strates that God is immaterial) will prove it in the highest degree 
probable, that the thinking substance in us is immaterial.  Rut your 
lordship thinks not probability enough, and by charging the want 
of demonstration upon my principles,  that  the thinking thing in 
us is immaterial, your lordship seems to conclude it demonstrable 
from principles ot  That demonstration I sllould with 
joy receive from your lordship, or any one.  For  though all  the 
great  ends of morality and religion arewell enough secured without 
it, as I have shown I-,  yet it would be a great advance of our know- 
ledge in nature and philosophy. 
To  what I have said in my book, to show that all the great cnds 
of religion and morality are secured barely by tlie immortality of 
the soul, without a necessary supposition that the soul is imniatc- 
rial, I crave leave to  add,  that immortality may and shall be an- 
nexed to tliat, which in its  own  nature is neither  immaterial  nor 
immortal, as the apostle  expressly declares in these words,  $ For 
tliis corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put 
on immortality. 
Perhaps my using the word spirit for a thinking substance, with- 
out excluding materiality  out of it,  will  be thought too great a 
liberty, and such as deserves censure, because I leave immateria- 
lity out of the idea I make it a sign of.  I readily own, that words 
should be sparingly ventured on in a sense wholly new; and nothing 
but absolute necessity can excuse the boldness  of using any term 
in a sense whereof we can produce no cxample.  But, in the pre- 
sent case, I think I have great authorities to justify me.  The soul 
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is agreed, on all hands, to bc that in US wl~icli  thinks.  And lie that 
will look  into the first book  of Cicero's  Tusculan  Questions,  and 
into tlie  sixth book  of Virgil's  Bneid, will  find, that these two 
great nien, who  of all  the Romans  best  understood  ~hiloso~hy, 
thought, or at least  did  not deny the soul to be a subtile  matter, 
which might come under the nanie of aura, or ignis, or scthcr, and 
this soul they both of them called spiritus :  in tlie notion of wl~icll, 
it is plain, they included only thought and active motion, mithorrt 
the total exclusion of matter.  Whether they tlioup!it  right in tliis, 
I do not  say; tliat  is  not tlie  question; but whctlicr  they spoke 
l)ropcrly, whcn they calied  an active, thinking, subtile substance, 
out of whicli  they excluded  o111y gross and palpable  matter, spi- 
Titus, spirit.  I think that nobody will deny, that if any among tlie 
Romans  can  be allolved  to  speak  properly, T~llly  and Virgil are 
the two who may most securely be dcpendcd on for it : and one of 
them speaking of the soul, says, Durn spiritus hos reget artus ;  and 
tlie  other,  V~ta  continetur corpore  et spiritu.  Where it is plain, 
by corpus, he means (as generally every where) only gross matter 
tliat may be felt  and handled,  as appears by these words,  Si cor, 
aut sanguis,  aut cerebrum est animus; certc, quonia~n  est corpus, 
interibit  cum reliquo  corporc ; si anima est, forti.  dissipabitur ;  si 
ignis, extinguctur, Tusc. Qusst. 1.  I.  c. 11.  Here Cicero opposes 
corp~rsto  ignis and anima, i. e. aura, or breath.  And tlic founda- 
tion of that his  distinction  of the soul, from that wliicli  he calls 
corpus or body, he gives a little lower in these words, Tanta cjus 
tenuitas ut fugiat  aciem, ib. c. 22.  Nor was it tlie heathen world 
alone that had this notion  of spirit; the most enlightened ofall the 
ancient  people of God,  Solomon  himself,  speaks  after the same 
manner, *that which  befalletli the sons  of men, behlleth beasts, 
even one thing befalleth them ;  as the one dieth, so diet11 the other, 
yea,  thcy have all one spirit.  So  I translate tlie Hebrew word hi? 
here, for so I find it translated the very next verse but one ;  I. who 
knoweth the spirit of man that goeth upward, and the spirit of tl~c 
beast th2t goetli  down to tlie  earth?  In which  places it is plain 
that Solomon  applies the word nn,  and our translators of him the 
word spirit, toil substance, out of which materiality was not wliolly 
excluded, unless the spirit of a beast that goeth downwards to the 
earth be immaterial.  Nor did the  way of speaking in our Saviour's 
time vary from  this:  St. Luke tells  us  $,  that when our  Saviour, 
after his  resurrection,  stood  in  tlie  midst of them, they were af- 
frightetl,  and  supposed that they had  seen mveu"pa, the Greck 
word which always answers spirit in English ;  and so the translators 
of the Bible  render  it Irere,  they supposed  that they had seen a 
spirit.  But our  Saviour  says to them, behold  my hands  and my 
feet, that it is I myself; handle me and see; fbr a spirit hat11 not 
flesh and bones, as you see me liave.  Which words of our Saviour 
lxlt the same distinction between body and spirit, that Ciccro did 
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ill the illace above-cited, viz.  That the one was a gross compages 
that cou!d  be felt  and handled;  and the other such as Virgil de- 
scribes the  or soul of Anchises. 
Tcr conatus ibi collo dare bracl~ia  circum, 
l'er  frustra comprensa manus effugit imago, 
P'lr  icvibus ventis vo!ucrique  sirnillima somno *. 
1  would not  be thought  hereby  to say, that spirit  never  does 
signify a  inlrnatcrial substance.  In that sense the scripture, 
I take it, spealis, when it says God is a spirit; and in that sense I 
have used it; and  in that sense 1  have proved from my principles 
that there is a spii.itual  substance; and am certain that there is a 
spiritual immaterial  substance: which  is,  I  liurnbly  conceive,  a 
direct answcr to your  lordship's  question  in the beginning of this 
argument, viz.  IIow we conle to be certain that there are spiritual 
substances, supposing this  principle  to be true,  that the simplc 
ideas by sensation  and reflection  are the solc matter and founda- 
tion of all  our reasoning?  But this hinders not, but that if God, 
that infinite,  omnipotent,  and perfectly immaterial Spirit, should 
please to give to a system of very subtile matter, sense and motion, 
it might with propriety of speech be cslled spirit, though materia- 
lity were not excludecl out of its  complex  idea.  Your  lordship 
proceeds, It is said indeed elsewhere t,  that it is repugnant to the 
idea of senseless  matter, that it should put into itself sense, per- 
ception,  and  knowledge.  I3ut  this  cloth  not reach  the present 
case; which is not what  matter  can do of  itsclf, but what matter 
prepared by an omnipotent hand can do.  And what certainty can 
we have  that hr hath  not done it?  We  can have none from the 
ideas, for those are given np in this case, and consequently we car1 
have  no  certainty,  llpon  these principles,  whether  we  have  any 
spiritual sul)stancc whhin us or not. 
Your lordship  in  this  paragraph proves, that, from what I say, 
we can have no certainty whethel+  we have any spiritual substance 
in us or not.  If by spiritual substance your lordship means an im- 
material substallcc in us, as you speak, I grant what your lordship 
says is truc, that it cannot upon these principles be demonstrated. 
But I n~ust  crave leave to say at the same time, that upon tpesc 
principles it can be proved, to the highest degree of  probability. 
If by spil.itu;tl substance your 1ordsh;p means a thinking substance, 
I must  clisscnt fionl  your  lordship,  and say,  that we  can have a 
certainty,  up011 my principles,  that  there is a spiritual substance 
in  us.  111  short, nly lord,  upon  my priuciples, i.  c. from thc idea 
oi'thinking, we can  liavc n certail~ty  that there is a thinking sub- 
.it:lilce in us ;  from hence we have a certainty that there is an eter- 
nal thinking substance.  This thinking substance, which has been 
from eternity, I have  proved to be immaterial.  This eternal, im- 
material, thinking substance, has put into us a thinking substance, 
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wI~icl~,  whether  it be a material  or immaterial substance,  canlloi 
l,e infallibly demonstrated  from  our ideas ; though  fro111 them  it 
may be provccl, that it is to the highest degree probable that it 14 
immaterial. 
Again, the bishop of Worcester undertakes  to prove from Mr. 
Locke's principles, that we may be certain,  6L That the firbt eternal 
~(tlrinking  IZeing, or omnipotent Spirit, cannot, if he m-ould, give ttr 
"certain  spstetns  of created  sensible  matter,  put  together as Ilc 
"sees  fit, sonle degrees of sense, perception, and tho~~~lit." 
To which Mr. Locke has made the following answer 111 his tllirtl 
letter. 
Your first argument I take to be this; that according to me, thr 
knowledge wc  have  being by our ideas, and our idea of matter in 
general  being a solid  substance,  and our idea of body a solici es- 
tended figured substance ;  if I admit matter to be capable of think- 
ing? I co~~found  the idea of  matter with  the idea of a spirit:  to 
wh~ch  1  answer, No, no more than I confound  the idea of' matter 
with the idea of  a  horse, when I say that matter in  general  is  a 
solid  extended substance; and that a horse is a material  animal, 
or an extended solid substance with sense and spontaneous n~otio~>. 
The idea of  matter  is  an extended solid  substance; wherever 
there is such a substance, there is matter, and the essence of mat- 
ter, whatever other qualities, not contained in that essence, it shall 
please God to superadd to it.  For example,  God  creates an cs- 
tended solid substance, without the superadding any thing clsc to 
it, and so we may consider it at rest: to some parts of it he super- 
adds motion, but it has still the essence of matter:  other parts of 
it he frames into plants, with  all  the excellencies  of  vcgetatioi~, 
life, and beauty, which is to be found in a rose or  peach tree, &c. 
above the essence of  matter, in general, but it is still but matter: 
to othcr parts he adds sense  and spontaneous motion, a~itl  thosc 
other properties that are to be found in an elephant.  I'litl~crto  it 
is not  doubted but the power of  God may go,  and that the pro- 
perties of a rose, a peach,  or an elephant,  superadded to matter, 
change not the properties of matter; but matter is in these things 
matter  still.  But if one ventur::  to go one step farther, and say, 
God may give to matter thought,  reason,  and volition, as well as 
sense and  spontaneous motion, there are men ready presently to 
limit the power of the omnipotent  Creator, and tell us he cannot 
do it; because  it destroys  the essence, or  changes the essential 
properties  of matter.  To make good  assertion, they hnvc 
no more to say, but that thought and reason  are not included in 
the essence of matter.  I grant it; but whatever excellency, not 
contained in its essence, be superadded to matter, it does not cle- 
stray the essence of matter, if it leaves it an extended  solid  snb- 
"ance;  wherevcr  that is, there is  the essence  of matter: arid  if 
every thing of greater prrfcction, superadded to such a substance, 
destroys the esscncc of matter, what will become of the essence ot' 
matter in a plant or  an animal, whose propertics far cvcerd those 
of a Inere cxtcndcd solitl su1)stancuT But it is farther urged, that we cannot conceive how matter call 
think.  I grant it; but to  argue from  thence, tliat God therefore 
cannot give to matter a faculty of  tliinking, is to say God's omni- 
potency is limited to a narrow compass, because man's  understand- 
ing is so; znd brings down God's  infinite power to the sue  of our 
capacities.  If God can givc no power to any parts of matter, but 
what men can account for from tlie essence of  niatter  in general ; 
if  all  such qualities  and properties  must  ilestroy tlie essence, or 
change tlie  essential  properties  of matter, which are to our con- 
ceptions above it, and we  cannot conceive to be the natural con- 
sequence of that essence; it is plain, tliat tlle essence of niatter is 
destroyed, and its essential properties changed, in   no st of the sen- 
sible parts of this our system.  For it is visible, tl!nt  n!l  tlie planets 
have revolutions about certain remote centres, wliicli I would have 
any one explain, or  make conceivable by tlie bare essence, or na- 
tural powers depending on the essence of matter in general, rvitli- 
out something added to that essencc, wliicli we cannot conceive; 
for the moving  of matter  in a crooked line,  or  tlle  attraction of 
matter  by matter,  is  all that can be said  in  the case; either of 
which it is above our reach to derive from the essence of matter 
or body in general; though one of these two must unavoidably be 
allowed to be superadded in this instance to the essence of matter 
in  general.  The omnipotent  Creator advised  not with us in the 
making of the world,  and his ways arc not tlie  less  excellent,  be- 
cause they arc past finding out. 
In the next  place,  the vegetable  part  of  tlie  creation  is  not 
doubted to be wholly material;  and yet lie tliat will  look into it, 
will  observe  excellencies  and operations  in  tliis  part of  matter, 
which lie will not find contained in tlie essencc of  niatter in gene- 
ral, nor be able to conceive how they can bc produced by it.  And 
mill he tlicrefbre say, that the essence of  matter  is  destroyed in 
them, because tlicy have  properties  and operations not contained 
in the essential properties of  matter as  niatter, nor explicable by 
tlie csscnce of matter in general ? 
Let us advance  one  step fhrther,  and  we sliall  in tlie  anirnal 
world meet with yet  greater  perfections  and properties, no ways 
explicable by the essence of matter in general.  If'tl~e  omriipoteiit 
Creator had not superadded to tlre earth, which produced the ir- 
rational  aninials,  qualities far  surpassing those  of the dull dead 
earth, out of which they were made, life,  sense,  and  spontaneous 
motion,  nobler qualities tliai~  were before in it, it had still remained 
rude senseless matter; and if to the individuals of each species he 
had not superadded a power  of propagation,  the species had pe- 
rished with those  individuals :  but by these essences or properties 
of each  species,  superadded to the matter which they were made 
of, tlie cssence or properties of matter in general were not destroy- 
ed or changed, any more than any tliing that was in tlie individuals 
before was destroyed or changed by the power of generation, SU- 
pcracldecl to tlicni by tlie firat benediction of the Almighty. 
In all  suc11 citscs, tlic  supcri~itlucenient  of greater  I)erfcctiolls 
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and nobler qualities destroys nothing of the essence or perfections 
that were there before; unless there can be showed a manifest re- 
pugnancy between thein :  but all the proof offered for tliat is only, 
that we  cannot  conceive how matter,  without  such  superaddetl 
perfections,  can produce  such effects; whicli is, in truth, no more 
than to say, matter in  general, or every part of matter, as matter, 
has them not; but is no reason to prove tliat God,  if he pleases, 
cannot superadd them  to some parts of matter, unless it can be 
proved to be a contradiction, that God should  give to sonie parts 
of matter qualities and perfections which  matter  in  general has 
not ;  tliough we cannot conceive how matter is invested with them, 
or how it operates by virtue of those new endowments; nor is it to 
be wondered  that we cannot, whilst we limit  all  its  operations to 
those qualities it had before, and would explain them by tl~e  known 
properties of matter in general, without any such iniluced perfec- 
tions.  For, if this be a right rule of reasoning, to deny a tliing to 
be, because we cannot conceive the manner  how it comes to be; 
I shall desire them who use it to stick to this  rule, and see what 
work it will make both in divinity as well as philosophy: and whe- 
ther they can advance any thing more iq favour of scepticism. 
For to keep within the present subject of the power of tliinking 
and self-motion, bestowed  by omnipotent  power  in  some parts of 
matter:  the objection to  this is, I  cannot  conceive how matter 
should think.  What is the consequence ?  Ergo, God cannot givc 
it a  power to think.  Let this stand for a good reason,  and then 
proceed  in  other cases by the same.  You cannot conceive how 
matter can attract matter at any distance, much less at  tlie distance 
of 1,000,000 miles ; ergo, God cannot give it such a power:  you 
cannot conceive how matter  should  feel,  or move itself,  or affect 
an immaterial being, or be moved by it ; ergo, God cannot give it 
such powers :  which is in effect to deny gravity, and the revolution 
of the planets about the sun; to make brutes mere machines, with- 
out sense or spontaneous motion; and to allow man  either  sense 
nor voluntary motion. 
Let  us apply this rule one degree farther.  You cannot conceive 
how an extended solid substance should think; therefore God can- 
not make it think :  can you  conceive how your own  soul, or any 
substance, thinks? You find indeed that you do think, and 60 do 1; 
but I want  to be told how the action of  thinking  is performed : 
this, I confess, is beyond my conception ; and I would be glad any 
one, who conceives it, would  explain  it to me.  God, I find, has 
given me this faculty; and since I cannot but be convinced of his 
power in this instance, which though I every  moment experiment 
In  myself,  yet  J  c;innot  conceive  the manner  of; what would  it 
be less than an insolent absurdity, to deny his power in other like 
cases, only fbr this reason, because I cannot conceive the manner 
how ? 
To  explain tliis  matter a little farther :  God has created a sub- 
"ante; let it be,  for  example, a  solid exteaded  substance.  1s 
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God bound to give  it, besides being, a power of action?-that,  I 
think, nobody will say:  he therefore  mag leave it in a state of in- 
activity, and it will be  nevertheless a  substance; for action is not 
necessary to  the being  of  any substance  that God does  create. 
God has likewise created and made to exist, de novo, an immaterial 
substance, which will not lose its being of a substance, though God 
should  bestow on  it nothing  more  but  this  bare  being, without 
giving it any activity at all.  Here are now two distinct substances, 
the one material, the other immaterial, both  in a  state of perfect 
inactivity.  Now I ask, what power God can give  to one of tllese 
substances (supposing them to retain the sanie distinct natures that 
they had as sai)s~anccs  in  their  state  of inactivity) which he can- 
not give  to the other? In t!l&t  state, it is  plain,  neither  of  them 
thinks ; for thinlting  bekg an  action, it ca~not  be  denied  that 
God can put an end to any action of any created substance, with- 
out annihilating of the substance whereof  it is an action;  and if it 
be so, he can also  create or  give existence to such a substance, 
without giving that substance any action at all.  By the same rea- 
son it is plain, that neitl~or  ofthem c:m  move itself':  now, I woul(1 
ask, why Omnipotency cannot give  to  either of these  substances, 
which  are equally in  a state of perfect inactivity, the same power 
that it can give to the other? Let it be, for example, that of'spon- 
taneous or  self-motion, which  is  a power  that it is supposed God 
can give to an  unsolid  substance, but  denied that he can give to 
solid substance. 
If it be asked,  why they limit  the ornnipotency  of God,  in re- 
ference to the one rather  than the otlier  of these substances ?  all 
that can be said to it is, that  they cannot conceive how the solid 
substance should cvcr be able to move itself.  And as little, say I, 
are they able to  conceive how a created unsolid  substance should 
move itself.  But there may be something  in an immaterial sub- 
stance, that you do not know.  I grant it; and in a  material  one 
too: for example, gravitation of matter towards matter, and in the 
several proportions observable, inevitably shows, that there is some- 
thing in matter that we do not understand, unless we can conceive 
self-motion  in matter ;  or an inexplicable and inconceivable attrac- 
tion in matter, at immense, almost incornprehcnsible  distances:  it 
must therefore be  confessed, that  there is  something in solid,  as 
well as unsolid substances, that we  do not understand.  But this 
we know,  that they may each of them  have  their distinct beings, 
without any activity superadded to them, unless you will deny that 
God  can  take  from  any being  its  power  of  acting,  which  it is 
probable will be tho~ight  too presumptuous for any one to do ;  and 
I  say, it  is  as hard to  conceive self-motion  in  a  created imma- 
terial, as in a material being, consider it how you will;  and there- 
fore this  is no reason  to deny Omnipotency to be able to give  a 
power of self-motion to a material snbstance, if he pleases,  as well 
as to an imnlaterial ; since neither of them  can  have it from them- 
selves, nor can we conceive how it can be in either of them. 
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The  same is visible in the other operation of thinking ; both these 
substances may bemade, and existwithout thought; neither of them 
has, or can have the power of thinking from  itself:  God may give 
it to either of them, according to the good  pleasure  of  his omni- 
potency;  and in whichever of them it is, it is ~qually  beyond  our 
capacity  to conceive bow  either of  these substances thinks.  But 
for that reason to deny that God, who had  power enough  to give 
them both a being out of nothing, can, by the same omnipotency, 
give them what  other  powers  and perfections  he pleases,  has no 
better foundation than to deny his  power  of creation, because we 
cannot conceive how it is performed : and tliere,  at last, this way 
of reasoning must terminate. 
That Omnipotency cannot make a substance to be solid and not 
solid at the same time, I  think with  due reverence we  may say; 
but that a solid substa~ice  may not have qualities, perfections, and 
powers, which have no natural or visibly necessary connexion with 
solidity and extension, is too  much for us (who are but of yester- 
day, and  know nothing) to be positive  in.  If God cannot join 
things together by connexions inconceivable to us, we must deny 
even the consistency and being of matter itself; since every particle 
of  it having some bulk,  has  its parts connected by ways incon- 
ceivable to us.  So that all the difficulties  that are raised  against 
the thinking of matter, from our ignorance, or narrow conceptions, 
stand not at all in the way  of  the power of  God,  if  he pleases to 
ordain it so; nor prove any thing against his  having actually en- 
dued  some parcels of matter,  so disposed  as he thinks fit,  with a 
faculty of thinking,  till  it can be shown  that it contains a  con- 
tradiction to suppose it. 
Though to me sensation be comprehended under  thinking  in 
general, yet, in the foregoing discourse, I have spolte of  sense in 
brutes,  as distinct from thinking j  because your lordship, as I re- 
member,  speaks of  sense in  brutes.  But her4 I take liberty to 
observe,  that if your lordship allows  brutes to have  sensation,  it 
will follow, either that God can and doth give to some parcels of 
matter a power of perception and thinking ;  or that all animals have 
immaterial, and consequently, according to your lordship, immortal 
souls as well  as men; and to say that fleas  and mites,  &c.  have 
immortal  souls,  as well  as  men,  will  possibly  be looked  on  as 
going a great way to serve an hypothesis. 
I have been pretty large in making this matter plain, that they 
who are so forward to bestow  hard censures or names on the opin~ons 
of  those who differ from them, may consider whether sometimes 
they are not more due to their own; and that they may be per- 
suaded a little to temper that heat, which,  supposillg the truth in 
their current opinions,  gives  them (as they think) a right to lay 
what imputations they please on those who weuld fairly examine 
!lie  grounds they stand upon.  For talking with a supposition and 
insinuations, that truth and knowledge, nay, and re!igion  too, stand 
and fall  wit11  their systems, is at best but an imperious way of beg- 
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ging the question, and assuming to themselves, iinder the pretence 
of zeal for the cause of God, a title to infallibility.  It is very be- 
coming tliat men's  zeal  for truth should go as far as their proofs, 
but not go for proofs tl~emselves.  He  that attacks received opinions 
with any thing but fair arguments, may, I own, be justly suspected 
not to mean well, nor to be  led by the love of truth;  but the same 
may be said of him too, who so defends them.  An error is not the 
better for being common, nor truth the worse for having lain neg- 
lected:  and if it were put to tlie vote any wliere  in the world, I 
doubt,  as things are managed, whether truth would have the ma- 
jority, at least whilst the authority of men, and not the examination 
of things, must be its measure.  The imputation of scepticism, and 
tliose broad insinuations to render what I have writ suspected, so 
frequent,  as if that were the great business  of all this pains you 
have been  at about me,  has made me say thus  much,  my lord, 
rather as my sense of tlie way to establish  truth in its full force 
and beauty, than  that I  think  the world will  need to have any 
thing said to it,  to  make  it distinguish  between  your lordship's 
and my design in writing, which therefore I securely leave to the 
judgment of the reader, and return to the argument in hand. 
What I have above said, I take to be a full answer to all that 
your  lordship  would  inyer  from  my  idea  of matter,  of  liberty, 
of identity,  and fiom the power of abstracting.  You ask, * How 
can my idfa of liberty agree with the idea that bodies can operate 
only by motion and impulse?  Ans. Ry the omnipotency of God, 
who can make all things  agree, that involve  not a contradiction. 
It  is true, I say, " t That bodies operate by impulse, and nothing 
else."  And so I thought when I writ it,  and can yet conceive no 
other way of their operation.  But I am since convinced by the 
judicious  Mr. Newton's  incomparable book, that it is too bold a 
presnmption to limit God's power in this point by my narrow con- 
ceptions.  The gravitation of matter towards matter, by ways un- 
conceivable to me, is not only a demonstration that God can, lf he 
pleases, put into bodies powers, and ways of operation, above what 
can be derived from  our idea of body,  or can be explained by 
what we know of matter, but  also an unquestionable, and every 
wliere visible  instance,  that he has  done so.  And therefore in 
the next edition of my book I will take care to have that passage 
rectified. 
As  to self-consciousnes~,  your lordship asks,  $ What is there like 
self-consciousness  in  matter? Nothing at  all in matter as matter. 
But that God cannot bestow on some parcels of matter a power of 
thinking,  and with  it self-consciousness,  will  never be proved by 
asking,  11 How is it possible  to apprehend that mere body sllould 
perceive that it dot11 perceive?  The weakness of our apprehension 
I grant in the case : I confess as much as you please,  that we can- 
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not conceive how a solid, no, nor how an unsolid created substance 
thinks ; but  this weakness  of our apprehensions reaches not the 
power of God, whose weakness is stronger than any thing in men. 
Your argument from abstraction we  hzve  in  this question,  * If 
it may be in  the power of matter to think,  how comes it to be so 
impossible for such organized bodies as the brutes have to enlarge 
their  ideas by  abstractiorl?  Ans.  This seems to suppose,  that I 
place thinking within the natural power of matter.  If tliat be your 
meaning,  my lord,  I never say, nor  suppose,  that all matter has 
naturally in it a faculty of thinking, but the direct contrary.  But 
if you mean that certain parcels of matter, ordered by tlie Divine 
power, as seems fit to him, may be made capable of receiving from 
his omnipotency tlie faculty of thinking;  that, indeed, I say; and 
tliat being granted, the answer to your question is easy; since,  if 
omnipotency can give thought to any solid substance, it is not hard 
to conceive that God may  give that faculty in a  lligher or lower 
degree, as it pleases him, who knows what disposition of the subject 
is suited to such a particular way or degree of thinking. 
Another argument to prove that God cnnnot endue any parcel 
of matter with the faculty of thinking,  is talien from tliose words 
of mine,  twhere T  show, by what connexion of ideas we mily come 
to know that God is  an immaterial substance.  They are these, 
"  The idea of au eternal actual knowing being, with  the idea of 
immateriality, by  the intervention of the idea of matter,  and of 
its  actual  division,  divisibility,  and  want  of  perception,"  &c. 
From whence your lordship thus argues,  $ Here the want of  per- 
ception is owned to be so essential to matter, that God is therefore 
concluded to be immaterial.  Ans. Perception and knowledge  in 
that one eternal being, where it has its source, it is visible must be 
essentially inseparable from it; therefore  the actual want of per- 
ception in so great part of  the particular parcels  of  matter, is a 
demonstration,  that  tlie  first  being,  from  whom  perception  and 
knowledge are inseparable,  is not matter : how far this makes the 
want of perception an essential property of matter,  I will not dis- 
pute ;  it suffices that it shows,  that perception is not an essential 
property of matter; and therefore matter cannot be that eternal 
original heing to which  perception  and knowledge are essential. 
Matter,  I say,  naturally  is wlt~iout  perception:  ergo,  says your 
lordship, want of perception is ari essential property of matter, and 
God does not change the essential properties of things, their nature 
remaining.  From whence you infer,  that God cannot bestow 011 
any parcel of matter (tlie nature of matter remaining) a faculty of 
thinking.  If the rules of logic, since my days, be not changed, I 
may safely  deny this  consequence.  For an  argument that runs 
thus, God does not;  ergo,  he cannot, I was taugl~t  when  1 first 
came to the university,  would  not hold.  For I  ilcvcr  s~id  God 
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did ;  but,  *  That I see no contradiction in it, that he should,  if 
he pleased,  give to some systems of senseless matter a  faculty of 
thinking;"  and I know nobody, before Des Cartes, that ever pre- 
tended to show that there was any contradiction in it.  So that at 
worst, my not being able to see in matter any such incapacity, as 
makes it impossible for Omnipotency to bestow on it a faculty of 
thinking, makes me opposite only to the Cartesians.  For, as far as 
I have seen or heard,  the fathers of the Christian  church never 
pretended to demonstrate that matter was  incapable to receive a 
power of sensation, perception, and thinking, from the hand of the 
omnipotent Creator.  Let us therefore, if you please, suppose the 
forin of your argumentation right,  and that your lordship means, 
God cannot:  and then,  if your argument be good, it proves,  that 
God could not give to Balaam's ass a power to speak to his master 
as he did; for the want of rational discourse being natural to that 
species, it is but for your lordship to call it an essential property, 
and then God cannot change the essential  properties of things, 
their nature  remaining;  whereby  it is  proved  that God cannot, 
with  all  his  omnipotency,  give to an ass a  power  to speak as 
Balaam's did. 
You  say,  I- my lord,  You  do not set bounds  to God's  omni- 
potency:  for  he may,  if  he please,  change a  body  into an im- 
material substance,  i. e.  take away from  a  substance the solidity 
which it had before, and which made it matter, and then give it a 
faculty of thinking, which it had not before, and which makes it a 
spirit,  the same substance remaining.  For if the substance  re- 
mains not,  body is  not changed into an immaterial substance, but 
the solid substance, and all belonging to it,  is annihilated, and an 
immaterial substance created, which  is not a change of one thing 
into another, but the destroying of one, and making another de 
aovo.  In this change therefore of a  body or material  substance 
into an immaterial, let us observe these distinct considerations. 
First, you say, God may,  if he pleases,  take away from a solid 
suh tance solidity, which  is that which  makes  it a  material  sub- 
stance or body; and may make it an immaterial substance, i. e.  a 
substance without solidity.  But this privation of one quality gives 
it not another ;  the bare taking away a lower or less noble quality 
does not give it an higher or nobler; that must be the gift of God. 
For the bare privation  of one,  and a  meaner quality,  cannot be 
the position of an higher and better; unless any one will say, that 
cogitation,  or the power  of  thinking,  results  from the nature of 
rubstance itself; which if it do, then wherever there is substance, 
there must be cogitation, or a power of thinking. Here then, upon 
your lordship's  own principles, is an immaterial substance without 
the faculty of thinking. 
In the next place, you wlll not deny, but God may give to this 
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substance,  thus  deprived of solidity,  a  faculty of  thinking;  for 
you suppose it made capable of  that, by being  made immaterial ; 
whereby  you  allow,  that the same numerical  substance may be 
sometimes  wholly  incogitative,  or without  a  power  of  thinking, 
and at other times perfectly cogitative, or endued with a power of 
thinking. 
Further,  you will  not  deny,  but  God can give it solidity and 
make  it material again.  For, I conclude,  it will  not be denied, 
that  God can make it again what  it was  before.  Now  I  crave 
leave  to ask your lordship,  why God,  having  given  to this sub- 
stance the faculty  of  thinking  after solidity  was  taken  from  it, 
cannot restore to it solidity again, without taking away the faculty 
of thinking? When you have resolved this, my lord, you will have 
proved  it impossible for God's  on~nipotence  to give a  solid sub- 
stance a  faculty of thinking; but till  then,  not having proved it 
impossible, and yet denying that God can do it, is to deny that he 
can do what is in itself possible ;  which, as I humbly conceive, is 
visibly to set bounds to God's omnipotency, though you say here* 
you do not set bounds to God's omnipotency. 
If I should imitate your lordship's  way of writing, I should not 
omit to bring in Epicurus here, and take notice that this was his 
way, Dcum verbisponere, re tollere:  md  then add, that I am certain 
yo11  do not  think  he promoted  the  great  ends of religion  and 
morality.  For  it is  with  such  candid and  kind  insinuations  as 
these  that you bring  in both f Hobbes and $ Spinosa into your 
discourse here about God's  being  able,  if he please,  to give to 
some parcels of matter, ordered as he  thinks fit, a faculty of think- 
ing: neither of those authors having,  as appears by any passages 
you bring out of them,  said any thing to this question, nor having, 
as it seems, any other business here, but by their  names skilfully 
to  give that  character  to my book,  with  uhich you  would  re- 
commend it to the world. 
I pretend not to inquire what  measure  of zeal,  nor for what, 
guides  your lordship's  pen in such a way of writing,  as yours has 
all along been with me:  only I cannot but consider, what reputa- 
tion it would  give to the writings of the fathers of the church, if 
they should think  truth required,  or  religion  allowed  them  to 
imitate  such  patterns.  But  God  be  thanked,  there  be  those 
amongst them who do not admire such ways of managing the cause 
of truth or religion;  they being sensible that if every one, who be- 
lieves  or  can pretend he hat11  truth  on his side,  is  thereby  au- 
thorized, without proof,  to insinuate whatever  may serve to pre- 
judice  men's  minds  against  the other side,  there  will  be great 
ravage made on charity and practice, witliout any gain to truth or 
knowledge;  and that the liberties frequently ta!ten  by disputants 
to do so,  may have been  the cause that the world in all age3 has 
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to import thus much, viz. Does God propose any thing to mankind 
to be believed ?  It is very fit and credible to be believed, if reason 
can demonstrate  it to be true.  But if human reason come short 
in the case,  and  cannot  make it out, its  credibility is  thereby 
lessened; which is in effect to say, that the veracity of God is not 
a firm and sure foundation of faith to rely upon, without the con- 
current testimony of reason ;  i. e.  with reverence be it spoken,  God 
is not to be believed on his own word,  unless what he reveals be 
in itself credible, and might be believed withbut him. 
If this be a way to promote religion, the christian  religion,  in 
all its articles, I am not sorry that it is not a way to be found in 
any of my writings;  for I imagine any thing like this would (and 
I should think deserved to) have other titles than bare scepticism 
bestowed upon it,  and would have raised  no small outcry against 
any one, who is not to be  supposed to be in the right in all that he 
says,  and so may sec~lrely  say what  he pleases.  Such as I,  the 
rofanron  vulgus, who take too much upon us, if we would examine, 
gave  nothing to do but to hearken and believe, though what he said 
should subvert tlie very foundations of the christian faith. 
What I  have above observed,  is  so visibly  contained in your 
lordship's  argument, that when I met with it in your answer to my 
first letter, it seemed so strange for a man of your lordship's cha- 
racter, and in a dispute in defence of  the doctrine of the Trinity, 
that I could hardly persuade myself, but it was a slip of your pen: 
but when I found it in your second letter * made use of again, and 
seriously enlarged as an argument of weight to be insisted upon, I 
was convinced that it was a  principle that you heartily embraced, 
how little favourable soever it was to the articles of the christian 
religion, and particularly those which you undertook to defend. 
I desire my reader to peruse the passages as they stand in your 
letters themselves, and see whether what you say in them does not 
amount to this :  that a revelation from God is more or less credible, 
according as it has a stronger or weaker confiririation from human  - 
reason.  For, 
1.  Your lordship says, t  you do not question whether  God can 
give immortality to a material  substance; but you say it takes off 
very much from the evidence of  immortality, if  it depends wholly 
upon God's giving that, which of its own nature it is not capable of. 
To  which I reply,  any one's  not being  able to demonstrete the 
soul to be immatcial, taltes off not very much, nor at all, from the 
evidence of its immortality,  if God  has revealed  that  it shall  be 
immortal;  because the veracity of God is a demonstration of the 
truth of what he has revealed,  and the want of another demonstra- 
tion of a  proposition,  that is  demonstratively true,  taltes  not off 
from the evidence of it.  For where there is a clear demonstration, 
there is as much evidence as any truth can have, that is not self- 
evident.  God has revealed that the souls of men should live for 
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ever.  But, says your lordship, from this evidence it takes off very 
much,  if  it depends wholly upon  God's  giving that, which  of  its 
own nature it is not capable of,  i. e. The revelation and testimony 
of God loses much of its evidence, if this depends wholly upon the 
pod  pleasure of God, and cannot be demonstratively made out by 
natural reason, that the soul is immaterial, and consequently in its 
own nature immortal.  For tliat is all that here is or can be meant 
by these words,  which  of its own nature it is not capable of,  to 
make them to the purpose.  For the whole of your lordship's  dis- 
course here is to prove,  that the soul cannot be material,  because 
then  the evidence  of  its being  immortal  would  be  very  much 
lessened.  Which is to say,  that it is not as credible,  upon divine 
revelation,  that a  material substance should be immortal,  as an 
immaterial; or which  is  all  one,  that God is  not equally to be 
believed, when he declares, that a material substance shall be im- 
mortal, as when he declares, tliat an immaterial shall  be so; be- 
cause the immortality of a material substance cannot be demon- 
strated from natural reason. 
Let us try this rule of your lordship's  a little farther.  God hath 
revealed,  that the bodies  men  shall have  after  the resurrection, 
as well  as their souls, shall live to eternity.  Does your lordship 
believe  the eternal life the one of these more than of the other, 
because  you  think you  can prove  it of  one of them by natural 
reason,  and of the other not?  Or can any one,  who  admits of 
divine revelation in the case,  doubt of one of them more than the 
other? or think this proposition  less credible,  that the bodies of 
men, after the resurrection, shall live for ever; than this, That the 
souls of men shall,  after the resurrection,  live for ever ?  For that 
he must do, if he thinks either of them is  less credible  than the 
other.  If this be so,  reason is to be consulted how far God is to 
be believed,  and the credit of divine testimony must receive  its 
force  from  the  evidence of  reason;  which  is  evidently  to take 
away the credibility of divine revelation in all supernatural truths, 
wherein the evidence of reason fails.  And how much such a prin- 
ciple as this tends to the support of ,the doctrine of the Trinity,  or 
the promoting tlie christian religion,  I shall leave it to your lord- 
ship to consider. 
I am not so well read in Wobbes or Spinosa as to be able to say, 
what were  their  opinions in this  matter.  But possibly there be 
those, who will think your lordship's authority of more use to them 
in the case, than those justly decried names; and be glad to find 
your lordship a patron of the oracles of reason, so little to the ad- 
vantage of the oracles of divine revelation.  This at least, I think, 
may be subjoined to the words at the bottom of the next page *, 
That those who have  gone about to lessen  the credibility of the 
articles  of faith, which  evidently  they do,  who say they are less 
credible,  because they cannot  be  made out demonstratively by 
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llatural  reason,  have not been thought  to securc several of the 
articles of the christian faith, especially those of the Trinity,  in- 
carnation, and resurrection of the body, wllich are those upon the 
account of which I am brought by your lordship into this dispute. 
I shall not trouble the reader with your lordship's endeavours, in 
the followi~lg  words, to prove, that if the soul be not an immaterial 
substance, it can be nothing but life; your very first words visibly 
confuting all  that you  allege  to that purpose: they are, *If the 
soul be a material substance, it is really nothing but life; which is 
to say,  That if the soul  be really a substance,  it is not really a 
substance, but really nothing else but an affection of a substance; 
for the life, whether of a material  or  immaterial  substance, is not 
the substance itself, but an affection of it. 
2. You say, t Although we think the separate state  of the soul 
after  death is sufficiently revealed in the scripture; yet it creates 
a great clifticulty in  understanding  it,  if the soul  be nothing but 
life, or a material  substance, which  must be dissolved when life is 
ended.  For, if the soul be a material  substance, it must be made 
up, as others are, of the cohesion of solid and separate parts, how 
minute and invisible soever they be.  And what is it which should 
keep them  together, when  life  is  gone?  So that it is  no easy 
matter to give an account how the soul should be capable of im- 
mortality, unless it be an immaterial substance; and then we know 
the solution and texture of  bodies cannot reach the soul, being of 
a different nature. 
Let it be as hard a matter  as it will,  to give an account what it 
is that should keep the parts of a material soul together, after it is 
separated from the body; yet it will  be always as easy to give an 
account of it, as to give an account what it is which shall keep to- 
gether a material and immaterial substance.  And yet the difficulty 
that there is  to give an account of  that, I hope,  does not, with 
your  lordship, weaken  the cred~bility  of the inseparable union of 
soul and body to eternity: and I persuade myself,  that tlie men of 
sense, to whom your lordship appeals in the case, do not find their 
belief of this fundamental point much weakened by that difficulty. 
I  thought heretofore  (and by your  lordship's  permission would 
think so still) that the union  of the parts of matter, one with an- 
other, is as much in the hands  of  God, as the union of a material 
and i~nmatcrial  subbtance; and that it does not take off very much, 
or at all, frotn the evidcncc of immortality, which depends on that 
union, that it is no easy matter  to give  an account what it is th;~t 
should keep them together: though its depending wholly upon the 
gift and good  pleasure  of  God, where the manner  creates great 
difficulty in the understantling,  and our reason cannot discover in 
the nature of things  how it is, be that whicll, your lordship so PO- 
sitively says, lessens the credibility of the fundamental  articles of 
the resurrection and immortality. 
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~ut,  my lord,  to remove this  objection a little, and to show of 
how sntall force it is even with yourself; give me leave to presume, 
that  your  lordship as firmly believes  the immortality of the body 
after the resurrection, as any other  article  of  faith; if  so, then it 
being no easy matter to give an account what it is that shall keep 
together the parts of a material soul, to one that believes it is ma- 
terial,  can no more weaken the credibility of its immortality, than 
the like difticulty weakens the credibility of the immortality of the 
body.  For, when your lordship shall find it an easy matter to give 
an account what  it is,  besides  the good  pleasure  of God, which 
shall keep together the parts of our material bodies to eternity, or 
even soul  and  body, 1  doubt not but any one who shall think the 
soul material, will also find it as easy to give an account what it is 
that shall keep tliose parts of matter also together to eternity. 
Were it not that the warmth of controversy is apt to make men 
so far forget, as to take up tliose principles themselves (when they 
will serve their turn) which they have highly condemned in others, 
I should wonder to find your  lordship to argue, that because it is 
a  difficulty  to understand  what  shall  keep  together the minute 
parts of a material soul, when life is gone ;  and because it is not an 
easy matter  to  give  an account how the soul shall be capable of 
in~n~ortality,  unless it be an immaterial substance:  therefore it is 
not so credible, as if it were  easy to give an account,  by natural 
reason, how it could be.  For to this it is  that all this your dis- 
course tends, as is evident by what ia  already set down ;  and will 
be more fully made out by what your lordship says in other places, 
though  there needs  no  such proof,  since it would all be nothing 
against me in any other sense. 
I thought your  lordship had in  other  places  asserted, and in- 
sisted on this truth, that no part of  divine  revelation was the less 
to be believed, because the thing itself  created great difficulty in 
the understanding, and the manner of it was hard to be explained, 
and it was no easy matter to give an account how it was.  This, 
as I take it,  your  lordship  condemned in others as a very unrea- 
sonable principle,  and sucli as would subvert all the articles of the 
christian religion,  that were  mere  matters of faith,  as I think il 
will: and is it possible, that you  should make use of it here your- 
self, against  the article of life  and immortality, that Christ hat11 
brought to light through the gospel, and neither was, nor could be 
made  out by natural  reason  without  revelation?  But you  will 
say, you speak only of the soul; and your words are, That it is no 
easy matter to give an account how the soul shoulcl be capable of 
immortality, unless it be an immaterial substance.  I grant it; but 
crave leave to say, that there is  not any one of those  difticulties, 
that are or can be raised  about tlie  manner  how a material soul 
can be immortal, which  do not  as well  reach  the immortality of 
the body. 
But, if it were not so, I am sure this principle of your lordship's 
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visible parts of a man, which Ile acknowledges to be mortal, should 
look  on thc soul to be a nlodification  of that  body,  in a discourse 
wherein he was endeavouring to persuade  another that it was im- 
mortal.  It is to be acknowledged  that truly great men,  such as 
he was, are not wont so  manifestly to contradict themselves.  He 
had therefore no thought concerning the modification of the body 
of a man  in  the case:  he was  not such a trifler  as to examine, 
whether the modification of the body of a man was immortal, when 
that body itself was  mortal:  and therefore, that which lie reports 
as Dicaearchus's  opinion, he dismisses in the beginning without any 
more ado, c. 11.  But Cicero's  was a direct, plain,  and sensible 
inquiry, viz.  What the soul was? to see whether from  thence be 
could discover  its  immortality.  But in  all  that discourse in his 
first  book  of 'rusculan  Questiol~s,  where lie  lays out so mucli of 
his reading and reason, there is not one syllable showing the least 
thought that the soul was an immaterial substance ;  but many things 
directly to the contrary. 
Indeed (1) he shuts out the body, taken in the senses he uses * 
corpus all along, for the sensible organical  parts of a Inan ;  and is 
positive  that is  not the soul:  and  body  in  this sense,  taken lbr 
the human body, lie calls the prison of  the soul:  and says a wise 
man, instancing in Socrates and Cato, is glad of a fair opportunity 
to get out of it.  But he nowhere  says any such thing of matter: 
he calls not matter  in general the prison of the soul, nor talks a 
word of being separate from it. 
2. He  concludes, that the sol11 is not, like other things liere below, 
made up of a composition of the elements, c. 27. 
3. He  excludes the two gross  elements,  earth  and water, from  - 
being the soul, c. 26. 
So far he is clear and ~ositive  :  but bevond this hc is uncertain ;  --  - 
beyond this he  could not'get :  fbr in somk places he speaks doubt- 
fully, whether the soul be not air or fire.  Anima sit animus, ig- 
nisve, nescio,  c. 25.  And therefore he agrees with Panztius, that, 
if it be at all elementarv, it is, as he calls it, inflammata anima, in- 
flamed air ; and for thii.he gives  several reasons, c.  18, 19.  And 
though he thinks it to be of a peculiar nature of its own, yet he is 
so far from thinking it immaterial, that he says, c. 19, that the ad- 
rnitting it to be of an aerial  or igneous nature will not be incon- 
sistent with any thing he had said. 
That which he seems most to incline to is, that the soul was not 
at all elementary, but was of the same substance with the heavens ; 
which  Aristotle,  to  ilistinguish from the four  elements,  and the 
changeable  bodies here below,  which  he supposed  made up of 
them,  called  quinta essentia.  That this was  Tully's  opinion  is 
plain from these words,  Ergo animus  (qui,  ut ego dico, divinus) 
est, ut Euripides audet dicere, Deus ;  et quidem, si Deus aut  anima 
ai~t  ignis est, idem est animus horninis.  Narn ut illa natura cceles- 
Ch. 3. 
tis et terr;  vacat et humore;  sic  utriusque harum rerum humanus 
est expers.  Sin autern est qtiinta quaedam natura ab Ari- 
stotele  inducta; primum hrec et deorum est et animorum.  Hanc 
110s sentcntiani secuti,  his ipsis verbis in consolatione hax  expres- 
simus,  clr.  29.  And  then he  goes on,  c. 27. to repeat those his 
own words, whicli  your lordship has  quoted out of him,  wherein 
he had affirmed, in his  treatise  De Consolatione,  the soul  not to 
have its original from the earth, or to be mixed or made of  any 
thing earthly ;  but had said, singularis est igitur quaedam natura et 
vis  animi, sejuncta ab his  usitatis  notisque naturis:  whereby he 
tells us, he meant nothing but Aristotle's  quinta essentia:  wllicll 
being unmixed, being that of which the gods and souls consisted, 
he calls it divinum caeleste,  and concludes it eternal;  it being, as 
he speaks, sejuncta ab omni  mortali  concretionc.  From which it 
is clear, that in all his inquiry about the substance of the soul, his 
thoughts went not beyond the four elements, or Aristotle's  quiritil 
essentia, to look for it.  In all which  there is nothing of immntc- 
riality, but quite the contrary. 
He  was willing to believe (as  good and wise  men have  always 
been) that the soul was immortal ;  but for that, it is plain, lie never 
thought of its immateriality,  but as the eastern people do, who be- 
lieve the soul to be immortal,  but  have  nevertheless no thought, 
110  conception of its  immateriality.  It  is remarkable what a very 
considerable and judicious author says * in the case.  No opinion, 
says he, has been so universally received as tliat of the immortality 
of the soul ;  but its irnmaterial~ty  is a truth, the knowledge whereof 
has not spread so far.  And indeed it  is extremely difficult  to let 
into the mind  of a Siamite the idea of  a pure spirit.  This thc 
nlissionaries who have  been longest  among then1 are positive in. 
All the pagans  of  the east do truly believe,  that there  remains 
something of a man after his death, which  subsists independently 
and separately from his body.  But they give extension and figure 
to that which remains, and attribute to it all the same members, all 
the same substances, both  solid  and liquid, which  our bodies arc 
composed  of.  They only suppose that the souls are of a matter 
subtile enough to escape being  seen or handled.--Such  were the 
shades and manes of the Greeks  and the Ilomans.  And it is by 
these figures of  the souls,  answerable to those of the bodies, that 
Virgil supposed IEneas knew Palinurus, Dido, and Anchises, in tlic 
other world.  ..  lhis gentleman was not a man that  travelled  into  those  parts 
for his pleasure, and to have the opportunity to tell strange stories, 
collected by chance, when he returned :  but one chosen on purpose 
(and he seems well  chosen fbr the purpose) to  inquire  into tlic 
siog~tlarities  of Siam.  And he has so well acquitted himself of the 
commission, which his epistle dedicatory tells us he had, to infor111 
hlmself'exactly  of what was  most  remarkable  there, tliat had we 
* Lo~tl>crc  du Iloyaunie de Siam, T. 1. c. 19. Q 4. 
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but SLIC~I  an account of other countries of' the east as he has given 
us of'tl~is  kingdom, which he was an envoy to, me should be n~uch 
better acquainted  than we arc with the manners, notions,  and re- 
ligions of that part of the world inhabited by civilized nations,  who 
want neither good sense nor acuteness of reason,  tho11g.11 not cast 
illto the mould of the logic and philosophy of our schools. 
But to return to Cicero :  it is plain, that in his inquiries about tl~c 
soul, his thoughts went not at all beyond  matter.  This the cx- 
I)ressions that drop from him in several places  of this  book  evi- 
del1tly show.  1:or  examplc,  that the souls of cxcellcnt men ant1 
women ascended into heaven ;  of otlicrs, that they renlainccl herc 
on eartl~,  c. 1%. That the soul is I~ot,  and warms the  body: that, at 
its leRVi~lg  the body, it penetrates, and divides, and breaks through 
our thick, cloudy, moist air : that it stops in the region of firc,  ant1 
~cends  no fjrtl~er  ;  the equality of warmth and weight making that 
its proper place, where it is nourished and sustained, v~ith  the same 
things wherewith the stars arc nourished and sustained, and that by 
the convenience of its neigllbourlloocl, it shall there have R  clearer 
viem a~ld  fuller knowledge of the heavenly boilies, c.  19.  That thc 
soul also fro111 this height shall have a pleasant and fairer prospect 
of the globe of the earth,  the disposition of whose parts will then 
lie bcti)rc it in one view,  c. 20.  That it is hard to determine what 
co~~for~llation,  size, anti place, the soul  has in the body:  that it is 
too subtile to be seen: that it is in the 11nman body as in a house, 
or a vessel, or a receptacle,  c. 22.  All which arc expressions that 
evidence,  that Ilc  who used  them had not in his mind 
matc~riality  frorn the idea of'th~  soul. 
It  may perhaps be rcplicd,  that n  great part of  this  whic!l  we 
fillil in chap. 19 is  salt1 upon  the principles  of' those who wonl[l 
]lave the soul to be aninla ~nflamin:ita,  inflamed air. I grant it.  RII~ 
it is also to be obscrvcd,  that in tl~is  l!lth.  ant1 the two follo~viog 
chapters, hc does not only not deny, but even admits, that so ma- 
terial a thing as inflamed air may think. 
The truth of the case in  sllort  is  this:  Ciccro was  willing to 
believe the soul irnmortal ;  but, when he sought in the nature of the 
soul itself'somctlling to establish this his belief  into a certainty of 
it, he found himself at a loss.  He  confessed lie knew not what the 
soul was; but the not knowing what it was, he argues,  c. 52,  was 
no rpason to conclude it was not.  And thereupon he procccds to 
the repetition of what he had said in his Gth book,  De  Ilepub. con- 
cerning the soul.  The argument, which, borrowed from Plato, he 
there ~nnkes  use of,  if  it have any force in it,  not only proves tlic 
soul  to  be immortal,  but more  than, I  think,  your  lordship will 
allow to be true ; for it proves it to bc eternal, and without begin- 
ning, as well as without cnd: Ncque nata certe est,  et aeterna est, 
says he. 
Indeed, from the faculties of the soul he concludes right, that it 
is of divine orrginal : but as to the substance of the soul, he at thc 
~11d  of' t!ll<  tl~scou~se  conccrni~lg  its faculties, c. 25,  as well as at 
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this beginning of it,  c. 22, is not ashamed to own his ignorance 0:' 
what it is; Anima  sit  animus,  ignisve,  nescio ; nec me pudet,  ut 
istos,  fateri nescire quod nesciam.  Illud si ulla alia de re obscura 
affirmare possem,  sive anima,  sive ignis sit animus,  eurn jurareni 
esse divinum,  c. 25.  So that a11  the certainty he could attain to 
about the soul was,  tli.lt  he was  confident  there was  something 
divine in it,  i. c.  there were  fi~cultics  in the soul that  could  not 
result from the nature of matter, but must have their original from 
a divine power; but  yet those  qualities,  as tfiviilc  as they wcrc, 
11e acknowletlged might be placed in l)reath or firc, whicl~,  I think, 
your lordship will  not deny to be material  substances.  So that 
all those divine qualitics, which he so mucb and so  justly extols iln 
the soul,  led  him  not,  as  appears,  so mucli  as  to  any the least 
tl~ought  of immateriality.  Tliis is demonstration, that he built them 
not upon an cxclu~ion  of materiality out of' the soul; for lie avom- 
eilly professes lie does not know  but breath  or fire might be this 
thinlring thing in us : and in all his  considerations  about the sub- 
stance of the soul itself, lie stuck in air, or fire, or Aristotle's quinta 
esscntia; for beyond those it is evident he went not. 
But with all his proofs out of Plato, to whose authority 11e defers 
so much, with  all the arguments his vast reading  and  great parts 
could furnish him with fbr the imlnortality  of  the soul,  he was so 
little satisfied, so far from being certain, so far from any thought that 
he  had, or  could prove it, that lie ovcr and over again professes his 
ignorance and doubt of  it.  111 the beginning lie cnun~erates  the 
several opinions of the philosophers,  which  he had v~ell  studied, 
about it :  and then, full of uncertainty, says, Harum sententiarum 
qua:  Vera  sit,  Deus aliquis  vidcrit ; (lux  verisimillima,  niagna 
quzestio, c. 11.  And towards the latter end, having gone them all 
over agaln,  and one after  another  examined them, he professes 
himself' still at a loss,  not knowing on which to pitch,  nor mhat to 
determine.  Mcntis acies, says he,  seipsam intuens,  nonnunquam 
hebescit,  c;b  eamque causam contemplarldi d~ligcntiam  an~ittimus. 
Itaque dubitans, circumspectans, haesitans, n~~~ltaadversa  revertens, 
tanquam  in  rate in mari immenso,  noslra vehitur  oratio,  c.  30. 
And to conclude this argument, when the person he introduces as 
discoursing with  him tells him he is  rcsolvetl to ltecp firm to the 
belief  of immortality;  Tully  answers,  c. 32,  Laudo id quidcm, 
etsi  niliil  animis  oportet conficlere:  lllovelnur  enim srpe aliquo 
?cute concluso ;  Inbarnus, mutamusque sentc~itiam  clarioribus ctiam 
In rebus; in liis est enim aliqna obscuritas. 
So unmoveablc is that truth delivered by the  spirit of truth, that 
tllough the light of nature  gave some obscure glimmering,  some 
uncertain l~opes  of  a future state; yet human reason could attain 
to  no  clearncss,  no certainty  about it,  but  that  it was  JESUS 
CHRIST  alo!~c who  had  brought  life  and  immortality  to light 
through the gospel *.  Though we  are now told,  that to own the 
illability of  natural reason to bring irnniortality to light, or, wlliclr 
* 2 Tim. i.  10. 
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passrs for the same, to own principles upon wllicli the immat~rinlit~ 
of the soul  (and,  as it is urged,  consequently  its  immortalityj 
cannot be denlonstratively proved,  does lessen  the belief  of  this 
article of  revelation, which JESUS  CHRIST  alone  has  brought to 
light, and which consequently the scripture assures us is established 
and made certain only by revelation.  This would not perhaps have 
seemed strange, from those who are  justly complained of for slight- 
ing the revelation of the gospel, and therefore would not be much 
regarded, if they should contradict so plain a text of scripture,  ill 
favour of their all-sufficient reason: but what use the promoters of 
scepticism  and infidelity,  in an age so much suspected by your 
lordship, may make of  what comes from one of  your great autho- 
rity and learning, may deserve your consideration. 
And  thus,  my  lord,  I hope,  I  have  satisfied you  concerning 
Cicero's  opinion  about  the soul,  in  his  first  book  of  Tusculan 
Questions;  which, though I easily believe,  as  your lordship says, 
you are no stranger to,  yet I humbly conceive you have not shown 
(and,  upon a careful perusal of that treatise again,  I think I may 
boldly say you  cannot show)  one word  in  it,  that expresses any 
thing like a notion inTully of the soul's immateriality, or its being 
an immaterial substance. 
From what you bring  out  of  Virgil,  your lordsllip  concludes, 
*That he,  no  more  than Cicero,  does  me  any kindness  in  this 
matter,  being both assertors of  the soul's  immortality.  My lortl, 
were  not the question of  the  soul's  immateriality,  according to 
custom,  changed here into tliat  of  its  immortality,  which  I  am 
no less an assertor of  than  either of  them,  Cicero  and Virgil  do 
me all the kindness I desired of them in this matter; and that was 
to show, that they attributed the word spiritus to the soul of man, 
without any thought of  its immateriality; and this the verses you 
yourself bring out of Virgil t, 
Et cum frigida mors anim%  seduxerit artus, 
OmrLibus  umbra locis adero ; dabis, improbe, poenas ; 
confirm, as well as those I quoted out of his Gth book ;  and for this 
Monsieur de la Loubere shall be my witness in the words above set 
down out of him ;  where he  shows,  that there be those amongst the 
heathens of our days,  as well  as Virgil  and others  amongst  the 
ancient Greeks and Romans,  who thought the souls or ghosts of 
men departed did not die with the body, without thinking them to 
be perfectly immaterial;  the latter  being much more incompre- 
hensible to them than the fbrmer.  And what Virgil's notion of the 
soul is,  and that corpus, when put in contradistinction to the soul, 
signifies nothing but the gross  tenement  of  flesh  and bones,  is 
evident from this verse of his Eneid vi. where he calls the souls 
wliich yet were visible, 
--  Tenues sine corpore vitas. 
Your  lordship's :  answer  concerning what  is  said  Eccles. xii. 
* 1st Answer.  -t.  fineid. iv. 385.  :  1st Answer. 
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turns wholly upon Soloi~ion's  taking the soul to be immortal, which 
was not what I questioned:  all  that I quoted  tliat place for, was 
to show,  that spirit in English might properly be applied to the 
soul,  without  any notion  of its  immateriality,  as i-135  was  by So- 
lomon,  which,  whether  he thought the souls of men to be imma- 
terial,  does little appear in  that passage, where he speaks of the 
souls of nlen and beasts together,  as lie does.  But firtlier,  what 
I contended for  is  evident ti-on1 that place, in that the word spirit 
is there applied by our  translators  to the souls  of  beasts, wllicli 
your lordship, I thinl;,  does not rank amongst the immaterial, and 
consequently imn~ortal  spirits,  though they have sense and spon- 
taneous motion. 
But  you say, * If the soul be not of itself  a free thinking sub- 
stance, you do not see what foundation there is in  nature for a day 
ofjudgment.  Ans.  Though the heatl~en  world did not of old, nor 
(lo to this day, see a foundation in nature for a day of judgnleiit ; 
yet in revelation,  if that will satisfy your lordship, every one may 
see a foundation for a day of judgment, because God has positively 
declared it; though God has not by that revelation taught us what 
the substance of the soul is ;  nor has any where said, that the soul 
ot' itself  is a free agent.  Whatsoever any created substance is, 
it is  not of itself,  but is  by the good pleasure  of  its  Creator: 
whatever degrees of perfection it has, it has from the bountiful hand 
ofits Maker.  For it is true in a natural, as well as a spiritual sense, 
what St. Paul says,  Jr  Not that we  are sufficient  of ourselves  to 
think any thing as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God. 
But your  lordship,  as I guess by your following words, would 
argue, that a material substance cannot be a free agent; whereby 
I suppose you only mean,  that you cannot see or conceive how a 
solid substance should begin,  stop, or change its own motion.  To 
wl~ich  give me leave to answer,  that when  you  can make it con- 
ceivable, hoiv any created,  finite, dependent substance can move 
itself, or alter or stop its own  motion, which  it must to be a free 
agent; I suppose you will find it no harder for God to bestow thla 
power  OII a solid than an unsolid created substancc.  Tully, in the 
place above quoted, :  could not conceive this power to be in  any 
thing but what was ftom eternity; Cum pateat igitur aeternum id 
esse quod seipsum moveat, quis est qui hanc naturam animis esse 
tributam neget? But though you cannot see how any created sub- 
stance, solid  or not solid,  can be a free  agent, (pardon me, my 
lord,  if I put in both,  till your lordship  please  to explain  it  of 
either,  and show  the manner how either  of them can,  of  itself, 
lllove itself or any thing else)  yet I do not think yqu will so fa1 
deny men to be free agents, from the difficulty there 1s to see  OM 
they  are free agents,  as to doubt whether  there be foundatior 
ellough  It is not  for for  a day  me  of  to  judgment.  judge  how  far your lordship's speculation. 
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impossible  for us,  by the contemplation of  our own 
ideas,  without revelation, to discover  whether  omni- 
potency has not given to some systems of matter, fitly 
disposed, a power to perceive and think, or else joined 
and fixed to matter so disposed a thinking immaterial 
substance :  it being, in respect of our notions, not much 
more remote from our comprehension to  conceive that 
reach :  but finding in  myself  nothing to be truer than what the 
wise Solomon tells me,  ++  As  thou knowest not what is the way of 
the spirit, nor how the bones do grow in the womb of  her that is 
with  child;  even so thou  knowest  not the  works  of  God,  who 
maketh all things ;  I gratefully receive and rejoice in the light of 
revelation,  which  sets  me at rest in  many  things,  the manner 
whereof my poor reason can by no means make out to me.  Omni- 
potency,  I know,  can do any thing that contains in it no contra- 
diction ; so that I readily  believe  whatever  God  has  declared, 
though  my reason  find difficulties  in  it,  which  it cannot master. 
As in the present case, God having revealed that there shall be a 
day of judgment,  I think that foundation enough to conclude men 
are free enough to be made answerable for  their  actions,  and to 
receive according to what they have done; though how man is a 
free agent surpass m  explication or comprehension. 
In answer to the  L brought  out of  St. Luke +,  your lord- 
ship asks,  $ Whether from these words of our Saviour ~t follows, 
that a spirit is only an appearance? I answer,  No; nor do I know 
who drew such  an inference from them:  b~t  it follows,  that in 
apparitions there is something that appears, and that which appears 
is not wholly immaterial; and yet this was properly calleil rvGpa, 
and was  often  looked  upon,  by tliose  who  called  it ev~i+a in 
Greek,  and now call  it spirit in English,  to be the ghost or soul 
of one departed ;  which  I  humbly  conceive justifies  my  use of 
the word spirit,  for a thinking  voluntary agent,  whether material 
or immaterial. 
Your lordship says, 4 That I grant, that it cannot uponthese prin- 
ciples be demonstrated,  that the spiritual substance in us is imma- 
terial ;  from whence you conclude, That then my grounds of cer- 
tainty from ideas are plainly given up.  This being a way of arguing 
that you often make use of,  I have often had occasion to consider 
it, and cannot after all see the force of this argument.  I acknow- 
ledge that this or that proposition  cannot upon  my principles be 
demonstrated; ergo, I grant this proposition to be fjlse, that cer- 
tainty consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement 
of ideas.  For that is my ground of certainty, and till that be given 
up, my grounds of certainty are not given up. 
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God can, if he pleases, superadd to matter a faculty of 
thinkii~g,  than that he should superadd to it another 
substance, with a faculty of  thinking ;  since we know 
not wherein thinking consists, nor to what sort of sub- 
stances the Almighty has  been  pleased  to give  that 
power, which cannot be in any created being,but merely 
by the good pleasure and bounty of the Creator.  For 
I see no contradiction in it, that the first eternal think- 
ing being should, if he pleased, give to certain systems 
of created senseless matter, put together as he thinks 
fit,  some degrees of  sense, perception,  and thought: 
though, as I think, I have proved, lib. iv. ch. 10. $14, 
&c. it is no less than a contradiction to suppose matter 
(which is evidently in its own nature void of sense and 
thought) should be  that eternal first-thinking being. 
What certainty of  knowledge can any one have that 
some perceptions,  such as,  a. g. pleasure  and  pain, 
should not be in some bodies themselves, after a certain 
manner modified and moved, as well as that they should 
be in an immaterial substance, upon the motion of the 
parts of body ? Body, as far as we can conceive, being 
able only to strike and affect body ;  and motion, ac- 
cording to the utmost reach of our ideas, being able to 
produce nothing but motion :  so that when we allow it 
to produce pleasure or pain, or the idea of a colour or 
sound, we are fain to quit our reason,  go beyond our 
ideas, and attribute it wholly to the good pleasure of 
our Maker.  For since we must allow he has annexed 
effects to motion, which we can no way conceive mo- 
tion able to ~roduce,  what reason have we to conclude, 
that he could not order them as well to be produced in 
a subject we cannot conceive capable of them, as well 
as in a subject we cannot conceive the motion of matter 
can any way operate upon ? I say not this, that I would 
any way lessen the belief of the soul's  immateriality: 
I am not here speaking of probability, but  knowledge ; 
and I think not only,  that it becomes the modesty of 
philosophy not to pronounce magisterially,  where we 
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also, that  it  is of use to us to discern how far our know- 
ledge does reach :  for the state  we are at  present in not 
being that of vision, we must, in many things, content 
ourselves with faith and probability ;  and  in the  present 
question, about the immateriality of the soul, if our fa- 
culties cannot arrive at demonstrative certainty, we 
need not think it strange.  All the great ends of  mo- 
rality and religion are well enough secured, without 
philosophical proofs of the soul's immateriality ;  since 
it is evident, that he who made us at the besinning to 
subsist here, sensible intelligent beings, and for several 
years continued us in such a state, can and will restore 
us to the like state of sensibility in another world, and 
malie us capable there to receive tlle retribution he has 
designed to men, according to their doings in this life. 
And therefore it is not of such mighty necessity to de- 
termine one way or the other,  as some,  over-zealous 
for or against tlie immateriality of the soul, have been 
fbr\vard to make the world believe.  Who, either on 
the one side,  indulging too much their thoughts im- 
mersed altogether in matter, can allow no existence to 
what is not material:  or who,  on the other side, find- 
ing  not cogitation within the natural powers of matter, 
examined over and over again by the utmost intention 
of niind, have the confidence to conclude,  that ornni- 
potency itself  cannot give perception and thooet  to 
a  substance  whicli  has  the modification  of  solidity. 
He that  consiclers  how  hardly  sensation  is,  in  our 
thoughts, rcconcilcable to extendecl matter ;  or exist- 
ence to any thing that has no existence  at all; will 
confess,  that he is  very far from certainly knowing 
what his soul is.  It  is a point which seems to me to be 
put ouL; of  tlle reach of  our knowledqe : and he who 
will give himself leave to  consider freely, and look into 
the dark and intricate part of  each  hypotllesis,  will 
scarce find his reason able to determine llinl fixedly for 
or against the soul's  materiality.  Since on which side 
:>ocvcr  hc views it, either as a11 unextended substnncc, 
or as  a  tliiiiking  extenclecl  inattcr,  the difficulty to 
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conceive  either  will,  whilst  either  alone  is  in  his 
thoughts, still drive him to the contrary side;  an un- 
fair way which some men take with themselves,  who, 
because of  the inconceiveableness  of  something they 
find in one,  throw themselves violently into the con- 
trary hypothesis,  though altogether as unintelligible 
to an unbiassed understanding.  This serves not only 
to show the weakness and the scantiness of our know- 
ledge,  but the insignificant  triumph of such  sort of 
arguments,  which,  drawn from our own  views,  may 
satisfy us that we can find no certainty on one side of 
the question ;  but do not at all thereby help us to truth 
by running into the opposite  opinion,  which,  on exa- 
mination, will be found clogged with equal difficulties. 
For what safety, what advantage to any one is it, for 
the avoiding the seeming absurdities,  and to him un- 
surn~ountable  rubs he meets with in one opinion,  to 
take refuge in the contrary, which is built on some- 
thing altogether  as inexplicable,  and as far remote 
from his comprehension ?  It is past controversy, that 
we have in us something that  thinks; our very doubts 
about what it is  confirm the certainty of  its being, 
though we must content ourselves in the ignorance of 
what kind of being it is: and it is in vain to go  about 
to be sceptical in this,  as it is unreasonable in most 
other cases  to be positive  against  the being  of  any 
thing, because we cannot comprehend its nature.  For 
I would fain know what substance exists, that has not 
something in it whicli  manifestly  baffles  our under- 
standings. Other spirits, who see and know the nature 
and inward  constitution  of  things,  how  much must 
they cxceed us in knowledge ! To  which  if  we add 
larger  comprehension,  which  enables  them  at one 
glance to see the connexion  and agreement of  very 
maily ideas,  and readily supplies  to them the inter- 
mediate proofs,  which we  by single and slow  steps, 
and long poring in the dark, hardly at last find out, 
and are often  ready  to forget  one before we have 
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the llapyincss of superior ranks of spirits, who have a 
quicker and more penetrating sight, as well as a larger 
field of  knowledge.  But to return to the argument 
in hand ;  our knowledge,  I  say,  is not  only limited 
to the pucity and imperfections of  the ideas we have 
and which we employ it about, but even comes short of 
that too.  But how far it reaches, let us now inquire. 
$ 7. The affirmations  or negations we 
How far  Our  make concerning the ideas we have, may, 
knowledge 
reaches.  as I have  before intimated in general, be 
reduced to these four sorts, viz.  identity, 
co-existence,  relation,  and  real  existence.  I  shall 
examine how  far our knowledge  extends in  each  of 
these. 
I.  Our know-  $ 8. First,  as to identity and diversity, 
ledge of  in this way of agreement or disagreement 
identity and  of our ideas, our intuitive knowledge is as 
as  far extended as our ideas themselves :  and 
fkr as our 
ideas.  there can be no idea in the mind, which it 
does not presently, by an intuitive know- 
ledge,  perceive  to be what it is,  and to be  different 
from any other. 
2. of  co-  t$  g.  Secondly,  as to the second  sort, 
existence,  a  which is  the agreement or disagreement 
very  little  of  our ideas in co-existence;  in this our 
way.  knowledge is very  short,  though in  this 
consists  the greatest and most  material part of  our 
knowledge  concerning substances.  For our ideas of 
the  species  of  substances  being,  as I have  showed, 
nothing but certain collections of simple ideas united 
in one subject, and so co-existing together;  u. g.  our 
idea of  flame  is  a  body  hot,  luminous,  and moving 
upward;  of  gold,  a body heavy to a certain degree, 
yellow,  malleable,  and fusible : these,  or  some such 
complex ideas as these  in men's  minds, do these two 
names  of  the different  substances,  flame  and gold, 
stand for.  When we would  know any thing farther 
concerning  these,  or  any  other  sort  of  substances, 
wliat do we inquire, but what other qualities or power 
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these substances have or have not ?  Which is nothing 
else but to know what other simple ideas do or do not 
co-exist with those that make up that complex idea. 
9 10.  This, how weighty and consider- 
Because  able a part soever of human science, is yet  connex;o, 
very narrow, and scarce any at all.  The  between 
reason whereof  is,  that the simple ideas,  most simple 
ideas is un-  whereof our complex  ideas of  substances 
known.  are made up, are, for the most part, such 
as  carry with  them,  in  their  own  nature,  no visible 
necessary connexion  or inconsistency with any other 
simple ideas, whose co-existence with them we would 
inform ourselves about. 
$ 11. The ideas that our complex ones  Especially 
of  substances are made up of,  and about  ofsecondary 
which  our  knowledge  concerning  sub-  qualities. 
stances is most employed, are those of their secondary 
qualities:  which  depending  all (as  has  been shown) 
upon  the primary  qualities  of  their  minute  and in- 
sensible parts,-or  if not upon them, upon something 
yet more  remote from our comprehension,-it  is im- 
possible we should know which have a necessary union 
or  inconsistency one with  another : for not  knowing 
the root  they  spring from,  not  knowing  what  size, 
figure,  and texture of  parts they are,  on  which de- 
pend,  and  from  which  result,  those  qualities  which 
make our complex idea of  gold; it is impossible we 
should know what other qualities result from, or are 
incompatible  with,  the same constitution of  the in- 
sensible  parts  of  gold,  and  so  consequently  must 
always co-exist with that complex idea we have of it, 
or else are inconsistent with it. 
§ 12. Besides this ignorance of the pri-  Because ,11 
mary qualities of  the insensible parts of  connexion 
bodies, on which depend all their secondarv  betwe" 
A  '  secondary 
qualities, there is yet another and more in-  primary  curable part of  ignorance, which sets US  "ualities is 
I--  ~  -- --  more remote from a certain knowledge of  undiscover- 
the co-existence  or  in-co-existence  (if  I  able. 
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and that is,  that there is  110  discoverable connesion 
between  ally  secondary  quality  and  those  primary 
qualities which it depends on. 
tj 13. That the size, figure, and motion of  one hody 
should cause a change in the size, figure, and motion 
of  another body,  is not beyond  our conceptioll:  the 
separation of the parts of  one body upon the intrusion 
of another,  and the change from rest to motion upon 
impulse,-these  and the like seem to have some con- 
nexion one with another.  And if we knew these pri- 
mary qualities of bodies, we might have reason to hope 
we inight be able to know a great deal more of these 
operations of  them one with  another :  but our minds 
not being able to discover any connesion betwixt these 
primary qualities of bodies and the sensations that are 
produced in us by them, we can never be able to esta- 
blish certain and undoubted rules of the consequences 
or co-existence of  any secondary qualities, though we 
could discover the size,  figure, or motioil of those in- 
visible  parts which immediately produce them.  We 
are so far from knowing what figure, size, or motion 
of parts produce a yellow colour,  a sweet taste,  or a 
sharp sound,  that we can by no means conceive how 
any size,  figure,  or motion of  any particles, can pos- 
sibly produce in us  the idea of  any colour,  taste, or 
sound whatsoever;  there is no conceivable connesion 
betwixt the one and the other. 
$ 14.  In vain, therefore, shall we endeavour to dis- 
cover by our ideas (the only true way of  certain and 
universal knowledge) what other ideas are to be found 
constantly joined with that of our complex idea of any 
substance :  since we neither know the real constitution 
of  the minute parts on  which their  qualities do de- 
pend ;  nor, did we know them, could we discover any 
necessary  connexion  between  them  and  any  of  the 
secondary  qualities : which  is  necessary  to  be  done 
before  we can certainly know their  necessary co-ex- 
istence.  So that let our complex idea of  any species 
of substances be what it will, we can hardly, from the 
simple ideas  coritained in it, certainly determine the 
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necessary  co-existence of  any  other  quality  m-hatso- 
ever.  Our knowledge  in all  these  inquiries  I-eaches 
very little farther than our esperience.  Indeed, some 
few  of  the  primary  qualities  have  a  necessary  de- 
pendence  aild visible  connexion  one with another, as 
figure necessarily  supposes  extension ; receiving  or 
communicating motion  Fy  impulse, supposes solidity. 
But though these and perhaps some other of our ideas 
have, yet there are so few of  them that llave a visible 
connexion one with another, that we can by intuitioil 
or demonstration discover the co-existence of very fen- 
of the qualities are to be found united in substances : 
and we are left only to the assistance of our senses, to 
make known to us what qualities they contain.  For 
of all the qualities that are co-existent in any subject, 
without  this  dependence  and  evident  connexion  of 
their  ideas  one  with  another,  we  cannot know  cer- 
tainly any two to co-exist any farther than experience, 
by our senses,  informs  us.  Thus though we see  the 
yellow  colour, and upon trial find the weight,  malle- 
ableness, fusibilit,~,  and fixedness, that are united in n 
piece of gold ; yet because no one of  these ideas has 
any evident dependence, or necessary connexion with 
the other, we cannot  certainly know,  that where any 
four  of  these  are,  the fifth will  be  there also,  hon- 
highly probable soever it may be ;  because the l~ighcst 
probability  amounts not to certainty, without ~vllicll 
there can be no true knowledge.  For this co-existence 
can be no farther known than it is perceived ; and it 
cannot be perceived  but either in particular subjects, 
by  the observation of  our senses,  or,  in  general,  by 
the necessary connexion of the ideas themselves. 
$ 15. As  to the incompatibility  or re-  ofrepLlg- 
pugnancy to co-existence,  we  may know  nancy to co- 
that any subject may have of each sort of  exisi,'argcr. 
primary  qualities  but cne particular  at once;  u. g. 
each  particular  extension,  figure,  number  of  parts, 
motion,  excludes  all other  of  each  kind.  The likc 
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sense;  for whatever  of  each  kind  is  present  in any 
subject, excludes all other of  that sort ;  v.  g. no one 
subject can  have  two  smells  or  two  colours  at the 
same time.  To this perhaps will be said, Has not an 
opal, or the infusion of lignzcnz neplwiticum, two colours 
at the saine  time?  To which  I  answer,  that these 
bodies,  to eyes  differently  placed,  may  at the same 
time afford  different  colours ; but I take liberty also 
to say, that, to eyes differently placed, it is different 
parts of  the object tl~at  reflect the particles of  light; 
and therefore it is not the saine part of  the object, 
and so not the very same subject, which  at the same 
time appears both yellow and azure.  For it is as im- 
possible that the very same particle of any body should 
at the same time differently modify or reflect the rays 
of light,  as that it should  have two different  figures 
and textures at the saine time. 
Of the co-  fj 16. But as to the powers of substances 
existellce  of  to change  the sensible qualities of  other 
powers, a  bodies, which  make  a great part of  our 
little  inquiries about them, and is no inconsider- 
way.  able branch of  our knowledge ;  I doubt, 
as to  these,  whether  our  knowledge  reaches  much 
farther than our experience ;  or whether we can come 
to the discovery of most of  these powers, and be cer- 
tain that they are i11  any subject,  by  the connexion 
with any of those ideas which to us make its essence. 
Because the active and passive powers of  bodies, and 
their ways of  operating, consisting in a texture and 
 notion of parts, which we cannot by any means come 
to discover; it is but in very few cases we can be able 
to perceive  their  dependence  on,  or  repugnance  to, 
any of  those ideas which  make  our  coniples one  of 
that sort of things.  I have here instanced in the cor- 
puscularian  hypothesis,  as that which is  thought to 
go farthest in an intelligible explication of those qua- 
lities  of  bodies;  and I  fear the weakness  of  human 
understanding is  scarce  able to  substitute  another, 
~rllicli  will  afforil us n  fuller and clearer discovery of 
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t]~c  necessary coililesion and co-existence of the po1vers 
which  are  to be  observed  united in several sorts of 
t]len~. This at least is certain, that whichever hypo- 
thesis be c1e:trcst and truest, (for of  that it is not my 
busiiless to determine) our knowledge concerning cor- 
poreal substances will be very little advanced by ally 
of  them,  till  we are made to see what qualities  aild 
powers  of  bodies  have  a  necessary coililesion  or re- 
pugnancy  one  with  another;  which  in the preseilt 
state of  plrilosoplly, I think,  we know but to a very 
small  degree :  and  I  doubt  whether,  with  those 
fac~~lties  we  Iinrc, wc  shall ever  be able to carry our 
general  knowledge (I say not particular  esperie~lce) 
in this part much  farther.  Experience is that n~hicI1 
in this part we  must depencl on.  Ancl  it were to be 
wislictl that it were nlorc improved.  Wc find tho ad- 
vantages  soine  men's  generous pains  have  this way 
brought to the stock of  natural knowledge.  Ancl  if 
others,  especially  the philosophers  by fire, who  pre- 
tend to it, had been so wary in their observations, and 
sincere in their reports, as those who call themselves 
philosophers  ought to have  been,  our  acquaintance 
with the bodies here about us,  and our insight into 
thcir  powers  and  operations,  had  been  yet  n~ucll 
greater. 
$ 17. If we  arc at a loss i11  respect of  ofsl,iriia, 
the  powers  ancl  operations of  bodies,  I  yet llnr- 
think it is easy to conclude, we are much  'OWer. 
niorc in the dark in reference to the spirits ;  whereof 
we naturally have  no  ideas but what we  draw froni 
that of our own, by reflecting on the operations of our 
own  souls within us,  as far as they can  come within 
our observation.  But how inconsiderable a rank the 
spirits  that  inhabit  our  bodies  hold  amongst  those 
various  and  possibly  innumerable  kinds  of  nobler 
beings;  and  how far short  they come of  the endow- 
ments  and  perfections  of  cherubim  and  seraphim, 
atid  infinite sorts of  spirits above  us ; is  what  by  n 3  6s  Extent  of Httmmt  K7zo~e:ledge.  Book 4, 
transient hint, in aiiotlier place, I liave offered  to my 
reader's  consiileration. 
3. ~f~~l,~~  $ 18. -AS to the third sort of our 1,non-- 
relations, it  lcclge, viz. the agreement or disagreeincnt 
isnoteasyto  of any of our itleas in any other relation : 
t:ar.  this, as it is the largest field of our know- 
ledge,  so it is hard to determine how far it may cs- 
tend;  because  the  advances  that are  made  ill  this 
part  of  knowledge,  depending  on  our  sagacity  in 
finding  intermediate  ideas,  that  nlay  show  tlie  re- 
lations and habitudes  of  ideas, whose  co-existence  is 
not considerecl,  it is  a  har(1 matter to tell tvhen tvc 
are at an end of  such discoveries;  and when reason 
has all the helps  it is  capable of,  for the fincling  of' 
proofs,  or esanliniag the agreement or  disagreement 
of remote ideas.  They that are ignorant of  algebra 
cannot imagine  the wonders  in this  kind  are to be 
done  by  it: and  what  farther  improvements  and 
helps, advantageous to other parts of  knowledge, the 
sagacious nlind of man inay yct find out, it is not easy 
to determine.  This at least I believe,  that tlie ideas 
of quantity are not those  alone  that are capable  of 
denlonstration  and knowledge;  and that other, ancl 
perhaps  more  uscful  parts of  contemplation,  would 
afford us certainty, if vices, passions, and clolnineering 
interest did not oppose or menace such endeavours. 
The idea of  a Suvreme Being, infinite 
u-  >forality  in  power,  goodness;  and wisdom,  wllosc 
pble  of tle- 
moristration.  workmanship we  are,  and on whom  we 
depend;  and  the idea  of  ourselves,  as 
A 
understanding  rational  beings,  being  such  as  are 
clear in us, would,  I suppose, if duly considered ancl 
pursued,  afford  such  foundations  of  our  duty  and 
rules of action, as might place morality amongst thc' 
sciences  capable  of  c!emonstration  : whereir~  I doubt. 
not but from  self-evident propositions, by necessary 
consequences,  as  incontestable  as those  in  innthe- 
mntics,  tlie  mcasurcs of  right and wrong migllt 11c 
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made out to any one that will apply liilnself with tlrc 
same iiidifferency and attelltion to the one, as he doe< 
to the other of these sciences.  The relation of  other 
modes may certainly be perceived, as well as those of 
number  arid  extension:  and I  cannot  see  why  they 
should  not  also  be capable of  dcn~onstration,  if  due 
methods were thought on to examine or pursue their 
agreement or disagreement.  Whcre there is no pro- 
perty, there is no injustice, is a proposition as certain 
as any demonstration in  Euclid :  for the idea of  pro- 
perty being  a  right  to any thing ; and  the idea to 
~vliich  the name injustice is  given, being the invasioll 
or  violation  of  that right;  it is  cvident,  that thcsc 
ideas being thus established, and these names annesed 
to them,  I can as certainly know this proposition to 
be true, as that a triangle has three angles equal to 
two right ones.  Again,  6c  no government allows ab- 
solute liberty :"  The idea of  government being  the 
establishment  of  society upon  certain  rules  or  laws 
which  require conformity to them; and the idea of 
absolute liberty being for any one to do whatevcr lie 
pleases ;  I am as capable of being certain of the truth 
of this proposition, as of any in the mathematics. 
$  19. That which  in this  respect  has  TWO  things 
given the advantage to the ideas of quan-  have made 
tity, and made them thought more capa-  thought  iaei's  in- 
ble of certainty and demonstration, is,  capable of 
First. that thev can be set down and re-  dernonstra- 
by seisible marks, which have  ti011 :  their 
a greater and nearer correspondence  -  -  with  :~~~~~$11- 
them than any words or sounds whatso-  ,an;  of 
ever.  ~ia~rims  drawn  on  paper  are  sible rcpre- 
copies of  the ideas in the mind, and not  sentations. 
liable  to the uncertainty  that words  carry in  their 
signification.  An angle, circle,  or square, drawn in 
lines, lies open to the view,  and caiinot be mistaken : 
il remains unchangeable, and may at leisure be con- 
sidered and examined, and the deinollstratioll bc re- 
rised, and all tllc ,,arts  of it may be gone orer inorc tliau 
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once without  any danger of the least  change in  the 
ideas.  This cannot be thus done in moral ideas ;  we 
have  no sensible marks that resemble them, rliereby 
we can set them down ;  we  have nothing but words 
to  express  them  by : which  though,  when  written, 
they remain  the same,  yet the ideas they stand for 
may change in the same man ; and it is very seliiom 
that they are not different in different persons. 
Secondly, another thing that makcs the greater dif- 
ficulty in  ethics  is,  that moral  ideas  are commonly 
more  complex  than  those  of  the figures  ordinarily 
considered in mathematics.  From whence  these two 
inconveniencies follow : first,  that their names  are of 
more uncertain signification,  the precise collectiorl of 
simple ideas they stand for not being so easily agreed 
on,  and so  tlie  sign  that is  used  for  them in  com- 
munication  always,  and  in  tllinlting  often,  does not 
steadily carry with it the san~c  idea.  Upon rx-hich the 
same disorder,  confusion,  and error follow,  as would 
if a man,  going to demonstrate sonlcthing of  nn hep- 
tagon, should,  in tlle diagrain he took to do it, leave 
out one of the angles, or by oversight make the figure 
with  one  angle more  than the name  ordinarily  iin- 
ported,  or  he intended  it sllould,  when  at first  he 
thought of  his  demonstration.  This often  Iiappens, 
and is hardly avoidable  in very complex moral ideas, 
where the same name being retained, one angle, i.  c. 
one simple idea is left out or put in the complex onc, 
(still called by the same name) more at one time than 
another.  Secondly, from tlie conlplexedness of these 
moral1 ideas,  there follows another inconvenience, viz. 
that the mind cannot easily retain those precise com- 
binations,  so exactly and perfectly as is necessary in 
the examination of the habitudes and correspontlencies. 
agreements or disagreements,  of several of thein one 
with  another ;  especially where it is to be judged  of 
by  long deductions,  and  the intervention  of  several 
other complex  ideas, to show  the agreement or dis- 
:rgrc.emrnt of two remote one>. 
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The g~cnt  hclp against this which mathen~aticiiiiis 
find  in  d~:tgran~s  and figures, which  remain  unalter- 
able in tllc~r  clr;aughts, is very apparent, slid the inc- 
inory would  often have great difficulty  otherwise  to 
retain them so esnc.tly, whilst the mind went over the 
parts of  tficin  step by  step, to examine their several 
correspontlcncics.  And  though in casting up a long 
s~lnl  either  in  addition,  multiplication,  or  division, 
every part be only a progression of  the mind, taliins 
a view of  its own  ideas, and considering  their agree- 
nlent  or  disagreement ; and  the  resolution  of  the 
c~ucstion be  nothing  but  the  result  of  the  whole, 
111:ltle up of  such particulars, whereof  tlle miricl has a 
clear perception:  yet without  setting. down  the sr- 
vernl parts by marks, whose precise significations arc 
known,  ancl  by  marks that last and remain  in  view 
~rhen  the nzemory haci let them go, it .woulii be almost 
impossible to carry so many different ideas in the mind, 
without confonnding or letting slip some partof  the 
reckoning,  and  thereby  maklng  all  our reasonings 
about it useless.  In which case, the cyphers or marks 
help not the mind at all to perceive the agreement of 
an!  two or more numbers,  their equalities or propor-, 
tions : that the mind has only by intuition of its own 
ideas of the aumbers themselves.  But the numerical 
characters are helps to the memory, to record and re- 
tain the several ideas about which the demonstration 
is n~ade,  whereby  a lnan may know  how  far  his  in- 
tuitive  knowledge,  in  surveying several  of  the par- 
ticulars, has proceeded;  that so he may without con- 
fusion go on to what is yet unknown,  and at last havc 
in one view before him the result of all his perceptions 
and reasonings. 
$ 20. One part of these disadvantages  Remcdics of 
in moral ideas, which has made them be  tllose dif- 
thought  not  capable  of  demonstration, 
ficultics. 
may in  n  good  measure  be  remedied  by definitions, 
setting do~sn  that collectio~l  of  sirnple  ideas, wrhicll 
evcry tcrn~  sllall stand for, and then using the tcrnls 
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steadily  and  constantly  for  that  precise  collection. 
And  what  methods  algebra,  or  something  of  that 
kind, may hereafter suggest, to remove the other dif- 
ficulties,  it is  not easy to foretel.  Confident I am, 
that if men would  in the same method, and with the 
same  indifferency,  search  after  moral,  as  they  do 
mathematical  truths,  they  would  find  them  have  a 
stronger  conncxion  one  with  another,  and  a  more 
necessary  consequence  from  our  clear  and  distinct 
ideas, and to come nearer perfect demonstration than 
is comn~only  imagined.  But much of  this is not to 
expected, whilst  the desire  of  esteem,  riches,  or 
yower, makes men espouse the well-endowed  opinions 
in fashion,  and then seek  arguments either to make 
good  their  beauty,  or  varnish  over  and  cover  their 
deformity : nothing being  so beautiful  to the eye  as 
truth is to the mind; nothing so deformed  and irre- 
concileable to the understanding as a lie.  For though 
many a man  can with satisfaction enough own  a  110 
very  handsoine  wife  in  his  bosom;  yet who  is  bold 
enough openly to avow, that he has espoused a false- 
hood,  and received  into his breast so ugly a thing as 
a  lie? Whilst the parties  of  men  cram their tenets 
down all men's  throats, whom they can get into their 
yower,  without  permitting  them  to  examine  their 
truth or  falsehood,  and will  not let truth have  fair 
play in the world, nor men tlie liberty to search after 
it, what improvements can be expected of this kind? 
What greater  light can  be  hoped  for  in  the moral 
sciences ?  The subject part of mankind in most places 
might,  instead  thereof,  with  Egyptian bondage  ex- 
pect Egyptian darkness, were not the candle of  the 
Lord  set up by himself  in men's  minds,  which  it is 
impossible  for the breath or power of  man wholly to 
extinguish. 
4. Of real  S 21. As to the fourth sort of our know- 
existence :  ledge, viz. of  the real actual existence of 
we have an  things, we have an intuitive knowledge of 
intuitive  our own  existence;  and a demonstrative 
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I;~~o~vlcclge  of the esistence of a God ; of  knowledge 
the existence  of  any thing else,  we have  our Own; 
demonstra-  no other but a sensitive knowledge, which  tive, of 
extends not beyond the objects present to  GO~~S;  sen- 
our senses.  sitive,  of 
8 20. O~lr  knowledge being so narrow, 
as I have showed, it will perhaps give us 
some light into the present state of  our  Our kno- 
minds, if we look a little into the dark side,  railce great. 
and take a view of  our ignorance : which, being infi- 
nitely larger than our knowledge, may serve much to 
the quieting of  disputes,  and improvement of  useful 
knowledge ;  if discovering how far we have clear and 
distinct ideas, we confine our thoughts within the con- 
templation of those things that are within the reach of 
our understandings, and launch not out into that abyss 
of darkness (where we have not eyes to see, nor facul- 
ties to perceive any thing) out of  a presnmption, that 
nothing is beyond our comprehension.  But to be sa- 
tisfied of  the folly of  such a col~ccit,  we need  not go 
far.  He that knows any thing, knows this in the first 
place,  that he need not seek long for instances of  his 
ignorance.  The  meanest and most obvious things that 
coinc  in  our way  have dark sides, that the quickest 
sight cannot penetrate into.  The clearest and  most 
en1;uged understandings of  thinking inen  find them- 
selves  puzzled,  and at a  loss,  in  every  particle  of 
matter.  We shall the less wonder to find it so, ivhcn 
we consider the causes of our ignorance ;  which, fi-om 
what has  been said,  I  suppose,  will  be  found  to be 
these three : 
First, want of  ideas. 
Secondly, want  of  a  discoverable  connexion  be- 
tween the ideas we have. 
Thirdly, want of  tracing and examining our ideas. 
23. ~irst,  there are some things, and  First, 
those not a few, that we  are ignorant of,  ,,,,,,  ofit 
for want of ideas.  want of 
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sucli ns  we  confilled (as I have shown) to tliose we re- 
llavenocon-  ception of,  ceive from corporeal objects by sensation, 
or sucll  and from the operations of our own minds 
DarticularI~  as the objects of reflection.  But how much 
;ve ]lave ndt.  these fe6  and narrow inlets are dispropor- 
tionate to the vast whole extent of all beings, will not 
be hard to persuade those, who are not so foolish as to 
think their span the measure of all thin~s.  What other 
simple ideas it is possible the creatures in other parts of 
the universe may have, by tlie assistance of senses and 
faculties more, or perfecter, than we have, or different 
from ours, it  is not for us to determine.  But to say or 
think there are no such, because we conceive nothing 
of them, is no better an argument, than if a blind man 
should be positive in it, that there was no such thing as 
sight and colours, because he had no manner of idea of 
any such thing, nor could by any means frame to him- 
self any notions about seeing.  The ignorance and dark- 
ness that is in us,  no  more  hinders nor confines  the 
knowledge that is in others, than the blindness of  a 
mole is an argument against the quick-sightedness  of 
an eagle.  He that will  consider the infinite  power, 
wisdom,  and goodness  of  the Creator  of  all things, 
will find reason to think it was  not all laid out upon 
SO inconsiderable, mean, and impotent a creature, as he 
will find man to be ;  who, in all probability, is one of 
the lowest of  all intellectual beings.  What faculties 
therefore other species of creatures have, to penetrate 
into tlie nature  and  inmost  constitutions  of  things ; 
what  ideas  they may  receive  of  them,  far  different 
from ours;  we  l<no+v  not.  This we  know,  and cer- 
tainly find, that we want several other views of them, 
besides  those we  have,  to make  discoveries  of  them 
more perfect.  And we may be convinced that the ideas 
we can attain to by our faculties,  are very dispropor- 
tionate to things themselves,  when  a  positive,  clear, 
distinct one  of  substance itself,  which is the fonnda- 
tion of  all the rcst, is  concealed  from us.  But want 
of idcas uf  this  kind  being  a part,  as  well  as cause 
of our ignorance,  cannot be  described.  Only this, I 
think, I may confidently say of it, that the iiltellectual 
and sensible world  are i11  this  perfectly alike;  that 
that pi~rt,  which  we  see of either of  them, holds no 
proportion  witli what me  see not ; and whatsoever we 
car1 reach witli our eyes, or our thoughts, of either of 
thein, is but a point, almost nothing in comparison of 
the rest. 
$94.  Secondly, another great cause of  n ,,,,,,,  ,f 
ignorance is the want of  ideas we are ca-  their rc- 
pable of.  As the want of ideas, which our  tnOteness; 
faculties are not able to give us,  shuts us  Or' 
wholly from  tliose views of  things which it is reason- 
able to think other beings, perfecter than we, have, of 
which we  know nothing,  so the want of  ideas 1  now 
speak of keeps us in ignorance of  things we conceive 
capable of being known to us.  Bulk, figure, and mo- 
tion, we have ideas of.  But though we are not without 
ideas of these primary qualities  of  bodies in general, 
yet not knowing what is  the particular bulk,  figure, 
and motion,  of  the greatest pnrt of the bodies of the 
universe ;  we are ignorant of the several powers, effi- 
cacies,  and  ways  of  operation,  whereby  the effects, 
which we daily see, are produced.  These are hid from 
us in some things, by being too remote; and in others, 
by being too minute.  When we consider the vast di- 
stance of  the known arid visible  parts  of  the world, 
arid  the  reasons  we  have  to  think  that what lies 
within our ken is but a sinall part of the universe, we 
shall then discover a huee abyss of ignorance.  What 
are  the  particular  fabr~cs  of  the  great  masses  of 
matter, which make up the whole stupendous frame of 
corporeal beings,  how far they are extended, what  is 
their  motion,  and  how  continued or  coinmunicated, 
and what influence  they have one upon  another, are 
corltemplations  that  at first  glimpse  our  thoughts 
lose themselves in.  If we narrow our contemplations, 
and confine our thoughts to this little canton, I mean 
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tcr that visibly move  about it; what several sorts of 
vegetables,  animals, and intellectual corporeal beings, 
infinitely different from those of our little spot of earth, 
may  there probably be  in the other planets,  to the 
knowledge of  which,  even  of  their  outward figures 
i~lld  parts, we  can no way attain, whilst we are con- 
fined  to this  earth ; there being no natural means, 
cither by sensation or  reflection, to convey their certain 
ideas into our minds ?  They are out of  the reach  of 
those inlets of  all our knowledge:  and what sorts of 
fur.ni' .Ire  ancl  inhahitants those  mansions contain i11 
them  we  cannot  so much as guess,  much  less have 
clear and distinct ideas of them. 
Because  of  $  2s. If a  great, nay, far the greatest 
their mi-  part of the several ranks of  bodies in the 
nuteness,  universe,  escape  our notice  by  their  re- 
moteness,  there are others that are no less concealed 
from us by  their minuteness.  These insensible  cor- 
puscles  being  the active  parts  of  matter,  and the 
great instruments  of  nature,  on  which  depend  not 
only all their  secondary  qualities,  but  also  most  of 
their natural operations ; our want of precise distinct 
ideas  of  their  primary  qualities keeps us  in  an in- 
curable ignorance of what we desire to know  about 
them.  I  doubt not  but  if  we  could  discover  the 
figure, size, texture,  and motion  of the minute  con- 
stituent parts of  any two  bodies,  we should  know 
without  trial  several  of  their  operations  one upon 
another, as we do now the properties of  a square or 
a triangle.  Did we know the mechanical affections of 
the particles of rhubarb, hemlock, opium, and a man ; 
as a watch-maker  does those  of a watch,  whereby it 
performs its operations, and of a file which by rubbing. 
on them will alter the figure of any of the wheels;  we 
should be able to tell before-hand,  that rhubarb will 
purge, hemlock kill,  and opium make a marl sleep ;  as 
well as a watch-maker can, that a little piece of paper 
laid oil  the balance will keep the watch from going, 
till it be removed ;  or that, some small part of it being 
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rubbed  by a  file,  the machine  would  quite lose  its 
]notion, and the watch go no more.  The  dissolving of 
silver in aqua fortis,  and gold in aqua regia, and not 
vice z9ersa,  would be the11 perhaps no more difficult to 
know,  than  it is  to a  smith to understand why the 
turning  of  one  key will  open  a  lock,  and  not  the 
turning of  another.  But whilst we  are destitute  of 
senses acute enough to discover the minute particles 
of  bodies,  and to give  us  ideas  of  their  mechanical 
affections, we must be content to be ignorant of their 
properties  and ways  of  operation;  nor  can we  be 
assured about them any farther than some few trials 
we  make  are  able  to reach.  But  whether  they 
will succeed again another time, we  cannot  be cer- 
tain.  This  hinders  our  certain  knowledge  of  uni- 
versal truths concerning natural bodies :  and our rea- 
son  carries  us  herein  very little beyond  particular 
matter of fact. 
26.  And therefore I am apt to doubt,  Hence no 
that how far soever  human industry may  science of 
advance  useful  and experimental  philo- 
sophy in physical things, scientifical will still be out of 
our  reach ;  because we want perfect and adequate ideas 
of those very bodies which are nearest to us, and most 
under our command.  Those which we  have  ranked 
into classes under names, and we think ourselves best 
acquainted with, we  have  but very imperfect and in- 
conlplete ideas of.  Distinct ideas of the several sorts 
of bodies that fall under the examination of our senses 
perhaps we may have ;  but adequate ideas, I suspect, 
wc have not of any one  amongst them.  And though 
the former of these will serve us for common use and 
discourse,  yet whilst we want the latter, we are not 
capable  of  scientifical knowledge;  nor shall ever be 
able to discover general,  instructive,  unquestionable 
truths corlcernillg  them.  Certainty and demonstra- 
tion  are tlgngs Fve  rnust  not, in these  matters, pre- 
tend to.  By the colour, figure, taste, and smell, and 
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ideas of sage arid hemlock,  as we have of a circle and a 
triangle : but having no ideas  of  the particular  pri- 
mary qualities  of the minute parts of either of  these 
plants,  nor  of  other  bodies  which  we  would  apply 
them to, we  cannot  tell what  effects  they will  pro- 
duce ;  nor when we  see those  effects can we so much 
as guess, much less know, their manner of production. 
Thus having no ideas of the particular mechanical af- 
fections of the minute parts of bodies that are within 
our view  and reach, we  are ignorant of  their  consti- 
tutions, powers, and operations : and of  bodies more 
remote we  are yet more  ignorant,  not knowing so 
much  as their very outward shapes,  or  the  sensible 
and grosser parts of  their constitutions. 
Much less  $ 27.  This,  at first,  will show  us how 
ofspirits,  disproportionate our knowledge is to the 
whole extent even of material beings ;  to 
which  if  we  add the  consideration of  that infinite 
number of spirits that may be, and probably are, which 
are yet more remote from our knowledge, whereofwe 
have no cognizance,  nor  can frame to ourselves any 
distinct ideas of their several ranks and sorts, we shall 
find  this cause of ignorance conceal  from  us,  in an 
impenetrable obscurity, almost the whole intellectual 
world ; a greater certainty, and more beautiful world 
than the material.  For  bating some very few,  and 
those, if I may so call them, superficial ideas of spirit, 
which by reflection we get  of our own, and from thence 
the best we can collect of the Father of all spirits, the 
eternal independellt Author of  them  and us and all 
things ;  we  have no certain information, so much as 
of  the existence  of  other spirits,  but by revelation. 
Angels  of  all sorts are naturally beyond  our disco-  , 
very :  and all those intelligences whereof it is likely 
there are more orders than  of  corporeal  substances, 
are things whereof our natural faculties give us no cer- 
tain account at all.  That there are minds and think- 
ing beings in other men as well as himself, every man 
has a reason,  from their words and actions, to be sa- 
tisfied:  and the knowledge  of his own  mind  cannot 
suffer a man, that considers, to be ignorant that there 
is a  God.  But that  there  are  degrees of  spiritual 
beings between us and the great God, who is  there 
that by his own search and ability can come to know? 
Much less have we distinct ideas of their different na- 
tures, conditions, states, powers, and several constitu- 
tions, wherein they agree or differ from one another, 
and from us.  And therefore in what concerns  their 
different species and properties, we are under an abso- 
lute ignorance. 
$28. Secondly, what a small part of the  seCon,~ly, 
substantial beings that are in the universe,  want ofa 
the want of ideas leaves or>en  to our know-  ~~scov"~- 
1  able con- 
ledge, we have seen.  In the next place, 
another cause  of  ignorance,  of  no  less  between 
moment,  is a want of a discoverable con-  ideas wc 
nexion between those ideas we have.  For  have. 
wherever we want that, we are utterly incapable of uni- 
versal and certain knowledge ;  and are, in the forilier 
case, left only to observation and experiment : which, 
how narrow and confined it is,  how far froill general 
knowledge, we need not be  told.  I shall give  some 
few instances of  this cause  of  our ignorance,  and so 
leave it.  It  is evident that the bulk, figure, and mo- 
tion of several bodies about us,  produce in us scvcral 
sensations, as of  colours,  sounds,  tastes,  smells, plea- 
sure and pain,  &c.  These mechanical  affections  of 
bodies having no affinity at all with those ideas they 
produce in us  (there being no conceivable connexion 
between any impulse of any sort of body and any per- 
ception  of  a  colour or  smell,  which we  find  in  OLI~ 
minds) we  can have  no  distinct knowledge  of  such 
operations beyond our experience ;  and can reason no 
otherwise about them than as effects produced by the 
aypoi~ltrnent  of  an infinitely wise  agent, which  per- 
fectly surpass  our  comprehensions.  As  the ideas of 
sensible  secondary  qualities  which  we  have  in  our 
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canses, ilor any correspoilrleilce or connexion be fo~und 
betwcca them and those primary qualities which (ex- 
perience  shows  us)  produce  them in  us ;  so, on the 
other side, the operation of our minds upon our bodies 
is  as inconceivable.  How  any  thought  should pro- 
duce a motion in body is  as remote from the nature 
of  our ideas,  as how  any  body  sl~ould  produce  any 
.tliought in the mind.  That it is so, if experience did 
not conviiice ns,  the consideration of the things them- 
selves would never  be able in the least to discover to 
us.  These, and the like, though they have a constant 
and  regular  connexion,  in  the  ordinary  course  of 
things ;  yet that connexion being not discoverable in 
the ideas themselves,  which  appearing to have no ne- 
cessary dependence one on another,  we can attribute 
their connexion to nothing else but the arbitrary de- 
termination of that all-wise agent, who has made them 
to be, and to operate as they do, in a way wholly above 
our weak understandings to conceive. 
Instances.  § 89. In some of our ideas there are cer- 
tain relations, habitudes,  and connesions, 
so visibly  included in  the nature of  the ideas  them- 
selves,  that we  cannot conceive them separable from 
them by any power whatsoever.  And in these only we 
are capable of certain and universal knowledge.  Thus 
the idea of  a  right-lined  triangle  necessarily carries 
with it an equality of  its angles to two right  ones. 
Nor can we  conceive  this relation,  this  connexion of 
these two ideas, to be possibly mutable, or to depend 
on any arbitrary power, which of choice made it thus, 
or could make it otherwise.  But  the coherence and 
continuity of  the parts of  matter;  the production of 
,iensation in us of  colours and sounds, &c. by  impuIse 
and motion ; nay, the original  rules and communica- 
tion of motion being such, wherein we can discover no 
natural connexion with any ideas we have ;  we cannot 
but ascribe them to the arbitrary will and good plea- 
sure of the wise architect.  I need not,  I think,  here 
rneritio~l  the rcsurrectioii of  the dead, the future state 
of  this globe of  earth,  and such other things, which 
are by every one acknowledged  to depend wholly on 
the determination of  a free agent.  The things that, 
as far as our observation reaches,  we constantly find 
to proceed regularly,  we  may  conclude  do act  by  a 
law set them;  but yet by a  law that we know not: 
whereby,  though  causes  work  steadily,  and  effects 
constantly flow from them,  yet their  connexions and 
dependencies being not discoverable in our ideas,  we 
call  have  but  an  experimental  knowledge  of  them. 
From all which it is easy to perceive what a d  ar  k  ness 
we are involved in,  how  little it is of  being,  and thc 
things that are, that we  are capable to know.  Ant1 
therefore  we  shall do no  injury  to our  knowledgr, 
when we modestly think with  ourselves,  that we are 
so far from being  able to comprehend the whole na- 
ture of  the universe,  and  all the things contained in 
it, that we are not capable of  a  philosophical know- 
ledge of the bodies that are about us,  and make a part 
of  us : concerning  their  secondary qualities,  powers, 
and operations,  we  can have  no  universal  certainty. 
Several  effects  come  every day within the notice  of 
our senses, of  which we have  so  far sensitive know- 
ledge ;  but the causes, manner, and certaiiity of  their 
production, for the two foregoing reasons, we  must be 
content to be very ignorant of.  In these we can go no 
farther than particular experience informs us of  mat- 
ter of  fact,  and by analogy to guess what effects the 
like bodies  are,  upon  other trials,  like  to  produce. 
13ut as to a perfect science of  natural bodies  (not to 
mention spiritual beings) we are, I think, so far from 
being  capable  of  any such thing,  that I conclude  it 
lost labour to seek after it. 
9 YO.  Thirdly, where we have adequate  T,,irdlg, 
ideas,  and where  there is  a  certain and  want oc 
discoverable connexion between them, yet  tracing our 
we are often ignorant, for want of tracing 
those  ideas which  we  have,  or  lnay  have;  and  for 
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may show us what habitude of agreement or disagree- 
ment they have one with another.  And thus many are 
ignorant of  mathematical truths, not out of  any im- 
perfection  of  their  faculties,  or  uncertainty  in  the 
things themselves ; but for want of  application in ac- 
quiring, examining, and by due ways comparing those 
ideas.  That which  has  most  contributed  to hinder 
the due  tracing of  our ideas,  and  finding  out their 
relations,  and agreements or disaprcmmcnts ollc with 
another, has been, I suppose, the ill use of  words.  It 
is  impossible  that  men  should  ever  truly seek, or 
certainly discover  the agreement  or disagreement of 
ideas themselves,  whilst their thoughts flutter about, 
or stick only in sounds of doubtful and uncertain sig- 
nifications.  Mathematicians abstracting their thoughts 
from names, and accustoming themselves to set before 
their n~inds  the ideas themselves that they would con- 
sider,  and not soilnds instead of  them, have avoided 
thereby a great part of  that perplexity, podderirrg, 
and confusion, which has so much hindered men's pro- 
gress in  other parts of  knowledge.  For whilst they 
stick in words of undetermined and uncertain signifi- 
cation, they are unable to distinguish true from false, 
certain from probable, consistent from inconsistent, in 
their own opinions.  This having been the fate or mis- 
fortune of ;i  great part of men of letters, the increase 
brought  into the stock  of  real knowledge has been 
very little, in proportion to the schools, disputes, and 
writings, the  world has been filled with ;  whilst students, 
being  lost in  the great  wood  of  words,  knew  not 
whereabout they were, how far their discoveries were 
advanced,  or what was wanting in their  own or the 
general stock  of  knowledge.  Had men,  in  the dis- 
coveries of the material, done as they have in those of 
the iiltellectual world, involved all in the obscurity of 
uncertai~l and  doubtf~~l  ways  of  talking,  volu~nes 
writ of  navigation  and  voyages,  theories  and stories 
of zoncs and tides, iuultiplied an(1 disputed ;  nay, ships 
built, and fleets scnt out, would never have taught us 
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the way beyond  the line ; and the antipodes  would 
1)e still  as  much  unknown as when it was  declared 
l~ercsy  to hold  there were  any.  But having spoken 
sufficiently of  words,  and the ill or careless use that, 
is conlmonly made of them,  I shall not say any thing 
Inore of it here. 
5 3 1.  Hitherto we  have examined  the  Extent  in re- 
extent of our knowledge, in respect of the  spect to uni- 
several sorts of beings that are.  There is  versality. 
another extent of  it, in respect of  universality,  which 
will also deserve to be considered ;  and in this regard, 
our knowledge follows the nature of our ideas.  If the 
ideas are abstract, whose  agreement or disagreement 
we perceive, our knowledge is uni-~ersal. For what is 
known of  such general ideas,  will  be  true of  every 
particular thing, in whom  that essence,  i.  e. that abs- 
tract idea is to be found; and what is once known of 
such ideas will be  perpetually and for ever true.  So 
that as to all general knowledge, we must search and 
find it only in our minds, and it is only the examining 
of our own ideas that furllisheth us with that.  Truths 
belonging to essences  of things,  (that is,  to abstract 
ideas) are eternal, and are to be found out by the con- 
templation only of those essences :  as the existences of 
things are to be  known only from experience.  But 
having  more to say of  this in the chapters  where I 
shall speak of general and real knowledge,  this nlay 
here suffice as to the universality of  our knowledge 
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CHAPTER IV. 
Of  the  Reality  of  I'inowledge. 
Objection.  1. I DOUBT not but my reader by this 
Knowledge  time may be apt to think, that I have been 
nlaced in  all this while only building a castle in tlie 
ideas  air ;  and be ready to say to  me, '(  To  what 
be a'1 bare  purpose all this stir ?  Knowledge, say you,  vision. 
is only  the perception of  the agreement 
or disagreement of  our  own ideas:  but who  knows 
what those ideas inay be ?  Is there any thing so  ex- 
travagant as the imaginations of men's brains ?  Where 
is the head that has no chimeras in it?  Or if there be 
a sober and a wise man, what difference will there be, 
by your rules, between his knowledge and that of the 
most extravagant fancy in the world ? They both liave 
their  ideas,  and perceive  their  agreement  and  clis- 
agreement one with another.  If there be any differ- 
ence between  them,  the  advantage  will  be  on  the 
warm-headed man's  side,  as  having  the more ideas, 
and the more lively : and so, by your rules, he will be 
the more knowing.  If it be true, that all knowledge 
lies only  in  the perception of  the agreement or  dis- 
agreement of  our own ideas,  the visions of  an enthu- 
siast,  and  the  reasonings  of  a  sober  man,  will  be 
equally certain.  It  is no matter how things are ; so  n 
Illan observe but the agreement of  his  own imagina* 
tions,  and talk conformably,  it is  all truth,  all cer- 
tainty.  Such castles in the air will be as strong holds 
of  truth  as the demonstrations of  Euclid.  That -an 
harpy is not a centaur is by this way  as certain know- 
ledge, and as much a truth,  as that a square is not a 
circle. 
'' But of  what use  is  all  this  fine  knowledge  of 
men's  own imaginations to a man that inquires after 
the reality of things ?  It  matters not what men's fancies 
are ;  it is the knowledgc of  things that is only to be 
prized:  it is  this alone gives a value  to our reason- 
ings,  and  preference  to  onc man's  knowledge  over 
another's ;  that it is of  things as they really are, and 
not of dreams and fancies." 
8 1.  To which  I  answer,  that if our  Not  knowledge of our ideas terminate in them,  ,,,  ,he,, 
and reach no farther, where there is some-  ideas agree 
thing farther intended,  our most  serious  with things* 
thoughts will be of  little more use than the  reveries 
of a crazy brain;  and the truths built thereon of no 
more weight than the discourses  of  a man, who sees 
things clearly in a dream,  and with  great assurance 
utters them.  But I hope, before I have done, to make 
it evident,  that this way of  certainty,  by  tlie  know- 
ledge of our own ideas, goes a little farther than bare 
imagination : and  I  belleve  it will  appear, that all 
the certainty of  general truths a man has lies in no- 
thing else. 
5 3.  It is  evident  the mind  knows not  things im- 
mediately,  but only by  the intervention of  the icleas 
it has of them.  Our knowledge therefore is real, only 
so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and 
the reality of things.  But what shall be here the cri- 
terion? How shall the mind,  when  it perceives  no- 
thing but its own  ideas,  know that they  agree with 
things theniselves ?  This, though it seems not to want 
difficulty,  yet,  I think,  there be  two  sorts of ideas, 
that, we may be assured, agree with things. 
$ 4.  First,  the  first  are simple  ideas,  As,  I.  AII 
which since the mind, as has been showed,  simple ideas 
can by  no means make to itself,  must ne-  do. 
cessarily be tlie  product  of  things operating on  the 
mind in a natural way,  and  producing therein  those 
perceptions  which  by  the  wisclom  and  will  of  our 
Maker  they  are  ordained  arid  adapted  to.  From 
lvhence it follows, that simple ideas are not fictions of 
our fancies,  but the natural and regular productions 
of things rvithout us, really operating upon us, and so 
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carry with them all the conformity which is intended, 
or which our state requires : for they represent to us 
things under those appearances which they are fitted 
to protluce in us, whereby me are enabled to  distinguish 
the sorts of particular substances, to discern the states 
they are in, and  so  to take them  for our necessities, 
and  to apply them  to  our  uses.  Thus the  idea of 
whiteness,  or bitterness,  as it is in the mind, exactly 
answering  that power  which  is  in any body to pro- 
duce it there,  has all the real conformity it can,  or 
ought to have, with things without us.  And this con- 
formity between  our simple ideas,  and  the existence 
of things, is sufficient for real knowledge. 
5 5. Secondly,  all  our  complex ideas, 
2-  *11  except  those  of  substances, being arche- 
plex ideas, 
types of  the mind's  own making,  not in- 
substances,  tended to be the copies of  any thing,  nor 
referred to the existence of  any thing, as 
to their  originals ; cannot want  any conformity ne- 
cessary to real Irnowledge.  For that which is not de- 
signed to represent any thing but itself, can never be 
capable  of  a  wrong  representation,  nor  mislead  us 
from the true apprehension of  any thing,  by its dis- 
likeness to it ;  and such, excepting those of substances, 
arc all our complex ideas:  which,  as I have showed 
in another place,  are combinations of ideas, which the 
mind,  by its free choice, puts together, without con- 
sidering any  connexion  they have  in  nature.  And 
hence it is, that in all these sorts the ideas themselves 
are considered as the archetypes, and things no other- 
wise regarded, but as they are conformable to them. 
So that we  cannot  but be  infallibly certain,  that a11 
the knowledge we attain concerning these ideas is re-al, 
and reaches  things  themselves;  because  in  all  our 
thoughts, reasonings,  and discourses of  this kind,  we 
intend things no farther than as they are conformable 
to our ideas.  So that in  these  we  cannot miss  of  a 
certain and undoubted reality. 
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§ 6.  I doubt  not but  it will  be easily  Hence tile 
granted,  that the knowledge we have of  realityofil~a- 
mathematical  truths is  not  only certain,  thenlatical 
but  real knowledge;  and  not  the  bare 
knowledge. 
empty vision of vain insignificant chimeras of the brain : 
and yet,if we will consider, we shall find that it  is only of 
our own ideas.  The  mathematician considers the truth 
and properties belonging to a rectangle, or circle, only 
as they are in idea in his own mind.  For it is possible 
he never found either of them existing mathematically, 
i  e. precisely true, in his life.  Rut get the knowledge 
he has of any truths or properties belonging to a circle, 
or  any  other  mathematical  figure,  are  nevertheless 
true and certain, even of real things existing; because 
real  things are  no  farther  concerned,  nor  intended 
to be meant by any such propositions, than as things 
really agree to those  archetypes in his  mind.  Is it 
true of the idea of a triangle, that its three angles are 
equal to two right ones ?  It is true also of  a triangle, 
wherever  it  really  exists.  Whatever  other  figure 
exists, that is not exactly answerable to the idea of  a 
triangle in his  mind,  is  not  at all concerned in that 
proposition : and therefore he is certain all his knorv- 
ledge concerning such ideas  is real knowledge;  be- 
cause intending things no farther than they agree with 
those his ideas,  he is sure what he knows concerning 
those figures, when they have barely an ideal existence 
in his mind, will hold true of them also, when they have 
real existence in matter; his consideration being barely 
of those figures, which are the same, wherever or how- 
ever they exist. 
9 7.  And  hence it follows,  that moral  -kl,d ,,fm,- 
knowledge is as capable of  real certainty  ral. 
as mathematics.  For certainty being but 
the perception of the agreement  or  disagreement  of 
our  ideas ; and  demonstration  nothing  but the per- 
ception  of  such  agreement,  by  the  intervention  of 
other ideas, or mediums ; our  moral ideas, as well as 
mathematical,  being  archetypes themselves,  and so 
cc2 adequate and complete ideas ;  all the agreement or dis- 
agreement, wliicI1 we shall Gnd in them, will produce 
real knowledge, as well as in mathematical figures.  - 
Existence  $  S.  For  the  attaining  of  knowledge 
not required 
to make it  and certainty, it is requisite that we have 
real.  (letermined ideas ;  and, to  make our know- 
ledge real, it is  requisite that the ideas answer their 
archetypes.  Nor let it be wondered,  that I place the 
certaiilty  of  onr knowledge  in  the consideration  of 
our ideas, with  so  little care and regard (as it may 
seem) to the real existence  of  things:  since  most of 
those discourses, which take up the thoughts, and en- 
gage the disputes of  those who  pretend  to make it 
their business  to inquire  after truth and certainty, 
will, I presume, upon examination be found to be ge- 
neral  propositions,  and notions in which existence is 
not  at all concerned.  All the discourses of the ma- 
thematicians  about  the  squaring of  a  circle,  conic 
sections,  or  any other  part of  mathematics, concern 
not the existence  of  any of  those  figures; but their 
demonstrations, which depend on their ideas, are the 
same, whether there be  any square or circle existing 
in the world, or no.  In the same manner, the truth 
and certainty of  moral  discourses  abstracts from the 
lives of men, ancl the existence of those virtues in the 
world whereof  they treat.  Nor  are  Tully's  Offices 
less  true,  because  there is nobody in the world  that 
exactly practises  his  rules,  and lives  up to that pat- 
tern  of a virtuous man which  he has  given  us,  ant1 
which  existed  nowhere,  when  he writ,  but in  idea. 
If it be true in  speculation, i. e. in idea, that murder 
deserves  death, it will  also  be true in  reality of  any 
action that exists conformable to that idea of innrdrr. 
As  for  other  actions,  the truth of  that propositioli 
concerns them not.  And thus it  is of a11 other species 
of  things,  which  have  ho other  essences  but thosc 
ideas which are in the minds of men. 
Nor will  it  $ 9.  But it will  here be said,  that if 
be less true  moral knowledge be placed in the contem- 
plation of our own moral ideas, and tllose, 
or certnitl,  as other  modes, be  of  our own  n~aking, 1  ,,,;,,,,,,no- 
what  strange  notions  will  there  be  of  raI  idcns are 
justice ant1 temperance ! What confusioll  of our own 
niahing atid  of  virtues  and vices,  if  every  one may  nnleillg. 
make what ideas of them he pleases!  No 
confusion  or disorder  in the  things tllemselves,  nor 
the reasonings about them ;  no more than (in mathe- 
matics) there would  be a disturbance  in the demon- 
stration, or a change in the properties of figures, and 
their  relations  one to another, if a man  shoulcl make 
a triangle with four corners, or a trapezium with four 
right  angles;  that is,  in  plain  English,  change the 
names  of  the  figures,  and  call  that by  one  name 
which  mathematicians  call  ordinarily  by  another. 
For let a man  make  to himself  the iclca of a figure 
with three angles, whereof one is a right one, and call 
it,  if  he  please,  equilaterum  or  trapezium,  or  any 
thin5 else, the properties of and demonstratiolls about 
that idea will be the same, as if he called it a rectan- 
gular triangle.  I confess the ellange of the name, by 
the impropriety of  speech, will  at first  disturb him, 
who  knows not what idea it stands for; but  as soon 
as the figure is drawn, the consequences  and demon- 
stration  are plain  and clear.  Just the same  is it ill 
moral knowleclge,  let a man have the idea  of  taking 
from others, without their consent, what their honeat 
industry has  possessed  them of, and call this justice, 
if he please.  He that takes  the name here without 
the idea put to it, will be mistaken, by joining another 
idea of his own  to that name : but strip  the idea of 
that name,  or take it such  as  it is in  the speaker's 
mind, and the same  things will  agree to it as if  you 
called  it injustice.  Indeed,  wrong  names  in  moral 
discourses breed  usually more disorder, because they 
are not so easily rectified  as in mathematics,  v;hcre 
the figure,  once  drawn  and  seen,  makes  the  name 
useless  and of  no  force.  For  what  need  of  a sign, 
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in  moral  names  that cannot be so easily and shortly 
done, because  of  the  many  decompositions  that go 
to the making up the complex ideas  of  those  modes. 
But yet for all this, miscalling of  any of  those ideas, 
contrary  to the usual  signification  of  the words  of 
that language, hinders not but that we may have cer- 
tain  and  demonstrative  knowledge  of  their  several 
agreements and  disagreements,  if we will  carefully, 
as in mathematics,  keep to the same precise  ideas, 
and  trace  them  in  their  several  relations  one to 
another, without  being  led away by their names.  If 
we  but separate the idea  under  consideration  from 
the sign that stands for it, our knowledge goes equally 
on in the discovery of  real truth and certainty, what- 
ever sounds we make use of. 
Misnamingt  9 lo. One thing more we  are to take 
disturbs no  notice  of, that where  God,  or  any other 
the certain-  la\v-maker, hath defined any moral names, 
the  there they have  made the essence of that 
knowledge.  species to which that name belongs ; and 
there it is not  safe to apply or  use  them  otherwise ; 
but in other cases it is bare  impropriety of speech to 
apply  them  contrary to the common  usage  of  the 
country.  But yet even this too disturbs not the cer- 
tainty of  that knowledge, which is still to be had by 
a  due  contemplation  and  comparing  of  those  even 
nick-named  ideas. 
Ideas of sub-  § 11. Thirdly, there is another  sort of 
stances have  complex  ideas, which,  being  referred  to 
their arche-  archetypes  without  us,  may  differ from 
'ypeS with-  them, and so our knowledge  about them  out us.  may come short of being real.  Such are 
our ideas  of  sGbstances, which congsting of  a collec- 
tion of simple ideas,  supposed  taken from the works 
of  nature, may yet vary from them, by having  more 
or different ideas united in them, than are to be found 
united  in  the things  themselves.  From  whence  it 
comes  to pass,  that they  may,  and  often  do  fail of 
being exactly conformclbie to things themselves. 
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fj 18. I say then, that to have  idcns of 
su6stances, Ghich, -by being  conformable  So far 
they ngrce  to things, may afford us real knowlcdge,  ,it,,  ,,  ,,,,,  -  - 
it is not enou.gl1,  as  in modes, to put to-  so fir  our 
gether such idks  as have no incons&t,encc,  kllowledgc 
Bough  they did  never  before  so exist:  ~~~~~~~~~,. 
v.g. the ideas of sacrilege or peyiury, &c. 
were  as  real  and true-ideas^be"fore as  l~fter  the ex- 
istence of any such fact.  But our ideas of substances 
being  supposed  copies,  and  referred  to  archetypes 
without  us,  must still be takcn from somethinq. that 
does  or  has  existed ; they must  not  consist of ideas 
put together at the pleasure of  our thoughts, without 
any real  pattern  they were  taken  from,  though  wc 
can perceive no  inconsistence in  such a combin  a  t'  1011. 
The reason whereof is, because we knowing not what 
real  constitution  it  is  of  substances,  whereon  our 
siinple ideas depend, and which really is the cause of 
the strict union  of  soine  of  then1 one with another, 
and  the exclusion  of  others;  there are very  few  of 
thein that we can be sure are, or are not, inconsistent 
in nature,  any farther  than  experience  and  sensible 
observation  reach.  Herein therefore  is founded the 
reality of our knowledge concerning substances, that 
all our complex ideas of them must be such, and such 
only,  as  are made  up of  such  siinple  ones  as have 
been discovered to co-exist in nature.  And our ideas 
being  thus  true,  though  not,  perhaps,  very  exact 
copies, are yet the subjects of real (as far as we have 
any)  knowledge of  them.  Which  (as has  been  al- 
ready shown) will not be found to reach very far :  but 
so  far as it  does,  ii; will  still  be  real  knowledge. 
Whatever ideas we have, the agreement we find they 
have with  others  will  still  be  knowledge.  If  those 
ideas be abstract, it will be general knowledge.  But, 
to make it real concerning substances, the ideas must 
be taken from the real existence  of  things.  What- 
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substance, these we may with confidence join together 
again, and so make abstract ideas of substances.  For 
whatever have once  had  an union, in nature, may be 
united again. 
Inourinqui-  § 13.  This,  if we rightly consider, and 
ries about  confine  not  our thourhts  and  abstract 
substances,  ideas to names,  as if there were or could 
we must 
consider  be  no  other  sorts  of  things than what 
ideas, and  known  names  had  already  determined, 
not confine  -.  and as it were  set out ;  we*  should  think 
ourthoughts  of  things with  greater freedom  and less  to names,  or 
species  sup-  confusion than perhaps we do.  It  would 
~osedset  out  DOSS~~~V  be thought a bold ~aradox.  if not  ,  --  LY  mmes.  la  veryddangero:s  falsehooh,  if  I  should 
say,  that  some  Ehangdings,  who  have  lived  forty 
years together without any appearance of reason, are 
something between  a man  and a beast:  which  pre- 
judice is founded  upon nothing  else but a false sup- 
position, that these two names, man and beast, stand 
for  distinct  species  so set out by real essences, that 
there  can  come  no  other  species  between  them: 
whereas if we will abstract from those names, and the 
suppos;tion of such  specific essences made by nature, 
wherein all things of the same denominations did ex- 
actly and equally partake,-if  we would not fancy that 
there were a certain number of these essences, where- 
in all things, as in moulds, were cast and formed,-we 
should find that the idea  of  the shape,  motion,  and 
life  oi a  man without  reason,  is  as much a distinct 
idea, and makes as much a distinct sort of things from 
man and beast, as the idea  of  the shape  of  an ass 
with  reason would  be different from  either  that of 
man or beast, and be a species of  an animal bctween 
or distinct from both. 
Objection  $ 14. Here every body will be ready to 
against a  ask,  If  changelings  may  be  supposcd 
changeiil~g  something between  man  arid beast, pray 
being some-  what  are they ?  I answer,  chaiigelings, 
which is as good a word to sicnify somc-  tl,;,g  be- 
thing  different  from the  sigmfication  of  twcen a mall 
man or beast, as the names m;ln and beast  beast, 
are  to  have  significations  different  one  a"sw"'"d. 
from the other.  This, well considered, would resolve 
tliis matter, and show my meaning without any more 
ado.  But I am not so unacquainted with the zeal of 
some  men, which enables them to spin consequences, 
and to see religion threatened whenever any one ven- 
tures to quit their forms of  speaking,  as not to fore- 
see what names such a proposition as this is like to be 
charged with:  and without doubt it will be asked, If 
changelings  are something between  man  and beast, 
what will become of  them  in the other world ?  To 
which I answer, 1. It concerns me not to know or in- 
quire.  To  their  own  Master they stand or fall.  It 
will make their state neither  better  nor worse, whe- 
ther we determine any thing of  it or no.  They are 
in the hands  of  a  faithful  Creator  and a bountiful 
Father, who disposes not of his creatures according to 
our  narrow  thoughts  or  opinions,  nor  distinguishes 
them  according  to names  and species  of  our  con- 
trivance.  And we, that know so little of this present 
world we are in, may, I think, content ourselves with- 
out being  peremptory in defining the different states 
which  creatures  shall  come  into  when  they  go off 
this  stage.  It may  suffice  us,  that he hath  made 
known to all those, who  are capable of  instruction, 
discoursing, and reasoning, that they shall come to an 
account,  and  receive  according to what they  have 
done in this body. 
§ 15.  But,  secondly,  I answer,  the force  of  these 
men's  question (viz. will you deprive changelings of a 
future state?) is founded  on one  of  these two sup- 
positions, which are both false.  The first is, that all 
things that have the outward  shape  and  appearance 
of a man must necessarily be designed to an imnlortal 
future being after this  life : or,  secondly, that what- 
ever is of human birth must be so.  Take away these Reality of Knowledge.  Book 4. 
imagications,  and such  questions will be  groundless 
and ridiculous.  I desire then those who think  there 
is no more but an accidental difference between them- 
selves and changelings, the essence in both  being ex- 
actly the same, to consider whether they can imagine 
immortality  annexed  to  any  outward  shape of  the 
body ?  The very proposing it  is, I suppose, enough to 
make them disown it.  No one yet, that ever I heard 
of, how much soever immersed in matter, allowed that 
excellency to any figure of the gross sensible outward 
parts, as to affirm eternal life due to it, or a necessary 
consequence of it ;  or that any mass of matter should, 
after its dissolution here, be again restored  hereafter 
to  an  everlasting  state  of  sense,  perception,  and 
knowledge, only because it was  moulded  into this or 
that figure, and had such a particular frame of its vi- 
sible parts.  Such an opinion as this, placing immor- 
tality  in a  certain  superficial  figure,  turns  out of 
doors all consideration  of  soul  or  spirit, upon whose 
account alone  some  corporeal  beings  have  hitherto 
been concluded immortal, and others not.  This is to 
attribute more to the outside  than  inside  of  things ; 
and to place the excellency of a man niore in the ex- 
ternal shape of his body, than internal perfections of 
his soul: which is but little better than to annex the 
great and inestimable  advantage of immortality and 
life  everlasting,  which  he has  above  other material 
beings,-to  annex it, I say, to  the cut of his beard, or 
the fashion  of  his  coat.  For  this  or  that outward 
mark of our bodies  no  more carries with it the hope 
of  an eternal duration,  than  the fashion  of  a man's 
suit gives  him  reasonable  grounds to imagine it will 
never wear out, or  that it will  make  him  immortal. 
It will  perhaps  be said, tha,t nobody thinks that the 
shape makes any thing immortal,  but it is the shape 
is the sign of a rational soul within, which is immortal. 
I wonder who made it the sign of any such thing :  for 
barely  saying it will  not  make  it so.  It  would  re- 
quire  some  proofs  to persuade one of it.  No figure 
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that I know speaks any such language.  For  it may 
as rationally  be  concluded,  that the dead body of a 
man, wherein there is to be found no more appearance 
or  action  of  life  than  there is  in  a  statue,  has  yet 
nevertheless a living  soul  in it because  of  its  shape, 
as  that there is a rational  soul  in a changeling,  be- 
cause he has the outside of a rational creature ;  when 
his actions carry far  less  marks of  reason with them, 
in the whole  course  of  his  life,  than what  are to be 
found in many a beast. 
$ 16. But it is the issue of  rational pa-  Monsters. 
rents, and must therefore be concluded to 
have a rational  soul.  I know not by what logic you 
must so conclude.  I am sure this is a conclusion that 
men  nowhere allow of.  For if  they did, they would 
not make bold, as every where they do, to destroy ill- 
formed  and mis-shaped  productions.  Ay,  but these 
are monsters.  Let them be so; what will  your  dri- 
veling, unintelligent, intractable changeling be ? Shall 
a defect in the body make a monster ;  a defect in the 
mind (the far more noble, and, in the common phrase, 
the far more essential part) not? Shall the want of a 
nose, or a neck, make a monster,  and  put such issue 
out of the rank  of  nlen ;  the want of reason and uric 
derstanding, not?  This is to bring all back again to 
what was  exploded  just  now : this  is  to place all in 
the shape, and to take the measure of a man only by 
his outside.  To show that, according to the ordinary 
way of  reasoning  in this  matter,  people  do lay the 
whole stress on the figure,  and  resolve the whole es- 
sence of the species of man (as they make itj  into the 
outward shape,  how unreasonable  soever  it be,  and 
how much  soever  they disown it; we  need but trace 
their thoughts and practice a little farther, and then 
it will  plainly appear.  The well-shaped  changeling 
is a man, has a rational  soul,  though it appear not; 
this  is  past doubt,  say you.  Make the ears a little 
longer, and more pointed, and the nose a little flatter tlinii ordinary, ant1 then  you  bcgi11 to boggle :  niake 
tl~c  face  yet  iiarrowcr, flnttci., ant1  longer, ant1 tlieil 
you itre  at a stand : adtl  still  more  ant1  inore of tlie 
likelic~ss  of  11 brute to it, and lct the liead be perfectly 
that of'sonie other animal, then presciitly it is a ltion- 
stcr ;  and it is dcnlonstration with you tliat it hat11 110 
rational soul,  and must  be  destroyed.  Where  now 
(I ask) shall be the just measure of the utmost bounds 
of  that shape,  that carries  with  it a rational  soul? 
For  since  there have  been human fcctuses produced, 
half beast, and half man ;  and others three parts one, 
and one part the other; and so it is possible they may 
be in all the variety of  approaches to the one or the 
other shape, and may have several degrees of mixture 
of  the likeness of a man  or a brute ; I would gladly 
know what  are those  precise  lineaments, which,  ac- 
cording to this  hypothesis, are, or are not capable of' 
a rational  soul to be joined  to them.  What sort of 
outside is the certain sign that there is,  or is not sucli 
an inhabitant within?  For till that be done, we talk 
at  random of man :  and shall always, I fear, do so,  as 
long as we  give  ourselves  up to certain  sounds, ant1 
the imaginations of settled and fixed species in nature, 
we know not what.  But after all, I desire it may bc 
considered, that those who think  they have answered 
the difficulty by telling us, that a mis-shaped  fetus is 
a monster, run into the same fault they are  arguing 
against,  by constituting  a species  between  man  ancl 
beast.  For what else, I pray, is their monster in the 
case (if the word  moilster  signifies  any thing at all) 
but something neither  man nor bcast, but partaking 
somewhat  of  either?  Acd just so is the changeling 
before-mentioned.  So  nicessary  is  it  to  quit  the 
common  notion  of  species  and  essences,  if  we  will 
truly  look  into tlie  liati~re  of  things,  and  examine 
them, by what our f~tculties  can  discover  in  them as 
they esist,  and not by grouiidless fancies, that have 
bceu takcri up about tliein. 
Ch. 4.  Reality of  Knorvledge.  397 
$ 17. I have  mentioned  this  here, be-  Words 
cause I think we cannot  be  too  cautious  sp,c.i,s. 
that words  and species,  in the ordinary 
notions which we  have  been  used to of them, impose 
not on us.  For I am apt to think,  therein  lies  one 
great obstacle to our clear  and distinct knowledge, 
especially in reference to substances ;  and from thence 
has rose a grent part of  the difficulties about truth 
and certainty.  Would we  accustom ourselves to se- 
parate our contemplations and reasonings from words, 
we  might,  in  a  great  measure,  remedy  this incon- 
venience within our own thoughts; but yet it would 
still disturb us in our discourse with others, as long as 
we  retained  the opinion,  that  species  and their  es- 
sences  were  any thing else  but our  abstract  ideas 
(such as they are) with names  annexed  to them,  to 
be the signs of them. 
$ 18. Wherever we perceive the agree- 
Recapitula-  ment or disagreement of any of our ideas,  tion. 
there is  certain  knowledge : and where- 
ever we are sure those ideas agree with the reality of 
things,  there is  certain  real knowledg~. Of which 
agreement of  our ideas,  with  the reality  of  things, 
having here given  the marks,  I think I have  show11 
wherein it is,  that certainty, real  certainty, consists: 
which, whatever it  was to others, was, I confess, to  me 
heretofore,  one  of  those  desiderata which  I  found 
great want of. 
END OF  VOII.  11. 